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Introduction	
	
	
	 This	project	begins	 from	a	simple	problem.	We	don’t	have	precise	explanations	
for	 how	 anti-realist	 fiction	 can	 make	 constructive	 arguments	 that	 validly	 influence	
readers’	beliefs	about	the	real	world.	 	The	standard	account	of	fiction’s	mind-changing	
work	 relies	 on	 the	 trope	 of	 immersion:	 when	 we	 read,	 our	 minds	 go	 “into”	 another	
world,	 we	 observe	 its	 objects	 and	 events,	 vicariously	 experience	 it,	 interact	 with	 its	
characters	 as	 if	 they	 were	 other	 humans,	 and	 eventually	 our	 minds	 come	 back	 out,	
allowing	 us	 to	 adjudicate	 the	 relationship	 between	 that	 world	 and	 our	 own.	 What,	
though,	of	fictions	that	refuse	to	let	us	get	immersed,	that	remind	us	constantly	of	their	
fictionality,	 textuality,	 conventionality?	 The	 standard	 argument	 in	 this	 case,	 closely	
associated	with	the	term	“postmodernism”	for	reasons	I’ll	examine	later,	tends	to	be	that	
such	fiction,	by	interrupting	the	assumptions	that	guarantee	the	immersive	experience	
in	conventional	 fiction,	 achieves	a	negative	argument,	 invalidating	 those	assumptions,	
and	hence	challenging	the	ideology	associated	with	them.	If	the	conventional	immersive	
novel	has,	since	Ian	Watt’s	The	Rise	of	the	Novel,	been	associated	with	the	development	
of	bourgeois	individualism,	the	presumption	that	we	can	take	an	objective	stance	on	the	
structures	 and	movements	of	 cultures,	 societies,	 and	 ideologies,	 the	presumption	 that	
human	mental	experience	is	linear	and	discursive,	and	so	on,	then	anti-mimetic	fiction	
can	argue	that	none	of	this	is	true,	and	can	point	to	at	least	some	of	the	sources	of	the	
false	 consciousness.	 Yet	 this	 leaves	 anti-mimetic	 fiction’s	 philosophical	 capacities	 and	
commitments	 entirely	 supervenient	 on	 those	 of	 the	 realism	 it	 rejects.	 All	 non-realist	
experiments	 then	 bear	 a	 single	 rhetoric.	 Both	 its	 advocates	 and	 its	 detractors	 have	
seemed	 content	 to	 agree	 on	 this,	 even	 as	 throughout	 a	 half-century’s	 concerted	
investigation	of	the	genre	they	have	disagreed	on	so	much	else.	
	 The	current	project	demonstrates	 the	 limits	of	 this	consensus,	and	 takes	
steps	 toward	 an	understanding	 of	 prose	 fiction	 that	 allows	 for	 individual	 antimimetic	
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forms	(those	that	render	the	fiction	explicit	about	being	only	words	on	a	page	and	won’t	
let	 the	 reader	 get	 immersed	 in	 ‘another	 world’)	 to	 entail	 equally	 individuated	
constructive	arguments	 in	 response	 to	 identifiable	historical	 contexts.	 I	make	my	case	
for	 anti-mimetic	 fiction’s	 constructive	 communicative	 capacities	 by	 examining	 first-
generation	US	 postmodernism,	 and	 in	 particular	 how	 authors	 of	 this	 generation	 used	
distinct	 stylistic	 forms	 to	 make	 different	 arguments	 about	 the	 viability	 of	 practical,	
deliberative	individual	agency.		
Since	 such	 agency	was	 the	 great	 philosophical	 enemy	 of	 poststructuralism,	my	
demonstration	that	US	postmodern	fiction	was	widely	committed	to	arguing	for	viable	
deliberative	 agency	 will,	 I	 hope,	 undermine	 the	 equation	 between	 that	 fiction	 and	
postmodern	philosophy:	an	equation	that	institutionally	underpinned	the	development	
and	promulgation	of	 the	 idea	 that	 formal	 antimimesis	 entails	 deconstructive	 rhetoric.	
The	historical	accident	of	the	equation	between	“postmodern”	experimental	fiction	and	
“postmodern”	philosophy	has	led	to	the	rhetorical	reductionism	that	can’t	make	sense	of	
the	 distinctiveness	 of	 novels	 like	 Joseph	McElroy’s	 PLUS	 (1977),	 and	 it’s	 that	 kind	 of	
distinctiveness	that	the	method	I	develop	in	this	project	aims	to	do	justice	to.	
**		
PLUS	 embodies	 the	 kind	 of	 postmodern	 antimimetic	 fiction	 that	 is	 almost	
impossible	 to	 reconcile	 with	 that	 conflation.	 Its	 self-conscious	 disassembling	 and	
reconstitution	of	traditional	prose	modes	for	representing	conscious	thought	allow	it	to	
first	conjure	a	situation	of	seeming	agentive	paralysis,	but	then	to	develop	and	represent	
a	viable	alternative	to	it,	all	through	modulations	of	style.	
PLUS	 concerns	 a	 disembodied	 brain	 orbiting	 the	 earth.	 Imp	 Plus,	 the	 brain	 in	
question,	was	 salvaged	 from	a	 terminally	 ill	 scientist	 and	 sent	 into	orbit	on	a	 satellite	
processing	 solar	 energy:	 Imp	 Plus’	 job	 is	 to	 transmit	 numerical	 data	 about	 that	
processing	back	 to	earth.	Through	prose	 structures	 that	evolve	with	each	chapter,	 the	
novel	traces	how	the	brain,	through	its	mastery	of	communication	devices	and	its	own	
linguistic	capacity	for	reflexive	self-consideration,	develops	a	version	of	agency	that	lets	
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its	 consciousness	 exceed	 its	 physical	 limitations,	 and	 finally	 break	 its	 own	 orbit.	
McElroy,	who’s	still	publishing,	published	his	first	novel	in	1963,	making	him	a	peer	of	
better	 known	 “postmodern”	 authors	 like	 William	 Gaddis,	 Thomas	 Pynchon,	 or	 Don	
Delillo.	 PLUS’	 precise	 sentence-level	 refigurations	 of	 the	 conventions	 of	 prose	
psychology	and	its	concern	with	the	process	of	attaining	practical	agency	in	the	face	of	
material	and	philosophical	obstacles	make	it,	I’ll	argue,	something	like	a	culmination	of	
the	 first	 generation	 of	 postmodern	writing,	 and	 an	 epitome	 of	 self-conscious	 fiction’s	
ability	 to	make	 constructive	 philosophical	 arguments	 through	 style.	 	 But	 precisely	 for	
this	reason,	it’s	almost	impossible	to	make	sense	of	within	existing	critical	vocabularies	
for	either	US	postmodernism	or	anti-mimetic	fiction	per	se.	Literary	theory	about	either	
almost	 unilaterally	 concludes	 or	 presumes	 that	 such	 fiction’s	 commitments	 must	 be	
deconstructive	and	anti-agential.	Novels	like	PLUS	ought	to	force	a	reconsideration.	
PLUS,	 like	 the	 other	 novels	 I’ll	 examine,	makes	 arguments	 through	 style.	 The	
argumentation	 I’ll	 discuss	 in	more	 depth	 later,	 but	 it’s	 important	 to	 clarify	 that	 I	 use	
“style”	 in	 the	 sense	 presumed	 by	 the	 field	 of	 literary	 stylistics:	 as	 the	 identifiable	 and	
consistent	grammatical	 features	of	sentences	that	characterise	a	 larger	text.	 I	don’t,	by	
contrast,	mean	some	more	general	signature	imprint	that	identifies	multiple	works	with	
their	 author.	 Similarly	 I	 prefer	 “style”	 to	 “form,”	 which	 in	 the	 study	 of	 postmodern	
fiction	as	elsewhere	is	too	often	used	as	an	overall	characterization	of	a	fiction’s	design	
or	 even	 ,	 rather	 than	 identifying	 specifically	 linguistic	 phenomena.	PLUS,	we’ll	 see,	 is	
stylistically	 notable	 precisely	 because	 at	 each	 stage	 of	 the	 brain’s	 evolving	 capacities,	
McElroy	 writes	 within	 newly	 evolving	 grammatical	 and	 syntactical	 constraints:	 it’s	 a	
novel	of	multiple	 related	 styles.	 Some	of	 the	other	 fictions	 I’ll	 examine	 stick	with	one	
such	style	throughout	their	span,	others	organize	passages	written	in	a	number	of	styles.	
What	matters	in	each	case	is,	first,	that	at	least	one	style	within	each	novel	is	distinctive	
to	 that	 novel—among	 the	 things	 that	 make	 these	 texts	 antimimetic	 is	 that	 their	
reformulation	 of	 prose	 conventions	 generates	 sentence-rulebooks	 that	 are	 often	 (like	
many	of	those	through	which	PLUS	evolves)	unique	in	literature,	and	hence	have	to	be	
encountered	qua	styles	rather	than	granting	us	transparent	access	to	the	novels’	posited	
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worlds—and	second,	that	it	is	thematically	salient:	syntactical	structures	in	such	fiction	
are	content	as	much	as	vehicle.	In	particular,	given	these	fictions’	shared	interest	in	the	
possibility	 of	 deliberative	 agency,	 sentence-structures	 for	 representing	 mental	
phenomena	often	embody	differing	attitudes	about	consciousness,	and	in	these	novels,	
which	so	often	set	differing	styles	against	each	other	within	the	 framework	of	a	single	
text,	the	styles	interact	as	competing	worldviews,	literal	arguments.		
Authors	 of	 this	 generation	 were	 quite	 explicit	 about	 how	 this	 textualist	
orientation	meant	their	fiction	should	be	read.	John	Barth’s	much-misunderstood	anti-
mimetic	 manifesto	 of	 1966,	 “The	 Literature	 of	 Exhaustion,”	 resolves	 two	 plausibly	
conflicting	insights.	First,	it’s	possible	for	a	literary	genre	to	stagnate	and	lose	touch	with	
advancing	 understandings	 of	 human	 minds	 and	 cultures:	 “A	 good	 many	 current	
novelists	 write	 turn-of-the-century-type	 novels,	 only	 in	 more	 or	 less	 mid-twentieth-
century	 language	 and	 about	 contemporary	 people	 and	 topics;	 this	 makes	 them	 less	
interesting	(to	me)	than	excellent	writers	who	are	also	technically	contemporary”	(66).	
But	 technical	 contemporaneity	 is	 difficult	 because	 there’s	 a	 finite	 supply	 of	 genuinely	
new	forms,	which,	as	Barth	for	one	believed	were	all	but	exhausted.	Nevertheless,	says	
Barth,	 novelistic	 forms	 can	 remain	 practically	 and	 philosophically	 relevant	 to	 the	
advancing	world,	by	being	 self-reflexive	about	 repurposing	old	 forms	 in	new	contexts.	
They	must	give	up	the	project	of	inventing	new	mimetic	forms:	the	successive	invention	
of	 forms	 like	 free	 indirect	 discourse	 or	 the	 stream	 of	 consciousness	 toward	 the	
impression	of	 ever	 less	mediated	 readerly	 immersion	 in	 the	minds	of	 fictional	people.	
Leaving	that	project	behind,	we	could	cultivate	a	model	of	literary	reading	based	less	on	
illusory	 immersion	 than	 a	 genre-literate	 awareness	 of	 the	 fiction’s	 fictionality,	 prose-
form’s	 conventionality:	 “it	 might	 be	 conceivable	 to	 rediscover	 validly	 the	 artifices	 of	
language	 and	 literature…	 if	 one	 goes	 about	 it	 the	 right	 way,	 aware	 of	 what	 one’s	
predecessors	have	been	up	to”(68).	 	Such	an	approach	would	be	“valid”	in	the	sense	of	
no	 longer	relying	on	the	temporary	commitment	to	the	existence	and	reality	of	 fictive	
entities	 that	 immersive	 reading	 requires:	 a	 commitment	 invalid	 due	 to	 its	 resting	 on	
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unreal	grounds,	which	had	hence	haunted	literary	theoreticians	since	Aristotle	with	the	
spectre	of	deception	and	false	consciousness.	
PLUS’	 chapter-by-chapter	evolutions	 in	 sentence-level	 form,	 then,	don’t	give	us	
access	 to	an	 inhabitable	human	mind,	but	 reorganize	 the	grammatical	 components	of	
the	 traditional	 literary	 presentation	 of	 minds	 in	 order	 to	 make	 an	 argument—
“technically	 contemporary”	 in	 both	 the	 Barth-ian	 formal	 and	 the	 science-of-
consciousness	 senses—about	 the	 role	 discursive	 mental	 phenomena	 can	 play	 in	 the	
development	 of	 practical	 agency	 even	 as	 growing	 focus	 on	 mental	 processes’	
dependence	on	embodied	feeling	had	challenged	the	precedence	and	practical	relevance	
of	discursive	thought.	
Imp	Plus’	prose-form	evolution	begins	with	a	language	composed	almost	entirely	
of	simple	single-clause	sentences.		
The	 impulses	 drew	 Imp	 Plus	 with	 their	 messages.	 And	 Imp	 Plus	 drew	 them.	
Through	the	brightness	the	messages	inclined	along	a	gradient.	Imp	Plus	inclined	
to	receive	them.	He	inclined	through	the	brightness.	The	brightness	was	good.	It	
folded.	 It	 folded	 the	messages.	 He	 could	 send	messages.	 He	 could	 talk	 on	 the	
Concentration	Loop.	The	brightness	packed	around	him.	A	part	of	the	brightness	
became	him.		
The	brightness	was	the	Sun	(5).	
Imp	Plus’	agency	here	is	restricted	to	inclining,	drawing,	and	sending	-	all	things	done	at	
the	behest	of	ground	control.	 	The	moment	that	prompts	an	evolution	 is	a	syntactical	
discovery:	 in	 a	 sequence	 of	 primarily	 transitive	 verbs,	 Imp	Plus’	 ability	 to	 talk	 on	 the	
Communication	Loop	that	keeps	him	in	touch	with	earth—“could	send”—is	intransitive.	
From	 the	 possibility	 of	 talking	 without	 a	 specified	 interlocutor,	 of	 using	 language	
reflexively,	we	arrive	at	the	first	major	change	in	his	state,	as	“he”	and	the	bright	monitor	
that	tracks	his	transmissions	of	data	about	sunlight	“become”	the	same	consciousness.	
The	 blending	 of	 the	 brightness	 of	 the	 monitor	 and	 the	 brightness	 of	 the	 sunlight,	
meanwhile,	 suggests	 that	his	 consciousness	 and	 agency	 span	 two	 realms:	 the	physical	
and	the	communicative.	
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Almost	 immediately,	 his	 self-awareness	 of	 this	 state	 leads	 him	 to	 feel	 and	
understand	what	 he	 has	 lost	 in	 the	 process	 of	 disembodiment,	 and	 hence	 to	 become	
aware	of	his	 agentive	 limits.	 Yet	 this	 awareness	 is	 the	 condition	 for	 another	new	 step	
towards	redeveloping	agency:		
From	the	message	pulses	through	this	change	he	knew	his	loss	was	real.	His	loss	
of	 all	 but	 a	 fraction.	 […]	 Everywhere	 he	went	 there	 was	 a	 part	 just	missing.	 A	
particle	 of	 difference..	 And	 in	 its	 place	 an	 inclination.	 A	 sharp	 drop.	 […]	 He	
thought	 of	 not	 answering,	 and	 this	 was	 a	 new	 thought,	 and	 he	 felt	 a	 trace	 of	
thought	all	over,	and	like	a	ray	he	fell	everywhere	after	the	trace	which	was	the	
absence	close	to	his	heart	but	alight	with	inclination	that	was	more	than	gradient	
though	it	was	gradient	(7/10).	
Bodilessness	 leads	 to	 a	 sensory	 world	 that,	 defined	 by	 communicative	 range,	 is	
“everywhere.”		His	new	agency	is	itself	communicative:	the	possibility	of	not	answering	
when	he	 is	 asked	 for	 data.	 This	 becomes	both	 the	 condition	 for	 advances	 in	 reflexive	
consciousness	 (the	 awareness	 that	 a	 thought	 is	 new	 to	 him)	 and	 the	 basis	 for	 his	
awareness	that	mental	distribution	might	transcend	physical	location.	New	thoughts	are	
felt	 “everywhere”	 all	 at	 once,	 even	 as	 they’re	 determined	 by	 “the	 trace	which	was	 the	
absence	 close	 to	 his	 heart	 but	 alight	 with	 inclination	 that	 was	 more	 than	 gradient	
though	 it	 was	 gradient.”	 This	multiply	 reflexive	 sentence—by	 far	 the	most	 complexly	
constructed	 by	 this	 point	 of	 the	 novel—makes	 a	 spatial	 understanding	 of	 the	 brain’s	
communication	 network	 the	 condition	 for	 the	 evolution	 of	 complex	 language	
constructions,	hence	of	the	ability	to	think	beyond	the	response	to	data	questions,	and	
hence	 to	communicate	with	 itself.	The	ability	 to	perceive	one’s	 thoughts	 from	outside	
themselves	 becomes	 the	 reflexive	 precondition	 of	 deliberate	 agency.	 And	 McElroy	
conveys	this	growing	repertoire	of	preconditions	through	the	novel’s	growing	repertoire	
of	sentence-structures.	
As	the	novel	goes	on,	Imp	Plus	recovers	earthly	memories,	becomes	able	to	judge	
the	 project	 he’s	 part	 of,	 able	 to	 store	 and	 regulate	 the	 solar	 energy	 that	 fuels	 his	
communication	 system,	 able	 to	 shut	 it	 on	 and	 off	 at	will,	 able	 to	 control	 the	 organic	
growth	 of	 the	 plant	 matter	 that	 the	 satellite	 uses	 to	 test	 the	 energy	 system,	 able	 to	
project	himself	into	that	matter	so	as	to	regain	sensory	physicality,	and,	most	crucially,	
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able	to	distribute	his	consciousness	throughout	the	communication	loop	by	reconciling	
two	of	his	newly	controllable	functions—the	processing	of	energy,	the	communication	
of	information—into	a	single	form	of	consciousness	he	calls	the	“lattice”:	essentially	an	
ability	 to	 direct	 energy	 around	 a	 visualized	 grid	 outside	 himself	 just	 as	 he	 does	
information.	 In	combination	with	his	reflexive	capacities	he	 is	 then	able	 to	 internalize	
the	lattice’s	energy-channels	so	as	to	direct	the	growth	of	new	physical	brain-parts.	Each	
of	 these	 steps	 is	 registered	 in	 stylistic	 terms,	 which	 then	 become	 preconditions	 for	
further	 steps.	 While	 the	 novel’s	 syntax	 of	 consciousness	 briefly	 coincides	 with	 what	
Barth	called	“turn-of-the-century”	novelistic	conventions	at	its	halfway	point,	the	second	
half	 of	 the	 novel	 moves	 decisively	 beyond	 them	 to	 establish	 newer	 forms.	 The	
development	 is	 expressed	 with	 generic	 self-consciousness	 when	 Imp	 Plus	 finds	 his	
expanding	repertoire	of	consciousness	incompatible	with	his	earthbound	interlocutors:	
“He	had	them	again,	he	thought;	and	he	went	on.	The	lattice,	he	felt,	also	wished	
to	know;	or	Imp	Plus	was	one	part	of	the	lattice’s	wish.	But	answering	Cap	Com	
that	the	sight	he	had	had	had	been	solid	yet	possibly	not	had	but	something	else,	
Imp	Plus	saw	into	the	flesh	of	his	past	motion:	only	deep	enough	to	think	what	
would	make	 them	believe.	Yet	 then	deep	enough	to	 let	him	 feel	 further,	as	 if	a	
sliver	had	been	implanted	in	him	out	of	sight	by	him	himself,	why	did	he	want	
them	to	believe	him?”	(208).	
Imp	Plus’s	lattice-distributed	consciousness	still	relies	on	the	communication	loop	that	
keeps	 him	 in	 touch	 with	 the	 human	 ground	 control.	 The	 problem	 is	 that	 those	
controllers,	 stuck	 in	 their	 existing	 assumptions	 about	 singularly	 embodied	
consciousness,	 can’t	 interact	with	 the	 full	 scope	of	 the	 lattice	he	 is	mastering	 even	 as	
they	constitute	nodes	in	it.	 Imp	Plus’	awareness	of	his	own	uncertainty	about	whether	
“wish”	comes	from	him	or	from	the	lattice	or	from	both	finds	expression	in	the	unusual	
recursiveness	 of	 “had”:	we’re	 at	 the	 syntactic	 stage	where	 the	 simultaneous	 difference	
and	 overlap	 of	 agentive	 consciousnesses	 within	 the	 same	 field	 pushes	 the	 limits	 of	
processable	earthbound	language.	In	questioning	to	what	degree	insights	and	ideas	and	
experiences	 have	 to	 be	 “had”	 by	 a	 locatable	 determinate	 individual,	 Imp	 Plus	 also	
realizes	the	difficulty	of	communicating	experiences	and	wishes	that	depend	on	having	
transcended	 “the	 flesh	 of	 his	 past	 motion”	 to	 people	 still	 trapped	 in	 a	 form	 of	
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consciousness	 tied	 to	 that	 flesh.	 The	 kind	 of	 embodied	 consciousness	 to	 which	 he	
initially	 aspired	 to	 return	 is	now	a	drag	and	a	 threat	on	his	growing	 sense	of	 self	 and	
capacity.	 So,	 McElroy	 seems	 to	 suggest,	 the	 future	 of	 the	 novel	 might	 come	 from	
imagining	 beyond	 the	 attempt	 to	 perfect	 immersive	 mimicry	 of	 nineteenth-century	
ideas	 of	 the	 active	 mind	 and	 self.	What	 started	 out	 as	 a	 Barth-style	 breakdown	 and	
reassembly	 of	 “exhausted”	 conventions	 provides	 the	 ground	 for	 the	 kind	 of	 novelty	
Barth	had	thought	impossible	to	generate	again.	
	 If	 the	 novel	 ended	 with	 this	 speculative	 articulation	 of	 a	 lattice-spanning	
consciousness,	then	PLUS	could	still	perhaps	be	read	as	another	piece	of	anti-	or	–post-
humanist	 postmodernism,	 uninterested	 in	 individual,	 deliberative,	 practical	 agency.	
Stressing	 that	 speculative	 lattice-mind’s	 incompatibility	with	 the	 earthbound,	 it	 could	
leave	 us	 with	 the	 intractable	 paralysis	 or	 deferred	 resolution	 typically	 attributed	 to	
postmodern	 fiction	by	 critics	who	 associate	 it	with	poststructural	 deconstruction.	 But	
the	novel’s	 final	narrative	 crux,	 resolving	 the	 single-brain	 syntax	with	which	 it	 began,	
finds	a	space	within	the	new	formation	for	a	version	of	individual	action.	Imp	Plus’	final	
act	 is	 to	 sabotage	his	 own	orbit	 and	 crash	 to	 earth,	 precisely	 in	order	 to	preserve	 the	
lattice	 he	 once	 grounded	 against	 the	 earthbound	 communicators’	 efforts	 to	 constrain	
him	and	thus	undermine	it.			
He	foresaw	a	fiery	carom,	he	saw	his	own	IMP	containing	the	lattice	like	a	planar	
field	 step	 into	 space	 so	deep[…]	and	he	was	drawn	by	 this	 chance	until	he	 saw	
that	 it	 really	was	his	 if	he	wanted[…]	he	 thought[…]	 that	what	he	and	they	had	
together	drawn	into	a	circuit	of	conception	could	best	hold	elliptically	distinct	if	
he	became	an	absence	(215).	
This	final	acts	dawn	in	terms	of	“foreseeing”	a	“chance”	that	he	is	“drawn”	by	“until	he	
saw	 that	 it	 really	 was	 his.”	 In	 this	 way,	 McElroy	 leads	 us	 back	 to	 the	 vocabulary	 of	
“drawing,”	“inclining,”	“absence,”	and	“chance”	that,	at	the	novel’s	outset,	signalled	Imp	
Plus	bare-minimum	capacities.	Having	been	preconditional	origins	of	the	evolution	the	
novel	traces,	these	remain—so	long	as	they	can	still	be	subordinated	to	“his”—the	terms	
through	which	a	capacity	for	embodied	individual	agency	persists—maintaining	a	“real”	
“him”—within	the	distributed	consciousness.	
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The	 novel	 ends,	 after	 Imp	 Plus’	 destruction,	 with	 a	 single	 paragraph	 whose	
focalizing	consciousness	is	the	lattice-persistent	“thought”	itself:	
thought	wondering	then	what	chances	now	turned	upon	this	fresh	absence	that	
would	be	as	lasting	as	the	glint	of	its	arrival	must	have	been	brief	for	any	who	saw	
it	 in	 the	 sky:	 thought	 wondering,	 too,	 if	 at	 last	 the	 great	 lattice	 had	 let	 this	
happen	or	had	been	surprised	(215).	
“Thought”	now	wonders	about	the	intentions	of	“the	great	lattice”	even	as	in	the	absence	
of	 Imp	 Plus’	 embodied	 “him”	 it	 depends	 on	 the	 lattice	 for	 existence.	 This	 reflexive	
awareness	of	absence	was	what	first	allowed	Imp	Plus	to	consider	refusals,	which	let	him	
conceive	 of	 positive	 actions:	 the	 lattice	 itself,	 in	 other	 words,	 has	 entered	 the	 prose	
structures	of	thought	that	allowed	Imp	Plus’	transcendence	of	disembodiment,	and	the	
question	 McElroy	 leaves	 us	 on	 is	 what	 higher	 level	 the	 lattice	 itself	 might	 come	 to	
function	 among.	 The	 novel	 thus	 elaborates	 a	 single	 cycle:	 the	 development	 of	 a	
consciousness	from	a	condition	that	seemed	to	limit	it	to	one	in	which	it	could	provide	
the	ground	for	a	 further,	second-stage,	overcoming	of	 limit.	Like	Olaf	Stapledon’s	Star	
Maker	(1937),	in	which	an	earthbound	man’s	consciousness	travels	through	the	universe	
taking	 part	 in	 ever-widening	 frames	 of	 consciousness	 and	 agency,	 from	 telepathy	 to	
planetary	and	galactic	levels	of	consciousness,	McElroy	gives	us	a	stage	by	stage	account	
of	what	supra-human	agency	might	look	like.	But	unlike	Stapledon,	McElroy	locates	the	
basic	 capacities	 of	 these	 further	 models	 in	 the	 human	 capacity	 for	 linguistic	 self-
reflexivity,	and,	more	crucially,	where	Stapledon’s	narrator	tells	the	story	in	unchanging,	
essentially	 journalistic	 terms,	 McElroy	 conveys	 his	 argument	 entirely	 by	 organized	
modulations	of	style.	His	deconstruction	of	prose-psychological	conventions	is	all	in	the	
service	 of	 a	 speculative	 reconstruction	 that	 both	 makes	 space	 for	 capable	 individual	
agency	 and	 suggests	 its	 compatibility	 with	 something	 even	 greater,	 even	 more	
constructive.	 And	 to	 achieve	 this,	 like	 Barth,	 he	 has	 to	 make	 his	 prose	 components	
opaque,	 has	 to	 make	 them	 signify	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 history	 of	 consciousness-
representation,	 and	 then	 rearrange	 those	 significations	 into	 something	 that	 signifies	
beyond	what	we	already	know.	
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PLUS’	self-consciousness	about	its	manipulation	of	existing	stylistic	conventions	
is	 absolutely	 central	 to	 its	 argument	 about	 what	 minds	 are,	 how	 they	 relate	 to	
embodiment,	 and	 what	 capacities	 they	 might	 have	 beyond	 our	 present	 state	 of	
evolution.	 The	 very	 qualities	 that	 make	 it	 formally	 “postmodern,”	 then,	 are	 those	
through	which	it	makes	an	argument	entirely	at	odds	with	standard	equations	between	
postmodern	fiction’s	rhetoric	and	the	commitments	of	poststructuralism.	His	optimism	
about	 the	 possibility	 of	 recovering	 a	 stable	 self,	 of	 putting	 language	 in	 the	 service	 of	
action,	 of	 imperfect	 cognition	 as	 a	 spur	 to	decision	 rather	 than	 a	 paralyzing	 obstacle,	
and	 the	 novel’s	 culmination	 in	 an	 act	 of	 achieved	 agentive	 responsibility,	 all	 set	 him	
opposition	to	the	tenets	of	the	philosophy	most	often	associated	with	his	generation	of	
writers.	As	antimimetic	 fiction	gets	read	under	the	aegis	of	postmodern	fiction,	so	the	
philosophical	 commitments	 of	 antimimetic	 fiction	 get	 read	 under	 the	 aegis	 of	 the	
canonically	 “postmodern”	 philosophy	 of	 poststructural	 deconstruction.	 Anti-cosmic	
fiction	 is	 too	often	understood	as	 a	mere	 expression	of	deconstruction’s	philosophical	
underpinnings.	As	Michael	LeMahieu	notes	 in	order	 to	motivate	his	own	 rereading	of	
the	importance	of	logical	positivism	to	the	era’s	fiction:	Because	 the	 canonization	 	 of	 postmodern	 fiction	 occurred	 concurrently	with	 the	rise	of	 theory,	 the	 textual	attributes	 that	 continue	 to	qualify	as	postmodern	 tend	[in	current	criticism]	 to	 illustrate	 theory’s	claims…	 	That	coherence	comes	at	 the	price	 of	 circumscribing	 the	 scope	 of	 postwar	 literature	 by	 ironically	 limiting	 the	postmodern	 literary	 canon	 to	 those	 texts	 that	 imitate	 a	 poststructuralist	theoretical	paradigm	that	is	based	on	decidedly	anti-mimetic	claims”	(17/8).			Even	 in	his	painstakingly	detailed	rereading	of	 the	philosophical	 impetus	behind	mid-
century	fiction,	founded	on	his	awareness	of	the	non-inevitability	of	the	identification	of	
postmodern	 theory	 and	 literature,	 LeMahieu	 ends	 up	 preserving	 the	 association	
between	antimimesis	and	poststructuralism.		
The	canonization	process	he	notes	was	 far	 from	inevitable,	 fulfilling	contingent	
institutional	exigencies,	but	the	equation	has	persisted	into	an	unhelpfully	procrustean	
axiom	 that	 regulates	 almost	 all	 discussion	 of	 antimimetic	 fiction.	 In	 Appendix	 A,	 I	
survey	 the	 critical	 history	 by	 which	 equations	 between	 postmodern	 fiction	 and	
deconstructive	philosophizing	were	canonized	despite	their	comparatively	fringe	origins	
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in	 the	 manifestos	 of	 a	 small	 group	 of	 late-1960s	 authors.	 McElroy	 is	 not	 the	 only	
experimental	 author	 of	 the	 era	 whose	 stylistic	 innovations	 serve	 rhetorical	 purposes	
entirely	at	odds	with	the	anti-mimetic=deconstructive	axiom	that	now	underpins	almost	
all	academic	research	on	non-immersive	fiction.	My	test-case	for	the	error	of	conflating	
the	era’s	fiction	and	literary	theory	is	to	examine	postmodern	fiction’s	concerted	interest	
in	developing	optimistic	accounts	of	how	deliberative	agency	might	remain	viable	even	
under	 the	 challenges	 the	 previous	 century	 threw	 at	 it.	 In	 the	 rest	 of	 this	 project	 I	
examine	 novels	 by	 Barth,	William	Gaddis,	 EL	Doctorow,	 and	 Thomas	 Pynchon.	 They	
and	many	of	their	peers	share	McElroy’s	interest	in	questions	of	deliberative	agency,	his	
stylistic	innovativeness,	and	his	essentially	optimistic	way	of	putting	the	latter	in	service	
of	the	former.	
	
The	Postmodern	Project	Novel:	A	Varied	Genre	
Abandoning	the	modernist	formal	pursuit	of	mimesis—the	quest	for	forms	more	
immersive	 than	 the	 Joycean	 stream	 of	 consciousness—is	 part	 of	 what	 makes	 these	
novelists’	 work	 more	 than	 a	 mere	 expression	 of	 their	 own	 era’s	 widespread,	 post-
existential	 antifoundational	 scepticism. 1 	Daniel	 Punday,	 examining	 the	 connections	
between	poststructualist	deconstruction	and	the	literature	of	its	era,	rightly	notes	that		
especially	 in	America,	when	 these	writers	 describe	 their	 own	 goals,	 they	 rarely	
emphasize	deconstruction	as	desirable	in	and	of	itself.	Indeed,	these	writers	often	
speak	 in	 seemingly	 traditional	 terms	 about	 discovering	 the	 natural	 aesthetic	
bases	for	new	fiction…	New	fiction	requires	new	criteria,	but	such	criteria	will	be	
rooted	in	the	essentials	of	the	medium”	(Narr/DeC	48-49).			
Punday’s	 vocabulary	 of	 roots	 and	 bases	 lets	 us	 read	 the	 anti-mimesis	 advocated	 by	
writer-critics	 like	 Barth	 and	William	 Gass	 in	 terms	 of	 literal	 construction:	 they	 want	
literature	 to	 proceed	 on	 a	 stabler—more	 “valid,”	 in	 Barth’s	 term—conception	 of	 the	
“essentials	 of	 [its]	 medium,”	 which	 for	 both	 means	 acknowledging	 that	 literature’s																																																									
1	Larry	McCaffery	distinguishes	postmodern	experiments	 from	modern	experiments,	 for	example,	on	the	
basis	 that	 for	 the	 earlier	 era,	 “most	 of	 the	 really	 significant	 experimentation	 tended	 to	 be	 largely	
extensions	of	 realistic	methods,	especially	 the	attempts	of	writers	 to	develop	methods	of	delving	deeply	
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medium	 is	 language	 rather	 than	 the	 objects	 of	 posited	 worlds. 2 	Its	 methods	 for	
conjuring	those	worlds	are	a	matter	of	 linguistic	conventions	we	have	naturalized	into	
transparency	 but	 whose	 valid	 capacities	 rely	 on	 an	 acknowledgment	 of	 their	
contingency	and	a	reclamation	of	their	opacity.	
PLUS	 investigates	 distributed	 consciousness,	 but	 doesn’t	 revel	 in	 directionless	
decentering	of	the	kind	privileged	by	Derrida	or	late-Baktinians	like	Linda	Hutcheon;	its	
formal	 play	 with	 spatial	 setting	 and	 the	 conflict	 of	 worlds	 physical,	 mental,	 and	
linguistic	 serves	 an	 argument	 about	 consciousness’	 capacities,	 rather	 than	 merely	
undermining	modernist	assumptions	as	Brian	McHale,	in	his	hugely	influential	account	
of	 postmodern	 fiction’s	 proliferating	worlds,	 would	 have	 it;	 if	 Frederic	 Jameson,	 even	
more	influentially,	suggests	that	postmodern	fiction	is	flat	both	affectively	and	in	terms	
of	 form,	 then	 PLUS’	 connections	 of	 melancholy	 memories	 from	 before	 the	
disembodiment	and	a	kind	of	 rapturous	anticipation	of	 future	 stages	of	 consciousness	
set	it	on	a	different	affective	plane,	while	its	step	by	step	evolution	of	form,	closely	tied	
to	a	mdodel	of	cognitive	progress,	 is	 the	very	opposite	of	undifferentiated	 flat	parody.	
It’s	not	a	novel	about	the	art-life	relationship,	not	an	exercise	in	immanent	objecthood,	
not	an	expression	of	the	incoherence	of	reason,	and,	though	Imp	Plus	begins	the	novel	
in	a	tough	situation	for	a	prospective	agent,	 it	 treats	an	awareness	of	the	structures	of	
language	 as	 a	 path	 toward	 that	 agency,	 rather	 than	 a	 matrix	 of	 endless	 paralyzing	
deferral.	 And	 yet	 Hutcheon,	 Jameson,	 and	 McHale,	 having	 written	 their	 unifying	
accounts	 of	 postmodern	 form	 in	 the	 1980s	 out	 of	 a	 concerted	 engagement	 with	
postmodern	 philosophy,	 remain	 the	 three	 most	 influential	 accounts	 of	 the	 formal	
qualities	of	McElroy’s	generation	of	novels.		Why?	
These	novels	take	post-existential	challenges	to	practical,	deliberative	agency	as	
their	 starting	 points.	 Imp	 Plus’	 passive	 state	 at	 the	 novel’s	 opening	 reflects	 early	
postmodern	 literature’s	 general	 preoccupation	 with	 states	 of	 agentive	 paralysis.	 The																																																									
2	Though	 Punday	makes	 the	 case	 for	 reading	 this	 fiction	 deconstructively,	 his	 vocabulary	 of	 roots	 and	
bases	 sets	Barth	and	Gass	 in	explicit	opposition	 to	Derrida,	whose	most	 influential	writing	 for	 the	era’s	
literary	critics	was	the	essay	“Structure,	Sign,	and	Play”	with	its	emphasis	on	the	contingency	intrinsic	to	
the	vocabulary	of	structural	foundation	on	which	the	human	sciences	erected	themselves.			
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preface	to	Joan	Didion’s	era-embodying	collection	of	essays	Slouching	Toward	Bethlehem	
(1968)	 stipulates	 that	 its	 title	essay	emerged	 from	a	 state	 “paralyzed	by	 the	conviction	
that	 writing	 was	 an	 irrelevant	 act,	 that	 the	 world	 as	 I	 had	 understood	 it	 no	 longer	
existed.	If	I	was	to	work	again	at	all,	it	would	be	necessary	for	me	to	come	to	terms	with	
disorder.”	Her	next	novel,	Play	It	As	It	Lays	(1971),	begins	with	its	heroine	seeking	modes	
of	paralysis	in	order	to	reconcile	herself	to	her	institutionalisation,	her	lack	of	access	to	
her	hospitalised	daughter,	and	her	 involvement	 in	 the	death	of	her	nihilistic	associate	
BZ.	Choosing	to	live	by	the	disconnective	motto	“nothing	applies,”	she	aims	to	believe	in	
a	world	without	belief	or	cause	 for	action,	and	 fantasizes	about	states	of	numbness	or	
total	 levellings	 of	 value	 or	 individuality—“The	 notion	 of	 general	 devastation	 had	 for	
Maria	 a	 certain	 sedative	 effect”—as	 a	 response	 to	 “peril,”	 which	 she	 fears	 less	 as	 a	
physical	threat	than	for	its	relation	to	causation	and	hence	to	deservingness.	Yet	over	its	
course,	the	novel	traces	her	“coming	to	terms	with	disorder”	in	terms	of	her	turning	this	
attraction	to	nothingness	into	a	faith	in	its	asymptotic	distance	that	necessarily	refuses	
BZ’s	 conclusion	 that	 the	 desirability	 of	 nothingness	 entails	 suicide.	 Maria	 thus	
establishes	a	minimalist	ground	for	the	minimal	action	of	going	on,	continuing	to	“play.”	
Thomas	Pynchon’s	 first	novel	V.	 (1963)	 in	part	 follows	Benny	Profane,	a	 “Schlemmihl”	
wilfully	resigned	to	putting	his	destiny	in	the	hands	of	inanimate	objects,	while	Gravity’s	
Rainbow	 (1973)	 features	 the	 song	 “Sold	 on	 Suicide”	 in	 which	 a	 young	 man	 can’t	 kill	
himself	until	he	has	explicitly	renounced	every	conceivable	aspect	of	life,	a	project	that	
keeps	 him	 from	 acting	 and	 hence	 keeps	 him	 alive.	 Most	 fundamentally,	 meanwhile,	
Barth’s	early	novel	The	End	of	 the	Road	(1958)	investigates	what	he	called	“cosmopsis”;	
the	paralyzing	contemplation	of	 the	vastness	of	existential	 relevance,	of	 the	 infinity	of	
considerations	present	to	every	act.		In	its	iconic	scene,	narrator	Jacob	Horner	goes	to	a	
train	station	planning	on	a	random	day	trip,	but	a	cosmoptic	paralysis	descends:	
it	was	there	that	I	simply	ran	out	of	motives…	there	was	no	reason,	either,	to	go	
back	 to	 the	apartment	hotel,	or	 for	 that	matter	 to	go	anywhere.	 	There	was	no	
reason	 to	 do	 anything.	 	 My	 eyes…	 were	 sightless,	 gazing	 on	 eternity,	 fixed	 on	
ultimacy,	and	when	that	 is	 the	case	there	 is	no	reason	to	do	anything—even	to	
change	the	focus	of	one’s	eyes	(323).	
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The	novel	begins	with	cosmopsis,	 and	 traces	Horner’s	wilful	attempts	 to	avoid	action,	
commitment,	 selfhood.	 	Paralysis—as	a	 starting	point	 and	as	 something	often	wilfully	
pursued	 by	 characters	 who	 believe	 they	 have	 something	 to	 fear	 from	 agency—is	 as	
central	a	preoccupation	of	postmodern	fiction	as	the	paralyzing	awareness	of	our	lack	of	
sovereignty	is	of	postmodern	theory.	
	 But	 precisely	 because	 this	 is	 where	 all	 these	 novels	 begin,	 this	 paralyzing	
challenge	 to	 deliberative	 agency	 is	 not	 the	 limit	 of	what	 they	have	 to	 offer	 by	way	 of	
rhetoric	 and	 insight.	 Amy	 Elias,	 in	 a	 study	 of	 postmodern	 fiction’s	 engagement	 with	
history,	diagnoses	 cosmopsis	 as	 a	 false	universal	with	 a	dubiously	passive	 and	myopic	
politics:	it’s	
the	 state	 induced	 by	 an	 epiphanic	 glimpse	 of	 the	 historical	 sublime	 by	 a	 First	
World	consciousness.		The	‘universality’	of	the	paralysis	as	Barth	defines	it	is	not	
universal.		It	is	a	pathology	of	the	West,	and	it	is	centered	in	philosophy	internal	
to	Western	 metaphysics.	 	 It	 is	 a	 state	 of	 existential	 paralysis	 that	 is	 linked	 to	
privilege—the	privilege	inherent	in	having	time	to	view	the	horizon	through	the	
gaze	of	the	master	(230).			
Logically,	of	course,	there’s	no	incompatibility	between	something	being	universally	true	
and	only	a	small	subset	of	privileged	people	having	the	time	to	get	angsty	about	it.	The	
argument’s	more	relevant	problem	is	that	it	only	works	as	a	criticism	of	Barth’s	fiction—
which,	as	she	goes	on	to	argue	that	Pynchon	uses	similar	materials	 to	more	politically	
defensible	 ends,	 Elias	 intends	 it	 to	 be—if	 we	 take	 the	 diagnosis	 of	 cosmopsis	 as	 the	
novel’s	 rhetorical	 impetus.	 This	 would	 be	 a	 mistake.	 Horner	 repeatedly	 refers	 to	
forerunner	problems	of	cosmopsis	as	ancient	as	Buridan’s	parable	of	 the	ass	paralyzed	
by	 the	decision	between	 identically	hunger-	 and	 thirst-sating	options	of	 a	bale	of	hay	
and	a	bucket	of	water:	neither	Barth	nor	his	characters	are	claiming	that	the	problem	of	
cosmopsis	 is	 anything	 new.	 As	PLUS’	 stylistic	 evolution	makes	 especially	 literal,	 such	
novels	 develop	beyond	 the	 initial	 challenge.	As	 I’ll	 examine	 at	 chapter	 length,	 Barth’s	
novel	both	diagnoses	Horner’s	cosmoposis	as	a	motivated	avoidance	of	available	agency,	
and	points	a	way	beyond	it.	Elias’	reading,	though,	is	symptomatic	of	the	way	that	The	
End	of	the	Road	and	novels	like	it	have	had	their	givens	taken	for	their	insights.		
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Moreover,	 especially	 in	 the	 early	 years	 of	 their	 reception,	 though	with	 notably	
little	 revision	 since,	 this	 misreading	 often	 saw	 the	 novels	 read	 as	 second-hand	
expressions	of	the	paralyzing	insights	associated	with	poststructuralism.		Among	these,	
we	might	non-exhaustively	include:	the	infinity	of	considerations	present	to	any	choice	
(cosmopsis);	the	recursiveness	of	all	attempts	to	locate	grounds	for	reason	outside	of	its	
own	 vocabulary;	 the	 radical,	 infinite	 singularity	 of	 others,	 violated	 when	 they	 are	
reduced	 to	 commensurable	 considerations	 in	 a	decision;	 the	 fact	 that	 so	much	of	 our	
decision-making	seems	to	happen	in	accordance	with	factors	outside	the	intellect,	from	
the	 influence	 of	 the	 body	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 desire;	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	 historically	
contingent	way	that	liberal	models	of	freely	deciding	and	calculating	self	serve	particular	
class	interests.	Yet	while	postmodern-era	fiction	often	accepts	the	reality	of	these	to	the	
point	of	beginning	its	narratives	by	taking	them	as	plot-level	givens,3	it	for	precisely	that	
reason	can’t	stop	its	rhetoric	at	the	point	of	articulating	them.		
**	
This	 is	 particularly	 clear	 insofar	 as	many	of	 these	 challenges	 to	 agency	predate	
poststructural	 philosophy,	 and	 indeed	 are	 registered	 as	 problems—in	 distinctively	
stylistic	terms—in	earlier	US	fiction.	The	period	from	the	civil	war	to	the	fin	de	siècle	is	
characterized	 by	 some	 of	 its	most	 high-profile	 fiction	 articulating	 these	 challenges	 as	
new,	 unfamiliar,	 dawning	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 relevant	 narratives,	 and	 genuinely	
paralyzing.	 Take,	 for	 example,	 Theodore	 Dreiser’s	 Sister	 Carrie	 (1900),	 in	 which	 a	
character,	 having	 pondered	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 steal	 money	 from	 his	 employers	 for	 a	
number	of	pages,	wavering	between	the	two	courses	of	action	in	linear	presentation	of	
considerations,	suddenly	finds	that	his	action	has	preceded	his	thought:	
While	the	money	was	in	his	hand	the	lock	clicked.		It	had	sprung!		Did	he	do	it?...	
the	moment	he	realised	the	safe	was	locked	for	a	surety,	the	sweat	burst	out	upon	
his	 brow	 and	 he	 trembled	 violently.	 	 He	 looked	 about	 him	 and	 decided	
instantly…	at	once	he	became	the	man	of	action	(243).																																																									
3	In	 the	 Jamesian	 sense	of	données	 rather	 than	 the	philosophical	 sense	Sellars	etc	 challenge	 in	 terms	of	
“the	myth	of	 the	given,”	 though	 that’s	 relevant	 in	 its	own	ways	 to	 the	contrast	between	pragmatist	and	
poststructural	antifoundationalism	that	I	discuss	later.	
	 16	
This	is	explicitly	framed	by	contrast	to	his	self-conception	as	a	methodical	deliberator—
“Hurstwood	could	not	bring	himself	to	act	definitely.	He	wanted	to	think	about	it—to	
ponder	over	 it,	 to	decide	whether	 it	were	best”	 (243)—a	reflexivity	about	 the	 terms	 in	
which	 our	 judgments	 of	 our	 deliberative	 freedoms	 come	 up	 short	 that	 also	 animates	
Edith	Wharton’s	The	House	 of	Mirth	 (1905).	Wharton’s	heroine,	Lily	Bart,	 is	a	chronic	
self-saboteur:	 knowing	 that	 her	material	 goal	 is	 a	 wealthy	marriage,	 she	 nevertheless	
becomes	 averse	 to	 making	 any	 decision	 in	 which	 she	 could	 conceive	 herself	 as	
“calculating”—a	 term	 she	 associates	 with	 the	 jewish	 arriviste	 Rosewood—rather	 than	
“risking”—one	 she	 associates	 with	 her	 friend	 the	 unmarriably	 poor	 but	 romantically	
appealing	 dilettante	 Selden.	 In	 other	 words,	 her	 decisions	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	
terminology	 in	 which	 she	 conceptualizes	 them.	 Finally,	 she	 dies	 of	 an	 overdose	 of	
sleeping	medicine,	a	process	in	which	the	language	of	both	risk	and	calculation	figure:	
“she	knew	she	 took	a	slight	 risk	 in	doing	so;	 she	remembered	the	chemist’s	warning…	
But	that	was	one	chance	in	a	hundred:	the	action	of	the	drug	was	incalculable…”	(342).	
Wharton’s	modulations	of	free	indirect	discourse	make	it	unclear	whether	this	language	
should	be	 taken	as	Lily’s	or	 the	narrator’s,	making	 it	unclear	how	much	responsibility	
Lily	herself	bears	for	the	concepts	that	brought	her	to	this	point,	and	mimicking	the	lack	
of	 clarity	 about	 how	 deliberate	 her	 overdose	 actually	was.	Wharton	 and	Dreiser	 thus	
make	 stylistically	 innovative	 arguments	 about	 the	 biological	 and	 linguistic	
determinations	of	action	that	undermine	even	the	most	deliberate	and	self-conscious	of	
agents.	Neither	offers	us	any	solution	to	the	problem	they	raise:	in	the	early	1900s,	the	
identifying	and	stylistically	expressing	the	problem	was	rhetoric	enough.		
We	might	 trace	 this	 earlier	 generation	 of	 fiction’s	 interest	 in	 articulating	 these	
paralyzing	challenges	without	seeking	solutions	to	Ambrose	Bierce’s	civil	war	short	story	
“Chickamauga,”	in	which	a	boy	realizes	as	he	returns	from	a	walk	that	the	house	on	fire	
is	his	own.	The	story	to	this	point	has	been	of	gently	comical	misrecognitions—his	fear	
of	a	rabbit,	his	suspicion	that	a	soldier	may	be	a	bear—but	successfully	recognizing	the	
house	 leaves	 him	 “stupefied	 by	 the	 power	 of	 the	 revelation,”	 a	 state	 of	 paralysis	
expressed	in	the	story’s	full	final	paragraph:	“Then	he	stood	motionless,	with	quivering	
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lips,	 looking	down	upon	 the	wreck”	 (26).	Chickamauga	articulates	a	dawning	national	
insight	 leading	 to	 paralysis,	 and	 if	 Dreiser	 and	 Wharton	 pick	 up	 this	 dynamic	 to	
articulate	 equally	 unresolved	 challenges	 to	 sovereign	 agency	 through	 stylistic	
experiments	 as	 tightly	 tradition-tweaking	 as	 Barth	 could	 desire,	 then	 this	 has	 three	
implications	 for	our	understanding	of	paralyzing	 insight’s	place	 in	postmodern	fiction.	
First,	US	postmodernism’s	engagement	with	agency-questions	is	continuous	with	earlier	
co-national	fiction’s	dealings	with	similar	issues.	Second,	the	paralyzing	challenges	were	
old	hat	by	the	time	the	postmodernists	wrote.	Third,	as	a	novel	like	PLUS	makes	clear,	
those	paralyzing	stipulations	shift	structural	place	in	the	later	genre,	to	become	starting	
problems,	 rather	 than	 final,	 challenging	 insights.	Postmodern	 fiction’s	 relation	 to	 that	
list	of	paralyzing	postmodern	givens,	then,	finds	its	real	interest	not	just	in	articulating	
them,	 but	 in	 working	 out	 how	 to	 legitimately	 value,	 decide	 and	 act	 without	 denying	
them.		
**	
This	distinction	grounds	the	grouping—call	it	a	genre,	a	canon,	or	an	archive—of	
fictions	 I	 examine	 in	 this	 book	 in	 order	 to	 make	 my	 case	 for	 the	 constructive	
philosophical	 capacities	 of	 style-driven	 anti-cosmic	 antimimesis.	 It’s	 a	 subcategory	 of	
postmodern	fiction	that	uses	antimimetic	forms	to	isomorphically	address	two	seeming	
impossibilities:	 	 how	 can	 we	 warrant	 deliberative	 agency	 in	 an	 post-foundationalist	
world,	when	every	fresh	revelation	about	the	way	the	mind	interacts	with	the	world	tells	
us	how	little	control	we	have	over	our	actions	and	how	impossible	it	is	to	justify	those	
decisions	we	are	responsible	for?		and	how	can	fictions	which	don’t	even	try	to	convince	
us	 that	 they	give	us	 access	 to	 some	kind	of	world	on	 the	other	 side	of	 their	 language	
affect	 our	beliefs	 and	 actions	 in	 the	world	 in	which	we	 and	 that	 language	 exist?	 	The	
fictions	 that	 shared	 this	 dual	 undertaking	 I	 call	postmodern	 project	 novels,	 since	 they	
both	pursue	the	overall	project	of	making	anti-cosmic	fiction	viably	argumentative,	and	
recount	 characters’	 attempts	 to	 achieve	 long-duration	 agentive	 projects	 from	 within	
situations	that	seem	to	endorse	only	paralysis	and	scepticism.	These	projects	range	from	
the	creation	of	an	artwork	(William	Gaddis’	J	R),	to	the	discovery	of	a	warrant	for	going	
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on	living	or	acting	(Play	 it	as	 it	Lays	or	The	End	of	 the	Road),	to	the	development	of	a	
consciousness	 (PLUS),	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 biography	 (Maxine	 Hong	 Kingston’s	
The	 Woman	 Warrior,	 McElroy’s	 debut	 Smuggler’s	 Bible,	 EL	 Doctorow’s	 The	 Book	 of	
Daniel),	 to	 the	 salvation	 of	 a	 romantic	 relationship	 (Carlene	 Hatcher	 Polite’s	 The	
Flagellants).	These	project-arced	plots	mirror	at	the	level	of	fictional	event	each	author’s	
own	attempts	to	establish	valid	formal	grounds	for	conspicuous	fiction	to	influence	real-
world	 beliefs	 or	 actions.	 These	 novels	 vary	 greatly,	 but	 they	 all	 put	 new	 styles	 in	 the	
service	of	optimistic	arguments	about	moving	beyond	paralyzing	challenges	to	agency.	
These	novels	 (and	occasional	 short	 fiction,	 though	the	 timeframe	of	 the	project	
suits	 itself	 to	 longer	narratives)	are	united	by	 five	major	qualities:	 1)	 they	 start	 from	a	
concern	 with	 agentive	 paralysis,	 with	 plots	 tending	 to	 revolve	 around	 characters	
struggling	to	carry	out	a	long-term	project;	2)	their	formal	qualities	highlight	their	own	
fictionality	 and	 conventionality,	 providing	 a	 barrier	 to	 worldly	 immersion	 and	
demanding	 self-consciousness	 about	 the	 meaning	 of	 forms;	 3)	 They	 take	
poststructuralist-type	critiques	of	agency	for	granted	rather	than	as	novelties	of	interest,	
and	so	they	seek	ways	to	 live	and	work	viably	without	denying	them:	they	hence	start	
with	formal	and	plot-level	articulations	of	these	problems,	but	develop	beyond	them,	in	
form	and	plot,	over	the	course	of	their	narratives;	4)	They	aren’t	critical	of	“Reason”	per	
se,	 along	 post-structural	 lines,	 but	 distinguish	 practical	 rationality	 from	 forms	 of	
personal,	theoretical,	or	political	rationalization:	the	conflict	between	–ity	and	–ization	
organizes	 their	 narratives;	 5)	 Contra	 standard	 accounts,	 they	 are	 not	 formally	 or	
rhetorically	 “flat”:	 their	 sentence-level	 forms	 vary	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 narratives	 in	
ways	 that	 add	up	 to	 arguments	 about	development	 and	progress.	Their	 starting-point	
formal	 innovations	 reflect	 the	 paralyzing	 problems	 they	 address,	 but	 modulations	 of	
form	within	those	overall	conditions	bear	the	weight	of	argumentative	development.4	
																																																								
4	We	can	see	this	dynamic	within	the	authors’	own	self-descriptions.	Just	to	take	the	two	I’ve	spent	most	
time	on	 already,	McElroy	describes	PLUS	 as	 about	 “the	 same	old	 subject	my	books	 are	 always	 about—
getting	myself	into	an	awful	trap	in	order	to	feel	more	real,	then	figuring	a	way	out”	(239).	We	start	with	a	
“real”	 problem,	 and	 move	 “out”ward	 towards	 a	 solution	 that	 doesn’t	 merely	 deny	 it.	 Barth	 bypasses	
McElroy’s	personal	framing	to	clarifymakes	the	relationship	between	this	dynamic	and	specific	historical	
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The	novels	all	respond	to	the	same	intellectual	climate.	But	since	each	responds	
to	 a	 different	 anti-agentive	 constellation	 of	 givens,	 narrates	 a	 project	with	 a	 different	
goal,	 and,	 most	 crucially,	 responds	 to	 those	 specificities	 with	 a	 distinct	 self-
foregrounding	prose	style,	each	offers	distinct	stylistic	arguments	about	how	to	reclaim	
some	practical	agency	under	the	conditions	that	seem	to	paralyze	it.			In	this	specificity,	
they	provide	 a	 counter	 to	 canonical	 accounts	of	postmodern	anti-realism	 in	which	all	
anti-mimetic	 stylistic	 innovation	 has	 the	 same	 simple	 anti-hegemonic	 logic	 and	
hestitation-generating	 effects.	 In	 this	 project,	 just	 as	 I	 examine	 postmodern	 fiction	 in	
order	 to	 revise	 the	most	central	accounts	of	how	antimimetic	 fiction	works,	 so	within	
the	generation	of	postmodernism	I	 focus	on	 four	of	 the	most	canonical	writers	of	 this	
generation:	 Barth,	 Gaddis,	 Doctorow,	 and	 Pynchon.	 Each	 uses	 a	 different	 stylistic	
innovation	 to	 address	 a	 different	 question	 and	 realm	 of	 deliberative	 agency.	 Barth	
investigates	 how	 to	 deliberate	 in	 an	 era	 where	 the	 stable	 self	 is	 in	 question,	 Gaddis	
examines	 the	 more	 fundamental	 question	 of	 where	 in	 an	 anti-deliberative	 language-
culture	 we	 can	 retain	 space	 and	 growth-potential	 for	 the	 unvocalized	 thought.	
Doctorow	exploits	the	different	semantic	constraints	that	fictionality	puts	on	sentence-
reference	in	order	to	make	an	argument	about	how	best	to	look	for	avenues	of	historical	
agency	under	state	hegemony,	while	Pynchon	uses	sentence-structures	whose	referents	
cross	ontological	boundaries	within	his	many-worlds	novelistic	universes	to	ask	an	even	
more	 fundamental	question	about	 the	metaphysics	of	historical	action	and	possibility.	
Varying	in	the	scale	of	their	concerns	and	the	ways	in	which	they	investigate	the	first-
person	texture	of	decision	alongside	the	world-historical	ontologies	of	possibility,	these	
authors	show	just	how	many	different	arguments	it	was	possible	for	anti-mimetic	styles	
to	make	about	the	basic	concept	of	deliberation	at	one	point	in	history.																																																																																																																																																																																		
situations:	 “The	 Literature	 of	 Exhaustion”	 suggests	 that	 “an	 artist	 may	 paradoxically	 turn	 the	 felt	
ultimacies	 of	 our	 time	 into	 material	 and	 means	 for	 his	 work—paradoxically,	 because	 by	 doing	 so	 he	
transcends	 what	 had	 appeared	 to	 be	 his	 refutation”	 (71).	 Turning	 what	 seemed	 like	 the	 “refutation”al	
problem	 into	 the	 “material”	 of	 practical	 “work,”	 Barth,	 like	 McElroy	 and	 the	 protagonists	 of	 the	
postmodern	project	novels,	puts	 energy	 into	overcoming	postmodern	challenges	 to	 agency,	 rather	 than	
just	denying,	recognizing,	or	expressing	them.	The	echo	of	the	“ultimacy”	on	which	his	earlier	protagonist	
had	 gazed	 in	 cosmopsis	 makes	 clear	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 projects	 of	 authorial	 rhetoric	 and	
fictional	event.			
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A	 selection	 of	 four	 less	 famous	 authors	 and	 fictions	 that	 also	 fit	 the	 five	 basic	
criteria	of	postmodern	project	fiction—say	The	Flagellants’	investigation	of	the	agency-
constraining	limitations	of	quotidian	language,	Play	It	As	It	Lays’	search	for	a	minimalist	
warrant	 for	 the	action	of	 refusing	 suicide,	William	S	Wilson’s	Why	 I	Don’t	Write	 Like	
Franz	Kafka	with	its	speculations	about	how	deliberative	agency	would	fare	among	the	
many	human	qualities	 set	 to	change	 irreversibly	 in	an	age	of	cyborgery	and	biological	
enhancement,	and	Walter	Abish’s	Future	Imperfect	sketching	how	we	act	towards	others	
in	terms	of	singularity	and	commensurability—would	demonstrate	 just	as	much	range	
in	 style	 and	 philosophical	 imagination,	 but	 since	 these	 works	 were	 never	 used	 to	
canonize	 the	 anti-mimesis=deconstruction	 equation	 a	 study	 elaborating	 their	 precise	
stylistic	 innovations	 and	 constructive	 commitments	would	have	 less	 revisionary	 force.	
The	four	authors	I	 focus	on	here,	 for	all	their	demographic	similarity,	provide	a	varied	
archive	 that	 can	 ground	 a	 complete	 revision	 of	 our	 understanding	 of	 anti-illusionist	
fiction’s	workings	and	rhetorical	capacity.5		
	
Antimimetic	Mechanics	
Whether	or	not	 the	argument	 that	PLUS’	 stylistic	modulations	make	about	 the	
importance	of	 linguistic	reflexivity	to	deliberative	agency	 is	right	matters	 less	than	the	
fact	that	those	precise	modulations	are	capable	of	carrying	an	equally	precise	argument.	
Since	 understanding	 the	 significance	 of	 these	 modulations	 requires	 a	 Barth-ian	
awareness	 of	 their	 place	 in	 the	 generic	 development	 of	 prose	 representations	 of	
psychology.	PLUS	doesn’t	immerse	us	in	another	mind	so	much	as	identify	and	organize	
linguistically	pre-coded	aspects	of	consciousness	to	tell	us	about	minds	per	se.	Its	style-
driven	argument	thus	relies	more	on	our	awareness	of	 its	genre-bound	textuality	 than	
on	the	imputed	world	on	the	other	side	of	the	language.	
																																																								
5	The	technicalities	of	which—in	terms	of	fictive	ontology,	cognitive	processing,	rhetorical	export—I	hope	
to	 develop	 in	 technical	 terms	 in	 future	work	 by	 a	more	 direct	 engagement	with	 narratology,	 cognitive	
studies,	and	the	philosophy	of	literature.	
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It’s	clear	that	some	texts	set	themselves	the	task	of	communicating	without	the	
apparatus	of	empathy	and	immersion,	but	terms	like	those	I	use	above,	about	textuality	
and	 referentiality	 and	 “worlds	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 language,”	 are	more	 controversial,	
and	come	from	an	existing	set	of	debates	about	the	ontology	of	fiction:	one	in	which	the	
authors	I	address	often	participated	directly.	
First,	 I	 should	 clarify	 what	 I	 mean	 when	 I	 frame	 this	 project	 as	 a	 defence	 of	
antimimetic	 prose’s	 capacities.	 The	 term’s	 meaning	 is	 determined,	 of	 course,	 by	 the	
meanings	 of	 mimesis	 it	 presumes,	 and	 there	 are	 many	 incompatible	 of	 these.	 Some	
identify	 fiction’s	 intent	 to	 mirror	 the	 specific	 world	 we	 live	 in—which	 would	 make	
conventional	 science	 fiction	anti-mimetic—while	others	 concern	 the	 formal	 apparatus	
by	which	fictions	try	to	guarantee	perceptual	access	to	imagined	worlds:	on	this	model,	
most	science	 fiction	 is	mimetic,	on	the	 former	model,	 it	 is	not.	Since	my	concerns	are	
stylistic,	I	use	the	term	in	fairly	narrow	terms	aligned	with	the	distinction	Christopher	
Nash	makes	between	neo-cosmic	 and	anti-cosmic	versions	of	non-realistic	 fiction.	The	
difference	comes	 in	the	degree	to	which	they	want	us	to	maintain	the	standard	fictive	
reading	practice	of	believing	in	the	existence	of	the	objects	the	narrative	describes.	Neo-
cosmic	 fiction	 presents	worlds	 that	 operate	 according	 to	 laws	 incompatible	 with	 our	
own,	but	does	so	through	formal	devices	familiar	from	conventional	realism	so	as	to	lay	
standard	 claim	 to	 giving	 us	 unmediated	 mental	 access	 to	 those	 worlds.	 Anti-cosmic	
fiction,	 by	 contrast,	 foregrounds	 its	 own	 textual	 appropriation	 or	 manipulation	 or	
rejection	of	those	conventions,	refusing	to	allow	us	to	forget	that	it	is	made	of	words	on	
a	 page,	 and	 that	 any	world	we	 imagine	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 those	words	 is	 limited	 to	 our	
imaginings,	with	no	independent	existence.6		
The	 term	 anti-cosmic	 usefully	 picks	 out	 the	 givens	 of	 Barth’s	 or	 Gass’	
philosophies	of	prose	 fiction,	which	 require	 readers	 to	maintain	 awareness	of	 the	 fact	
																																																								
6	“As	a	still	illusionistic	[neocosmic]	mode	[non-realist	fiction]	may	feel	free	to	pretend,	or	even	think	right	
to	set	out	to	demonstrate	that	there’s	more	than	everyday	life-in-the-world	to	feel	and	think	about.		Or,	as	
an	anti-illusionist	[anticosmic]	mode,	it	may	unfold	and	explore—whether	for	the	sake	of	beauty	or	some	
further	kind	of	truth	or	pleasure—the	one	thing	fictional	illusions	can’t	cope	with:	the	fictionality	of	the	
fiction	itself,	and	all	that	it’s	composed	of”	(46).		
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that	no	world	exists	on	the	other	side	of	the	words	they	read,	even	as	those	words	rely	
on	 an	 imagined	 world	 to	 organize	 their	 relationships.	 I	 use	 anti-mimetic	 rather	 than	
anti-cosmic,	 though,	 because	 Nash’s	 account	 of	 anti-cosmic	 fiction’s	 rhetorical	
capacities	 makes	 the	 text’s	 specific	 language	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 overall	 attack	 on	 the	
possibility	of	representable	worlds,	and	I	need	a	term	that	leaves	room	for	specific	words	
and	organizations	 to	bear	 specific	 arguments.	The	other	 flaw	 in	anti-cosmic—and	any	
designator	 for	 this	 fiction	 which	 doesn’t	 mention	 mimesis—is	 that	 it	 leaves	 open	
another	of	the	blanket	anti-cognitive	rhetorics	I	want	to	undermine:	the	claim	that	the	
disorientation	produced	by	any	departure	from	mimetic	habits	is	a	kind	of	second-order	
mimesis,	 corresponding	 better	 with	 our	 reality	 than	 the	 traditional	 novel’s	 delusory	
implications	 of	 worldly	 comprehensibility,	 world-navigating	 sovereign	 agency,	 and	 so	
on.		My	anti-mimesis	clarifies	that	the	novels	I	examine	seem	uninvested	in	this	model.		
In	 this	 respect,	a	 term	 like	counter-illusory	might	get	at	what	 I’m	 interested	 in,	
except	 that	 there	 are	 persuasive	 accounts	 of	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 traditional	mimetic	
fiction	aims	to	immerse	us	in	its	worlds	without	denying	the	artificiality	of	the	process.	
Robert	Alter,	 for	 example,	 defines	his	 history	 of	 non-realistic	 fiction	 against	 a	 realism	
that	
operates	with	a	tacit	agreement	between	author	and	audience	that	these	artifices	
are	 the	 necessary	 and	 efficacious	 vehicle	 for	 conveying	 the	 truth	 about	 the	
characters,	 and	 that	 they	 are	 to	 be	 assumed	 as	 a	 transparent	medium	 even	 in	
their	conspicuousness;	for	our	chief	interest	is	in	the	personages	and	events	they	
convey	to	us,	not	in	the	nature	and	status	of	the	artifices	(19).	
This	 crucially	 distinguishes	 between	 fictions	 that	 ask	 to	 be	 read	 as	 organizations	 of	
fictive	 event,	 and	 those	 that	 ask	 to	 be	 read	 as	 organizations	 of	 verbal	 artifice.	
Unfortunately,	 this	 leads	him	to	argue	 that	non-realism	always	preoccupies	 itself	with	
the	 “nature…	 of	 the	 artifice”	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 worldly	 concerns,	 which	 is	 of	 course	
precisely	 what	 I’m	 disputing.	 Leonard	Orr	 argues	 similarly	 about	 the	 category	 of	 the	
non-aristotelian	 novel,	 which	 like	 counter-illusory	 has	 the	 virtue	 of	 not	 naturalizing	
realist	aspects	by	making	them	the	dominant	term	that	constrains	anything	“anti.”	Yet	
where	anti-cosmic	doesn’t	 leave	enough	 room	 for	a	 focus	on	 the	different	 rhetorics	of	
	 23	
different	styles,	non-aristotelian	runs	the	risk	of	undermining	the	constructive	rhetorical	
intent	I	think	that	form’s	capable	of	sustaining.	I	use	antimimetic,	then,	for	its	ability	to	
both	 reject	 world-illusory	 formal	mechanics	 and	 stay	 capable	 of	 a	 range	 of	 rhetorical	
outputs.	
**	 	
This	 limitation	of	available	rhetorics	 is	the	most	consistent	weakness	across	the	
almost	half-century	 of	work	on	 antimimetic	 fiction’s	 distinctive	history	 and	workings,	
from	 Alter’s	 survey	 to	 the	 present.	 Nash,	 for	 all	 his	 useful	 distinction,	 gives	 a	 fairly	
underwhelming	 account	 of	 their	 respective	 communicative	 potentials:	 both	 are	
constrained	 to	 rejections	 of	 realism’s	 rhetoric:	 with	 “[anticosmism]	 laying	 siege	 to	
Realism’s	 having	 declarative	 intentions,	 and	 [neocosmism]	 assaulting	 the	 specific	
declarative	 intentions”	 (278).	Unfortunately,	 the	 lack	of	uptake	 for	Nash’s	work	means	
that	scholarly	examinations	or	histories	of	anti-realist	fiction	tend	to	blur	his	two	modes	
together,	with	even	more	reductive	consequences	for	the	accounts	of	the	rhetoric.		
While	anti-cosmic	fiction	seems	to	raise	harder	and	more	interesting	questions,	
critics	who	don’t	make	Nash’s	distinction	have	almost	exclusively	examined	the	overall	
category	 of	 antimimesis	 in	 terms	 of	 neo-cosmic	 examples.	 The	 kind	 of	 convention-
foregrounding	 stylistic	 anti-cosmism	 advocated	 by	 Barth	 and	 epitomised	 by	 McElroy	
struggles	 to	 find	 a	 place	 in	 such	 accounts,	 even	 before	 we	 get	 to	 rhetorical	
considerations.	 We	 don’t	 lack	 explanations	 of	 Neocosmic	 rhetoric:	 the	 standard	
“immersion”	 account	 of	 fiction’s	mind-changing	mechanic	 works	 perfectly	 well	 for	 it.		
When	people	do	distinguish	among	antimimeses,	the	presumption	is	usually	that	anti-
cosmic	fiction	is	the	most	simply	deconstructive	of	available	modes:	in	Nash’s	account,	
“anticosmic	fiction	is	brilliantly	proficient	in—and	in	fact	highly	specialized	for	exactly	
the	activity	of—shattering	our	sluggish	habits	of	thought,	but	is	inclined…	to	stop	there”	
(292).	 As	 I’ll	 argue,	 the	 way	 that	 authors	 like	 Barth	 and	 McElroy,	 in	 line	 with	 the	
methodological	manifestos	of	Barth	or	Gass,	highlight	their	textuality	is	essentially	anti-
cosmic,	 but	 their	 rhetoric	 is	 not	 negative,	 doesn’t	 get	 to	 “shattering”	 and	 then	 “stop	
there.”	Presumptions	about	the	limited	array	of	rhetorical	work	such	fiction	is	capable	of	
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are	 belied	 by	 any	 reasonably	 faithful	 examination	 of	 the	 texts	 themselves.	 What	 we	
need,	 then,	 are	 accounts	 of	 the	 constructive	 capacities	 of	 the	 anti-cosmic	 strain	 of	
antimimesis,	 but	 recent	 developments	 have	 if	 anything	 subsumed	 this	 even	 further	
below	existing	emphases.	
Take,	for	example,	the	recent	boom	in	work	on	non-realist	fiction	in	the	field	of	
narrative	theory.	This	has	mostly	happened	under	the	heading	of	“Unnatural	Narrative,”	
examining	 the	 challenges	 that	 non-realist	 fiction	 poses	 to	 a	 field	 whose	 models	 for	
narrative	structure	are	mainly	drawn	from	the	study	of	classic	victorian	or	“turn-of-the-
century”	realism.7		The	movement	has	drawn	useful	attention	to	antimimetic	texts,	but	
it	 both	 privileges	 neo-cosmic	 forms	 of	 antimimesis	 and	 insists	 on	 the	 old	 unilateral	
destructive-verb	rhetoric.	
An	 early	 manifesto	 essay,	 for	 example,	 suggests	 that	 Unnatural	 covers	
“temporalities,	storyworlds,	mind	representations,	or	acts	of	narration	that	would	have	
to	be	construed	as	physically,	logically,	mnemonically,	or	psychologically	impossible	or	
highly	implausible	in	real-world	storytelling	situations”	(“What	is	Unnatural”	373),	while	
the	introduction	to	a	collection	on	the	poetics	of	unnatural	narrative	as	a	whole	defines	
its	 remit	 by	 conflating	 the	 texts	 that	 best	 allow	 us	 to	 “comprehend	 theoretically	 the	
strategies	 of	 narrative	 construction	 that	 are	 unique	 to	 fiction”	 with	 those	 “texts	 that	
present	 extremely	 implausible,	 impossible,	 or	 logically	 contradictory	 scenarios	 or	
events”	 (Poetics	 3).	 The	 emphasis	 in	 both	 cases	 is	 on	 departures	 in	 the	 usual	
construction	of	 fictional	 “storyworlds,”	 “events,”	 “scenarios”	 rather	 than	on	any	quality	
of	 the	 language.	 Brian	 Richardson’s	 recent	 summative	 monograph	 on	 the	 movement	
makes	explicit	that	for	him,	“discourse	does	not	constitute	the	unnatural,	except	in	rare	
cases	where	the	discourse	actually	affects	the	storyworld”	(12).	Richardson,	meanwhile,	
lists	 and	 taxonomizes	 vast	 arrays	 of	 forms	 that	 violate	 the	 “Natural”	 canon.	 Yet	 he	
embodies	the	discipline-wide	problem	that	 interest	 in	the	array	of	 forms	has	not	been	
																																																								
7	“Unnatural	 Narrative”	 also	 more	 directly	 contests	 the	 more	 technical	 sense	 of	 “Natural	 Narrative,”	 a	
model	that	insists	that	our	default	mode	of	processing	the	implication-conditions	of	all	narrative	is	drawn	
from	those	that	govern	face-to-face	conversations	about	real-world	events.	See	Fludernik	
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matched	 by	 interest	 in	 the	 range	 of	 rhetorical	 capacity.	 He	 avows	 an	 investment	 in	
plurality:	 “Every	unnatural	work	has	 to	be	quite	different.”	 	But	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	
rhetoric	of	such	works,	he’s	happy	to	 talk	 in	general	 terms	that	remind	us	of	Nash	on	
“shattering,”	 let	 alone	 the	 more	 globally	 pervasive	 vocabulary	 of	 “deconstruction”	 or	
“subversion.”	Sometimes	he	writes	as	if	the	“violation”	or	“transgression”	of	expectation	
is	 an	 end	 in	 itself,	 at	 other	 times	 as	 if	 the	 forms	necessarily	 “challenge”	 and	 “disrupt”	
philosophical	 positions	 associated	 with	 traditional	 rise-of-the-novel	 realism,	 and	 at	
others	 as	 if	 the	 readerly	 experience	 of	 “disturbance”	 or	 “disruption”	 are	 the	 goals.	
Though	 Richardson	 like	 most	 theorists	 of	 Unnatural	 Narrative	 is	 committed	 to	
investigating	the	whole	of	“The	Other	Great	Tradition,”	the	limitations	of	his	rhetorical	
accounts	 are	 drawn	 from	a	 vocabulary	 associated	 strongly	with	 the	 self-conception	 of	
“radical”	 “postmodern”	 theory	 in	 its	US-poststructuralist	 guise.	As	 this	was	 the	 theory	
through	which	the	study	of	McElroy’s	generation	of	authors	was	institutionalized,	it’s	no	
surprise	 that	 Richardson’s	 initial	 account	 of	 the	 texts	 he’ll	 consider	 refers	 to	 their	
“postmodern	and	other”	versions	of	innovation	(3).		
Postmodern	 fiction	 continues	 to	 play	 a	 shoring	 role	 in	 the	
antimimetic=deconstructive	 presumption	 that	 underpins	 the	 study	 of	 antimimetic	
fiction.	 As	 long	 as	 antimimeic	 fiction’s	 interests	 are	 presumed	 to	 be	 limited	 to	 the	
negation	 of	 realism’s,	 we	 will	 lack	 a	 vocabulary	 to	 talk	 about	 some	 of	 the	 most	
distinctive	 fiction	 of	 recent	 decades.	 Monika	 Fludernik,	 the	 articulator	 of	 Natural	
Narratology,	 was	 right	 to	 suggest	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 current	 interest	 in	 the	
Unnatural	 that	 “mimetic	 reductionism”	 might	 give	 rise	 to	 a	 corresponding	 “anti-
mimetic…	reductionism”	(358).	Whatever	its	causes,	this	antimimetic	reductionism	has	
left	us	without	either	a	clear	technical	account	of	how	explicitly	anti-illusory	fictions	can	
do	more	than	“disturb”	us,	or	a	store	of	examples	of	such	fiction	on	the	basis	of	which	
we	could	build	such	a	technical	account.	
**	
This	 is	where	 the	 criticism	and	 the	practice	 of	 anti-mimetic	 fiction	diverge.	As	
Richard	 Walsh,	 one	 of	 the	 few	 critics	 to	 examine	 antimimetic	 fiction’s	 range	 of	
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argumentative	implication,	suggests	of	the	postmodern	generation,	“What	they	reject,	to	
different	degrees,	 is	 the	centrality	of	mimesis	as	a	mode	of	engagement.	 	This	 is	not	a	
negative	or	restrictive	strategy:	the	chief	merit	innovative	fictions	share	is	their	capacity	
to	 extend	 the	 possibilities	 of	 fictional	 engagement	 beyond	mimesis”	 (NA	 2).8	In	 other	
words,	anti-mimesis	 is	a	tool	that	can	serve	a	constructive	“beyond”	of	what	we	know,	
not	 just	negations	 supervenient	on	what	we	already	know.	 	This,	 certainly,	 is	 the	way	
that	the	authors	I	discuss	in	this	project	tend	to	talk	about	their	own	work.	
Walsh’s	 language	 of	 “beyond”	 tangentially	 conjures	 the	 other	 distinctive	
presumption	that	undergirds	 the	theoretical	assertions	of	critic-authors	 like	Barth	and	
Gass.	As	I’ve	said	above,	such	authors	insist	that	one	of	the	distinctive	qualities	of	their	
kind	 of	 convention-foregrounding	 antimimesis	 is	 its	 open	 insistence	 that	 there	 is	 no	
existent	 world	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 its	 language,	 no	 matter	 what	 that	 language	 may	
prompt	 us	 to	 imagine.	 For	 Gass,	 for	 example,	 it	 is	 a	 mistake	 to	 think	 of	 a	 character	
whose	nose	hasn’t	been	described	as	having	a	nose	in	the	same	way	that	they	have	the	
eyes	 their	 author	 has	 told	 us	 are	 blue.	 The	 character	 is	 not	 a	 whole	 person	 partially	
described,	but	only	the	constellation	of	words	that	constitute	the	description.	
On	the	mimetic	model,	developments	 in	 formal	methods	of	conveying	 fictional	
characters’	mental	 experience	 thus	 develop	 as	 “better”	 alternatives	 for	 presenting	 the	
way	minds	really	work,	better	immersing	us	in	another	person’s	head.	For	him	or	Barth,	
the	succession	of	prose-forms	that	promise	to	do	a	more	transparent	job	of	presenting	
the	way	minds	really	work,	better	immersing	us	in	another	person’s	head	has	to	reach	an	
end-point	at	which	we	instead	choose	to	read	prose	fiction	more	explicitly	as	what	it	is:	
rhetorically	 arranged	 language.	Gass	 goes	 perhaps	 further	 than	Barth	 in	 insisting	 that	
this	is	all	literature	ever	has	been	or	can	be:	he	offers	a	thoroughly	anticosmic	verbalism																																																									
8	See	also	Daniel	Green	on	postmodernism’s	central	quality	being	not	an	ideology	or	a	contextual	origin,	
but	its	being	an	intensely,	enthusiastically	written	fiction,	an	attempt	to	above	all	keep	writing	itself	alive	
as	the	material	or	medium	of	art-in	other	words,	to	preserve	the	idea	of	literature	as	a	distinctive,	perhaps	
necessarily	even	as	a	self-consciously	distinctive,	order	of	writing”	(741)	or	RM	Berry	on	metafiction	as	an	
investigation	 of	 working	 conditions:	 “It	 was	 as	 though	 recent	 history,	 both	 political	 and	 cultural,	 had	
exposed	fiction’s	received	versions	as	fraudulent…	whether	they	considered	these	versions	obsolete,	naïve,	
arbitrary,	 or	 just	 boring,	 the	metafictionists	 were	 determined	 to	 establish	 the	 real	 conditions	 for	 their	
practice”	(132).	
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that	treats	all	the	conventional	aspects	of	fiction	in	linguistic	terms.	See	for	example	his	
refiguration	of	the	concept	of	character:	
“A	character	for	me	is	any	linguistic	location	of	a	book	toward	which	a	great	part	
of	the	rest	of	the	text	stands	as	a	modifier.	Just	as	the	subject	of	a	sentence	say,	is	
modified	 by	 the	 predicate,	 so	 frequently	 some	 character,	 Emma	 Bovary	 for	
instance,	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	 central	 character	 in	 the	 book	 because	 a	 lot	 of	 the	
language	basically	and	ultimately	goes	back	to	modify,	be	about,	Emma	Bovary.	...	
The	work	is	filled	with	only	one	thing—words	and	how	they	work	and	how	they	
connect”	(interview	w/	Gardner	8).	
The	difference	might	be	best	explained	by	recourse	to	the	work	of	Roman	Ingarden,	the	
Austrian	metaphysician	whose	The	 Literary	Work	 of	 Art	 aimed	 to	 give	 an	 account	 of	
what	 a	 literary	 artwork	was	 that	 didn’t	 boil	 down	 to	 either	 the	 physical	 object	 of	 the	
book,	 the	 psychological	 experience	 or	 author	 or	 reader,	 or	 the	 objects	 of	 imaginary	
worlds.	For	Ingarden,	literary	artworks	exist	as	such	when	they	unite	in	one	space	four	
different	 levels	of	 inseparable	phenomena:	 the	phonetic	 structure	of	a	word-sequence,	
units	 of	 verbal	meaning	 and	 their	 interrelations,	 “schematized	 aspects”	 that	 direct	 us	
from	the	verbal	meanings	to	imaginings,	and	the	objects	and	events	that	populate	those	
imaginings:	 entities	 of	 the	 kind	 Ingarden’s	mentor	 Franz	 Brentano	 called	 “intentional	
inexistents.” 9 	Ingarden’s	 interest	 was	 in	 ontology	 rather	 than	 rhetoric,	 and	 so	 he	
required	the	co-presence	of	these	four	levels	of	artwork,	without	any	implicit	hierarchy.	
In	standard	mimetic	reading	practice,	however,	of	the	kind	that	 leads	people	to	praise	
prose	fiction	on	the	basis	that	“it	makes	you	feel	like	you’re	really	there”	or	“I	feel	like	I	
really	know	 this	 character,”	 there’s	 a	 clear	hierarchy	of	engagement:	 Ingarden’s	 fourth	
level	is	the	object	of	interest,	and	the	first	two	levels	just	serve	as	material	for	the	third	
to	process	to	give	readers	access:	call	this	the	transparency	approach	to	reading	fiction.		
Gass’	model,	on	the	other	hand,	asks	us	to	find	the	salient,	engagement-worthy	aspect	of	
prose	fiction	in	the	first	two	levels:	the	fourth	level	serves,	through	the	membrane	of	the	
third,	 to	 help	 order	 and	 regulate	 the	 relationships	 on	 the	 first	 two,	 but	 has	 no	
																																																								
9	That	 is,	entities	with	no	true	existence,	but	which	could	still	be	consistently	posited	objects	of	mental	
attention	and	orientation,	including	intersubjectively.	
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independent	interest	of	its	own.	Texts	will	solicit	us	to	engage	with	them	in	one	of	these	
ways	or	the	other.	
Insisting	that	prose	fiction	has	a	more	promising	future	as	an	artwork	that	directs	
attention	to	Ingarden-levels	1+2	than	by	treating	them	as	mere	adjuncts	to	4,	Gass	and	
Barth	both	endorse	a	 set	of	 fiction-building	 formal	practices	 that	deny	us	 explanatory	
resort	 to	 entities	 on	 “the	 other	 side”	 of	 the	 fiction’s	 language.	 They	 each,	 in	 their	
theories	and	their	practice	use	conspicuous,	insistently	non-transparent	style	in	such	a	
way	that	any	fiction	construed	by	that	style	necessarily	announces	 its	own	fictionality,	
its	own	textual	ontology	within	a	generic	history,	and	the	need	to	read	it	by	computing	
with	the	significance	of	 that	opaque	form.	If	 this	 is	 the	model	of	 fiction	that	animates	
much	“postmodern”	antimimesis,	then	it	seems	clear	that	we	need	clearer	accounts	both	
of	how	style	alone	can	establish	a	text’s	wish	to	be	read	anti-cosmically,	and	of	what	goes	
on	in	terms	of	“how	[words]	work	and	how	they	connect”	once	that	reading	imperative	
is	established.	
	 While	these	models	are	often	read	as	iconoclastic,	understanding	them	as	simply	
another	way	to	make	rhetorical	moves	within	the	same	basic	Ingarden	ontology	lets	us	
see	 that	 the	 Barth/Gass	 approach	 can	 in	 accommodate	 a	 much	 broader	 sense	 of	
antimimetic	 fiction’s	 rhetorical	 capacities.	 This	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 contrast	 between	 the	
language	these	authors	themselves	use	about	their	work,	and	the	vocabulary	favoured	by	
those	 who	 associate	 antimimesis	 with	 negation.	 Compare	 the	 positive	 vocabulary	 of	
Barth’s	 and	 Gass’	 anti-cosmic	 postmodern	manifestoes—discovery,	 validity,	 rightness,	
work,	 connection—with	 those	 of	 putatively	 antimimetic	 explicators	 like	 Nash	 and	
Richardson:	 violating,	 shattering,	 transgressing,	 disrupting.	 This	 tendency	 persists	
through	an	array	of	approaches:	Brian	McHale’s	examination	of	postmodernism	sees	its	
formal	 experiment	 as	 dedicated	 to	 “disrupting	 the	 conditioned	 responses	 of	 the	
modernist	reader”	(81),	Alter’s	earlier	examination	of	the	antimimetic	tradition	sees	all	
such	work	as	“forc[ing]”	a	reader	“to	examine	again	and	again	the	validity	of	his	ordinary	
discriminations”	(224),	unnatural	narratologists	stress	how	“relatively	plotless,	pointless,	
artitrary,	unconnected,	or	contradictory”	can	“easily	and	radically	deconstruct	our	real-
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world	 notions	 of	 time	 and	 space”	 (Poetics	 Intro	 2),	 or	 force	 us	 to	 “accept	 the	
fundamental	strangeness	of	unnatural	scenarios	and	the	 feelings	of	disorientation	that	
they	 might	 evoke”	 (UnNat	 /UnNat	 intro	 9).	 	 Srnivas	 Aravamudan,	 recovering	 anti-
mimetic	 texts	 of	 the	 Enlightenment	 era	 and	 their	 constructive	 treatments	 of	 other	
worlds	 and	 cultures,	 finds	 that	 “At	 their	 best,	 such	 comparative	 representations	 go	
beyond	 the	 stereotype	 and	 put	 forward	 a	 radical	 epistemological	 scepticism	 of	
everything,	including	their	own	status”	(110).	In	all	of	this,	there’s	an	emphasis	on	mere	
undermining,	simple	shock,	sub-cognitive	“shattering.”	The	authors	themselves	make	no	
such	claims.	Yet	critics’	shared	presumption	that	anti-mimetic	fiction	sets	itself	up	first	
and	 foremost	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 default	 mimetic	 practices	 leads	 us	 to	 a	 rhetoric	
constrained	 to	 the	 negation	 of	 ideas	 or	 orientations	 associated	with	 those	 defaults.	 A	
vast	chasm	of	particularity	persists	between	minutely	detailed	elaboration	of	what	anti-
mimetic	 formal	 features	 look	 like,	 and	blanket	 claims	about	what	 they’re	 good	 for.	 In	
the	aggregate,	these	become	deadeningly	homogenous.		Such	fictions	will	freak	you	out,	
and	make	you	question	what	you	take	for	granted.		
Christian	Thorne	examines	this	problem	in	relation	to	the	philosophical	context	
of	 early-enlightenment	 fiction,	 where	 the	 anachronistic	 treatment	 of	 enlightenment	
versions	of	scepticism	in	20th-century	deconstructive	terms	has	had	a	misleading	effect.	
The	genealogical	 critique	of	 reason	has	 its	own	history,	Thorne	 shows,	 and	both	anti-
realist	 fictive	 experiment	 and	 philosophical	 scepticism	 in	 the	 period	were	more	 often	
tools	 of	 overt	 reactionaries	 than	 of	marginalized	 critique.	 If	we	 presume	 that	 “radical	
epistemology”	 leads	 to	 “radical	 politics,”	 he	 suggests,	 then	we	 get	 a	 “radical	 criticism”	
that	 assumes	 “that	 all	 power	 is	 centralized”	 and	 thus	 that	 “gestures	 toward	
decentralization	 are	 thus	 indiscriminately	 to	 be	 seconded”	 (308).	 The	 putative	
alignment	 of	 “radical”	 literary	 experiment	 with	 “radical	 epistemology”	 thus	 partly	
explains	 the	 presumptions	 about	 such	 experiment’s	 intrinsically	 de-centering	 political	
and	philosophical	commitments.	But	as	a	novel	like	PLUS	shows,	such	experiments	can	
be	put	in	service	of	a	thoroughly	constructive	take	on	epistemology,	agency,	and	so	on.	
Thorne’s	 defence	 of	 the	 plurality	 of	 possible	 constellations	 of	 political	 commitment,	
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philosophical	sckepticism,	and	literary	form	serves	his	overall	wish	for	a	criticism	more	
willing	 to	 treat	 both	 literary	 forms	 and	 philosophical	 commitments	 as	 specifically	
historical.	 Might	 postmodern	 fiction’s	 relation	 to	 its	 generally	 sceptical	 times	 and	
institutional	history,	then,	be	more	complex	than	a	mere	mirroring?		
The	equations	Thorne	diagnoses	have	become	a	barrier	to	reading,	one	that	PLUS	
arguably	anticipates.	 In	another	of	 its	self-conscious	moments,	ground	control	express	
their	 cognitive	 limitations	when	 Imp	Plus	 first	 attempts	 to	 communicate	his	 dawning	
sense	 of	 supra-individual	 insight	 to	 them.	 “IMP	 PLUS,”	 they	 call,	 “WE	READ	OTHER	
THAN.	 BUT	 AFTER	 THAT	WE	DO	NOT	 READ.	 SAY	 AGAIN.”	 There’s	 more	 to	 anti-
mimetic	fiction’s	rhetorical	capacities	than	the	assertion	of	its	status	as	“OTHER	THAN”	
realism.	After	half	a	century,	there’s	no	need	to	insist	on	“OTHER	THAN”	“AGAIN.”		
	
Definitions	Regarding	Style	and	Argument	
I’ve	 already	 delineated	 the	 restricted	 meanings	 I	 reserve	 for	 the	 complex	 and	
overdetermined	 terms	 style	 and	 antimimetic.	 The	 methodological	 clarifcations	 above	
require	 a	 few	 further	 definitions,	 particularly	 regarding	 the	 approaches	 to	 literature	 I	
rely	 on	 in	 claiming	 that	 style	 can	 argue.	 For	 some	 less	 argumentatively	 central	
explanations	of	why	I’m	using	certain	generic,	philosophical,	and	contextual	terms	in	my	
discussion	of	this	set	of	authors,	see	Appendix	B.	
Given	 the	 postmodern	 authors’	 concern	 with	 deliberative	 agency,	 the	 kind	 of	
formal	 structures	 the	 novels	 manipulate	 away	 from	 Alter’s	 “transparency”	 are	 often	
those	 for	 the	 presentation	 of	 thought.	 The	 development	 is	 away	 from	 what	 I’ll	 call	
conventional	prose	psychology.	This	category	covers	most	fictional	mind-representation	
up	to	the	“stream	of	consciousness,”	identifying	any	prose	form	that	claims	to	grant	us	
access	to	the	moment	by	moment	working	of	a	mind	through	prose	characterised	by	the	
linear,	sequential	presentation	of	experiences,	 impressions,	 insights	and	considerations	
toward	a	conclusion	or	an	action.	Dorrit	Cohn’s	history	and	taxonomy	of	these	forms—
she	identifies	six	major	forms	that	have	been	discussed	interchaeably	as	either	“stream	
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of	 consciousness”	 or	 “free	 indirect”—makes	 many	 subtle	 and	 useful	 distinctions,	 but	
each	 sticks	 to	 that	basic	 linear	 sequencing,	 and	 so	 in	 the	 aggregate	 they	 establish	 the	
connection	between	“turn	of	the	century”	 forms	and	the	presumption	of	psychological	
regularity.	Cohn,	 like	Ann	Banfield	 from	a	 linguist’s	perspective	 in	Transparent	Minds,	
draws	on	Käte	Hamburger’s	arguments	that	free	indirect	forms	in	particular	are	unique	
to	 prose	 fiction	 and	 hence	 characterized	 by	 an	 unshakable	 conventionality:	 they	 are	
artifices	of	 the	kind	Alter	 suggests	 readers	and	authors	have	 to	agree	 to	 treat	 as	more	
transparent	 to	 experience	 than	 they	 actually	 are.	 Yet	 neither	 Cohn	 nor	 followers	 like	
Banfield	 or	Maria	Mäkelä	 investigate	 the	ways	 in	which	 authors	 covered	 by	 her	 time	
period	exploit	this	conventionality	to	propose	non-linear	or	linguistically	opaque	models	
of	minds,	as	I’ve	suggested	Dreiser	or	Wharton	do.		
The	insight	that	Wharton	or	Dreiser	provided	for	the	postmodern	generation	to	
build	 on	 was	 that	 foregrounding	 the	 ways	 that	 small	 tweaks	 to	 existing	 conventions	
could	 turn	 them	 opaque	 and	 make	 them	 serve	 accounts	 of	 mental	 experience	 that	
challenged	the	transparent-linear	model.	10	Barth,	writing	in	the	mid-70s	after	his	fiction	
had	 moved	 on	 from	 the	 investigation	 of	 deliberative	 paralysis,	 could	 nevertheless	
suggest	that,	antimimetic	or	not,	“literature’s	 linearity—the	literal	 lines	of	print	on	the	
page	and	the	normal	one-word-at-a-timeness	of	language”	meant	that	“other	media	may	
deal	more	effectively	than	writing	with	the	nonlinear	and	the	discontinuous,	but	it	may	
be	that	writing	is	uniquely	suited	to	deal	with	the	linear	and	the	continuous	aspects	of	
human	 experience”	 (“FoLLoF”	 163).	 Even	 in	 an	 age	 of	 “exhaustion,”	 he	 suggests	 that	
“written	literature	can	deal	most	appropriately—at	least	more	effectively	than	any	other	
art—with	 just	 those	 aspects	 of	 our	 experience	 that	 are	 at	 some	 remove	 from	 direct	
sensation…”	 among	 which	 remain	 the	 standard	 materials	 of	 the	 classic	 psychological	
novel:	“the	whole	silent	life	of	the	mind—cognition,	reflection,	speculation,	recollection,																																																									
10	Many	of	the	authors	I	discuss	don’t	depart	from	these	conventions	in	“radical”	ways	but	just	do	things	
like	modify	one	or	 two	basic	habits	of	sentence	construction.	Critics	 like	Brian	McHale	address	 the	 fact	
that	much	of	the	most	widely	read	postmodern	fiction	is	that	whose	departures	from	convention	are	non-
total,	 treating	 this	 as	 a	 rhetorical	principle	 for	making	 their	own	bigger	departures	 stand	out.	We	have	
plenty	 of	 discussion	 of	 this	 balance	 in	 terms	 of	 affective	 impact,	 but	 little	 if	 any	 that	 discusses	 the	
combination	of	conventional	and	convention-stretching	prose	forms	in	terms	of	meaning.		
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calculation,	 and	 the	 rest”	 (164).11	From	 Wharton	 and	 Dreiser	 to	 Barth	 and	 McElroy,	
departures	 from	 conventional	 prose	 psychology	 don’t	 mean	 a	 disinterest	 in	 practical	
“cognition”	or	deliberative	“calculation.”	Quite	the	opposite:	the	conventions	are	a	root	
form	over	which	 the	novels	 can	organize	modulations	and	departures	 so	as	 to	convey	
how	we	could	viably	update	the	presumptions	that	undergirded	the	older	prose.	
My	 claim	 that	 these	 stylistic	 forms	 argue,	 or	 bear	 arguments,	 relies	 on	 a	 fairly	
idiosyncratic	model	of	how	fictionality	works	that	I	hope	to	justify	more	fully	in	future	
work.	 For	 the	 present,	 a	 couple	 of	 stipulations	 should	make	 things	 intelligible,	 if	 not	
clearly	 justified.	 There	 are	 many	 ways	 in	 which	 literature	 or	 fiction	 can	 persuade:	
Walsh’s	Novel	 Arguments	makes	 a	 useful	 start	 on	 taxonomizing	 some	 of	 the	 versions	
that	are	distinctive	to	antimimetic	fiction.	Both	these	and	the	usual	accounts	of	realist	
fiction’s	 persuasive	 repertoire	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 pre-discursive	 and	 non-propositional	
factors:	empathy,	immersion,	affect,	and	so	on.	My	own	interest	is	narrower:	while	even	
the	novels	I	examine	persuade	in	various	modes,	I’m	interested	only	in	the	most	literally	
argumentative:	 those	 that	 use	 stylistic	 methods	 to	 organize	 imply	 and	 combine	
propositions	toward	conclusions.	Since	it’s	already	controversial	whether	even	mimetic	
fiction	can	persuade	by	anything	like	this	approach,	I	aim	by	showing	that	anti-mimetic	
fiction	can	do	so	to	establish	the	full	range	and	“freedom”	of	its	rhetorical	capacities.		
Walsh,	in	a	later	monograph,	makes	clear	how	much	those	capacities	depend	on	
non-immersion	 throughout	 the	 reading	 experience:	 “as	 the	basis	 for	 reading	 fiction,	 a	
willing	 suspension	 of	 disbelief	 will	 not	 do:	 disbelief	 is	 essential	 to	 reading	 a	 work	 of	
fiction	as	fictional,	and	it	is	only	by	doing	so	that	we	apprehend	the	effects	it	achieves	by	
means	of	fiction’s	own	particular	 literary	resources”	(70).	My	model	relies	on	the	basic	
postulate—discussed	above	as	 central	 to	 thinkers	 as	 varied	as	Barth,	Alter,	or	Cohn—
that	 competent	 readers	 of	 prose	 fiction	will	 process	 language	 constructions	 with	 this	
Walshian	 awareness	 first	 of	 their	 conventionality	 or	 relation	 to	 existing	 conventions,	
																																																								
11	Alan	Singer	has	suggested	that	for	Barth-ian	reasons,		“eludicidat[ing]”	“subjective	agency”	is	“the	chief	
conceptual	warrant	 of	 the	 [novel]	 genre	 itself”	 (4),	 and	while	 he	 focuses	mainly	 on	mimetic	 examples,	
Barth	shows	why	this	doesn’t	have	to	be	exclusive.	
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and	 second	of	 the	historical	 or	 logical	 associations	between	 the	 root	 conventions	 and	
particular	 ideas,	worldviews,	 or	 ideologies	 (for	 example,	 the	 chronological	 linearity	 of	
conventional	 prose	 psychology	 insists	 that	 we	 weigh	 considerations	 before	 making	
choices).	 Controlling	 for	 the	 degree	 of	 readerly	 competence,	 these	 language	
constructions	 should	have	 stable	 enough	 implications—due	 to	 the	 concrete	history	of	
the	 conventions	 they	 rely	 on—that	 their	 organization	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 in	 terms	 of	
entailment	(relative	to	the	narrative	they	posit).		
Existing	 accounts	 of	 realist	 ideology,	 for	 example,	 take	 this	 for	 granted	 in	 a	
conservative	sense:	that	the	“transparency”	with	which	readers	take	conventional	prose	
psychology	 to	 grant	 them	access	 to	 fictional	worlds	 and	minds	 presumes	 that	 readers	
have	 already	 naturalized	 a	 model	 of	 real	 psychological	 experience	 as	 linear	 and	
discursive.	Such	fiction	thus	argues,	on	this	account,	by	ratifying	that	naturalization	and	
reinforcing	 how	 we’ve	 been	 taught	 to	 think	 of	 ourselves.	When	 it	 comes	 to	 fictional	
forms	 that	 depart	 from	 the	 already-naturalized,	 though,	 existing	 criticism	 pays	 less	
attention	 to	 specific	 connections	 between	 form	 and	 ideology.	 It	 stresses	 instead	 the	
mere	 affective	 jarring	 of	 unfamiliarity,	 the	 undirected	 undermining	 of	 the	 default	
naturalizing	process.	By	contrast,	a	reader	who’s	competent	with	literary	conventions	in	
the	linguistic	sense	(able	to	understand	the	implications	of	existing	meaning-units	and	
able	to	create	and	understand	new	combinations	of	 them)	should	be	aware	enough	of	
the	construction	and	implication	of	the	conventions	the	new	form	departs	from	that	by	
examining	 the	 details	 of	 the	 departure	 they	 should	 be	 able	 to	 say	 whether	 or	 not	 it	
proposes	a	coherent	alternative	to	the	original.	Think,	in	this	respect,	of	my	discussions	
above	 of	 Dreiser’s	 reorganization	 of	 the	 standard	 sentence-construction	 to	 place	 the	
outcome	of	the	action	before	the	narration	of	the	choice.	As	soon	as	we	start	thinking	
about	 the	 relationship	 between	 specific	 departures	 from	 convention	 and	 specific	
refinements	 to	 existing	 worldviews,	 we	 find	 ourselves,	 I	 suggest,	 attributing	
argumentative	entailments	to	constructions	and	organizations	of	style.		
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Call	this	approach	to	the	implications	of	literary	style	cognitive,12	in	the	sense	of	
involving	 calculation	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 implied	 propositions,	 and	 in	
contrast	 to	 models	 that	 think	 about	 style’s	 effects	 in	 terms	 of	 pre-discursive	 affects,	
mere	 transparency,	 or	 ornamentation.13	This	 makes	 the	 moment	 of	 departure	 from	
convention	 not	 one	 of	 shock	 alone,	 but	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 plausibly	 constructive	
engagement	 with	 argument:	 Nash,	 in	 one	 of	 the	 rare	 moments	 that	 he	 frees	 anti-
mimetic	 rhetoric	 from	mere	 rejection,	 suggests	 that	 “The	 assembly	of	 such	 fiction,	 all	
told,	 may	 finally	 be	 against	 shock,	 though	 each	 work’s	 individual	 programme	 takes	
shock	 as	 its	 initiating	 strategy”	 (159).	 This	 seems	 to	 usefully	 acknowledge—against	
Nash’s	 own	 wider	 thrust—that	 insistent	 fictionality	 might	 be	 a	 precondition	 for	
constructive	 work	 rather	 than	 a	 deconstructing	 end	 in	 itself.	 This	 idea	 has	 been	
disparately	 developed	 by	 a	 number	 of	 critics	 who	 understand	 the	 act	 of	 literary	
composition	in	vocabularies	drawn	from	the	philosophy	of	intentional	action,	one	that	
often	 insists	 on	 literature’s	 rationality	 from	 a	 communicative-theory	 perspective	 that	
makes	no	distinction	in	terms	of	mimetic	and	anti-mimetic	choices.	Theo	D’Haen	draws	
on	 Gricean	 models	 of	 conversational	 implicature	 to	 be	 precise	 about	 how	 this	
constructive	 rhetoric	 can	 be	 channelled.	 Far	 from	 forcing	 readers	 into	 disorientation	
and	 shock,	 he	 argues,	 authorial	 violations	 of	 generic	 expectations	 begin	 a	 process	 of	
engrossment:	 “The	 conviction	 of	 the	 reader	 that	 the	 story	 has	 a	 meaning	 and	 is	
consistent,	is	such	that	the	reader	sees	[the	author]	deliberately	and	blatantly	failing	to	
fulfil	a	maxim	and	thereby	as	inviting	the	reader	to	calculate	that	meaning	himself”	(15).		
Expectations	of	communicative	significance	are	so	powerful	that	anticosmic	moves,	for	
example,	 direct	 readerly	 efforts	 straight	 past	 the	 usual	 otherworld-immersion	
mechanics,	and	directly	to	working	out	how	the	fiction	is	meant	to	bear	on	their	real-																																																								
12	I	 would	 also	 want	 to	 distinguish	 it	 from	 the	 approach	 of	 literary	 study’s	 “cognitive	 turn,”	 which	
particularly	within	narratology	has	tended	to	focus	on	applying	psychological	research	about	how	people	
interact	with	other	people	to	the	relationship	between	readers	and	characters,	while	skipping	or	begging	
the	question	of	the	cognitive	processes	by	which	we	get	from	words	on	a	page	to	the	positing	of	literary	
characters	 as	 counterpart	 humans.	 See	 Zunshine	 or	 Herman	 (“Storytelling”)	 for	 two	 versions	 of	 this	
approach.	
13	Though	the	latter	can	be	intrusive	enough	to	make	us	wonder	whether	something	cognition-worthy	is	
being	foregrounded.		
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world	beliefs	 and	actions.	The	 result	 is	 that	 “the	more	and	more	 frantically	 an	author	
forces	us	to	calculate	implicatures…	the	more	‘problematic’	his	novel	is,	the	more…	our	
attention	will	shift	from	the	fictional	world	to	the	problem	of	reconciling	the	given	novel	
with	our	expectations	to	the	functioning	of	the	real	world”	(15).	That	stylistic	departures	
from	convention	turn	their	initial	affective	shocks	into	an	invitation	to	“calculate”	about	
their	relation	to	readers’	 lives	and	beliefs	 is	at	 the	heart	of	 the	rhetorical	cognitivism	 I	
presume.		
This	makes	possible	the	rhetorical	mechanism	I’ll	suggest	almost	all	postmodern	
project	novels	rely	on:	what	I’ll	call	stylistic	allegory.	If	a	variety	of	forms	are	set	next	to	
each	other	in	a	significant	order,	we	should	be	able	to	work	out	the	significance	of	their	
relationships	in	terms	of	a	relationship	between	the	philosophical	ideas	the	forms	stand	
for.	 In	traditional	allegory,	concept-embodying	characters	interact	at	the	level	of	event	
in	 ways	 that	 allow	 us	 to	 extrapolate	 arguments	 about	 the	 real-world	 relationship	
between	those	concepts.	Insofar	as	antimimetic	fiction	defines	the	material	of	fiction	as	
its	 arrangement	 of	 language-forms	 rather	 than	 its	 arrangement	 of	 personages	 and	
events,	stylistic	allegory	naturally	follows	as	a	redirection	of	the	allegory-bearing	entities	
from	fictive	personages	to	linguistic	constructions.14		
Talking	 of	 style’s	 argument-bearing	 capacities,	 meanwhile,	 presumes	 that	
although	 authorial	 communicative	 intent	 is	 a	 regulative	 category	 with	 which	 to	
calculate,	 the	 stability	of	 the	generic	 conventions	 in	which	new	 texts	 intervene	allows	
the	 texts	 alone	 to	 provide	 the	 matter	 for	 establishing	 re-organizations	 of	 readerly	
concept-networks	 and	 the	 beliefs	 that	 hinge	 on	 them.	 Hence	 the	 communicative	
network	D’Haen	elaborates	is	that	from	Text	to	Reader,	one	in	which	the	author	is	less	
essential.	 Wendell	 V.	 Harris,	 writing	 explicitly	 against	 poststructuralist	 accounts	 of	
readerly	 experience,	 makes	 this	 clear	 in	 his	 own	 discussion	 of	 these	 communicative	
networks.	For	him,	the	writer	is	the	source	of	the	communicative	intentions	that	prompt	
readers	 to	 “calculate”	 about	 text-to-world	 relationships,	 but	 has	 no	 extra-textual																																																									
14 	Many	 theories	 of	 allegory	 already	 note	 that	 even	 its	 traditional	 mode	 is	 an	 essentially	 linguistic	
phenomenon.	See	Quilligan.	
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regulatory	 power	 over	 those	 calculations:	 “The	 writer	 constantly	 assumes	 certain	
responses	 in	 the	 reader,	 who	 in	 turn	 is	 assuming	 certain	 intentions	 in	 the	 relations	
between	the	text	and	external	contexts.	 	The	complexity	of	 that	process	can	hardly	be	
overstated.	 	 Writing	 and	 reading	 thus	 both	 require	 continuous	 strategic	 calculation”	
(56).	The	determinate	textual	qualities	of	convention-breaking	fictions,	then,	can	be	said	
to	 bear	 their	 own	 arguments;	 a	 bearing	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 presumption	 that	 another	
communicative	 actor	 composed	 them,	 but	 specified	 only	 by	 their	 particular	 linguistic	
forms	and	the	generic	and	conventional	context	in	which	they	operate.	
On	D’Haen’s	model,	then,	anti-mimetic	forms	may	even	argue	more	directly	than	
conventional	 forms,	 since	 they	 more	 directly	 function	 as	 calls	 to	 “calculation”	 about	
intended	 “implication.”	 If	 anti-mimesis	 acts	 so	 directly	 as	 a	 cue	 to	 that	 kind	 of	
constructive,	 relevance-driven	 reading,	 it	may	be	no	coincidence	 that	 the	conventions	
the	 experimental	 novels	 of	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s	 broke	 down	 and	 rebuilt	 were	
conventions	 for	 the	presentation	of	 consciousness	 and	agency.	Reading	anticosmically	
is,	 on	D’Haen’s	model,	 an	 overtly	 deliberative,	 practical,	 and	 social	 act,	 requiring	 the	
ongoing	 construction	 and	 refinement	 of	 plausible	 communicative	 coherences	 and	
relevances.	 	 Th	 rereading	 I	 propose	 of	 canonical	 first-generation	 US	 postmodernism,	
then,	 is	 to	 treat	 it	 as	 a	 repository	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 precise,	 distinct	 stylistic	 argument,	
rather	than	as	unilaterally	deconstructive.	
	
Rereading	and	My	Chapters’	Specific	Adversaries	
As	 I	 discuss	 in	 Appendix	 A,	 it	 is	 only	 recently	 that	 scholars	 have	 been	 able	 to	
approach	“postmodern	fiction”	with	enough	separation	from	“contemporary	fiction”	to	
talk	 about	 rereading	 it,	 and	 such	 rereadings	 	 have	 been	 predominantly	 historicist:	
offering	 new	 contextual	 explanations	 for	 familiar	 accounts	 of	 the	 fiction’s	 formal	
qualities,	rather	than	starting	from	disagreement	with	those	accounts.	In	this	project,	I	
take	the	latter	approach,	presuming	the	genre’s	historical	specificity	but	rereading	first	
of	 all	 for	 form:	 different	 understandings	 of	 the	 fiction’s	 thematic	 concerns	 and	
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contextual	 significance	 should	 naturally	 follow.	 Previous	 critics	 of	 the	 genre	 have	
actively	 divorced	 formal	 analysis	 from	 historical	 insight,	 most	 influentially	 Jameson,	
whose	 account	 of	 postmodern	 fiction	 as	 limited	 to	 “flat”	 “pastiche”	 follows	 naturally	
from	 his	 methodological	 disinterest	 in	 “stylistic	 description…	 I	 have	 rather	 meant	 to	
offer	a	periodizing	hypothesis…”	(3).	But	Walsh	notes	the	risks	of	theorizing	generalities	
without	 accurate	 “stylistic	 description”	 of	 specifics:	 “the	 critical	 violence	 that	 the	
concept	of	postmodernism	has	done	to	innovative	fiction…	subordinat[ing]	that	fiction	
to	the	logic	of	a	grand	cultural	hypothesis;	and	then,	finding	the	hypothesis	embroiled	
in	self-contradiction,	 it	has	delegated	responsibility	 for	 its	paralysis	back	to	the	fiction	
itself”	 (NA	 26).	 Since	 my	 formal	 re-reading’s	 first	 move	 is	 to	 snap	 this	 artificial	 but	
persistently	 presumed	 bond	 between	 postmodern	 fiction	 and	 postmodern	 academic	
theory,	 the	 second	 part	 of	 my	 revisionary	 re-reading	 will	 be	 to	 identify	 potentially	
different	genealogies	 for	 the	work’s	 thematic	concerns	and	philosophical	positions.	 I’ll	
suggest	that	the	novels’	optimistic	engagement	with	the	putatively	paralyzing	givens	of	
their	 era	 establishes	 their	 place	 in,	 and	 their	 so-far	misprized	 contribution	 to,	 a	 long	
tradition	of	antifoundational	US	 thought	about	 the	 relationships	between	deliberation	
and	deferral,	doubt	and	faith,	practice	and	paralysis.	My	operating	contextual	question	
will	be:	how	might	we	read	this	fiction—and	how	might	we	have	read	it	for	the	past	40	
years—if	 US	 university	 literature	 departments	 hadn’t	 become	 invested	 in	
poststructuralism	at	the	same	time	as	this	fiction	was	becoming	the	object	of	study	for	
the	new	field	of	“contemporary	literature?”		
The	lack	of	overt	rereadings	of	postmodern	fiction’s	formal	elements	means	that	
three	1980s	accounts	of	postmodern	form	continue	to	be	cited	as	authoritative	wherever	
the	 era’s	 formal	 qualities	 are	 discussed.	 The	 dwindling	 interest	 in	 postmodern	 theory	
has	led	to	a	 lack	of	 interest	 in	reconsidering	the	fiction	so	widely	taken	to	be	covalent	
with	 it,	 while	 since	 these	 authors	 still	 fall—for	 course-coverage,	 hiring,	 and	 journal-
focus	 purposes—under	 the	 headings	 of	 either	 “contemporary”	 or	 “post-1945,”	 energy	
within	 those	 course-coverage	 fields	may	 seem	 better	 devoted	 either	 to	 engaging	with	
work	that’s	more	literally	contemporary,	or	to	excavating	earlier	work	that	the	original	
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postmodern=contemporary	 zeitgeist	never	 acknowledged.	 “Stylistic	description”	of	 the	
era	gets	deferred	 to	 the	 three	canonical	 accounts:	books	by	 Jameson,	Linda	Hutcheon	
and	Brian	McHale	that	have	each	garnered	multiple	thousands	of	citations	while	barely	
any	 of	 the	 other	 critical	 texts	 I’ve	 discussed	 get	 into	 triple	 figures.	 Since	 each	 was	 a	
deliberately	generalizing	early	overview	of	the	era’s	fiction,	each	was	naturally	unsuited	
to	 the	 kind	 of	 distinction	 among	 the	 different	 rhetorics	 of	 different	 styles	 that	 I’m	
interested	 in	 warranting.	 Normal	 literary-critical	 dynamics	 would	 see	 early	
generalizations	 taken	 up	 for	 nuancing	 by	 more	 precise	 readings	 of	 individual	 texts,	
which	could	then	re-ground	newer,	more	tentative	generalizations.	Yet	due	to	the	core	
study	 of	 “contemporary	 literature”	 advancing	 beyond	 “postmodernism”	 so	 soon	 after	
these	books	came	out,	that	nuancing	process	never	really	happened.15	That	it’s	still	these	
30-year-old	accounts	of	the	form	that	most	re-readings	take	themselves	to	be	historically	
explaining	 reifies	 the	 problem	 I’m	 hoping	 to	 solve,	 since	 all	 three	 rely	 heavily	 on	 the	
equation	between	antimimesis	and	deconstructive	rhetoric.	
Jameson’s	 treatment	 of	 fictions	 that	 foreground	 their	 own	 fictionality	 as	 wilful	
abandonments	 of	 history	 and	 reality	 replicates	 Graff’s	 antipathy,	 albeit	 through	
references	 to	 Lacan,	 Marx,	 and	 David	 Harvey.	 Hutcheon,	 by	 contrast,	 brought	 back	
some	 of	 the	 zealous	 faith	 in	 “disruption”	 that	 had	 animated	 the	 surfictionists:	 in	 her	
account,	postmodern	fiction	challenges	the	authority	of	hegemonic	narratives	that	rely	
on	the	naturalization	of	tendentious	histories.	Its	self-conscious	repurposing	of	existing	
linguistic	 conventions,	 on	 her	 account,	 propounds	 a	 Bakhtinian	 parody	 in	 which	 the	
standard	 authority	 of	 “history”	 is	 provisionalized	 as	 a	 portable	 discourse,	 and	 hence	
undermined,	restoring	franchise	and	legitimacy	to	the	perspectives	it	had	marginalized.	
McHale	 too	 prioritizes	 undirected	 formal	 proliferations:	 for	 him,	 postmodernism	
fiction’s	 unstable	 ontologies	 supercede	 the	 merely	 epistemological	 pluralism	 of	
modernism.	 For	 him,	 “a	 characteristically	 postmodern	 text”	 is	 one	 “in	which	multiple																																																									
15	Hutcheon	 is	 the	 one	 exception,	 as	 her	 consistent	 treatment	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 literature,	
politics,	and	historiography	addresses	themes	that	remain	central	to	subsequent	focii	of	“contemporary”	
literary	studies:	I	address	a	few	examples	of	books	that	consciously	try	to	refine	Hutcheon’s	model	in	my	
chapter	on	EL	Doctorow	and	Hutcheon,	but	 it’s	worth	noting	that	none	of	 these	aim	to	undermine	the	
equation	between	anti-mimetic	form	and	deconstructive	rhetoric	that	underpins	her	work.	
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worlds	 coexist	 in	 uneasy	 tension”	 	 (CP	 217),	 and	 this	 reflects	 the	 change	 of	 question	
between	the	two	eras	from	“how	can	I	interpret	this	world	of	which	I	am	part,	and	what	
am	I	in	it”	to	“which	world	is	this,	what	is	to	be	done	in	it,	which	of	my	selves	is	to	do	it.”	
Through	attentive	descriptions	of	the	strangely	structured	ontologies	in	specific	texts—
which	dubiously	suggest	that	the	various	levels	are	always	unhierarchized—he	comes	to	
the	 fairly	 underwhelming	 conclusion	 that	 they	 all	 serve	 the	 same	 basic	 rhetorical	
purpose	of	undermining	modernist	reading	habits.		
In	 all	 three	 models,	 then,	 the	 attempt	 to	 identity	 the	 generic	 basis	 of	
“postmodernist	fiction”	ends	up	insisting	on	rhetorical	homogeny:	Jameson’s	account	of	
the	“flatness”	of	all	postmodern	forms	doesn’t	really	distinguish	between	their	rhetoric	
any	less	than	McHale’s	attention	to	their	vast	array	of	multi-level	world-constructions.	
Each	 of	 the	 three	 defines	 postmodernist	 form	 in	 opposition	 to	 realism’s	 immersive	
model	of	world-correspondence,	and	extrapolates	from	this	its	rhetoric	must	be	limited	
to	an	unconstrained	movement	away	from	realism’s	politics.	None	of	these	models	can	
make	sense	of	PLUS.	Since	their	aggregate	canonicity	of	these	accounts	perpetuates	the	
monolithic	antimimetic=deconstructive	axiom	that	they	rest	on,	I	dedicate	a	chapter	to	
disputing	each	by	showing	how	they	fail	to	accommodate	a	novel	that	should	obviously	
fit	under	their	remit.	
I	 reread	 postmodern	 fiction	 not	 as	 an	 end	 in	 itself,	 then,	 but	 to	 establish	 an	
archive	 with	 which	 to	 challenge	 standard	 accounts	 of	 anticosmic	 anti-mimesis’	
rhetorical	 capacities.	 The	 particular	 arguments	made	 by	US	 postmodernism’s	 array	 of	
forms	 are	 obviously	 a	 response	 to	 historically	 and	 geographically	 specific	 problems,	
which	influence	the	direction	of	their	responses.	But	the	generation’s	interest	lies	in	the	
sheer	variety	of	 forms	that	grow	from	that	context,	not	 in	the	explanatory	force	of	the	
context	 itself.	 Aravamudan’s	 recovery	 of	 the	 vast	 array	 of	 prose-fictional	 forms	 with	
which	 the	eighteenth	century	engaged	with	newly	 reliable	knowledge	about	 “oriental”	
cultures	was	fundamentally	an	exercise	in,	per	its	subtitle,	Resisting	the	Rise	of	the	Novel,	
undermining	a	narrative	 in	which	 the	 teleology	of	 the	 realist	novel	purged	 “defective”	
forms	 less	 tied	 to	 national	 history	 along	 the	 way.	 	 Postmodern	 project	 novels	 are	 a	
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similarly	 broad	 and	 generative	 archive	 of	 alternative	models	 for	what	 longform	 prose	
fiction	can	be	and	do.	
Outside	of	university	study,	framings	of	postmodern	fiction	are	finally	beginning	
to	match	 the	 authors’	 own	 self-conceptions.	 The	 blurb	 for	 the	 recent	 compilation	 of	
Barth’s	short	fiction	treats	him	not	as	a	leading	postmodernist,	but	by	insisting	that	his	
“writing	was	not	a	response	to	the	realistic	fiction	that	characterized	American	literature	
at	 the	 time;	 it	 beckoned	 back	 to	 the	 founders	 of	 the	 novel:	 Cervantes,	 Rabelais,	 and	
Sterne,	echoing	their	playfulness	and	reflecting	the	 freedom	inherent	 in	the	writing	of	
fiction.”	This	is	how	the	authors	in	question	always	seem	to	have	seen	themselves,	from	
Barth’s	 constant	 adaptations	 of	 Arabian	 Nights	 to	 Robert	 Coover’s	 1984	 insistence—	
discussing	the	homogeny	of	the	300	novels	he	had	read	as	a	judge	of	the	PEN/Faulkner	
award—that	 experimental	 fiction,	 though	 “often	 thought	 of	 as	 disruptive,	 eccentric,	
even	 inaccessible…	 could	 easily	 be	 [thought	 of	 as]	 true	mainstream	 fiction,	 emerging	
from	the	very	core	of	 the	evolving	 form”	 (38).	Coover	explicitly	 links	 this	evolution	 to	
shifts	in	“social	forms”	outside	the	fiction.	The	“freedom”	Barth	celebrated	was	less	the	
upshot	of	a	 severance	between	 fiction	and	 the	 social	or	 the	practical	 than	a	matter	of	
antimimesis’	ability	to	react	to	external	problems	with	a	variety	of	forms,	rhetorics,	and	
arguments	unconstrained	by	the	terms	of	the	realism	it	defies.	Such	rhetorics	might,	per	
Thorne,	 include	 radical	 conservatism,	 or	 per	 Aravamudan,	 posit	 transcultural	 moral	
universals.	 For	 my	 purposes,	 it	 will	 cover	 arguments	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 practical	
agency	 in	 a	 world	 that	 grants	 the	 insights	 of	 a	 long	 tradition	 of	 antifoundational	
thought.	
Lisi	Schoenbach,	writing	about	Pragmatic	Modernism,	makes	a	crucial	argument	
along	these	lines.	She	argues	against	two	conflations	at	once:	between	modernism	and	
the	pursuit	of	rhetorical	“shock,”	and	between	US	pragmatism	and	the	mere	attack	on	
philosophical	universals.	Noting	instead	that	the	Anglophone	modernist	literature	that	
engages	most	directly	with	the	ideas	of	James	or	Dewey	is	also	characterized	by	an	effort	
to	bend	its	innovations	toward	influencing	readers’	“habit,”	she	usefully	makes	the	case	
that	 neither	 literary	 self-consciousness	 nor	 antifoundational	 philosophy	 have	 to	 be	
	 41	
invested	“only	in	dramatic	moments	of	break	and	rupture,”	but	can	assert	the	value	and	
establish	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 constructive	 integrations	 “that	 preceded	 and	 followed	
such	moments”	(5).	Gregg	Crane,	in	a	review	of	Schoenbach	and	similar	books	on	earlier	
fiction,	notes	that	this	post-shock-value	critical	“orientation	runs	the	risk	of	neutralizing	
what	 makes	 these	 texts	 literary	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 their	 courting	 of	 risk	 and	
acknowledgement	of	mystery	 in	an	era	of	 increasing	rationalism”	(234).	 Insofar	as	I	go	
on	to	 identify	pragmatism	as	a	model	 for	self-consciously	 literary	 literature’s	ability	 to	
offer	 constructive	 accounts	 of	 daily	 agency,	 I’ll	 stress	 the	 shared	 emphasis	 on	
characterizing	agency	in	terms	of	an	openness	to	the	possibility	of	failure	or	error	that	
poststructuralist	 versions	 of	 antifoundationalism	 find	 paralyzing.	 But	 Crane’s	 framing	
also	 comes	 close	 to	 insisting	 that	 the	 more	 “literary”	 the	 text,	 the	 more	 covalently	
committed	 to	 “risk”	 and	 “mystery,”	 the	 more	 opposed	 to	 cognitivism	 and	 conscious	
rationalty.16	The	novels	I	examine	will,	I	hope,	show	that	the	Barthian	“freedom”	of	their	
literariness	allows	them	to	reorganize	just	this	constellation	of	heuristics.	
Abandoning	 the	 idea	 that	 prose-fictive	 antimimesis	 negatively	 supervenes	 on	
“Rise	 of	 the	 Novel”	 realism’s	 commitments	 leaves	 us	 space	 to	 distinguish	 not	 only	 a	
range	 of	 rhetorics,	 but	 also	 a	 range	 of	 criteria	 by	 which	 the	 departures	 from	 realism	
might	 ask	 to	 be	 read	 as	 individual	 forms.	 We	 can	 hence,	 instead	 of	 taking	 blanket	
																																																								
16	The	 rigid	 separation	 of	 imaginative	 literature	 dates	 at	 least	 to	 the	 classical	 era,	 and	 animates	 both	
poststructural	 literary	 criticism	 and	 many	 postmodernist	 authors.	 It	 also	 might	 explain	 some	 of	 yet	
another	 tendency	 in	 literary	 criticism	 that	makes	my	project	 urgent.	 Poststructuralism	may	have	 fallen	
out	of	fashion,	but	the	most	heavily-promoted	“turns”	that	literary	inquiry	has	pushed	in	its	place	have	all	
perpetuated	 its	 hostility	 to	 conscious	 reasoning	 about	 literature,	 or	 what—were	 we	 not	 still	 amid	 a	
“cognitive	turn”	devoted	to	elaborating	the	mimetic	logic	by	which	readers	of	novels	can	be	understood	to	
relate	 to	 their	 characters	 as	 real	 people—could	 be	 called	 a	 “cognitivist”	 approach,	 treating	 fictions	 in	
terms	 of	 their	 propositional-content-bearing	 and	 reading	 processes	 based	 on	 unimmersed	 reasoning	
about	 their	 constructions.	 From	 that	 mimetic	 “cognitive	 turn”	 to	 movements	 based	 on	 affect	 or	
materialism,	 literary	 criticism	 has	 become	 increasingly	 committed	 to	 investigating	 the	 parts	 of	 our	
engagement	with	 literature	 that	come	before	discursive	 reasoning	about	 it.	 Selectively	 interdisciplinary,	
these	movements	 reflect	 their	overt	 commitment	 to	 the	pre-discursive	by	 studiously	 avoiding	 the	work	
within	 the	 disciplines	 they	 draw	 on	 that	 insists	 on	 the	 discursive	 or	 rational	 components	 of	 the	
phenomena	in	question.	For	a	widely	footnoted	but	rarely	substantively	engaged	critique	of	this	tendency	
in	 affect	 theory,	 see	Leys.	 For	 an	 example	of	 the	kind	of	work	on	 ineliminable	discursivity	 that	 literary	
critics	who	draw	on	psychology	pretend	doesn’t	 exist,	 see	Wetherell.	 For	 an	 account	 of	 cultural	 theory	
since	postmodernism’s	organizing	hostility	to	the	relevance	of	belief,	see	Benn	Michaels.	
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positions	about	the	intrinsic	effectiveness	of	all	departures	from	convention,	judge	these	
forms	 in	 terms	of	 greater	 and	 lesser	 success	on	 their	 own	 terms,	 in	 articulating	 those	
terms,	in	offering	viable	arguments,	in	corresponding	to	experience,	in	generating	new	
compounds	 of	 feeling,	 and	 so	 on.	 Ronald	 Sukenick,	 an	 author-critic	 of	 an	 overtly	
deconstructive	bent	whose	manifestos	had	an	outsized	influence	on	the	reception	of	his	
postmodern	peers,	always	 insists	on	the	necessity	of	a	plurality	of	 forms:	 “there	are	as	
many	 novels	 as	 there	 are	 authentic	 novelists,	 and,	 ideally,	 there	 should	 be	 as	 many	
novels	 as	 there	 are	 novels	 of	 those	 novelists,	 since	 in	 an	 exploratory	 situation,	 every	
form	should	be	idiosyncratic”	(“Ten	Digressions”	202).	Yet	this	variety	is	only	in	service	
of	 a	 singular	 overall	 “disruption”:	 variety	 in	 form	 only	 lends	 weight	 to	 the	 one	
movement.	 By	 contrast,	 Christine	 Brooke-Rose,	 the	 Swiss-British	 author	 and	
narratologist	 whose	 anticosmic	 novels	 grow	 out	 of	 “lipogrammatic”	 linguistic	
constraints—Between	 (1967)	 assembles	 sentences	 from	 the	 overlaps	 of	 more	 than	 a	
dozen	languages,	without	ever	using	versions	of	the	verb	“to	be,”	Amalgamemnon	(1984)	
is	 written	 entirely	 in	 subjunctive	 constructions—noted	 in	 the	 1980s	 how	 little	
discrimination	 there	 was	 within	 criticism	 that	 notionally	 endorsed	 her	 approach.	
Lamenting	 critics’	 willingness	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 terms	 of	 authorial	 manifestoes,	 she	
complains	that:	
no	 one	 ever	 says:	 the	 use	 of	 this	 ‘strategy’	 is	 banal,	 clumsy,	 too	 insistent	 (or	
whatever).	 	 Or	 rather,	 those	 who	 might	 do	 so	 are	 said	 to	 be	 aesthetically	
prejudiced	 (against	 ‘postmodernism’),	 nostalgic	 for	 stable	 structure	 or	 stable	
moral	values	or	art	as	illusion	and	so	on…	Which	can	produce	a	pretty	gormless	
and	pedagogic	criticism:	everything	teacher	mentions	is	good	(212/3).		
All	 that	 has	 changed	 since	 Brooke-Rose	wrote	 is	 a	 dwindling	 of	 advocacy.	 Everything	
teacher	mentions—be	 it	 to	promote	successor-forms,	 to	 re-explain	 in	historical	 terms,	
or	whatever—remains	basically	homogenous,	and	hence	basically	uninteresting.		
Charles	 Altieri	 wrote	 not	 too	 long	 after	 Brooke-Rose	 that	 the	 then-incipient	
division	between	postmodern	and	contemporary	would	grant	us	
two	 fundamental	 theses—first	 that	 we	 can	 distinguish	 a	 postmodernism	 that	
deserves	to	live	on	from	the	ones	that	are	now	properly	receiving…	last	rites,	and	
then	that	we	can	use	contrasts	with	what	is	problematic	in	postmodern	poetry	in	
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order	 to	 highlight	 distinctive	 features	 of	 how	 artists	 and	 writers	 manage	 to	
engage	the	same	cultural	problems	and	pressures	(PoMo	2).		
The	 current	 book	 attempts	 to	 fulfil	 Brooke-Rose	 and	 Altieri’s	 unanswered	 calls.	 By	
demonstrating	 the	 range	 of	 forms	 and	 rhetorics	 that	 sprung	 from	 one	 generational	
engagement	with	 one	 particular	 set	 of	 “cultural	 problems	 and	 pressures,”	 I’ll	 account	
less	for	a	“postmodernism	that	deserves	to	live”	than	for	the	living	capacities	of	a	form	of	
fiction	that	too	often	gets	buried	along	with	the	parts	of	postmodernism	that	deserve	to	
die.	
**	
Finally,	 the	 contextual	 rereading	 I	 aim	 to	 pursue	 most	 directly	 in	 this	 project	
concerns	 the	matter	of	which	philosophical	movements	 the	antimimetic	 fiction	of	 the	
US	postmodern	era	should	be	aligned	with.	As	I’ve	suggested,	the	existing	limitations	of	
criticism	 on	 antimimetic	 fiction	 have	 a	 lot	 to	 do	 with	 the	 widespread	 association	
between	postmodern	fiction	and	postmodern	theory.		
Although	I’m	writing	to	vindicate	literature’s	philosophical	capacities,	this	isn’t	a	
“literature	and	philosophy”	project	along	the	lines	of	recent	books	by	Robert	Chodat	or	
Michael	LeMahieu,	who	investigate	20th	century	US	literary	manifestations	of	academic-
philosophical	 ideas	 about	 truth	 and	 value,	 intentionality	 and	 agency.	 I’m	 first	 and	
foremost	 aiming	 to	 show	 that	 postmodern	 project	 novels	 use	 stylistic	 innovations	 to	
construct	 precise,	 coherent	 arguments	 (about	 those	 issues)	 in	 response	 to	 particular	
cultural	pressures.	Those	pressures	and	arguments,	though,	were	closely	tied	to	the	way	
that	 insights	once	restricted	to	recondite	circles	and	propounded	by	philosophers	who	
conceived	 of	 their	 work	 as	 “antifoundational”—from	 traditional	 pragmatism	 to	
existentialism—had	become	commonplace	 in	mainstream	US	culture.	And	 insofar	as	 I	
see	 these	novels	engaging	directly	with	 the	question	of	what	 to	do	 in	a	culture	where	
antifoundational	critiques	of	deliberative	agency	are	taken	for	granted,	I	align	them	with	
very	 different	 philosophical	 forces	 in	 their	 culture	 than	 critics	 who	 have	 previously	
aligned	them	with	the	philosophers	who	spent	the	1960s	and	1970s	propounding	those	
critiques.	
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Precisely	because	of	 the	 spread	of	 those	 ideas	 it	may	make	more	 sense	 to	 label	
the	 authors	 I’m	 addressing	 “postfoundational”:	 anti-foundational	 would	 suggest	 that	
attacks	 on	 foundations	were	 as	 urgent	 as	working	 out	what	 to	 do	without	 them.	We	
could	 also	 distinguish	 among	 anti-foundational	 and	 post-foundational	 postmodernist	
writing.	 But	 I’ll	 discuss	 the	more	 constructively-orientated	 of	my	 authors	 in	 terms	 of	
anti-foundationalism	 throughout,	 in	 order,	 first,	 to	 highlight	 the	 fact	 that	 their	
intellectual	lineage	is	so	thoroughly	bound	up	in	these	traditions,	and	second,	to	again	
try	and	explode	from	within	the	existing	trend	that	uses	“anti-foundational”	to	link	them	
to	 French	 poststructuralism	 alone.	 As	 I’ll	 show,	 their	 immediate	 response	 was	 to	
intellectual	 conditions	 caused	 by	 the	 swift	 boom	 and	 collapse	 of	 interest	 in	
existentialism	 in	 the	 US,	 while	 their	 recuperative	 response	 to	 the	 postfoundational	
conditions	of	agency	aligns	them	with	traditional	US	pragmatism.	In	Appendix	C	I	give	a	
brief	 overview	 of	 archival	 and	 contextual	 reasons	 to	 think	 of	 both	 of	 these	 as	 more	
substantive	and	better	documented	influences	on	the	generation	of	authors	in	question	
than	 the	 poststructuralists	 were:	 the	 continental	 postmodern	 philosophers’	 major	
influence	 on	 US	 fiction	 in	 fact	 comes	 with	 the	 subsequent	 generation	 of	 innovative	
fiction	writers.	
Nevertheless,	 Pragmatism	 in	 its	 popular	 slogan	 form,	 focused	 on	 promoting	
James’	definition	of	 truth	as	 “what	works”	and	his	 figuration	of	 ideas’	 truth-relation	as	
their	 “cash	value,”	has	 found	 itself	among	the	putative	enemies	of	postmodern	fiction.	
As	 a	warrant	 for	 retrospective	 rationalization	 and	 deference	 to	 the	 status	 quo,	 which	
indeed	raises	the	status	quo	to	the	 level	of	a	philosophical	 foundation,	that	rhetoric	 is	
indeed	an	enemy	of	postfoundational	fiction,	which	is	why	that	fiction	often	criticizes	it.	
Characters	 in	 Barth,	 McElroy,	 William	 Gaddis,	 Thomas	 Pynchon,	 all	 appeal	 to	 such	
readings	of	pragmatism	in	ways	that	the	novels	go	on	to	show	were	mistaken.17	Gaddis’	
notes	from	when	he	taught	James	“The	Will	to	Believe”	as	part	of	a	1971	university	course	
on	“The	Literature	of	Failure”	show	how	sceptical	we	should	be	in	taking	such	allusions																																																									
17	Barth’s	narrator	 Jacob	Horner	 refers	 to	his	Doctor,	who	 is	 interested	 in	action	without	 intention,	as	a	
“superpragmatist,”	Gaddis’	young	hero	 in	 J	R	commissions	a	 false	biography	of	himself	 that	claims	he	 is	
motivated	by	James’	idea	that	truth	is	what	works,	and	so	on…	
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as	ventriloquizing	the	authors’	own	understandings	of	American	philosophy	though:	“I	
am	mainly	concerned	with	the	misinterpretation	of	James’	pragmatism”	(Archive).18	It’s	
true	 that	 in	 the	 same	novels	we	get	very	 little	accurate	 citation	of	pragmatic	 thought:	
perhaps	 LeMahieu’s	 demonstration	 that	 novels	 of	 the	 era	 often	 progressively	 erased	
explicit	engagement	with	logical	positivism	out	of	successive	drafts	until	 it	remained	a	
barely	acknowledged	but	organizing	spectre	applies	to	pragmatism	too.	
At	 any	 rate,	 I’ll	 show	 that	 Morris	 Dickstein’s	 judgement	 with	 100	 years	 of	
hindsight	on	the	first	generation	of	pragmatism	is	what	those	of	us	with	over	fifty	years	
of	hindsight	on	the	first	generation	of	postmodern	project	novels	ought	to	say	of	them	
too.		Pragmatism	was,	he	suggested,	“less	an	attack	on	the	foundations	of	knowledge,	as	
it	was	portrayed	by	its	early	critics,	than	a	search	for	method	when	the	foundations	have	
already	 crumbled”	 (16).	The	philosophical	 arguments	 I’ll	 show	 that	 these	novels	make	
about	the	value	and	viability	of	practical	deliberation	in	a	postfoundational	world	make	
pragmatism	 a	 plausible	 component	 of	 their	 philosophical	 lineage,	 just	 as	Wharton	 or	
Dreiser	 are	 of	 their	 formal	 departures.	 As	 I’ve	 defined	 postmodern	 project	 fiction	 in	
terms	of	its	isomorphic	narrative	and	genre-formal	commitments,	so	its	relationship	to	a	
philosophy	of	doubt-based	faith	may	be	matched	by	 its	use	of	 immersion-interrupting	
form	as	the	basis	of	its	communication.		
Acknowledge	 that	 this	understanding	of	 the	 fiction	and	 its	place	 in	 intellectual	
history	might	be	plausible,	and	we	will	have	to	substantially	revise	our	understanding	of	
the	capacities,	development,	and	future	value	of	antimimetic	prose	fiction	as	a	whole.	
	
What’s	Coming	Up?	
My	 four	 chapters	 each	 reread	 one	 of	 the	 novels	 by	 which	 the	 existing	
understandings	of	postmodern	fiction	were	canonized.	I	read	each	as	defying	a	different	
dominant	understanding	of	postmodernism’s	rhetoric,	whose	dominance	was	achieved																																																									
18	“Teaching	Notes	for	‘Literature	of	Failure.’”	Teaching	Materials.	Folder	128,	Box	454.	
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by	 reading	 precisely	 these	 novels.	 Those	 shibboleths	 are:	 the	 standard	misreading	 of	
Barth’s	“The	Literature	of	Exhaustion”	as	a	pessimistic	document	rather	than	a	call	 for	
repurposing	 old	 forms	 to	 new	 ends;	 Jameson	 on	 postmodern	 fiction’s	 econo-mimetic	
“flatness”;	 Hutcheon	 on	 postmodern	 parody	 as	 a	 provisionalising	 of	 the	 single	
authoritative	discourse	of	history;	McHale	on	postmodern	 fictional	worlds’	ontological	
instability	 as	 a	 challenge	 to	modernist	 reading	habits.	 Each	 reduces	 all	 anti-illusionist	
form	to	a	single	rhetoric	that	rejects	categories	essential	for	deliberative	agency:	I	show	
instead	how	each	novel’s	convention-departure	makes	a	different	specific	argument	 in	
favour	of	deliberation’s	viability.	
Chapter	 1:	 I	 read	 Barth’s	The	 End	 of	 the	 Road	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 standard	
misreading	 of	 “The	 Literature	 of	 Exhaustion.”	 End	 of	 the	 Road	 is	 usually	 read	 as,	 in	
Barth’s	won	words,	 a	basically	 realistic	 “nihilist	 catastrophe”	 (preface),	 a	kind	of	post-
existential	dead	end	 that	he	 transcends	by	writing	 “The	Literature	of	Exhaustion”	and	
moving	on	 to	 fiction	 that	 renounces	 its	ability	 to	address	non-literary	problems.	But	 I	
show	how	we	might	constructively	read	the	actual	argument	of	“Exhaustion”—that	any	
future	 argument-making	 fiction	won’t	 be	 able	 to	 invent	 totally	new	 forms	 and	 so	will	
have	 to	 exploit	 a	 meta-awareness	 of	 the	 conventionality	 of	 old	 ones—back	 into	 the	
novel	that	precedes	it.	The	End	of	 the	Road	uses	two	very	different	syntactical	forms	of	
consciousness-representation—one	a	duo-temporal	 retrospective	rationalization,	one	a	
conventional	 linear	 transcription	 of	 thought—and	 their	 interaction	 diagnoses	 the	
narrator’s	insistence	on	his	lack	of	coherent	subjecthood	as	an	excuse	for	his	culpability	
in	the	events	he	recounts.	The	novel’s	structure	ties	its	defence	of	motivated	reasoning	
to	 the	way	 it	makes	 the	 “conventional”	 prose	 seem	 fresh	when	 it	 breaks	 through	 the	
default	 duo-temporal	 one.	 Barth	 jointly	 recuperates	 an	 older	 prose-form	 and	 a	
traditional	account	of	the	relationship	between	motivation	and	action,	showing	that	the	
new	 givens	 he	 invented	 the	 duo-temporal	 narrative	 voice	 to	 reflect	 don’t	 have	 to	 be	
paralyzing.	 In	 the	 earliest	 novel	 I	 examine,	 he’s	 already	 diagnosing	 poststructural	
objections	to	practical	subjectivity	as	a	defeasible	exercise	in	bad	faith.	
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Chapter	 2:	 William	 Gaddis’	 J	 R	 completely	 dispenses	 with	 the	 convention	 of	
transcribing	characters’	unspoken	thoughts,	and	so	is	often	taken	to	be	an	exemplar	of	
the	“flatness”	 Jameson	attributes	 to	economic	postmodernity	and	the	 fiction	he	thinks	
merely	 reflects	 it.	 J	 R	 gets	 read	 as	 mere	 mimicry	 of	 a	 world	 in	 which	 individual	
deliberative	agency	has	become	 irrelevant.	But	while	 that	world	 is	 the	novel’s	 starting	
condition,	 Gaddis	 uses	 variations	 in	 characters’	 speech-patterns	 to	 reflect	 different	
degrees	 of	 implied	 deliberation,	 and	 while	 the	 novel	 begins	 with	 the	 deliberative	
characters	interrupted	and	constrained	to	the	speech	patterns	of	the	non-deliberators,	I	
show	 how	 that	 process	 gets	 reversed	 as	 the	 novel	 goes	 on.	 Gaddis	 argues	 by	 these	
patterns	of	 formal	 contagion	 that	deliberative	 thinkers	 can	 still	 transmit	 their	depths,	
and	 that	 the	 world	 in	 which	 depth-psychology	 and	 individual	 deliberation	 are	 an	
anachronism	doesn’t	have	to	be	a	fait	accompli.	
Chapter	 3:	 EL	 Doctorow’s	 The	 Book	 of	 Daniel	 is	 central	 to	 Hutcheon’s	
articulation	of	postmodern	fiction’s	politics	as	the	undermining	of	dominant	discourses,	
since	 it	 literally	presents	 itself	as	a	document	 in	which	a	character	experiments	with	a	
number	of	different	voices	 in	order	to	try	and	escape	dominant	history.	But	Hutcheon	
insists	that	the	final	value	of	such	re-voicing	is	the	realization	that	no	one	form	is	better	
than	another,	which	removes	the	dominant	discourse’s	privileged	ground.	It’s	here	that	
she	 and	Doctorow	part	ways,	 since	The	 Book	 of	Daniel	 is	 all	 about	how	 revelling	 in	 a	
merely	delegitimizing	parody	distracts	 from	the	pressing	work	of	developing	a	specific	
alternative.	 Daniel	 the	 parodying	 narrator	 is	 himself	 the	 subject	 of	 Doctorow’s	 own	
satire,	and	he’s	faulted	most	for	what	Hutcheon	finds	most	sufficient.	Doctorow	offers	a	
pre-emptive	 criticism	 of	 the	 mere-delegitimation	 approach	 to	 parody,	 and	 instead	
argues	 for	 the	 necessity	 of	 deliberating	 about	 counter-narratives’	 respective	
correspondence	 with	 the	 non-discursive	 world.	 He	 rejects	 the	 Hutcheon-idea	 that	
letting	them	proliferate	is	work	enough.		
Chapter	 4	 -	 a	 Coda:	 The	 association	 between	 postmodernism’s	 rhetoric	 and	
mere	proliferation	is	even	more	fundamental	in	McHale’s	account	of	the	way	the	fiction	
uses	 unstable	 and	 multiple	 worlds	 to	 undermine	 engrained	 reading	 habits.	 My	 final	
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short	chapter	rereads	Thomas	Pynchon’s	early	fiction	in	order	to	challenge	McHale’s	use	
of	Gravity’s	 Rainbow	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 this	 generalization.	 	 I	 show	 how	Pynchon’s	 recent	
fiction,	 in	 its	 increasingly	 explicit	 and	politicized	concern	with	 the	question	of	how	 it	
might	be	possible	to	bring	lost	historical	possibilities	back	into	present	existence,	gives	
us	a	way	to	read	all	of	Pynchon’s	play	with	the	boundaries	between	worlds	as	relying	on	
questions	of	their	specific	hierarchy,	accessibility,	and	sub-juncture.	Pynchon	is	the	one	
of	 my	 novelists	 with	 a	 genuine	 and	 explicit	 antipathy	 to	 the	 legacy	 of	 the	
Enlightenment,	 but	 if	 we	 understand	 his	 ontological	 experiments	 as	 rooted	 in	 the	
historical-metaphysics	 question	 of	 how	we	 can	 juggle	 relevant	 possibilities	 to	make	 a	
better	world	 than	 the	 one	we	 ended	up	with,	 then	we	 can	 read	him	 as	 the	 one	most	
directly	 engaged	 with	 the	 absolute	 fundamentals	 of	 practical	 deliberation:	 the	
identification	of	goal	states	that	could	improve	on	the	present,	and	the	judging	of	best	
means	to	attain	them.	
**	
Finally,	 then,	 I	 offer	 A)	 a	 form-driven	 rather	 than	 historicist	 rereading	 of	 a	
generation	 of	 writers	 about	 whom	 a	 misleading	 consensus	 has	 persisted	 for	 whole	
critical	 generations,	 and	 B)	 thereby,	 a	 contention	 that	 anti-mimetic	 fiction	 has	 the	
capacity	 to	 make	 specifically	 constructive	 philosophical	 cases	 in	 specific	 historical	
contexts.	 	 The	 central	 grouping	 of	 postmodern	 fiction	 emerges	 as	 a	 finally	 optimistic	
and	 constructive	 stage	 in	 the	 long	 US	 intellectual	 engagement	 with	 the	 matters	 of	
practical	 living	 in	 a	 foundationless	 world,	 and	 anti-mimesis	 as	 a	malleable	 rhetorical	
resource	rather	than	a	prepackaged	set	of	limited	ideological	commitments.	
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Chapter	1	
John	Barth	and	the	Anti-Nihilist	Capacities	of	Anti-Mimetic	Prose	
	
John	Barth’s	The	End	of	 the	Road	(1958)	is	the	prototype	of	what	I’m	calling	the	
postmodern	 project	 novel:	 formally	anti-realist,	philosophically	constructive.	Yet	critics	
usually	 treat	 it	 as	 a	 formally	 realist	 expression	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 existentialism,	with	no	
constructive	 message	 to	 offer.	 It	 addresses	 fundamental	 challenges	 to	 deliberative	
agency	 that	 its	 own	 narrator	 Jacob	 Horner	 propounds.	 First,	 he	 denies	 coherent	
selfhood:	the	novel	begins	with	the	full	paragraph	“In	a	sense,	I	am	Jacob	Horner,”19	and	
he	attributes	his	 thoughts,	 feelings,	and	actions	 to	personalities	and	moods	 that	come	
upon	 him	 like	 “weather.”	 	 Second,	 he	 suffers	 from	 “cosmopsis”:	 the	 paralyzing	
contemplation	of	 the	vastness	of	existential	 relevance,	of	 the	 infinity	of	considerations	
present	to	every	act.	The	novel’s	iconic	scene	features	Horner	going	to	a	train	station	on	
his	birthday,	where,	unable	to	decide	which	line	to	take,		
it	was	there	that	I	simply	ran	out	of	motives…	there	was	no	reason,	either,	to	go	
back	 to	 the	apartment	hotel,	or	 for	 that	matter	 to	go	anywhere.	 	There	was	no	
reason	 to	 do	 anything.	 	 My	 eyes…	 were	 sightless,	 gazing	 on	 eternity,	 fixed	 on	
ultimacy,	and	when	that	 is	 the	case	there	 is	no	reason	to	do	anything—even	to	
change	the	focus	of	one’s	eyes	(323)	
This	 narration	 of	 the	 onset	 of	 cosmoptic	 paralysis	 alludes	 to	 the	 third	 challenge:	 the	
infinite	 regress	 of	 reason’s	 ground,	 acknowledging	which	makes	Horner	 determinedly	
refuse	to	commensurate	reasons	and	find	grounds	for	preference.	Early	on,	attempting	
to	reject	a	recommended	course	of	action,		
Instantly	 a	host	of	 arguments	 against	 applying	 for	 a	 job	 at	 the	Wicomico	State	
Teachers	 College	 presented	 themselves	 for	 my	 use,	 and	 as	 instantly	 a	
corresponding	number	of	refutations	lined	up	opposite	them,	one	for	one,	so	that																																																									
19		 Probably	 the	most	 famous	 line	 of	 the	 novel,	 Barth’s	 archive	 reveals	 that	 it	 was	 inserted	 only	 in	 the	
novel’s	second	draft.	
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the	question	of	my	application	was	held	static	 like	the	rope	marker	 in	a	 tug-o’-
war	where	the	opposing	teams	are	perfectly	matched	(258).			
Without	 an	 external	 reason	 to	 resolve	 the	 logical	 entailment	 that	 propositions	 have	
matching	 negations,	 rationality’s	 deliberative	 mechanisms	 are	 framed	 as	 necessarily	
“held	 static.”	 	 If	 reason	 can’t	 resolve	 them,	 then	 the	 tug	 of	war	 analogy	 suggests	 that	
something	 equivalent	 to	 force	 should	 do	 so,	 but	 given	 his	 already-granted	 lack	 of	 a	
stable	 self,	no	 such	 force	exists	within	Horner,	 leaving	his	paralysis	 resolvable	only	by	
external	 guidance.	 On	 top	 of	 the	 individual	 paralyzing	 claims	 of	 each	 of	 these	
postmodern	givens,	then,	they	combine	to	reinforce	each	other.	
The	 prose	 style	 in	 which	 these	 claims	 are	 conveyed	 suggests—particularly	 in	
sliding	 from	 clauses	 that	 index	 their	 logic	 to	 “I”	 or	 “my”	 into	 clauses	 of	 a	 more	
categorical	 grammar—that	 Horner’s	 propounding	 of	 these	 paralyzing	 postmodern	
givens	stems	from	the	kind	of	persistent	motives	he	wishes	to	deny	having.	The	novel’s	
plot,	 though,	seems	to	ratify	his	pessimism,	as	 it	ends	with	his	actions	contributing	to	
the	death	of	the	woman	who	may	be	bearing	his	child,	and	his	retreat	from	society.	Yet	
as	 I’ll	 show,	even	 in	 this	early	novel	Barth	uses	 the	kind	of	 stylistic	 reflexivity	we	now	
think	 of	 as	 postmodern	 to	 make	 a	 pre-emptive	 argument	 against	 ideas	 about	 the	
paralysis	 of	 reason	 that	 became	 canonical	 in	 the	 equation	 between	 poststructuralist	
theory	and	postmodern	fiction.	I’ll	show	that	even	the	earliest	postmodern	novels	take	
those	 for	 granted,	 as	 they	use	 formal	means	 to	offer	 insights	 that	 can	 take	us	beyond	
these	ideas	in	sophistication	or	implication.		
The	End	of	 the	Road	does	this	by	reflexively	recuperating	outmoded	prose	styles	
in	precisely	the	manner	that	Barth’s	later,	more	obviously	postmodern	manifesto	essay	
“The	Literature	of	Exhaustion”	advocates.	There,	he	laments	that	“A	good	many	current	
novelists	 write	 turn-of-the-century-type	 novels,	 only	 in	 more	 or	 less	 mid-twentieth-
century	 language	 and	 about	 contemporary	 people	 and	 topics;	 this	 makes	 them	 less	
interesting	(to	me)	than	excellent	writers	who	are	also	technically	contemporary”	(66).	
The	 End	 of	 the	 Road	 is	 a	 novel	 of	 two	 prose	 styles:	 one	 a	 “turn	 of	 the	 century”	
psychologism	that	only	occurs	in	the	passages	where	our	hero	is	motivated	to	action,	the	
	 51	
other	being	that	which	characterizes	 the	passages	above:	a	 “technically	contemporary”	
modulation	 of	 its	 predecessor	 updated	 to	 embody	 a	 mind	 that	 rationalizes	
irresponsibility	based	on	accepting	those	paralyzing	givens:	the	prose	is	characterized	by	
sentence-structures	that	blur	personal	preferences	into	universal	laws.	These	modes	are	
sufficiently	distinct	that	rather	than	reading	them	as	transparent	refelctions	of	the	same	
human	mind,	we	have	to	treat	their	organization	and	sequencing	qua	styles	as	a	rhetoric	
in	 itself:	 as	 stylistic	 allegory.	 “The	 Literature	 of	 Exhaustion”	 stipulates	 that	 technical	
contemporaneity	is	a	problem	for	writers	after	modernism,	because	truly	individual	new	
forms	may	have	 run	out.	 Its	 optimistic	 solution,	 though,	 is	 to	make	old	ones	work	 in	
new	contexts:	“it	might	be	conceivable	to	rediscover	validly	the	artifices	of	language	and	
literature…	 if	 one	 goes	 about	 it	 the	 right	way,	 aware	 of	what	 one’s	 predecessors	 have	
been	 up	 to”(Fri	 68).	The	 End	 of	 the	 Road	 fulfills	 this	 validity-criterion	 by	making	 the	
traditional	 realist	 prose	 the	 one	 that—returning	 at	 the	 plot’s	 most	 urgent	 turning	
point—generates	 formal	 surprise.	 The	 form	whose	 claim	 to	 transparency	 Barth	 found	
outdated	gets	repurposed	and	made	freshly	opaque	as	our	hero	temporarily	gives	up	on	
his	 proto-postmodern	 rationalizations,	 a	 transformation	 that	 governs	 the	 novel’s	
argument	about	agency.	
If	postmodern	literary	theory	equated	anti-mimetic	prose	with	a	challenge	to	the	
philosophical	assumptions	of	realist	prose,	it	tended	in	doing	so	to	limit	anti-mimesis	to	
rhetorics	of	shock,	disruption,	and	negation.	Reason	was	the	great	object	of	this	attack,	
and	 as	 Christopher	 Conti	 suggests,	 “The	 theme	 of	 paralysis	 induced	 by	 reason	 is	 so	
frequent	in	Barth’s	work	as	to	suggest	its	foundation”	(“NNN”	141).	It	is	clearly	one	of	the	
novel’s	concerns:	above	the	first	page	of	Barth’s	earliest	preserved	draft	of	the	novel,	the	
word	“PARALYSIS”	looms	in	title	position,	albeit	crossed	out	(Archive).20			Yet	The	End	
of	the	Road	isn’t	just	an	expression	of	the	late-1950s	philosophy	of	deliberative	paralysis.		
Its	prose,	I’ll	show,	distinguishes	forms	of	reason	and	posits	that	challenges	to	some	are	
more	 paralysing	 than	 challenges	 to	 others:	 the	 forms	 of	 reason	 associated	 with	
																																																								
20	EotR	Manuscript	1,	Holograph	Drafts,	Box	1,	Folder	1	
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traditional	prose	 are	 recuperated,	 treated	 as	 viable	 alternatives	 to	 a	newer	prose	 form	
that	expresses	the	paralyzing	givens	that	underpin	our	narrator’s	philosophy.			
The	 alternative	 the	 novel	 develops	 involves	 a	 complex	 argument	 about	 the	
intrinsic	normativity	 of	 inaction,	 the	necessity	 for	practical	 agents	 to	 engage	with	 the	
possibility	of	failure,	and	the	structural	relationship	between	the	conative	and	cognitive	
aspects	 of	 deliberate	 action:	 ideas	 that	 bridge	 early	 US	 pragmatism	 and	 recent	
philosophy	 of	 action.	 These	 arguments	 are	made	 entirely	 through	 self-reflexive	 style.	
Barth’s	anti-mimesis	begins	earlier	in	his	career	than	critics	have	usually	presumed,	and	
from	 the	 very	 beginning	 critiques	 ideas	 about	 the	 impossibility	 of	 deliberative	 agency	
that	would	soon	become	canonically	“postmodern.”	
**	
First,	the	plot…	Horner,	propounder	of	self-instability	and	sufferer	of	cosmopsis,	
gets	 woken	 from	 his	 most	 serious	 paralytic	 episode	 by	 a	 mysterious	 doctor,	 whose	
advice	he	follows	in	applying	for	a	job	at	a	university	in	a	new	town.		There,	he	gets	to	
know	Joe	and	Rennie	Morgan.		Joe,	counter	to	Horner,	is	dedicated	to	complete	personal	
accountability;	he	structures	his	and	Rennie’s	lives	such	that	all	their	actions	can	be	fully	
explained,	 that	 their	 desires	 conform	 with	 their	 actions	 and	 vice	 versa.	 	 Anti-
accountable	Horner	begins	an	affair	with	Rennie,	who,	eventually,	trapped	between	the	
two	philosophies,	tries	to	end	it.		By	the	time	she	manages,	she	is	pregnant,	and	unsure	
by	 which	 father.	 	 Both	 Joe’s	 and	 Horner’s	 philosophies	 commit	 them	 to	 hold	 the	
situation	in	suspension,	which	tortures	Rennie	until	she	sets	a	dilemma;	either	she	will	
have	an	abortion	or	she	will	kill	herself.	 	But	she	has	no	 idea	how—and	no	remaining	
volition	with	which—to	 organise	 the	 abortion.	 	 Joe’s	 philosophy	 commits	 him	 not	 to	
intervene,	 and	 so	Horner	 has	 to	 take	 on	 agency	 in	 order	 to	 revivify	 the	 dilemma;	 he	
frantically	 seeks	 to	 arrange	 an	 abortion,	 fails,	 but	 then	 eventually	 resorts	 to	 his	 own	
Doctor.	 	 Rennie	 goes	 through	 with	 the	 abortion,	 but	 no-one	 has	 told	 her	 not	 to	 eat	
ahead	of	her	anaesthetic,	and	she	chokes	to	death	while	sedated.		Horner	and	Joe	are	left	
numb,	and	the	Doctor	flees	town,	asking	Horner	to	come	with	him	so	that	his	cosmopsis	
can	be	studied	in	isolation.	Horner	narrates	the	novel	from	the	Doctor’s	new	clinic.	
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Conti	 has	 shown	why	 all	 of	 this	 adds	up	 to	 a	 portrait	 of	Horner	 as	 an	 agency-
evasive	 cynic,	but	 I’ll	 show	 that	 it’s	 in	 the	prose,	 rather	 than	 in	 the	action,	 that	Barth	
offers	 a	positive	 argument—beyond	 the	 critique	of	Horner—for	what	practical	 agency	
might	look	like	in	a	cosmoptic	universe	of	incoherent	subjects.	
	
“Early	Barth”	Narratives:	False	Divisions	and	Philosophical	Foundations	
The	 End	 of	 the	 Road	was	 Barth’s	 second	 novel,	 composed	 almost	 continuously	
with	 his	 first	 over	 the	 course	 of	 1955.	 Falling	 outside	 standard	 chronologies	 of	
postmodernism,	 these	 first	 two	novels	are	often	 treated	as	outliers	within	Barth’s	own	
career.	 Three	 claims	 define	 the	 standard	 account	 of	 what	 distinguishes	 “Early”	 or	
“existential”	 Barth	 from	 “Mature”	 or	 “postmodern”	 Barth,	 with	 the	 shift	 notionally	
completed	by	 the	publication	of	 “The	Literature	of	Exhaustion”	 in	 1967.	First,	 that	 the	
early	 novels	 are	 formally	 realist,	 unlike	 the	 reflexive	metafiction	 of	 the	mature	 work;	
second,	that	the	early	work	is	preoccupied	by	existential	concerns	of	choice-making	and	
worldly	agency,	unlike	the	later	work’s	preoccupation	with	storytelling	and	imagination;	
and	 third,	 that	 the	 early	 novels	 offer	 only	 pessimistic	 answers	 to	 their	 existential	
questions.	I’ll	dispute	these	tenets—both	the	stylistic	and	the	evaluative.		
The	 two	 most	 substantial	 recent	 rereadings	 of	 the	 novel	 disagree	 on	 how	
seriously	we	should	take	our	narrator:	Michael	LeMahieu	treats	Horner’s	ruminations	as	
the	 novel’s	 own,	 while	 Conti	 reads	 the	 novel	 as	 an	 indictment	 of	 his	 cynical	
aestheticism.	 Yet	while	 they	 disagree	 on	 everything	 else,	 both	maintain	 that	 nexus	 of	
Early-Barth	assumptions:	each	concludes	that	the	novel	uses	realist	means	to	articulate	a	
terminal	pessimism,	 leaving	formal	and	philosophical	progress	for	a	 later	“postmodern	
Barth.”	 For	 LeMahieu,	 the	 novel	 is	 really	 about	 the	 logical-positivist	 division	 between	
facts	 and	 values,	 but	 its	 value-saturated	 realist	 prose	 constrains	 its	 ability	 to	 think	
beyond	their	separation:	“its	aesthetic	resistance	to	the	philosophical	realism	it	desires	
results	 in	a	state	of	narrative,	affective,	and	ethical	exhaustion	at	the	end	of	the	book”	
(87).	 	 It’s	 left	 to	 “The	Literature	of	Exhaustion”	 and	 the	 fictions-about-writing-fictions	
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that	followed	it	to	move	past	that	exhaustion.	Conti,	by	contrast,	thinks	it	wrong	to	treat	
the	novel	as	ventriloquy	of	existing	philosophical	ideas:	lamenting	the	fact	that	chunks	
of	 Horner’s	 narration	 were	 excerpted	 for	 a	 textbook	 on	 existentialism,	 he	 criticizes	
readings	that	treat	the	novel	“as	if	Barth	had	used	Horner	as	a	mouthpiece	to	set	a	new	
course	for	contemporary	philosophy	rather	as	an	imp	of	the	perverse	to	run	it	aground	
on	scepticism”	(“Aes”	81).	Conti’s	focus	on	the	novel’s	ironic	indictment	or	Horner	grants	
him	no	more	purchase	than	LeMahieu	on	any	constructive	ideas	the	novel	may	suggest.	
LeMahieu’s	attention	to	style,	meanwhile,	in	identifying	it	only	as	more	traditional	than	
the	 ideas	 it	attempts	 to	 investigate,	also	 fails	 to	 look	beyond	the	point	at	which	 those	
ideas,	 in	 Conti’s	 terms	 “run	 aground”	 in	 what	 LeMahieu	 diagnoses	 as	 unilateral	
“exhaustion.”	 Barth	 himself	 sometimes	 seems	 to	 paratextually	 concur,	 as	 when	 he	
himself	retrospectively	judges	the	novel	a	“nihilist	catastrophe”	(vii).		
It’s	 precisely	 through	 “The	 Literature	 of	 Exhaustion”	 though	 that,	 with	 a	 little	
anachronistic	reading,	the	constructive	aspects	of	The	End	of	 the	Road	become	legible.		
LeMahieu	repeats	 the	persistent	misreading	of	 “The	Literature	of	Exhaustion”	as	a	call	
for	literature	to	disengage	from	worldly	questions	as	it	leaves	“turn-of-the-century”	form	
behind,	and	 to	 limit	 its	 concerns	 to	 self-scrutiny.	Such	accounts	presume	an	equation	
between	 self-consciousness	 of	 style	 and	 hermeticism	 of	 concern:	 consequently,	 they	
presume	that	self-conscious	style	can’t	be	a	resource	for	productive	argument	about	the	
extra-literary	 world.	 	 Yet	 Barth	 repeatedly	 insists	 otherwise:	 exhaustion	 is	 “only	 the	
used-upness	of	certain	forms	or	the	felt	exhaustion	of	certain	possibilities—by	no	means	
necessarily	a	cause	for	despair”	(Fri	64),	and	so	“validly”	“rediscover[ing]…	artifices”	can	
help	us	“confront[]	an	intellectual	dead	end	and	employ[]	it	against	itself	to	accomplish	
new	 human	 work”	 (Fri	 69-70).	 Barth	 establishes	 a	 viable	 subordinating	 relationship	
between	the	very	“intellectual”	and	“human”	realms	that	critics	have	taken	his	work	to	
sever.	He	does	something	similar	in	discussing	“how	an	artist	may	paradoxically	turn	the	
felt	ultimacies	of	our	time	into	material	and	means	for	his	work—paradoxically,	because	
by	doing	so	he	transcends	what	had	appeared	to	be	his	refutation”	(Fri	71),	connecting	
generic	self-consciousness	(“his”	“material”)	with	historical	engagement	(“our	time”).		
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Yet	 this	 wouldn’t	mean	 anything	 for	The	 End	 of	 the	 Road’s	 agency-thinking	 if	
these	were	only	the	insights	of	a	“later”	“postmodern”	Barth,	leaving	behind	his	“early”	
“existential”	mode.	LeMahieu’s	 inattention	 to	 this	case	 for	 the	positive	 “work”	 that	 re-
presented	older	forms	can	do	matches	his	presumption	that	The	End	of	the	Road’s	forms	
merely	 inhibit	 its	 philosophy.	 Conti,	 too,	 may	 treat	 style	 as	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 novel’s	
skeptical	 characterization	 of	 Horner,	 but	 if	 the	 manifesto	 explicitly	 supercedes	 the	
novel—LeMahieu	 notes	 “what	 Barth	 does	 not	 include	 in	 his	 self-promotion:	 any	
mention	of	The	Floating	opera	or	The	End	of	 the	Road”	(116)””—then	there	may	not	be	
any	mistake.			
Even	before	“The	Literature	of	Exhaustion,”	though,	critics	were	noting	both	the	
parodic	 aspects	 of	 Barth’s	 forms,	 and	 their	 complex	 relation	 to	 his	 ethical	 thinking:	
Richard	Noland,	 for	example,	suggested	in	1966	that	Barth	“will	have	to	show	whether	
his	 parody	 is	 a	 kind	of	 artistic	 trap,	 and	hence	 an	 evasion	of	 genuine	 engagement;	 or	
whether	 it	 is	a	real	critical	technique	which	reflects	Barth’s	own	moral	vision.”	At	that	
stage,	 he	 was	 already	 able	 to	 voice	 the	 suspicion	 of	 unproductive	 gameplaying	 that	
subsequent	critics	have	applied	to	“postmodern”-era	Barth:	he	“may	use	parody	as	a	way	
of	clearing	his	vision,	but	he	can	hardly	rest	in	it	if	he	is	to	develop	at	all”	(257).		Other	
critics	 have	 rcognized	 the	 early	 novels’	 antimimetic	 inclinations:	 for	 Tony	 Tanner,	
language	in	Barth	is	an	alternative	to	worldly	engagement:		“language	that	appears	in	the	
telling,	 and	which	proliferates	 in	 arbitrary	patterns	 in	 exuberant	disregard	 for	what	 is	
the	case.		That	is	what	I	referred	to	as	foregrounding,	calling	more	attention	to	language	
than	 to	 what	 it	 signifies”	 (247).	 	 For	 Patricia	 Tobin,	 form	 is	 a	 way	 to	 “separate	 the	
destructive	negatives	of	rationality	from	its	positively	creative	potential.	The	light	at	the	
end	of	the	tunnel	shines	through	for	Barth	with	the	realization	that	rational	mentality	
also	 fosters	 the	 formal	 imagination”	 (52),	 and	 hence,	 again,	 something	 like	 a	
disconnected	end	in	itself.	 	She	singles	out	The	End	of	 the	Road	as	not	even	managing	
this	minor	happiness:	“Barth’s	grimmest	book,	claustrophobic	and	catastrophic,	with	no	
comic	opera	aboard	to	flaot	it	home	free”	(42).	Early	Barth	is,	for	critics	from	the	1960s	
to	2010s,	a	pessimistic	diagnoser	of	the	limits	of	his	time’s	philosophy,	who	if	he	offers	
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any	alternative	to	that	paralyzing	pessimism,	does	so	only	by	holding	out	the	prospect	of	
an	 escape	 into	 what	 Horner	 at	 one	 point	 calls	 pure	 “articulation.”	 Noland’s	 negative	
answer	to	the	question	of	whether	Barth	has	yet	achieved	a	constructive	relationship	for	
parody	and	engagement	epitomises	the	consensus	about	The	End	of	the	Road:		its	author	
has	 “simply	 taken	 the	 fact	 of	 nihilism	 as	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 [his]	 work	 without	
necessarily	 developing	 a	 single	 philosophical	 position	 on	 which	 to	 base	 a	 system	 of	
values”	(240).		
Yet	I’ll	show	that,	since	“The	Literature	of	Exhaustion”	clarifies	that	what	Tanner	
calls	 the	 “foregrounding”	of	narrative	 language’s	opacity	 can	 serve	 “new	human	work”	
without	 being	 a	 mere	 end	 in	 itself,	 the	 difference	 between	 styles	 of	 prose	 and	 their	
organization	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 novel’s	 plot	 add	 up	 to	 an	 argument	 that	 first	 indicts	
Horner’s	nihilism	as	cheap	rationalization,	and	then	establishes	the	validity,	coherence,	
and	value	of	his	one	brief	departure	from	it.	This	stylistic	argument,	hinging	on	the	fresh	
opacity	 of	 conventional	 prose	 psychology,	 connects	 the	 recuperated	 validity	 of	 the	
formal	mechanisms	 to	 the	validity	of	 the	argument.	As	 “The	Literature	of	Exhaustion”	
explains	 how	 opaque	 formal	 recuperations	 can	 “refute”	 apparent	 “ultimacies”	 of	
compositional	practice,	so	such	practices	in	The	End	of	the	Road	create	an	argument	that	
refutes	the	apparently	paralyzing	ultimacies	to	which	practical	rationality	had	come	by	
the	mid-1950s.	
**	
Before	 I	 examine	 this	 prose-structure	 argumentation,	 it’s	 finally	 just	 worth	
clarifying	 exactly	 what	 those	 ultimacies	 are	 and	 how	 the	 novel	 establishes	 them	 as	
givens	to	be	worked	with	rather	than	as	fresh	new	insights.	
My	introduction	discusses	how,	in	critiquing	Barth	for	proposing	that	cosmopsis	
is	a	universal	truth,	Amy	Elias	takes	the	novel’s	givens	for	its	insights.	None	of	the	critics	
I	discuss	above	have	come	any	closer	to	finding	a	positive	alternative	to	cosmopsis	in	the	
novel,	since	none	acknowledge	its	 indications	that	 it	 takes	the	problems	of	cosmopsis,	
the	 incoherent	 self,	 and	 reason’s	 regressive	 ground	 absolutely	 for	 granted.	 It	 cites,	
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discusses	 or	 figures	 classic	 and	 medieval	 exemplars	 of	 paralysis—Horner’s	 boarding	
room	 contains	 a	 statue	 of	 Laocoon	 and	 he	 mentions	 Buridan’s	 ass—and	 then	 fills	
Horner’s	 philosophical	 conversation	 with	 further	 acknowledgments	 of	 more	 recent	
antifoundationalists:	 Sartre,	 Kierkegaard,	 pragmatism.	 LeMahieu	 has	 convincingly	
argued	that	the	novel’s	dialogue	about	fact/value	relations	amounts	to	thinly	disguised	
citation	of	logical-positivism,	and	while	his	chapter	on	Barth	is	the	only	one	that	doesn’t	
produce	 archival	 evidence	 of	 deleted	 engagement-by-name	 with	 logical	 positivism,	
Barth’s	 preserved	 drafts	 of	 the	 novel	 show	 that	 he	 did	 delete	 plenty	 of	 philosophical	
citation,	 in	 particular	 Joe’s	 explicit	 comparison	 of	 US	 pragmatism	 and	 French	
Existentialism,	and	a	moment	where	Horner	compares	himself	to	Descartes	in	terms	of	
programmatic	 doubt	 (Archive). 21 	The	 novel’s	 openness	 about	 its	 antifoundational	
heritage	belies	the	idea	that	the	lack	of	foundations	in	Horner’s	world	could	be	its	full	
rhetorical	payoff.	
Various	 critics	 have	 noted	 the	 degree	 to	which	Horner’s	 convictions	 anticipate	
the	 tenets	 of	 poststructuralism:	 these	 constitute	 the	 few	 attempts	 to	 reconcile	 early	
Barth’s	 methods	 and	 insights	 with	 mature-postmodern	 Barth’s.	 The	 stress	 on	 the	
incoherent	 self—arguably	 the	 one	 of	Horner’s	 axioms	which	 has	 the	 best	 claim	 to	 be	
distinctively	poststructuralist—is	established,	though,	in	the	novel’s	very	first	 line.	The	
cosmoptic	 scene,	 meanwhile,	 assumes	 the	 priorty	 of	 givenness	 through	 another	
conspicuous	 location:	 it’s	 the	 only	 scene	 in	 the	novel	 to	 be	narrated	out	 of	 sequence.	
Chronologically,	it	precedes	all	the	rest	of	the	novel’s	narrated	events,	emphasising	the	
extent	 to	 which	 it	 grounds	 all	 the	 novel’s	 other	 dealings	 with	 decision.	 Its	 out-of-
sequence	 narration	 puts	 it	 just	 after	 Horner	 has	 exposed	 Rennie	 to	 a	 disillusioning	
vision	of	 how	 Joe	 behaves	when	he	 thinks	he’s	 unobserved,	 and	before	 the	 revelation	
that	Horner	and	Rennie	have	slept	together.	It	thus	functions	to	clarify	the	exact	terms	
within	which	the	subsequent	exertions	of	agency	that	will	hinge	on	Rennie’s	pregnancy	
and	threatened	suicide	have	to	work.	Cosmopsis,	then,	is	not	built	up	to	or	argued	for.		
It	is	the	condition	on	which	the	novel	is	premised.	All	the	novel’s	citation	and	structure																																																									
21	EotR	Manuscript	298	+	164,	Holograph	Drafts,	Box	1,	Folder	1	+	3	
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emphasise	 that	 these	 paralyzing	 problems	 are	 its	 starting	 conditions,	 not	 its	 insights,	
leaving	the	rest	of	the	novel	to	examine	what	is	to	be	done	in	a	world	where	they	can’t	
be	denied.		
That	question	then	establishes	the	framework	within	which	the	models	of	action	
figured	 by	 Horner,	 Joe,	 and	 the	 Doctor—call	 these	 respectively	 “weather,”	 “mastery,”	
and	 “mere	 action”—have	 to	 be	 assessed.	Horner	 and	 Joe	 initially	 seem	 like	 opposites;	
one	invested	in	the	rational	accountability	of	the	self,	and	the	other	having	reasoned	his	
cosmoptic	way	to	rejecting	both	selfhood	and	practical	choice-making.	Joe	rationalizes	
forwards,	 by	 imagining	 how	 he	 might	 be	 held	 accountable.	 	 Since	 “the	 only	
demonstrable	 index	 to	 a	man’s	 desires	 is	 his	 acts,	when	 you’re	 speaking	 of	 past	 time:	
what	a	man	did	 is	what	he	wanted	 to	do”	 (300),	 the	only	way	 to	make	sure	 that	your	
actions	will	 be	 rationally	 justifiable	 is	 to	make	 your	 desires	 synonymous	with	 reason.		
Horner,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 rationalizes	 backwards,	 not	 only	 in	 the	 moment,	 but	
crucially	 from	 his	 retrospective	 narratorial	 vantage.	 Early	 in	 the	 novel,	 he	 claims	 a	
superior	 sympathy	 towards	anyone	who	cannot	 “discipline	his	 standards,	down	 to	 the	
last	shred	of	conscience,	to	fit	his	behaviour”	(281).		To	be	able	to	do	so	is	the	privilege	of	
one	who	can	think	after	his	act	 is	determined,	can	explain	the	act	 in	knowledge	of	 its	
consequence,	and	Horner’s	retrospective	narrative	vantage	allows	him	to	rationalise	any	
action	as	conforming	to	his	(lack	of)	beliefs.		While	Joe	must	rationalise	before	he	acts,	
Horner	as	narrator	can	do	what	Joe	as	character	cannot,	and	construct	a	perfect	match	
between	values	and	actions.	He	just	happens	to	value	the	conviction	of	irresponsibility	
for	his	own	actions,	matching	his	actions	to	 inscrutable	mental	“weather.”	This	shared	
rationalizing	 has	 a	 shared	 consequence:	 each	 is	 motivated	 by	 a	 refusal	 to	 act	 in	 the	
absence	 of	 total	 certainty.	 It’s	 this	 shared	 anti-commitment	 that	 finally	 generates	 the	
tortuous	 suspension	 that	 Rennie	 resolves	 to	 escape	 by	 the	 forced	 choice	 between	
abortion	and	suicide.	
When	Joe	is	unable	to	understand	Rennie’s	adultery,	the	natural	consequence	is	
that	they	be	left	in	a	painful	suspension	until	he	can:		
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According	 to	 my	 version	 of	 Rennie,	 what	 happened	 couldn’t	 have	 happened.		
According	 to	 her	 version	 of	 herself,	 it	 couldn’t	 have	 happened.	 	 And	 yet	 it	
happened.	 	That’s	why	even	now	we	have	a	hard	time	believing	 it	did	happen…	
and	 why	 everything’s	 got	 to	 be	 held	 in	 suspension	 now	 until	 we	 decide	 the	
significance	of	what	happened	(362).	
In	‘The	Will	to	Believe,’	William	James	criticised	William	Clifford’s	version	of	scepticism:	
“Believe	nothing,	he	tells	us,	keep	your	mind	in	suspense	forever,	rather	than	by	closing	
it	on	insufficient	evidence	incur	the	awful	risk	of	believing	lies”	(727).		This	is	Joe’s	logic,	
but	it’s	also	Horner’s.	Tobin	Siebers	objects	to	postmodern	theory’s	anti-subjectivism	in	
similar	terms:	“Skeptics	define	their	virtue	as	critics	in	direct	proportion	to	their	ability	
to	purify	their	thinking	of	‘beliefs”	(12).	The	resistance	to	belief,	Siebers	goes	on	to	make	
clear,	 is	 a	 resistance	 to	 Clifford’s	 “awful	 risk”	 of	 being	 proved	 wrong,	 of	 being	 found	
subject	to	a	false	ideology.		Horner’s	refusal	to	attribute	his	actions	to	himself	is	just	this	
kind	 of	 exculpation:	 he	 too	 is	 initially	 willing	 to	 let	 Rennie	 suffer,	 ending	 a	 long	
balancing	 of	 considerations	with	 an	 anti-conclusion:	 “‘I’m	not	 taking	 a	 stand…	 I’m	 an	
issue	 evader	 from	 way	 back.	 	 I’ll	 go	 along	 with	 you	 any	 way	 you	 want’”	 (375).	 The	
deliberate	 suspension	 of	 action	 and	 the	 displacement	 of	 responsibility	 for	 choice,	 so	
often	 given	 a	 positive	 valence	 by	 postmodern	 theory,	 is	 in	The	 End	 of	 the	 Road	mere	
callousness.			
While	both	Joe	and	Horner	hold	their	actions	to	such	standards,	meanwhile,	the	
Doctor’s	 “treatments”	 for	 agentive	 paralysis	 all	 work	 by	 divorcing	 action	 from	
considerations	 of	 outcome	 or	 accountability,	 making	 it	 an	 end	 in	 itself.	 From	
impersonating	someone	else,	to	“mythotherapy,”	in	which	you	conceive	your	actions	as	
fulfilling	an	already	written	script,	to	the	minimal	connection	between	“motivation”	and	
action	that	comes	from	randomly	specifying	a	destination	and	then	walking	there,	 the	
doctor’s	 therapies	 are	 all	 broadly	 parodic	 of	 the	 existential	 insistence	 that	 a	
foundationless	 world	 makes	 action	 an	 end	 in	 itself.	 The	 Doctor	 may	 not	 be	 a	
rationalizer,	 then,	 but	 his	 models	 of	 agency	 have	 little	 to	 offer	 in	 terms	 of	 practical	
agency	or	its	attendant	categories:	goal-pursuit,	longterm	coherence,	responsibility,	and	
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so	 on.	 There’s	 nothing	 here	 that	 can	 validly	 resolve—rather	 than	 just	 breaking—the	
suspension	into	which	Horner	and	Joe	put	Rennie.		
The	moment	 at	which	Horner	 resolves	 to	 break	 this	 suspension,	 realizing	 that	
he’s	less	committed	to	his	rationalization	than	Joe	to	his,	is	the	moment	where	the	novel	
introduces	 a	 new	 philosophical	 alternative,	 and	 it	 does	 so	 through	 style.	 	 It’s	 in	 the	
passages	that	follow,	as	Horner	frantically	tries	to	arrange	an	abortion,	that	we	get	the	
novel’s	most	traditional	prose:	both	the	prose	style	and	the	narrative	events	are	at	their	
furthest	remove	from	the	evocation	of	cosmopsis	and	self-diffusion	on	which	the	novel	
begins.	 Yet	 for	 critics	 who	 read	 the	 novel	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 pessimism,	 or	 an	
endorsement	 of	 one	 or	 other	 character’s	 philosophy,	 it’s	 precisely	 this	 passage	 of	 the	
novel	that	has	seemed	most	jarring	and	hardest	to	explain:	critics	consistently	treat	it	as	
an	 aside	 from,	 rather	 than	 a	 crux	 for,	 the	 novel’s	 core	 arguments	 on	 agency.	 Patricia	
Tobin	 finds	 its	 representation	 of	 active	 choice-making	 “severely	 and	 comically	
qualified,”	while	for	Charles	Harris	it’s	“clearly	an	exercise	in	futility…	The	chapter	seems	
far	 less	 an	 account	 of	 Jake’s	 sudden	 resolve	 than	 a	 parody	 of	 decisiveness,	 further	
confirmation	that	events	have	a	life	of	their	own,	impervious	to	Jake’s	desire	to	restrain	
them”	 (144).	 Only	 Ken	 Pellow	 and	 Rita	 Hug	 have	 read	 it	 positively,	 as	 showing	 how	
Horner’s	respect	for	Rennie’s	personhood	is	“sufficient	to	overwhelm	his	usual	tendency	
to	 examine	 motivations	 rather	 than	 be	 motivated.	 The	 Horner	 who	 chooses	 to	 help	
Rennie	get	an	abortion	is	a	decisive,	active,	un-catatonic,	non-self-centred,	strategic,	and	
pretty	 damned	 efficient	 fellow”	 (43).	 	 What	 none	 of	 these	 critics	 focus	 on	 is	 the	
distinctiveness	of	this	part	of	the	novel	in	terms	of	style.		
	
Two	Prose	Psychologies	
Harris’	 judgment	 that	 the	 passage	 seems	 parodic	 is,	 as	 I’ll	 show,	 the	 key	 to	 its	
import.	 There’s	 a	 connection	 between	 the	 logical	 change	 of	mind	 that	Horner	 has	 to	
make	 in	 order	 to	 end	 Rennie’s	 suspension,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 doing	 so	 puts	 him	 into	
conventional	prose	psychology.	His	shift	to	that	prose—freshly,	parodically	opaque	in	all	
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the	ways	 “The	 Literature	 of	 Exhaustion”	 had	 recommended—shows	him	 accepting	 an	
older	mode	of	deliberative	agency	that	his	propounding	of	the	various	paralyzing	givens	
seemed	to	require	him	to	reject.	As	the	prose	forms	become	opaque,	so	too	the	model	of	
agency	they	offer	is	updated,	“rediscover[ed]	validly”	outside	its	original	context.	
The	kind	of	realism	that	has	been	attributed	to	The	End	of	 the	Road	is	precisely	
that	which	“The	Literature	of	Exhaustion	singles	out	as	outdated:	a	“turn	of	the	century”	
psychologism	that	aims	at	the	optimal	presentation	of	the	moment	by	moment	working	
of	 a	 mind	 in	 urgent	 social	 situations.	 This	 is	 a	 prose	 characterised	 by	 the	 linear,	
sequential	presentation	of	experiences,	impressions,	insights	and	considerations	toward	
a	conclusion	or	an	action.	If	we	look	to	the	abortion-organising	sequence,	we’ll	find	just	
this	kind	of	prose.		Take	this	extended	example:	
Dr.	Welleck’s	manner	gave	me	some	confidence	that	he	could	be	swindled.	For	
one	 thing,	 he	 talked	 too	 much:	 three	 of	 the	 doctors	 I’d	 called	 had	 refused	 to	
discuss	 anything	 at	 all	 over	 the	 telephone,	 and	 none	 of	 the	 others	 had	 been	
anything	 like	 so	 garrulous	 as	 young	 Dr	Welleck.	 Also,	 from	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
conversation	I	gathered	that	he	was	finding	it	difficult	to	compete	with	the	older	
practitioners,	perhaps	because	he	was	new	 in	 town.	Any	professional	man	who	
would	criticize	his	colleague	to	perfect	stranger	on	the	telephone	was,	I	guessed,	
a	man	with	whom	arrangements	could	be	made	(407).		
Here	are	considerations	arranged	into	linear	sequence	by	qualifiers	like	“For	one	thing”	
and	“Also”;	here	are	the	verbs	of	local	mental	activity—“I	gathered”	or	“I	guessed”—that	
turn	past	impressions	into	present	considerations,	and	all	are	organized	by	a	consistent	
deliberative	present	established	by	the	passage	beginning	and	ending	at	the	point	where	
these	 considerations	 add	 up	 to	 the	 conclusion	 from	 which	 subsequent	 paragraphs	
continue.		Anyone	who	wanted	to	claim	that	The	End	of	the	Road	was	a	conventionally	
realist	novel	would	surely	start	with	a	passage	like	this.	
But	recall	that	this	is	the	part	of	the	novel	that	critics	have	found	weird,	parodic,	
ill-fitting	 with	 this	 realist	 novel’s	main	 cosmoptic	 preoccupations.	 If	 we	 contrast	 this	
passage	with	the	kind	of	prose	that	is	basic	to	the	rest	of	the	novel,	the	kind	of	prose	on	
which	it	begins	and	ends,	we’ll	see	that	that	basic	prose	lacks	these	markers	of	turn-of-
the-century	realist	psychologism.	Take	this	extended	example	from	the	opening	pages,	
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in	which	Horner	explains	the	difficulties	of	choosing	how	to	sit	in	the	Doctor’s	Progress	
and	Advice	Room:	
You	would	not	slouch	down,	because	to	do	so	would	thrust	your	knees	virtually	
against	 his.	 Neither	 would	 you	 be	 inclined	 to	 cross	 your	 legs	 in	 either	 the	
masculine	or	the	feminine	manner:	the	masculine	manner…	would	cause	your	left	
shoe	to	rub	against	 the	Doctor’s	 left	 trouser	 leg…	the	 feminine	manner…	would	
thrust	 the	 toes	 of	 your	 shoe	 against	 the	 same	 trouser	 leg…	 To	 sit	 sideways,	 of	
course,	would	 be	 unthinkable,	 and	 spreading	 your	 knees	 in	 the	manner	 of	 the	
Doctor	 makes	 you	 acutely	 conscious	 of	 aping	 his	 position,	 as	 if	 you	 hadn’t	 a	
personality	 of	 your	 own.	 	 Your	 position,	 then	 (Which	 has	 the	 appearance	 of	
choice,	 because	 you	 are	 not	 ordered	 to	 sit	 thus,	 but…	 is	 chosen	 only	 in	 a	 very	
limited	sense,	since	there	are	no	alternatives)	is	as	follows…	(255-6).			
This	is	less	a	presentation	of	deliberation	than	a	sequence	of	claims	about	consideration	
given	 a	 speciously	 deliberative	 subjunctivity.	Where	 the	 style	 of	 the	 classically	 realist	
abortion-procurement	 insists,	 per	 classical	 realism,	 on	 the	 action	 as	 an	 outcome	 of	
thoughts	that	precede	it,	the	style	of	prose	on	which	the	novel	begins	and	ends	separates	
considerations	from	thought:	although	the	available	options	are	presented	in	relation	to	
a	 “you”,	 there	 is	 only	 one	 verb	 of	mental	 action—“is	 chosen”—and	 this	 has	no	 agent.	
Agential	deliberation	 is	constrained	 to	 the	 form	of	 logical	deduction,	by	contrast	with	
the	 contingent	 inductive	 structure	 of	 the	 abortion-procurement	 section.	 The	 style	
presents	the	premises	of	the	narrated	deliberation	as	universal	truths,	but	beneath	the	
prose’s	 insistence	 they	are	nothing	of	 the	sort:	Horner’s	claim	that	 “to	 sit	 sideways,	of	
course,	would	be	unthinkable,”	for	example,	presents	a	personal	aversion	as	a	literal	and	
obvious	 cognitive	 impossibility.	 	 A	 specific	 narrative	 situation	 is	 presenting	 itself	 as	 a	
universal	 condition	 of	 agency,	 and	 doing	 so	 at	 the	 level	 of	 unconventional	 prose	
construction.	
Recall	 a	 similar	move	 in	 the	 discussion	 of	 cosmopsis,	where	what	 seems	 like	 a	
standard	 piece	 of	 free	 indirect	 discourse	 based	 on	Horner’s	 own	 perspective—“There	
was	no	 reason	 to	 do	 anything.	 	My	 eyes…	were	 sightless,	 gazing	 on	 eternity,	 fixed	 on	
ultimacy”—moves	into	a	universal	generalization:	“and	when	that	is	the	case	there	is	no	
reason	 to	 do	 anything—even	 to	 change	 the	 focus	 of	 one’s	 eyes”	 (323).	 These	
pronouncements	 blend	 past	 or	 subjunctive	 tenses	 indexed	 to	 specifically	 located	
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perspectives	 into	 simple-present	 generalizations	 about	 the	 inexistence	 of	 “reasons”	 or	
“cho[ices].”	After	more	than	a	hundred	pages	of	prose	given	over	 to	such	grammatical	
naturalizations	 of	 dubious	 logic,	 the	 restoration	 of	 a	 conventional	 prose	whose	 forms	
presume	 rather	 than	 asserting	 the	 existence	 of	 alternative	 options	 and	 live	
considerations	comes	to	seem	unusual.	
**	
The	novel’s	two	distinct	prose	psychologies	hinge	on	the	fact	that	the	narrator	is	
narrating	 his	 own	 earlier	 self.	 Horner,	 as	 a	 narrator,	 has	 established	 psychological	
grounds	for	wanting	to	believe	in	the	unstable	version	of	human	consciousness,	reasons	
that	 become	 clearer	 and	 clearer	 as	 the	 novel	 goes	 on	 and	 his	 recounted	 actions	 take	
their	place	in	the	build-up	to	Rennie’s	death.		Horner	exerts	his	narratorial	authority	to	
insist	 that	 his	 actions	 have	 always	 been	 “both	 specifically	 (if	 not	 generally)	
unpremeditated	 and	 entirely	 unreflective.”	 	 	 The	 acts	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	 final	
catastrophe,	 he	 implies,	 should	 be	 related	 to	 “The	 fellow	who	 committed	 [them],”	 by	
what	“I	would	call”	something	 less	 than	deliberated	responsibility	(349).	 “Would”	here	
works	doubly	with	its	original	sense	of	“wish	to.”	These	implications	of	the	motivation	
behind	Horner’s	default	mode	of	narration	makes	the	difference	between	the	two	proses	
crucial	to	the	novel	because	they	represent	a	distinction	between	forms	of	reason.	The	
recuperated	 style	 of	 the	 abortion-procurement	 passages	 is	 a	 prose	 of	 practical	
deliberation,	a	pursuit	of	contingent	goals	that	has	to	engage	with	the	possibility	of	error	
or	 failure.	 That	 strange	 default	 prose,	 meanwhile,	 is	 a	 prose	 of	 rationalization—a	
retrospective	 attempt	 to	 deny	 and	 avoid	 error,	 contingency,	 and	 unpredictability	 by	
aligning	his	motives	with	mere	logic.	
That	prior	critics	haven’t	noticed	this	shift	in	styles,	instead	treating	the	novel	as	
consistently	 realist,	 reflects	 the	 subtlety	 of	 the	 modulations	 with	 which	 the	 novel’s	
default	 prose	 accommodates	 the	 postmodern	 givens	 that	 made	 conventional	 prose	
psychology	 less	 than	 “technically	 contemporary.”	 I’ll	 pick	 on	 three	 qualities	 that	
distinguish	 it:	 these	 are	 non-standard	 in	 conventional	 prose	 psychology,	 but	 occur	
persistently	 in	 the	 default	 parts	 of	 the	 novel,	 are	 clearly	 tied	 to	 the	 rationalizing	
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promotion	 of	 postmodern	 givens	 as	 exhaustions	 of	 agentive	 possibility,	 and	 vanish	
entirely	in	the	passages	where	Horner	is	practically	deliberating	to	save	Rennie.		
For	 a	 start,	 Horner’s	 mental	 self-quotation	 when	 rationalizing	 and	 when	
perturbed	 are	 distinct.	 Early	 in	 the	 novel,	 he	 narrates	 coming	 home	 after	 his	 first	
meeting	with	Joe	and	Rennie,	when	the	phone	rings	and	he	knows	it’s	Rennie	asking	to	
meet	again.	 “Rennie,	girl,	 said	 I	 to	myself,	 I	 am	out;	be	content	 that	 I	don’t	commit	a	
lewdness	with	your	voice,	since	you’ve	aborted	my	infant	manic.	Ring	away,	girl	scout:	
your	quarry’s	not	in	his	hole”	(275).	After	the	reminder	that	Rennie’s	voice	comes	to	us	
entirely	 through	Horner’s	modulation,	 the	 ostentatiously	 unnatural	 diction	 highlights	
its	 own	 lack	 of	 a	 clear	 parodic	 source:	 in	 rationalizing	 himself	 as	 selfless,	Horner	 can	
make	 his	 own	 voice	 and	 thoughts	maximally	 idiosyncratic	 to	 stress	 his	 disconnection	
from	the	kind	of	stable	human	relations	that	 Joe	and	Rennie	aim	to	model.	But	under	
stress,	Horner’s	mental	quotation	of	himself	blends	into	his	narrative	prose	in	standard	
free	indirect	style:	“the	guilt	poured	in	with	a	violent	shock	that	slacked	my	jaw…	What	
in	heaven’s	name	was	 I	 doing?	 	What,	 for	God’s	 sake,	 had	 I	 done?...”	 (350).	As	 in	 the	
above	passage	 the	 introductory	 line	 reminded	us	of	Horner’s	 filtering	power,	here	 the	
equivalent	 line	 seems	 to	 self-consciously	 cancel	 that	 power	 out—to	 slacken	 Horner’s	
speaking	 organ—in	 order	 to	 revert	 to	 conventionally	 direct	mental	 transcription.	 The	
urgency	of	the	past	events	takes	over	the	present	style,	rather	than	the	default	mode’s	
usual	filtering	control	over	the	presentation	of	the	past.	
The	 default	 style	 also	 exploits	 the	 transtemporal	 possibilities	 of	 Horner’s	
narration,	 blending	 past	 and	 present	 in	 a	 single	 prose.	 The	 novel	 gives	 us	 an	 early	
clarification	of	how	this	works:	with	Horner	notionally	narrating	an	earlier	meeting	 in	
the	Doctor’s	old	Baltimore	facility,	his	reference	to	“the	present	establishment”	reminds	
us	 that	 he	 is	 writing	 from	 the	Doctor’s	 new	 Philadelphia	 facility.	 Since	 “present”	 can	
refer	equally	to	both	settings,	his	prose	treats	the	axioms	of	past	choices	as	syntatically	
“present”	to	both	settings,	and	transcendentally	true	thanks	to	his	generalizing	simple-
present	 tense.	 This	 principle	 then	 governs	 the	whole	 subsequent	 novel.	Near	 its	 end,	
Horner	discusses	having	told	Joe	that	he	loved	Rennie,	and	tells	us	“at	any	rate	I	couldn’t	
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see	 any	 meaning	 in	 the	 statement	 now.”	 “Now,”	 throughout	 the	 novel,	 gives	 such	
sentences	 two	 available	 indices,	 which	 have	 different	 significances	 before	 and	 after	
knowledge	of	Rennie’s	death.	In	the	past	tense,	this	just	seems	like	another	example	of	
Horner’s	 denial	 of	 personal	 connection	 to	 human	 categories	 and	 the	 language	 that	
represents	them:	he	said	something	but	he	changes	like	weather	so	lacks	commitment	
to	its	content.	But	from	the	present,	we	can	read	the	now	as	distinguishing	past	Horner	
from	present	Horner	on	the	basis	of	what	has	happened	to	him	and	what	he’s	learned.	
That	makes	available	a	reading	something	like	“couldn’t	even	if	I	tried,”	which	points	to	
the	influence	that	Rennie’s	death	may	have	had	on	the	nihilism	that	saturates	the	book.		
“Could,”	too,	is	consistently	used	with	this	dual	implication.	The	archive	reveals	
that	 Barth	 added	 or	 changed	 a	 lot	 of	 these	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 drafting	 process,	
suggesting	 it	 was	 a	 conscious	 pattern.	 In	 particular,	 Horner	 uses	 it	 to	 sustain	 those	
faulty	 reasonings	 that	 imply	 that	 since	 he,	 either	 in	 the	 narrated	 past	 or	 narrating	
present,	doesn’t	acknowledge	something’s	existence	then	that	something	doesn’t	exist.		
For	example,	 in	a	seemingly	minor	confusion	that	leads	him	to	turn	up	a	day	early	for	
his	interview	at	the	teacher’s	college,	Horner	paraphrases	his	apologetic	response	to	the	
secretary:	 “I	 certainly	wasn’t	 going	 to	make	 an	 issue	 out	 of	 it,	 and	 for	 that	matter	 an	
equally	 good	 case	 could	be	made	 for	Monday”	 (261).	 	 “Could”	here	blurs	 together	 the	
factual	dimension	of	when	the	interview	had	really	been	arranged	for	and	the	normative	
question	of	when	such	interviews	should	be	arranged.	Horner	attempts	to	subsume	the	
factual	 to	 the	 normative.	 Later	 in	 the	 incident,	 this	 dynamic	 leads	 him	 to	
straightforwardly	untrue	modal	reasoning:	“Since	I	would	not	 in	a	hundred	years	have	
been	 at	 home	 enough	 in	Dr	 Schott’s	 office	 to	 ask	 Shirley	 to	 investigate	 her	 files,	 the	
question	 of	 my	 appointment	 date	 could	 not	 be	 verified	 by	 appeal	 to	 objective	 facts”	
(267).	This	suggests	that	since	Horner	is	disinclined	to	do	something,	no	person	could	
do	that	thing.	At	the	same	time,	it	articulates	a	truth	contingent	on	his	power	over	the	
narrative:	 if	 a	 fiction	 has	 a	 single	 narrator,	 there	 is	 no	 way	 to	 verify	 facts	 about	 the	
fictional	 world	 beyond	 what	 that	 character	 presents	 us.	 Barth	 thus,	 in	 one	 language	
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detail,	highlights	both	Horner’s	 faulty	motivated	reasoning	and	the	generic	conditions	
that	allow	him	to	propound	it.		
As	I’ve	suggested	the	prose-style	interactions	bear	the	weight	of	the	philosophical	
significance	and	structure	of	Horner’s	change	of	mind,	 it’s	 important	 that	 this	pattern	
shows	 up	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Joe/Rennie/Horner	 triangle.	When	 Joe	 first	 confronts	
Horner	with	the	infidelity,	Horner	attempts	to	rationalize	his	way	out	of	it	by	appeal	to	
his	 usual	 givens:	 “‘I	 don’t	 know	what	unconscious	motives	 I	might	have	had,	 Joe,	 but	
whatever	they	were,	they	were	unconscious,	so	I	can’t	know	anything	about	them.’	And,	
I	was	 thinking,	can’t	be	held	 responsible	 for	 them”	(358).	 	Horner’s	 first	 “can”	 is	more	
dubious	 logic:	 that	 something	was	 unconscious	 in	 the	 past	 doesn’t	mean	 that	 it’s	 not	
knowable	 in	 the	 present.	 Horner’s	 reported	 thought,	 meanwhile,	 establishes	 the	
conscious	motive	that	leads	him	to	make	such	claims.	And	this	highlights	the	degree	to	
which	 the	 past/present	 play	 of	 “can”	 in	 this	 scene	 establishes	 how	 Horner’s	 pseudo-
logical	narrative	style	is	motivated	by	his	present	need	to	be	able	to	avoid	responsibility	
for	 his	 part	 in	 later	 events	 of	 the	 same	 relationship.	 The	 way	 that	 “I	 was	 thinking”	
stresses	the	difference	between	past	and	present	can	then	be	read	in	at	least	two	ways:	
either	as	a	deliberate	disavowal	of	having	those	thoughts	in	the	present,	or	as	a	present	
acknowledgment	that	his	undeniable	role	in	bringing	about	Rennie’s	death	has	stopped	
him	from	being	able	to	truly	“think”	his	irresponsibility	any	longer.	That	the	ambiguity	
goes	 unresolved	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 duo-temporal	 narrative	 situation	
without	 resolving	 exactly	 what	 Horner’s	 present	 logic	 is.	 It	 stresses	 the	 fundamental	
reading	condition	Conti	sets	up	for	the	novel:	“We	must	be	wary	of	Horner’s	attempt	to	
supply	 us	with	 the	 terms	 of	 interpretation	most	 favourable	 to	 a	 rationalization	 of	 his	
antisocial	behaviour”	(“Aes”	94).	
It	would	be	a	stretch	to	say	that	this	odd,	Barth-invented	duo-temporal	prose	is	
obviously	 anti-mimetic	 on	 its	 own.	 But	 it	 is	 genuinely,	 consistently	 distinctive,	 and	
thereby	provides	the	foil	that	makes	anti-mimesis	a	rhetorically	relevant	category	when	
a	 prose-style	 usually	 associated	 with	 transparency	 later	 intrudes	 so	 opaquely	 that	 it	
becomes	 the	 one	 in	 need	 of	 thematic	 explanation.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 that	 thematic	
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explanation	 of	 the	 rational-deliberation	 section,	 we	 have	 to	 fully	 understand	 the	
position	from	which	Horner	otherwise	rationalizes	such	agency	out	of	acknowledgable	
existence.	
The	novel’s	organization	of	opaque	rational-deliberation	and	default	deliberate-
rationalization	prose-forms	suggests	 that	 the	 latter	provides	a	viable	alternative	 to	 the	
former.	 Critics	 have	 seen	 the	 novel	 endorsing	 the	 ideas	 that	 structure	 the	misleading	
default	 prose.	 But	 if	 Horner’s	 efforts	 to	 procure	 the	 abortion	 for	 Rennie	 reflect	 bth	
worthwhile	 motivations	 and	 temporarily	 viable	 agency,	 we’re	 cued	 to	 think	 of	 this	
passage	as	philosophically	distinct	by	its	recuperation	of	the	traditional	prose	style.	The	
interaction,	or	conflict,	between	the	two	pose	forms	adds	up,	I’ll	show,	to	three	related	
philosophical	 arguments	 that	 are,	 cumulatively,	 Barth’s	 contribution	 to	
postfoundational	agency-thinking.	First,	there’s	the	implicit	critique	of	the	logic	and	the	
motives	 behind	 Horner’s	 paralyzing	 rationalizations.	 Second,	 the	 prose	 of	 practical	
deliberation	 embodies	 certain	 values	 and	 practices	 opposed	 to	 those	 critiqued	 flaws.	
Third,	there’s	a	logical	structure	in	Horner’s	choosing	to	briefly	reject	rationalization	for	
deliberation.	 Barth	 associates	 Horner’s	 retrospective	 model	 of	 philosophy-justifying	
narration	with	fixity	and	error-aversion,	and	hence	with	postmodern	paralysis.		Against	
this,	he	defends	a	warrant	structure	for	contingent	deliberation	as	a	non-sovereign	but	
profoundly	 useful	 mode	 of	 thinking,	 to	 which	 generalised	 critiques	 of	 	 “reason”	 or	
“rationalism”	do	not	apply.	Yet	finally	Horner’s	reading	of	his	own	story	prompts	him	to	
return	 to	 rationalization.	 I’ll	 show	 finally	 how	 the	 novel	 cues	 us	 to	 treat	 this	 as	 a	
mistake,	a	diagnosis	that	opens	up	into	its	wider	case	for	a	version	of	rationality	unafraid	
of	error	and	accident.	
	
The	Stylistic	Argument	Against	Rationalized	Paralysis	
Horner’s	repeated	grammatical	efforts	to	claim	the	status	of	law	for	suppositions	
entirely	 his	 own	 align	 him	 wih	 Conti’s	 reading	 of	 an	 earlier	 Barth	 protagonist:	 “the	
straight-talking	 narrator	 who	 dresses	 up	 nihilism	 as	 naked	 truth”	 (ICS	 81).	 By	 the	
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standard	 logic	 of	 unreliable	 narrators,	 the	 novel’s	 consistent	 revelation	 of	 Horner’s	
motivated	 reasoning	 	 ought	 to	 trouble	 the	 propositions	 he	 relies	 on,	 a	 worry	 that	
Thomas	 Schaub	 has	 identified:	 “The	 novel	 seems	 caught	 in	 a	 troubling	 oscillation	
between	 a	 dramatic	 critique	 of	 Horner	 and	 an	 admission	 that	 what	 he	 says	 is	
inescapably	true”	(166).		This	is	particularly	the	case	when,	as	Schaub	notes,	“Horner	is	
entirely	 discredited”	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	many	 of	 his	 “assertions	 about	 language	 and	
reality,	 that	 must	 be	 read	 dramatically,	 appear	 in	 Barth’s	 interviews	 as	 straight	
assessments	 of	 the	 artist’s	 problems	 and	 compromises”	 (167).	 	 	 The	 problem	 for	 a	
postmodern	 project	 novel	 as	 I’ve	 defined	 the	 genre	 is	 to	make	 apparently	 paralyzing	
givens	 compatible	 with	 deliberative	 agency	 without	 actually	 denying	 them.	 Horner’s	
error	is	not	in	the	givens	he	propounds,	but	the	logic	with	which	he	combines	them	to	
propound	an	anti-agentive	agenda.	To	understand	 the	 flaws	 in	 that	 logic	and	 the	way	
that	Horner’s	briefly	constructive	response	to	Rennie’s	deadly	dilemma	overcomes	them	
even	 though	 she	 still	 dies,	 we	 need	 to	 fully	 understand	 how	Horner	 and	 his	 dubious	
logic	are,	literally,	characterized.	
The	 End	 of	 the	 Road	 constantly	 invites	 us	 to	 think	 about	 Horner’s	 anti-
subjectivity	 arguments	 as	 anti-responsibility	 arguments,	 to	 consider	 these	 in	 terms	 of	
revealed	motives,	and	those	motives	in	relation	to	the	gradual	revelation	of	a	narrative	
arc	whose	events	Horner	might	wish	to	avoid	responsibility	for.	This	might	seem	to	treat	
Horner	as	human	in	ways	that	anti-mimetic	fiction	ought,	by	its	very	principles,	not	to.	
If	we	 think	of	Horner	as	 a	 character	 in	William	Gass’	non-mimetic	 sense	of	 the	 term,	
though—“A	character	 for	me	 is	any	 linguistic	 location	of	a	book	toward	which	a	great	
part	of	the	rest	of	the	text	stands	as	a	modifier…	The	work	is	filled	with	only	one	thing	-	
words	and	how	they	work	and	how	they	connect”	 (interview	w/	Gardner	8)—then	we	
can	read	Horner’s	significance	as	the	narrator,	and	his	relation	to	questions	of	agency,	in	
terms	 of	 how	 the	words	 that	 represent	 him	modify	 other	 clusters	 of	words	 related	 to	
categories	of	agency.	Take,	for	example,	the	way	that	Horner	and	the	word	“self”	relate.	
We	already	know,	of	 course,	 that	Horner	aims	 to	 invalidate	 the	word	by	 rationalizing	
about	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 his	 being.	 Yet	 rationalization	 is	 the	 product	 of	 linguistic	
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structures	 that,	 in	 Horner’s	 instrumental	 uses	 of	 them,	 entail	 a	 self	 to	 do	 the	
rationalizing.	 	As	such,	though	“self”	 is	a	term	that	Horner	as	narrator	foregrounds	for	
revision,	it	also	modifies	the	word-structures	that	constitute	Horner.		
For	example,	his	claims	to	be	guided	by	mental	“weather”	usually	come	from	the	
position	 of	 stable	 rationalization.	 	 Yet	 under	 the	 pressure	 of	 narrative	 events	 that	
threaten	that	account	of	irresponsible	freedom,	the	language	of	self	creeps	into	the	text	
free	 from	 qualification:	 his	 first	 feelings	 of	 guilt	 follow	 from	 his	 realisation	 that	 he	
“didn’t	 want	 to	 think	 about	 myself”	 (350),	 while	 after	 he	 first	 sleeps	 with	 Rennie	 “it	
seemed	 I	 had	 to	 admit	 that	 I	 was	 a	 coward	 after	 all…	 and	 now	 I	 was	 self-conscious	
again…	 my	 curiosity	 returned	 with	 my	 self-consciousness”	 (354).	 	 In	 both	 instances,	
there’s	 a	 connection	between	 the	 sense	of	 selfhood	 and	 the	 feeling	of	 accusation	 that	
Horner	 associates	 with	 the	 very	 concept	 of	 responsibility.	 Daniel	 Majdiak,	 traces	
Horner’s	 unreflexive	 use	 of	 “self”	 to	 cowardice,	 suggesting	 that	 “from	 this	 point	 on	
Horner	 never	 again	 totally	 loses	 himself	 in	 a	 role;	 every	 action	 he	 participates	 in	 is	
complicated	for	him	by	his	awareness	of	the	role”	(58).		This	is	right	about	the	scenes	in	
which	Horner	attempts	to	rationalize	himself	out	of	problems,	but	doesn’t	acknowledge	
that	in	the	practical-deliberation,	conventional-prose	passages,	such	self-mention	drops	
away:	when	he	acts	in	terms	compatible	with	having	a	self,	the	concept	has	no	external	
perch	from	which	to	attack.	
“Self”	 distorts	 the	 prose	most	 when	 rationalization	 conflicts	 with	 the	 need	 for	
urgent	response,	especially	to	others	who	depend	on	Horner.	In	the	self-justificications	
he	relies	on	to	avoid	those	obligations,	he	most	explicitly	sets	out	his	self-conception	as	
a	 post-existential	 man.	 	 Increasingly,	 he	 becomes	 aware	 that	 such	 wishes	 might	
themselves	be	a	basis	for	accusation:	he	refrains	from	using	his	theory	of	self	to	explain	
his	actions	to	Joe,	“for	to	do	so	would	have	been	to	testify	further	against	myself”	(368).		
This	makes	clear	just	how	dependent	Horner’s	anti-self	theories	are	on	his	unified	and	
consistent	 tendencies:	 granting	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 accusation	 establishes	 a	 self	 to	 be	
testified	 against,	 a	 self	 that	 anxiety	 forces	 him	 to	 acknowledge	 wherever	 accusation	
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takes	place.	 	The	absence	of	self	 is	 thus	an	exculpatory	maneuver,	 its	pursuit	entailing	
selfish	motives	that	indict	by	the	exculpation’s	own	terms.22		
The	 complexity	 of	 these	 modifying	 relationships	 make	 even	 the	 narrator’s	
relation	to	his	earlier	self	bear	argumentative	weight.	The	novel’s	opening	hedge,	“In	a	
sense,	 I	 am	 Jacob	 Horner”	 (255)	 establishes	 a	 wobbling	 relationship	 between	 the	
narrated	character	and	the	narrator.	There	are	at	 least	 two	ways	to	read	 it:	either	as	a	
belief	attributable	to	both	Horners	that	“Horner”	is	always	unstable	and	so	no	iteration	
of	 him	 is	 him	 in	 a	 fundamentally	 different	 sense	 than	 any	 other,	 or	 as	 the	 narrator	
establishing	the	tenuousness	of	the	link	between	the	two:	“I	[your	current	narrator]	am	
Jacob	Horner	[the	character	you’re	about	to	read	about],	but	only	in	a	sense	[due	to	the	
changes	that	followed	what	I’m	about	to	recount].”		The	possibility	of	the	latter	reading	
highlights	that	narrator	and	character	may	have	different	reasons	to	be	invested	in	their	
identical	 accounts	 of	 the	 non-identity	 of	 selfhood.	 	 Those	 reasons	 hinge	 on	
responsibility	for	Rennie’s	death.	Both	Horner’s	modes	of	action—the	rationalizing	and	
the	 deliberative—played	 a	 part	 in	 the	 events	 that	 led	 to	 it.	 But	 his	 narration’s	 duo-
temporal	 style	 elements	 encode	 a	 circular	 logic:	 Narrating	 Horner	 derives	 from	 the	
fortunes	of	Narrated	Horner	only	a	claim	that	narrated	Horner’s	 initial	worldview	was	
right	all	along.	The	novel	stresses	this	by	specifying	from	page	one	that	Barth	narrates	
from	 the	 Doctor’s	 new	 clinic.	 From	 the	 start,	 we	 know	 that	 the	 narrator	 still	 finds	
himself	 in	 the	 same	medical-philosophical	 situation	 that	 led	 him	 into	 the	 events	 he’s	
about	to	recount.23	In	both	narratological	and	intra-world	geographical	terms,	Horner’s	
modifying	 role	 as	 a	 narrator	 is	 reiteration	 despite	 signs	 that	 his	 ideas	 ought	 to	 have	
changed	or	evolved.																																																									
22	Insofar	 as	 Horner’s	 intellect	 and	 the	 self	 that	 underlies	 it	 conflict,	 we	might	 see	 him	 as	 a	 narrator-
structural	literalization	of	the	motive-dynamic	in	Barth’s	debut	novel	The	Floating	Opera,	whose	narrator	
expressed	a	need	“to	hide	my	heart	from	my	mind”	(223).	
23	Barth	 added	 the	 specification	 of	Horner’s	 location	 late	 in	 the	 drafting	 process:	 “(I	 am	writing	 this	 in	
October,	 1955	at	7.55	P.M.	 in	 the	evening	of	Tuesday,	October	4,	 1955)”	 (EotR	Manuscript	4,	Holograph	
Drafts,	Box	 1,	Folder	 1)	becomes	 -	 “I	am	writing	 this	at	7.55	 in	 the	evening	of	Tuesday,	October	4,	 1955,	
upstairs	in	the	dormitory”	(EotR	256).		The	specification	that	the	narration	is	not	only	retrospect	but	from	
a	 very	 specific	 place	 emphasises	 the	 narrative	 circularity	 of	Horner’s	 ending	 up	with	 the	Doctor	 again,	
taking	a	Doctor’s-eye	view	of	the	whole	story	he	recollects	for	us.	
	
	 71	
**	
The	aspect	of	this	reiteration	most	central	to	the	novel’s	ideas	on	deliberation	is	
its	 aversion	 to	 contingency.	Horner’s	 attitude	 doesn’t	 evolve	 between	 past	 action	 and	
present	 narration	 because	 for	 it	 to	 do	 so	 would	 logically	 require	 him	 to	 take	
responsibility	for	the	consequences	of	his	ongoing	commitment	to	irresponsibility.	His	
grammatically	strenuous	efforts	to	make	that	commitment	play	out	as	universally	valid	
generalization	 reflect	 his	 investment	 in	 infallbility.	 Recall	 again	 Siebers	 and	 James’	
identifications,	 a	 century	 apart,	 of	 the	 affective	 attractions	 of	 freedom	 from	 error	 or	
blame	 in	 determinist	 thinking.	Horner’s	 commitment	 is	 notionally	 to	 undeterminable	
unpredictability,	but	 its	 fundamental	upshot	 is	 the	 same	evasion	of	what	 James	called	
the	“awful	risk”	of	responsibility	for	error,	and	it	has	the	same	stable	affective	appeal.		
The	 novel	 makes	 this	 clear	 by	 explicitly	 figuring	 some	 of	 Horner’s	 dubiously	
universalizing	 rationalizations	 in	 terms	 of	 error-aversion.	 His	 axiom	 of	 the	 non-
preferability	of	choices	means	that	many	of	his	own	are	made	not	on	the	basis	of	seeking	
value	but	of	avoiding	pitfall.	Looking	for	accommodation	after	taking	the	teaching	 job	
that	 begins	 his	 interaction	 with	 the	 Morgans,	 he	 finds	 the	 first	 place	 he	 visits	 “too	
perfect,	and	I	was	sceptical…	There	was	nothing	to	do	but	take	the	room…	arranging	my	
belongings	 took	but	an	hour	and	a	half,	after	which	time	there	was	simply	nothing	to	
done”	 (262/3).	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 justification	 for	 backing	 out,	 Horner’s	 inertial	
“nothing	 to	 do”	 abdication	 of	 agency	 leads	 him	 to	 a	 situation	 with	 a	 more	 general	
vacancy:	 the	world	cannot	be	made	 to	provide	occasions	 for	acting,	and	so	 its	natural	
state,	 and	 that	of	all	 external	phenomena,	must	be	 to	offer	 “nothing	 to	be	done”.	The	
passage’s	 structure	 yet	 again	 enacts	 a	 false	 universalization:	 since	Horner	 desires	 that	
there	be	no	reasons	in	a	choice,	there	must	be	no	viable	considerations	in	the	world.		
Similarly,	the	Doctor	gets	Horner	out	of	his	initial	cosmoptic	paralysis	by	directly	
addressing	him:	
“I	 realized	 as	 soon	 as	 I	 deliberately	 held	 my	 tongue	 (there	 being	 in	 the	 last	
analysis	 no	 reason	 to	 answer	 his	 question	 at	 all)	 that…	Not	 to	 choose	 at	 all	 is	
unthinkable:	what	 I	had	done	before	was	 simply	 choose	not	 to	act,	 since	 I	had	
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been	at	rest	when	the	situation	arose.		Now,	however,	it	was	harder—‘more	of	a	
choice’—to	hold	my	tongue	than	to	croak	out	something”	(324).			
Chronologically	taking	place	before	the	novel	begins,	and	placed	just	before	what	Barth	
refers	to	as	“the	crisis	of	the	novel”	(intro)	gets	underway,	this	particular	cognitive	shift	
iterates,	 rather	 than	 repudiating,	 the	 terms	 on	 which	 the	 narratorial	 Horner	 makes	
strenuous	effort	 to	remain	paralyzed.	The	response	to	the	doctor,	even	though	it	ends	
that	 paralysis,	 clarifies	 two	 of	 the	 premises	 that	 were	 motivating	 it:	 that	 choice	 is	
unavoidable	(“unthinkable”	here	being	much	more	genuine	and	literal	than	in	the	use	I	
quoted	earlier),	and	that	the	preferable	choice	is	the	easiest	one,	the	one	that	is	“less	of	a	
choice.”	 	The	exertion	of	deliberation	 in	 tongue-holding	 thus	gives	way	 to	a	 response:	
Horner’s	error-avoidant	instinct	is	to	hold	his	tongue	until	a	compelling	reason	to	use	it	
occurs	 but,	 in	 the	 end,	 ‘croaking	 out	 something’	 is	 justified	 by	 its	 better	 fitting	 his	
program	 of	minimal	 exertion.	 	What	 emerges,	 then,	 is	 an	 implicit	 deliberation	 about	
which	act	will	best	fulfil	anti-deliberative	criteria.		
The	deliberateness	of	Horner’s	paralysis	is	what	allows	him	to	deliberately	reject	
it	 when	 he	 realises	 that	 not	 doing	 so	 will	 lead	 to	 Rennie’s	 suicide.	 Whether	 the	
postmodern	givens	are	universal	or	not,	the	novel	thus	suggests,	the	decision	to	let	them	
be	 paralysing	 is	 deliberate,	 however	 dressed	 up	 in	 specious	 logic.	 Horner’s	 usual	
rationalizing	mode,	with	 its	 specious	 logical	constructions,	 insists	on	these	givens	and	
his	 deployment	 of	 them	 as	 cognitive	 phenomena,	 consequences	 of	 his	 intellectual	
insight.	But	the	novel’s	insistence	on	them	as	motivated	reasoning,	challenge	to	which	is	
registered	as	affective	discombobulation	rather	than	intellectual	challenge,	suggests	that	
we	should	view	them	differently.		
The	 threat	 of	 Rennie’s	 death	 forces	 Horner	 to	 belie	 his	 own	 generalizations.	
Motives	 stronger	 than	 the	 comfort	 of	 irresponsibility	 occasionally	 discombobulate	
Horner’s	 rationalizing	 prose	 throughout	 the	 novel,	 just	 like	 the	 unbidden	 concept	 of	
“self”	 does.	 Recall	 Hug	 and	 Pellow’s	 discussion	 of	 his	 change	 of	 mind,	 the	 threat	 to	
Rennie	 is	 “sufficient	 to	 overwhelm	 [Horner’s]	 usual	 tendency	 to	 examine	motivations	
rather	 than	 be	motivated.”	 The	 language	 of	 “tendency”	 here	 echoes	 James’	 argument	
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about	the	possibility	of	rational	action	after	the	exhaustion	of	cognitive	avenues.	In	“The	
Will	 to	 Believe,”	 James	 says	 that	 it	 can	 be	 rational,	 when	we	 come	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	
knowable	commensurability	of	options	without	one	emerging	as	clearly	better,	to	take	
the	final	decision	out	of	deliberative	frameworks:	we	can	leave	this	adjudication	to	what	
he	 calls	 our	 “passional	 tendencies	 and	 volitions”	 (WTB	 233).	 For	 James,	 the	 passional	
tendencies	are	more	fundamental	to	the	deliberating	self	than	the	purely	cognitive	mind	
is.	We	can	rationally	appeal	to	them	after	cognition	runs	out	of	force	because	they	are	
persistent	substrata	of	our	selves,	and	choosing	on	their	basis	can	be	part	of	a	 longer-
form,	self-orienting	plan	of	action.	In	this	respect,	James	suggests	that	the	cognitive	part	
of	 the	 active	 mind	 can	 defer	 to	 the	 conative	 part:	 the	 part	 that	 spurs	 and	 directs	
purposive	 action.	On	 James’	model,	 the	 cognitive	 is	usually	 in	 service	of	 the	 conative,	
but	the	conative	can	intervene	to	act	on	its	own,	and	when	it	does	so,	it	will	express	a	
purpose	 rationally	 consistent	 with	 the	 cognitive	 deliberations	 whose	 goals	 and	
directions	(in	the	literal	sense	of	tendencies)	the	conative	had	always	been	powering.	
Horner,	 of	 course,	 denies	 precisely	 that	 any	 such	 consistent	 self-principle	 can	
exist	within	him,	even	as,	 in	his	world	of	regressive	reason	and	infinite	considerations,	
all	choices	are	implicitly	as	in	need	of	adjudication	by	the	supra-rational	as	the	choices	
James	 isolates.	Horner’s	postmodernism	is	so	thoroughgoing	that	he	subjects	even	the	
conditions	 James	 considered	 supra-rational	 to	 a	 paralysing	 impotence.	 In	 the	 terms	
above,	 he	 deploys	 his	 cognitive	 powers	 to	 resist	 the	 acknowledgment	 of	 consistently	
oriented	 conative	 inner	 promptings.	 For	 precisely	 this	 reason,	 the	 concept	 of	 an	
adjudicating	 “tendency”	 can	 help	 make	 sense	 both	 of	 his	 rationalizations	 and	 of	 his	
change	 of	 mind.	 We	 might	 not	 instinctively	 associate	 meta-cognition	 with	 the	
“passional,”	but	as	the	novel	cues	us	to	understand	Horner’s	paralyzing	metacognition	as	
motivated,	it	must	stem	from	some	conative	impulse.	Horner	of	course	suggests	that	the	
only	force	that	determines	his	behavior	is	unpredictable	mental	“weather,”	but	this	is	to	
ignore	the	parts	of	his	“self”	that	don’t	change	under	that	rubric:	his	rationalization,	and	
his	“tendency	to”	distance	himself	from	his	actions.	Insofar	as	these	are	consistent,	they	
can’t	 be	 the	 products	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 inconsistency	 he	 attributes	 to	 himself.	 His	
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fundamental	 tendency	 towards	 evading	 issues	 or	 choosing	 not	 to	 choose	 establishes	
conative	consistency.	 James	clarifies	 this	 logic	within	 the	 framework	of	 single	choices:	
insisting	that	scepticism	is	always	a	matter	of	will	and	convenience,	he	tells	us	“‘Do	not	
decide,	but	leave	the	question	open,’	is	itself	a	passional	decision—just	like	deciding	yes	
or	 no—and	 its	 attended	 with	 the	 same	 risk	 of	 losing	 the	 truth”	 (WTB	 229).	 Such	 a	
scepticism	“is	not	avoidance	of	option;	 it	 is	option	of	a	certain	particular	kind	of	 risk”	
(WTB	241).	There	 is	no	way,	 on	 this	model,	 to	 truly	 avoid	 choosing,	 or	 to	 truly	 avoid	
evincing	 a	 character	 by	 the	 choice	 one	 makes.	 Consequently,	 one	 can’t	 avoid	
responsibility	 by	 forestalling	 decision.	 Any	 aversion	 to	 the	 risks	 of	 option-ranking	 in	
practical	decision	is	an	acceptance	of	responsibility	for	whatever	risks	the	delay	incurs.			
Barth’s	 revisions	 to	 the	novel	 include	 an	 explicit	 statement	 of	 the	 rationalizing	
characters’	 aversion	 to	 options,	 as	 the	Doctor’s	 prescriptions	 for	 the	 kind	of	 grammar	
Horner	would	benefit	from	teaching—““No	description	at	all.		No	divided	usage.		Teach	
the	rules.		Teach	prescription	the	truth	about	grammar”	(Archive)24—were	revised	to	a	
shorter	 list:	 “No	 description	 at	 all.	 No	 optional	 situations…”	 (259).	 	 The	 revisin	
emphaises	Horner	and	the	Doctor’s	commitment	to	the	idea	that	option-avoidance	can	
forestall	 the	 onset	 of	 responsibility:	 Horner’s	 shift	 then	 undermines	 this	 claim.	 His	
seemingly	“passional”	response	to	Rennie’s	plight	is	not	entry	into	a	world	of	choice	and	
character	 from	 someone	 who	 formerly	 lay	 outside	 it,	 but	merely	 a	 different	 revealed	
preference	in	answering	James’	fundamental	questions:	are	you	the	kind	of	person	who	
is	 willing	 to	 risk	 error	 to	make	 practical,	 present	 choices?	 and	 which	 risk	 scares	 you	
more:	 the	 possibility	 of	 making	 errors	 for	 whose	 consequences	 you	 would	 be	
responsible,	 or	 the	 necessity	 of	 being	 responsible	 for	 the	 consequences	 of	 your	 non-
intervention?		A	positive	passional	tendency	comes	to	override	a	negative	one,	and	the	
novel’s	 two	 prose	 structures	 manifest	 the	 different	 cognitive	 structures	 entailed	 by	
differing	conative	underpinnings.	
The	 difference	 between	 James’	model	 and	 Barth’s	 thus	 hinges	 on	 the	 different	
times	they	wrote.	For	James,	the	purely-conative’s	natural	place	of	intervention	is	at	the																																																									
24	EotR	Manuscript	10	Holograph	Drafts,	Box	1,	Folder	1	
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end	of	cognition’s	capacities:	up	to	that	point,	it	is	assumed	that	deliberative	cognition	
can	 deal	 with	 most	 choices.	 But	 for	 Horner,	 the	 givens	 have	 changed:	 the	 basic	
skepticism	 towards	 cognition’s	 agentive	 value	 can	 only	 be	 resolved	 by	 moving	 the	
intervention	of	“passional	tendencies”	to	the	beginning	of	the	process.	In	James’	original	
model,	 the	 intervention	 of	 conation	 was	 linearly	 continuous	 with	 the	 prior	 work	 of	
cognition,	but	in	the	skeptical	era	in	which	Barth	wrote,	deliberative	practice	becomes	a	
two-layered	affair:	we	first	have	to	answer	the	question	of	whether	or	not	we	are	willing	
to	be	choosers,	 and	 then	all	 subsequent	choices	happen	within	 the	 framework	of	 that	
initial	choice.		
	
The	Coherent	Structural	Warrant	
This	double	model	provides	a	framework	within	which	older	ideas	of	deliberative	
rationality	 can	 be	 newly	 legitimate.	 	 	 It’s	 a	 specifically	 recuperative	 novelty.	 It	 offers	
viable	 alternatives	 not	 only	 to	 the	 problems	 of	 empty	 subjectivity	 and	 of	 paralyzing	
cognitive	incommensurability	between	choices,	but	of	the	regress	of	reason	too.		
The	 first-stage	 “decision-to-decide”	 is	 grounded	 on	 conation	 rather	 than	 an	
appeal	 to	 external	 reason.	 Once	 we	 choose	 to	 act	 rather	 than	 to	 delay,	 then	 all	
subsequent	decisions	within	the	span	of	acting	appeal	not	to	reason	but	to	the	stakes	of	
that	 initial	 decision.	 For	 Horner,	 the	 overall	 decision	 is	 to	 act	 to	 procure	 Rennie	 an	
abortion,	and	that	 initial	decision	establishes,	 for	granted,	 that	choices	will	have	to	be	
made	 along	 the	 way,	 and	 that	 they	 will	 run	 the	 risk	 of	 error.	 Once	 the	 postmodern	
givens	 fail	 to	 outweigh	 the	 potential	 value	 achievable	 by	 choice,	 they	 don’t	 have	 to	
interfere	in	the	second,	specific,	dependent	decision	at	all.	The	local,	dependent	choices	
made	 in	 carrying	 out	 this	 plan	 then	 don’t	 have	 to	 regress	 all	 the	 way	 back	 to	 the	
standards	of	infallible	reason.	Once	goals	have	been	established	for	a	decision,	there	is	
an	 immediate	cost-benefit	calculation	to	be	made	that	sets	 the	value	of	choosing	by	a	
given	 deadline	 against	 the	 likelihood	 of	 error	 caused	 by	 the	 shortened	 span	 of	
deliberation.	The	postmodern	givens	remain	acknowledged,	but	the	suspensive	inaction	
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they	 sanction	has	 already	 been	 outweighed,	 so	 they	 lose	 their	 obstructive	 power	 over	
subsequent	practical	decision.	Doubt	and	deadlines	force	us	to	attempt	best	estimates,	
rather	than	seek	perfect	correspondence	with	the	truth,	and	within	a	warrant-structure	
based	on	a	project	rather	than	on	standards	of	infallibility,	the	possibility	of	error	is	built	
in	and	granted	rather	than	a	threat.	
The	 exact	 structure	 of	Horner’s	 original	 commitment	 then	 reveals	 some	 of	 the	
values	at	stake	in	this	logical	structure.	It	hinges	on	an	earlier	version	of	the	decision-to-
decide	structure,	as	Rennie	sets	up	her	abortion-or-suicide	dilemma	as	the	only	possible	
way	 out	 of	 the	 torturous	 suspense	 that	 Joe	 and	 Horner’s	 combined	 attitudes	 to	 her	
pregnancy	 have	 established.	 It’s	 important	 and	 explicit	 that	 their	 creation	 of	 this	
suspense	 is	 figured	 as	 deliberate	 cruelty,	 against	which	 the	 anti-suspensive	 prose	 can	
then	embody	counterpart	values.	At	the	outset	of	the	scene,	when	Horner	puts	pressure	
on	 her	 to	 pick	 either	 his	 or	 Joe’s	 attitude	 to	 the	 situation,	 Rennie	 sees	 only	 two	
unpleasant	alternatives:		
‘I’m	postponing	as	much	as	I	possibly	can,’	she	said,	‘for	as	long	as	I	possibly	can.		
I’m	desperate,	and	that’s	the	only	thing	I	can	think	of	to	do.’		
‘Joe	might	 have	 allowed	 for	 the	 same	possibility	 all	 along,’	 I	 offered.	 	 ‘He’s	 not	
afraid	to	look	at	all	the	alternatives’	(388).	
Horner’s	 sarcasm	 associates	 exhaustive	 consideration	 of	 alternatives	 with	 temporal	
delay.	Guilty	of	the	same	thing,25	he	is	well	placed	to	see	Joe	wilfully	prolonging	Rennie’s	
“desperation”	with	rationalization.	For	each,	the	wish	not	to	choose	wrong	overrides	the	
																																																								
25	Within	his	own	remit,	Horner’s	 suspension	of	agency	can	seem	 like	a	merely	cognitive	game,	but	 the	
previous	scene	shows	him	using	it	to	make	Rennie	suffer	even	more	deliberately	than	Joe.	A	long	balance	
of	considerations	on	Horner’s	part—his	attraction	to	Rennie,	that	persistent	guilt,	the	potential	pleasure	
of	 sadism,	 a	 sense	of	what’s	 good	 for	 Joe—leads	him	 to	an	anti-conclusion:	 “	 ‘I’m	not	 taking	a	 stand,’	 I	
declared,	 ‘I’m	an	 issue	evader	 from	way	back.	 	 I’ll	go	along	with	you	any	way	you	want’”	 (375).	 	Horner	
thus,	by	his	subordination	of	deliberative	prose	to	suspensive	action,	belies	his	own	intention	to	take	no	
personal	stand.		It	is	directed	at	Rennie	as	personal	violence.	Her	brief	speculation	that	Horner	raping	her	
might	end	the	suspension,	since	it	would	allow	Joe	to	read	the	situation	in	such	a	way	as	to	exculpate	here	
merely	 makes	 explicit	 the	 scene’s	 organising	 logic:	 rationalization’s	 fundamentally	 volitive	 violence	
whenever	other	people	are	involved.	The	chapter	ends	with	an	image	establishing	the	consequences	of	his	
deliberate	irresolution—“Rennie	sobbed	for	a	full	two	minutes,	huddled	in	her	chair:	this	affair	was	indeed	
tearing	her	up”	(375)—after	which,	over	which,	he	gives	us	a	final	few	sentences	of	his	typical	rationalizing	
prose.	
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possibility	of	choosing	right,	and	the	suspension	lets	them	be	cruel	to	Rennie,	who	has	
not	 been	 presented	with	 any	 right	 option:	 at	 this	 point	 in	 the	 novel	 she	 is	 the	 pawn	
between	 two	competing	ethics,	neither	of	which	 she	 can	endorse.	 She	 is	 left,	 then,	 to	
wait	for	a	meta-solution	to	emerge,	for	contingency	to	bring	a	solution	into	being.	
At	 this	 stage,	only	Rennie	 is	 seeking	a	 resolution	 to	 the	 situation.	Both	Horner	
and	Joe’s	philosophies	remain	intact	as	long	as	no	external	solution	presents	itself,	and	
enjoying	Rennie’s	desperation	neither	has	a	reason	to	seek	one.	Yet	when	she	says	“I’m	
going	to	get	an	abortion	or	shoot	myself,	Joe.		I’ve	decided”	(399),	she	brings	things	into	
the	 realm	of	 decision	 even	without	 choosing	 an	 action	herself.	 To	be	held	 suspended	
while	 Joe	 attempts	 to	 find	 a	way	 to	 believe	 in	what	 has	 happened	 is	more	 painful	 to	
suffer	 through	than	either	of	 the	options	 in	the	dilemma	she	prefers,	even	though	the	
suspension	would	hold	true	to	her	values.		She	decides	to	decide,	opting	for	a	passional	
tendency	 over	 cognitive	 commitment.	 	 She	 thus	 performs	 an	 anticipatory	 version	 of	
Horner’s	own	 leap,	moving	 the	situation	back	 into	 the	realm	of	present	choice,	where	
decisions	are	both	necessary	and	contingent.		
To	 understand	why	 this	 is	 a	 problem	 for	 both	 Joe	 and	Horner,	 it	may	 help	 to	
consider	 James	 again.	 The	 situation	 Rennie	 sets	 up	 is	 of	 a	 kind	 James	 identifies	 as	
unrationalizable:	 “let	us	call	 the	decision	between	two	hypotheses	an	option.	 	Options	
may	 be	 of	 several	 kinds.	 	 They	 may	 be—1,	 living	 or	 dead;	 2,	 forced	 or	 avoidable;	 3,	
momentous	 or	 trivial;	 and	 for	 our	 purposes	 we	may	 call	 an	 option	 a	 genuine	 option	
when	it	is	of	the	forced,	living	and	momentous	kind”	(“WtB”	227).		A	living	option	is	one	
in	which	both	options	are	valid:	“each	hypothesis	makes	some	appeal,	however	small,	to	
your	 belief,”	 a	 forced	 one	 comes	 when	 there	 is	 “no	 standing	 place	 outside	 the	
alternative.		Every	dilemma	based	on	a	complete	logical	disjunction,	with	no	possibility	
of	 not	 choosing,	 is	 an	 option	 of	 this	 kind,”	 while	 momentousness	 is	 defined	 in	
opposition	 to	 situations	 when	 “the	 opportunity	 is	 not	 unique,	 when	 the	 stake	 is	
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insignificant,	or	when	the	decision	 is	 reversible	 if	 it	 later	prove	unwise.”	The	situation	
Rennie	sets	up	is	live,	forced,	and	momentous:	genuine.26	
This	validly	motivated	change	of	frameworks	still	doesn’t	provide	any	grounds	for	
her	 to	 reason	 practically,	 however,	 as	 Joe	 almost	 immediately	 cancels	 the	 option’s	
liveness.27	His	horror	at	live	decisions	outweighs	his	sense	of	momentousness:	Rennie’s	
enlivening	dilemma	prompts	him	to	insist	that	one	of	its	options	is	actually	dead:	“you	
don’t	know	any	abortionists	around	here,	do	you?...	you’re	not	thinking	straight.		You’re	
setting	up	alternatives	that	aren’t	actually	open	to	you”	(399/400).		Acknowledging	this	
forces	Rennie	to	realize	that	she	has	only	shifted	her	waiting	for	a	meta-solution	from	
one	level	of	decision	to	another.	This	prompts	her	to	lunge	for	the	pistol	that	Horner	has	
always	 considered	 “the	 concrete	 embodiment	 of	 an	 alternative”	 (394).	 After	 Rennie’s	
decision	 to	 decide,	 the	 gun	 literally	 embodies	 her	 alternative	 to	 an	 abortion.	 	 The	
deadness	of	the	option	of	living	spurs	her	to	the	only	live	option	she	has	defined:	dying.			
Joe	is	revealed	as	sufficiently	a	rationaliser	that	he	would	rather	have	his	wife	dead	than	
a	dilemma	live.	When	Horner	intervenes	to	take	the	gun	out	of	reach,	he	returns	her	to	
temporary	suspension,	both	options	no	longer	live.	When	she	then	establishes	a	specific	
deadline	by	when	the	abortion	must	happen—a	deadline	at	the	end	of	which,	since	she	
clarifies	that	she	won’t	organize	the	abortion	herself,	only	suicide	will	be	a	live	option—
Horner	 has	 to	 choose	 whether	 to	 act	 since	 only	 he	 can	 redeem	 her	 suicide	 from	
inevitability.	Rennie’s	version	of	the	decision-to-decide	is	not	a	successful	overcoming	of	
the	 paralyzing	 postmodern	 givens,	 then.	 She	may	 decide	 to	 decide,	 but	 she	 does	 not	
actively	decide	to	act.	
That	is	left	to	Horner,	who	first	in	his	leap	to	stop	her	reaching	the	gun,	and	then	
in	his	realisation	that	only	he	can	revivify	her	option,	becomes	the	character	who	enters	
the	 realm	of	practical	deliberation	and	establishes	 its	 validity	even	where	postmodern	
givens	(the	incommensurability	of	considerations	and	the	final	unjustifiability	of	values)																																																									
26	Decisions,	 as	 James	makes	 clear,	 can	 be	made	 on	 a	 non-rational	 basis,	 and	 Rennie	 shows	 this	 to	 be	
equally	true	of	decisions	to	decide.			
27	His	 commitment	 to	making	 choices	 only	 in	 certainty	 of	 their	 rightness	 him	necessarily	 averse	 to	 the	
presence	of	live	decisions,	unlike	Horner	who	just	prefers	not	to	believe	in	them.			
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are	 granted.	 With	 his	 first	 intervention,	 he	 has	 made	 a	 decision	 at	 the	 level	 of	
momentousness.		The	initial	moment	is	framed	as	undeliberated	but	conditioned	by	his	
understanding	 of	 Joe’s	 goading:	 “Rennie	 gave	 a	 little	 cry	 and	 rushed	 to	 the	 smoking	
stand	 [where	 the	 gun	 is]	 but	because	 I	had	 seen	 as	 clearly	 as	 Joe	what	 she	was	being	
driven	to	I	was	ready	when	she	made	her	move.	I	dived	headlong…”	(400).	There	are	no	
verbs	 of	mental	 computation	 here,	 and	 indeed	 the	 passage	was	 lightly	 revised	 in	 the	
composition	process	so	that	“when	she	made	her	move…”replaced	“even	before	she	made	
her	 move”	 (Archive),28	thus	 shifting	 the	 implication	 from	 premeditation	 to	 instinct.	
Instinct	 in	 this	 context	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 deliberative	 categories,	 however.		
Horner’s	leap	is	a	passional	action,	a	clear	commitment	to	the	value	of	Rennie’s	life.	It	is	
framed	 this	 way	 in	 relation	 to	 a	moment	 earlier	 in	 the	 scene	 where	 Joe	 threatens	 to	
shoot	Horner	and	 the	 latter,	 though	he	 feels	 “sick,”	 remains	committed	enough	to	his	
performance	of	valuelessness	to	offers	no	argument	for	his	life.	The	leap	to	stop	Rennie,	
by	 contrast,	 establishes	 the	 normative	 basis	 of	 Horner’s	 conative	 systems	 when	
cognition	isn’t	given	the	chance	to	override	them.	
Horner’s	 action	 is	 thus	 the	 revelation	 of	 his	 passional	 tendency	 rather	 than	 a	
consequence	of	cognitive	valuation.	Even	so,	it	becomes	a	pretext	to	maintain	his	anti-
responsibility	 schtick:	 when	 the	 exasperated	 Joe	 demands	 “Explain	 why,	 Horner,”	 he	
responds	 “The	 hell	 I	 will”	 (400).	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 scene	 plays	 out	 almost	 entirely	 in	
dialogue,	keeping	each	character’s	thinking	unnnarated	until	Horner	“called	out	as	they	
left”	 with	 the	 offer	 to	 organize	 the	 abortion	 himself	 (401).	 	 The	 only	 non-dialogue	
reports	of	his	thought	between	the	leap	and	this	moment	are	his	realization	that	in	Joe	
he	 is	 “deal[ing]	with	 a	man	who	will	 see,	 face	up	 to,	 and	unhesitatingly	 act	 upon	 the	
extremest	of	his	ideas”	and	his	observing	Joe	pocketing	the	gun	on	the	way	out,	looking	
“extremely	 upset”	 (402).	 His	 commitment	 to	 act	 combines	 acknowledgment	 of	 the	
stakes	 of	 his	 leap	 and	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	 danger	 still	 posed	 to	 Rennie.	 It	 is	 at	 this	
second	 step,	 the	willingness	 to	 think	 about	 one’s	 own	 revealed	 values	 in	 constructive	
relation	to	contingent	external	possibilities,	that	he	enters	the	realm	of	deliberation.																																																									
28	EotR	Manuscript,	305,	Holograph	Drafts,	Box	1,	Folder	5	
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Being	the	sole	figure	with	the	will	and	capacity	to	revivify	the	“dead”	possibility	of	
abortion	requires	him	to	abandon	the	comfort	of	his	error-avoidant,	contingency-averse	
prose	psychology.	The	emotional	involvement	that	prompts	him	to	intervene	in	Rennie’s	
fate	is	both	an	acceptance	of	the	necessity	of	rational	action	and,	crucially,	an	attempt	to	
restore	her	to	a	dilemma,	to	restore	her	to	the	realm	of	reasoned	choice.	In	the	course	of	
committing	 himself	 to	 her	 wellbeing,	 he	 thus	 necessarily	 commits	 himself	 to	 the	
relevance	 and	 viability	 of	 contingent	 choices.	 Once	 he	 has	 granted	 the	 decision-
justifying	value	of	saving	Rennie’s	life,	he	necessarily	has	to	prefer	an	option	in	which	it	
can	be	saved	to	one	 in	which	it	can’t.	Given	the	condition	of	the	deadline,	 this	entails	
that	contingent	choice	outweighs	rationalizing	delay.	This,	then,	is	the	achievement	of	
the	 Jamesian	 model	 whereby	 conative	 commitments	 take	 the	 grounding	 place	 of	
external	reason,	which	can	work	with	postmodern	givens	without	either	being	paralyzed	
by	 them	or	 denying	 them.	Until	 Rennie	 turns	 down	 the	 first	 abortion	 he	manages	 to	
arrange,	Horner’s	psychology	is	thus	rendered	in	the	conventional	deliberative	stylistics	
of	genuine	options.29	
**	
This	 scene	 is	 established	 as	 a	 bridge	 between	 the	 rationalizing	 and	 the	
deliberating	 prose	 mindsets	 by	 its	 lack	 of	 non-dialogue	 psychological	 prose,	 and	
especially	 the	 absence	 of	 Horner’s	 duo-temporal	 rationalization-prose.	 The	 prose	
construction	of	the	novel	makes	clearer	than	the	narrative	itself	that	its	solution	to	the	
problem	 of	 agentive	 paralysis	 is	 not	 mere	 reflex—the	 leap	 for	 the	 gun	 alone—but	 a	
recuperated	 practical	 deliberation	 based	 on	 having	 chosen	 action	 over	 inaction,	 the	
possibility	of	failure	over	the	comforts	of	passive	freedom	from	its	threat.		
																																																								
29	Rennie	and	Horner’s	misreadings	of	each	other	come	together	on	the	matter	of	suspension:	at	the	point	
of	her	least	and	his	greatest	deliberative	urgency,	she	takes	him	not	to	be	seeking	genuine	solutions,	but	
to	be	recapitulating	his	earlier	games	of	delay	in	order	to	trick	her:	“If	you	think	I’ll	change	my	mind	if	you	
stall	long	enough,	you’re	wrong”	(416).		This	at	least	shows	that	she	is	aware	that	her	surviving	has	value	to	
him	on	some	level,	but	to	read	him	as	a	mere	staller	at	this	stage	shows	how	easy	it	is	not	just	for	critics	
but	for	the	novel’s	own	characters	to	misread	the	RLS	in	terms	of	Horner’s	usual	predilections.			
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LeMahieu,	who	takes	Horner	as	a	spokesperson	for	 the	novel’s	 ideas	and	hence	
credits	Barth	with	“develop[ing]	so	fully	a	character	that	lacks	all	character”	(103)	despite	
the	 novel’s	 frequent	 implications	 that	 Horner’s	 anti-character	 ideas	 are	 consistently	
motivated,	 claims	 that	Barth’s	 early	 fiction	 “narrates	 its	way	 to	 an	absolutely	hopeless	
state	of	affairs”	(96).		Horner	does	this	especially	literally,	insisting	on	hopelessness	from	
the	narratorial	perspective	that	propounds	the	rationalizing	paralysis	that	led	him	into	
the	 situation	whose	ending	made	him	hopeless.	 	The	prose	medium	 is	 essential	 to	 all	
this	work.	Charles	Harris	suspects	that	the	reason	the	film	version	fails	to	engage	with	so	
many	of	the	book’s	central	 ideas	 is	 “its	 incapacity	qua	 film—to	capture	 Jacob	Horner’s	
inner	sense	of	ontological	insecurity	and	self-estrangement	so	effectively	communicated	
through	the	novel’s	 first-person	narration…”	(138).	For	Conti,	meanwhile,	 the	narrative	
technique	 is	 equally	 crucial	 to	 our	 reading	 experience,	 as	 “we	 learn	 to	 see	 the	moral	
dummy	 behind	 the	 mask	 of	 Horner’s	 unreliable	 narration”	 (82).	 However,	 neither	
pursues	 the	 specific	 stylistic	 operations	 through	 which	 this	 “learning”	 and	
“communication”	works.	As	I’ve	shown	above,	these	effects	can	be	traced	to	distinctive	
and	consistent	stylistic	qualities	of	the	novel’s	default	rationalizing	prose.	The	revealed	
counter-values	of	the	mind-change	scene—the	importance	of	openness	to	contingency,	
the	willingness	to	value	other	people	as	ends—then	raise	the	question	of	what	ideas	and	
values	 we	 can	 derive	 from	 the	 constructions	 of	 the	 subsequent	 conventional	 prose	
psychology.	Do	 they	 offer	 a	 correspondingly	 detailed	 alternative	 to	 the	 commitments	
the	novel	reveals	underpinning	Horner’s	defult	bad-faith	rationalization?	If	the	prose	is	
so	traditional	and	unremarkable	in	construction,	what	can	it	have	to	contribute?		
What	 are	 the	 new	 ideas	 about	 agency	 in	The	 End	 of	 the	 Road?	 As	 I’ve	 shown	
above,	 they’re	 the	 old	 ones,	 but	with	 a	 crucial	 updating	 asterix	 attached.	 That	 asterix	
indicates	the	reflexivity	that	works	as	a	warrant.	The	same	goes	for	the	prose	that	bears	
this	 argument.	 The	 characteristics	 of	 that	 prose	 gain	 positive	 rather	 than	 natural	 or	
neutral	qualities	by	being	set	 freshly	against	 the	 foil	of	 the	 rationalizing	prose.	As	 I’ve	
said,	 the	 novel	 frames	 the	 old	 prose’s	 conventionality	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 make	 it	
conspicuous,	 to	 strip	 it	 of	 its	 associations	 with	 transparency.	 	 In	 making	 it	 the	
	 82	
unintuitive	 component	 in	 a	 conflict	 of	 prose	 psychologies,	 it	 thus	 gives	 it	 an	
oppositional	power.			
	
The	Stylistic	Argument	for	the	Value	of	Foundationless	Practical	Deliberation	
What	 values,	 then,	 does	 this	 fresh	 opacity	 reveal	 to	 be	 viable	 and—in	 the	
postmodern	 era—oppositional	 about	 conventional	 prose	 psychology	 and	 its	model	 of	
agency?			
Where	 James	 frames	 decision	 as	 having	 the	 “strange	 and	 intense	 function	 of	
granting	consent	to	one	possibility”	(WtB	595),	The	End	of	the	Road	offers	a	postmodern	
inversion	of	similar	values.	Horner’s	decision	to	decide	is	motivated	by	a	refusal	to	grant	
consent	to	suicide,	which	Joe	wished	to	render	the	only	live	possibility.	 	It’s	a	decision	
whose	 value,	 in	 other	 words,	 is	 not	 only	 the	 end-point	 of	 a	 single	 action,	 but	 the	
structural	achievement	of	keeping	options	open	and	live	along	the	way,	even	in	an	age	
of	skeptical	determinism.	The	historical	differences	again	establish	that	The	End	of	 the	
Road	 is	 a	 distinctively	 postmodern	 piece	 of	 thinking	 rather	 than	 mere	 anachronist	
ventriloquy	of	pragmatism,	existentialism,	or	proto-poststructuralism.	
In	“The	Dilemma	of	Determinism,”	an	important	but	less	canonical	precursor	of	
“The	Will	to	Believe,”	James	established	error	and	regret	as	necessary	conditions	of	the	
indeterminate	 world.	 	 If	 we	 lament	 that	 an	 event	 is	 foreclosed	 by	 the	 making	 of	 a	
decision,	 we	 must	 believe	 in	 its	 having	 been	 genuinely	 available	 for	 existence:	 of	
determinism	 and	 our	 attitude	 to	 it,	 “The	 question	 relates	 solely	 to	 the	 existence	 of	
possibilities”	 (“DoD”	 42).	 	 If	we	 grant	 that	 existence,	we	 live	 in	 “a	world	 in	which	we	
constantly	 have	 to	 make	 what	 I	 shall…	 call	 judgements	 of	 regret”	 (“DoD”	 43).	 James	
finally	 comes	 down	 against	 determinism	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons,	 among	which	 is	 his	
sense	that	the	feeling	of	contingency	and	the	possibility	of	regret	are	desirable	in	and	of	
themselves.		For	James,	though,	that	omnipresent	possibility	has	a	value	in	itself:	“What	
interest,	 zest	 or	 excitement	 can	 there	 be	 in	 achieving	 the	 right	 way,	 unless	 we	 are	
enabled	to	feel	that	the	wrong	way	is	also	a	possible	and	a	natural	way”	(“DoD”	48).	It	
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makes	 living	 exciting.	 	 Even	 regret	 itself	 is	 a	 valuable	 error,	 “the	 errors	 included	 in	
remorses	 and	 regrets,	 the	 error	 of	 supposing	 that	 the	 past	 could	 have	 been	 different,	
justifies	itself	by	its	use.		Its	use	is	to	quicken	our	sense	of	what	the	irretrievably	lost	is…”	
(“DoD”	 48).	 	 Error	 thus	 has	 a	motivating	 value,	 which	Horner’s	 abandonment	 of	 the	
comforting,	error-avoidant,	 loss-avoidant	givens	of	postmodernism	finally	exposes	him	
to.			
James’	terms	once	again	give	us	a	way	to	understand	the	value	Barth	attaches	
to	 the	 conventional	 agency	model,	 once	 it’s	 framed	as	 a	 contrast	 to	 the	 limitations	of	
postmodern	 rationalization.	 Above	 all,	 the	 abortion-procurement	 passages	 embody	
openness	to	contingency,	both	in	the	sense	of	possible	error	and	general	accident.	At	the	
most	 basic	 level,	 we	 now	 get	 a	 prose	 defined	 not	 only	 by	 linear	 presentation	 of	
considerations,	 but	 also	 by	 how	 many	 of	 those	 considerations	 represent	 Horner’s	
awareness	 of	 his	 own	 limited	 knowledge	 and	 anticipatory	 skills:	 a	 far	 cry	 from	 the	
rationalizing	 prose	 that	 made	 his	 predilections	 universal	 laws.30	Compare	 that	 earlier	
prose’s	pseudo-logical	circularity,	 for	example,	with	the	following	passage,	 in	which	he	
tries	to	get	a	fake	abortion	affidavit	signed:	
“I	found	a	notary	public…	and	went	in	quickly	before	my	nerve	failed.		It	is	my	lot	
to	look	older	than	my	years,	but	I	could	scarcely	believe	anyone	would	seriously	
take	me	for	a	certified	psychiatrist.		Besides,	it	is	even	more	difficult	to	act	out	a	
fiction	 face	 to	 face	 with	 the	 man	 you’re	 lying	 to	 than	 it	 is	 to	 do	 it	 on	 the	
telephone.		Finally,	I	wasn’t	at	all	sure	that	notaries	didn’t	demand	identification	
before	administering	the	oath	and	seal…”	(411).		
Although	the	deliberative	considerations	here	are	narrated	after	the	action	of	‘going	in,’	
they	only	make	sense	in	relation	to	a	failure	of	nerve	if	that	failure	would	happen	after	
confronting	them.	Each	offers	a	reason	for	the	nerve	to	fail;	that	the	decision	was	taken	
on	 the	basis	of	 that	possibility	means	 that	 the	considerations	must	have	preceded	 the	
choice.	The	acknowledged	possibility	of	failure,	the	validity	of	doubt,	thus	becomes	an	
incentive	not	to	delay	or	deferral—as	 in	the	poststructuralism	horner	anticipates—but																																																									
30	Singer,	isomorph	of	narratives	and	compositional…	-	Art	that	“honors	a	determination	of	subjectivity	in	
relation	to	what	it	does	nt	know…	sustains	it	as	a	viable	choice-making	enterprise”	(263-4).	Cf	Siebers	on	
pomo	defensiveness	against	the	prospect	of	surprise…	
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to	action.		In	the	cosmopsis	scene,	Horner	shifts	from	“there	was	no	reason	to	go	to	the	
hotel”	 to	 “there	was	no	reason	to	do	anything”	 to	 “there	 is	no	reason	to	do	anything,”	
making	 a	 rule	 out	 of	 an	 instance	 and	 obtruding	 that	 rule	 into	 the	 space	 before	 all	
decision.	 	 But	 in	 the	 notary	 sequence,	 the	 general	 statements	 like	 “it	 is	 even	 more	
difficult…”	are	subordinated	to	personal	 judgments	with	acknowledged	 limits:	 “I	could	
scarcely	 believe…”	 or	 “I	 wasn’t	 at	 all	 sure…”	 “Went	 in	 quickly,”	 then,	 with	 its	 specific	
goal,	 local	 considerations,	 and	acceptance	of	possible	 error,	 is	 a	 self-aware,	practically	
reasoned	decision.		This	not	only	establishes	Horner’s	acknowledgement	of	contingency,	
but	his	willingness	to	think	about	his	own	personal	role	in	any	error	that	might	ensue.	
When	it	comes	to	accident,	meanwhile,	Horner’s	prose	in	this	section	is	for	the	
first	 time	 willing	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 the	 world	 itself,	 rather	 than	 only	 his	 internal	
weather,	might	be	capable	of	surprise:	this	fact	soon	becomes	part	of	the	considerations	
he	 actually	 weighs.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 notary	 who	 Horner	 gets	 to	 sign	 his	 bogus	
documentation	 struggles,	 once	 he	 agrees,	 to	 find	 the	 rubber	 stamp	he	would	need	 in	
order	to	do	so:	“after	my	good	luck	in	finding	a	notary	as	cynical	as	he	was	credulous,	
could	 my	 scheme	 hang	 on	 such	 a	 mischance?”	 (411).	 	 Horner	 here	 acknowledges,	 in	
prose	 free	 from	 narratorial	 certainty,	 that	 both	 the	 conditions	 which	 justified	 the	
success	 of	 the	 decision	 that	 led	 him	 this	 far	 and	 the	 condition	 that	may	 be	 about	 to	
undermine	it	are	equally	independent	of	his	own	will	and	foresight.	
Harris	 reads	 the	 abortion-procurement	 section	 as	 parodic	 because	 of	 its	 comic	
profusion	of	 such	moments,	 each	 insisting	 that	 events	have	a	 life	of	 their	own,	which	
Horner	 can’t	 rationalize	 away.	 These	 events	 have	 been	 strenuously	 excised	 from	 the	
passages	of	rationalizing	narration,	and	their	return	highlights	the	unnaturalness	of	that	
model	of	worldly	action:	reason	is	only	paralyzing	if	it’s	entirely	averse	to	the	possibility	
of	failure	and	contingency,	and	the	abortion	procurement	scene,	with	Horner’s	gradual	
progression	 towards	 successfully	 organizing	 one,	 shows	 that	 that	 aversion	 is	 not	 a	
necessity.	The	whole	section	offers	a	case	study	in	the	viability	of	concrete	engagement	
with	difficulty,	as	opposed	to	an	error-averse	perfectionism.	
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Considerations	 of	 difficulty	 are	 here	 often	 explicitly	 figured	 in	 relation	 to	
considerations	of	time,	contrasting	with	the	rationalizing	mindset	where	time-delays	are	
endorsed	 as	 indefinite	 extensions	 of	 ease	 or	 indulgent	 cruelties.	 	 The	 abortion	
procurement	 passages	 don’t	 deny	 or	 elide	 the	 difficulties	 they	 deliberate	 over,	 but	
acknowledge	 that	 a	 shortened	 timeframe	 spurs	 that	 engagement	 with	 contingency.	
Temporal	 considerations	 thus	 hurry	 the	 linear	 prose	 along,	 literally	 overtaking	 the	
rehearsal	of	options:	“To	fake	a	letter	was	one	thing—I	could	be	anybody	in	a	letter—but	
I	found	it	almost	insuperably	difficult	to	be	even	Henry	Dempsey	on	the	telephone:	how	
could	I	be	Dr	Harry	L	Siegrist?		There	was	no	time	to	waste…”	(407).		Difficulty	is,	in	this	
estimative	moral	mindset,	no	excuse	 for	delay.	 If	Rennie’s	decision-to-decide	aimed	to	
establish	a	two-pronged	dilemma	free	from	the	complications	of	doubt,	Horner’s	similar	
decision	makes	doubt	and	contingency	motivating	bedrocks.		In	both	instances,	there	is	
an	 explicit	 rejection	 of	 delay,	 but	 while	 for	 Rennie	 this	 involves	 streamlining	
contingency,	 for	 Horner	 it	 involves	 embracing	 it.	 The	 post-Levinasian	 ethics	 that	
connects	 acknowledged	 doubt	 to	 suspended	 decision,	 and	 hence	 with	 delay,	 is	 thus	
inadequate	to	some	of	the	novel’s	central	conflicts.	
Finally,	 in	 terms	of	 the	passage’s	 values,	 the	 fact	 that	 it’s	motivated	by	care	 for	
Rennie	leads	Horner	to	engage	more	directly	with	other	people’s	unpredictability	than	
in	his	attempts	elsewhere	to	explain	their	actions	in	terms	of	his	own	philosophy.	The	
doubting,	contingency-driven	psychology	of	the	abortion-procurement	prose	is	notably	
focused	 on	 forms	 of	 non-knowledge	 about	 people:	 doubt	 about	 their	 reasons,	 and	
speculation	 about	 the	 reasons	 they	may	or	may	not	have	 for	believing	or	disbelieving	
things	relevant	to	one’s	own	intentions.			
On	 his	 car	 journey	 back	 from	 the	 first	 stages	 of	 the	 abortion-arrangements,	
Horner	 methodically	 considers	 known	 unknowns	 about	 the	 way	 his	 potential	
abortionist	 Dr	Welleck	might	 yet	 be	 alerted	 to	 the	 artifice	 of	 the	 scheme	 (412).	 	 No	
longer	 such	a	deliberate	 sceptic	himself,	Horner	now	calculates	about	 the	doubts	 that	
Welleck	may	 feel,	 and	 the	 action	 they	might	 justify:	 Horner	 fears	 that	 his	 behaviour	
“might	turn	that	doubt	into	scepticism”	or	that	acting	too	“deliberately”	might	“add	to	
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his	suspicion…”	(413).		Having	rationally	constructed	a	lie,	Horner	now	has	to	rationally	
turn	over	its	chances	of	success,	precisely	in	terms	of	Welleck’s	own	grounds	for	doubt	
about	 Horner’s	 action.	 	 To	 act	 on	 such	 considerations	 establishes	 that	 in	 practical	
action,	reasons,	claims	to	knowledge,	and	the	relationships	between	the	two	must	not	
only	 be	 rendered	 commensurable	 for	 one’s	 own	 reasoning,	 but	 in	 one’s	 projections	
about	the	likely	beliefs	and	actions	of	others.		The	doubts	that	Horner	makes	a	subject	
of	 deliberation	 are	 not	 those	 of	 a	 universal	 scepticism,	 but	 based	 on	 a	 targeted	
acknowledgement	of	absent	reasons	for	belief,	reasons	that	he	needs	to	direct	his	energy	
to	create.	
**	
The	 prose	 of	 this	 part	 of	 the	 novel	 then	 articulates	 alternative	 values	 to	 the	
limitations	 and	 harms	 of	 Horner’s	 default	 postmodern	 rationalizations:	 openness	 to	
contingency,	awareness	of	others,	acting	as	part	of	a	project	rather	than	seeing	choices	
as	 isolated,	 a	 good-humoured	 alertness	 to	 the	 world’s	 potential	 for	 surprise,	 and	 the	
fundamental	motivating	force	of	care	for	others.	
Horner’s	ability	to	act	rationally	and	act	effectually	without	denying	himself	the	
possibility	 of	 error	 not	 only	 defends	 the	 possibility	 of	 action	 under	 postmodern	
conditions,	but	 refutes	a	blanket	critique	of	 rationality	as	equivalent	 to	 rationalism	or	
rationalization.	 Harris	 describes	 Barth’s	 career	 as	 “ongoing	 postmodernist	 critique”	
(139),	and	The	End	of	the	Road’s	defence	of	rationality’s	relationship	to	contingency	is	set	
so	overtly	 against	 the	ground	of	 cosmopsis	 and	 the	 strenuous	assertion	of	 selflessness	
that	 it	 adds	 up	 to	 a	 pre-emptive	 rejection	 of	 postmodern	 claims	 that	 the	 unchoosing	
space	before	decision	is	where	we	have	our	greatest	access	to	valuable	possibility.	John	
Searle,	 in	 his	 mid-1970s	 debate	 with	 Derrida,	 suggested	 that	 the	 deconstructive	
invocation	of	difference	and	contingency	 relied	on	an	entirely	 idealistic	 conception	of	
reason	and	so	had	no	bearing	in	realms	of	experience	where	difference	and	contingency	
were	 live	 considerations.	 Barth’s	 stylistic	 contrast	 of	 two	 types	 of	 reason	 criticizes	
Horner	similarly	on	the	turf	of	practical	agency.	
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And	 yet	 things	 don’t	 go	 right	 when	 Horner	 turns	 to	 practical	 action.	 He	
successfully	organizes	an	abortion,	but	Rennie	won’t	go	through	with	it	because	he	has	
organized	 it	 by	 deception.	 Almost	 immediately	 his	 urgency	 starts	 to	 wind	 down,	 his	
prose	 to	 lose	 its	 linearity.	 The	 solution	 of	 getting	 his	 own	Doctor	 to	 do	 the	 abortion	
comes	almost	parenthetically.	That	the	end	of	deliberative	agency	should	be	associated	
with	a	return	to	the	Doctor	is	consistent:	the	Doctor’s	solutions	to	paralysis	are	all	anti-
deliberative,	since	 fundamentally	anti-value	and	anti-investment.	Within	this	mindset,	
Horner	starts	to	go	meta-cognitive	again,	comparing	his	perception	of	reasons	for	action	
to	 the	physical	 urge	 of	 urination:	 absent	 a	workable	 ground	 for	 deliberation,	 he	 finds	
himself	 re-stranded	 between	 the	 paralysis	 of	 postmodern	 givens	 and	 the	 inarticulate	
promptings	 of	 instinct.	 	 The	 values	 attached	 to	 the	 problem	 have	 shifted	 from	 the	
possibility	of	aiding	Rennie	back	to	paralysis	as	a	concern	in	itself:	he	initially	explains	
his	wish	 for	 the	Doctor’s	 help	 by	 saying	 “I	 had	 a	 touch	 of	my	 trouble	 this	 afternoon”	
(424).	
Of	 course,	 that	 Horner	 finally	 rejects	 his	 burst	 of	 practical	 decision	 does	 not	
imply	that	the	reader	should	take	it	any	less	seriously.	But	then,	of	course,	Rennie	dies.	
She	dies	of	what	after	all	 this	effort	seems	a	mere	accident,	an	unpredictable	 fluke.	So	
wasn’t	Horner	right?	After	all	 that	 laudable	engagement	with	the	possibility	of	 failure,	
isn’t	his	return	to	the	prose	of	assured,	relieved	paralysis	warranted?	Shouldn’t	we	take	
this	as	the	novel	finally	endorsing	cosmoptic	paralysis	as	a	way	of	being?		
We	should	not.	
	
A	Wrong	Reversion	
Horner’s	 recursion	 to	 the	 comfort	 of	 anti-agentive	 rationalisation	 can	 be	
explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 his	 one	 failed	 sequence	 of	 deliberations	 is	 unique	 in	 his	
experience:	as	 the	one	time	that	he	becomes	genuinely	 invested	 in	a	value	beyond	his	
own	 evasion	 of	 responsible	 selfhood,	 it’s	 the	 one	 time	 that	 he	 faces	 the	 possibility	 of	
failing	 by	 what	 are	 briefly	 his	 own	 standards.	 	 When	 Rennie	 dies	 at	 the	 end	 of	 his	
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sequence	of	actions,	he	takes	this	one	failure	for	law.	This	final	bad	deduction	and	false	
generalization	turns	out	to	underlie	the	pseudo-logical	prose	on	which	the	novel	began.	
The	 rationalisation-prose’s	 unwarranted	 self-confirming	 statements	 about	 the	
universality	 of	 Horner’s	 paralysing	 logic,	 with	 which	 the	 novel	 opens	 and	 ends	 thus	
reveal	themselves	as	the	projections	of	a	disappointed	narrator’s	retrospection.	Horner’s	
abandonment	of	 the	 lessons	of	one	prose	 leads	 to	his	 creation	of	 a	 less	 coherent	one.		
His	critique	of	reason	turns	out	finally	to	be	a	consequence	of	bad	reasoning.	
Joshua	 Landy,	 in	 one	 of	 the	most	 productive	 recent	 considerations	 of	 fiction’s	
non-mimetic	uses,	argues	that	the	fictive	rhetorical	value	of	the	Socratic	dialogues	is	not	
that	they	present	valid	arguments	engagingly,	but	that	the	constrained	conceptual	world	
of	a	fiction	better	allows	the	construction	of	bad	arguments	that	we	can	train	ourselves	
to	 identify.	The	End	of	 the	Road’s	ending	 follows	a	similar	approach,	as	Horner	makes	
false	deductions	about	agency	from	the	true	premises	of	cosmopsis	and	the	incoherent	
subject.		These	are	threats	only	to	the	kind	of	deductive	reason	of	which	he	makes	them	
a	 subject	 in	 his	 rationalizations,	 but	 not	 to	 the	 kind	 of	 inductive	 thinking	 that	
characterizes	the	rationality-passages.	Horner’s	inability	to	realise	that	the	possibility	of	
error	 is	 intrinsic	 to	 the	 psychology	 he	 adopted	 to	 arrange	 the	 abortion	 leads	 him	 to	
falsely	 reject	 all	 action-motivated	 rationality.	 Among	 Horner’s	 modifying	 nihilism,	
though,	the	novel	has	presented	a	passage	of	viable	deliberative	action,	made	valid	by	its	
structure	 of	 choosing	 to	 choose.It’s	 important	 too	 that	 nothing	 that	 that	 psychology	
brings	about	is	responsible	for	Rennie’s	death:	she	establishes	the	dilemma	as	a	response	
to	Joe	and	Horner’s	collaborative	rationalization,	the	decision	to	have	the	Doctor	do	the	
abortion	 comes	 after	Horner	 has	 already	 relinquished	 his	 deliberative	mode,	 and	 the	
cause	of	death	is	an	omitted	warning	that	can’t	be	pinned	on	Horner.	Such	accidents	are	
acknowledged	possibilities	under	the	Jamesian	logc	of	decision,	and	Horner’s	failure	to	
realize	this	establishes	that	he,	 the	 figure	of	a	cynical	era,	has	not	 learned	the	rules	of	
the	 contingent	 universe.	 The	 atmosphere	 of	 absolute	 devastation	 and	 emptiness	 on	
which	the	novel	ends	is	Horner’s	personal	response	to	events,	endorsed	by	the	novel	as	
an	emotional	 response	but	not	as	 a	 logical	 extrapolation.	The	 fallibilistic	 attitude	 that	
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conventional	 prose	 psychology	 takes	 to	 such	 a	 world	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 world’s	
contingency.	 Horner’s	 final	 refusal	 to	 countenance	 that	 the	 lesson	 of	 his	 experience	
might	 be	 that	 he	 was	 briefly	 right	 to	 engage	 with	 that	 world’s	 possibility	 of	 failure	
suggests	that	the	attraction	to	a	world	where	we	can	live	“without	fault”	is	the	cause	of	
his	 problems	 rather	 than	 their	 liberating	 upshot.	 Horner’s	 tale	 is	 that	 of	 a	 world-
saturatingly	 flawed	 response	 to	 foundationless	 conditions,	 not	 an	 expression	 of	 those	
conditions’	ultimate	consequences.		
The	novel’s	final	couple	of	lines,	in	which	Horner	finds	himself	“without	weather”	
and	gets	 into	 a	 taxi	 giving	 the	driver	 the	 sole	direction	 “Terminal”,	 have	usually	been	
read	as	the	expression	of	what	LeMahieu	called	the	novel’s	philosophical	“exhaustion,”	
and	Conti	 its	 “run[ning]	 aground.”	 “Terminal,”	 on	 such	 an	 account,	would	 reflect	 the	
final	exhaustion	of	options.	Yet	even	on	Horner’s	own	terms,	the	novel	doesn’t	have	to	
end	 with	 an	 equation	 between	 paralysis	 and	 pessimism.	 What	 such	 readings	 don’t	
appreciate	 is	that	“terminal”	 is	not	a	complete	refusal	of	choice,	but	a	reversion	to	the	
Doctor’s	 sub-normative,	 anti-rational	 model	 of	 agency.	 	 Among	 the	 Doctor’s	
prescriptions	 after	 his	 first	meeting	with	Horner	 is	 “Take	 long	walks,	 but	 always	 to	 a	
previously	 determined	destination”	 (333).	 The	 echo	 of	 “termi”	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	novel	
shows	 that	 rather	 than	 giving	up	on	philosophy,	Horner	 is	 plumping	 for	 the	Doctor’s	
minimalist	 determinism.	 In	 James’	 terms,	 he’s	 giving	 up	 on	 the	 “zest”	 of	 a	 world	 of	
possible	error,	and	electing	the	“risks”	of	suspension	over	those	of	action.	“Terminal”	is	a	
motivated	choice	of	destination,	specifying	a	kind	of	minimal	directionality	over	other	
alternatives.	 	 The	 novel’s	 original	 draft	 specified	 “greyhound	 terminal”	 as	 the	
destination,	recalling	the	train	station	in	which	Horner	suffered	his	first	cosmopsis,	and	
suggesting	 that	 the	ending	was	always	 intended	 to	be	about	 identifying	a	place	 rather	
than	an	exhaustion.	Once	again,	the	novel’s	 final	words	establish	the	mindset	through	
which	 the	whole	plot	 is	modified	 for	us.	 Its	 events	 are	presented	under	 the	aegis	of	 a	
preference	 for	pre-determination	over	deliberation,	one	 that	 the	novel	 invites	us	 from	
first	 cosmopsis	until	 final	paralysis	 to	 see	 as	 the	 consequences	of	 inept	 reasoning	and	
affective	tendencies	that	reflect	the	era’s	basic	aversion	to	the	possibility	of	error.	
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The	 End	 of	 the	 Road,	 qua	 philosophical	 fiction,	works	 through	 two	 isomorphic	
projects.	 It	 recuperates	 and	makes	 freshly	 significant	 an	 outdated	 prose	 form.	 And	 it	
salvages	 a	 model	 of	 rational	 deliberative	 agency	 despite	 portraying	 a	 philosophical	
context	 that	 claimed	 to	 do	 away	 with	 it.	 	 As	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 novel	 begins	 with	 the	
elaborations	on	cosmopsis	and	the	incoherent	subject	suggests,	the	prose	innovation	is	
in	the	service	of	the	agency	argument:	a	challenge	to	readings	of	“postmodern	Barth”’s	
emergence	 as	 formal	 first	 and	 philosophical	 second.	 Barth	 uses	 the	 kind	 of	 formal	
reflexiveness	 and	 opacity	 that	 people	 have	 used	 to	 define	 his	 postmodern	 period	
precisely	to	pre-emptively	dispute	the	philosophical	givens	we	now	call	postmodern.		
Jacqueline	 Kegley	 reads	 Barth	 as	 a	 philosophical	 novelist,	 and	 one	 who	 has	
something	to	add	to	existing	philosophy.	However,	her	sense	of	the	contribution	fiction	
can	make	to	philosophy	is	constrained	to	the	two	modes	I’ve	argued	The	End	of	the	Road	
avoids:	 the	mimetic	 and	 the	merely	 critical:	 “philosophy	needs	 literature	 to	dramatize	
ideas	 as	Barth	has	 so	 skilfully	done	 so	 that	one	 can	 see	 the	horrors	one’s	 ideas	might	
lead	to	if	taken	seriously”	(133).	The	postmodern	project	novels	that	follow	in	The	End	of	
the	Road’s	wake	offer	readers	constructive	proposal	of	coherent	warrants	and	alternative	
values.	 They	 might	 therefore	 be	 the	 ground	 for	 a	 reinvestigation	 of	 literature’s	
philosophical	capacities	and	uses	beyond	the	 longform-immersive-thought-experiment	
model	to	which	Landy	proposes	his	alternative	models.	
In	the	essay	that	updated	“The	Literature	of	Exhaustion”	for	the	1980s,	Barth	sets	
his	 work	 against	 not	 only	 the	 surviving	 orthodoxies	 of	 modernism	 but	 also	 the	
burgeoning	consensus	of	radical	experiment:	
“If	 the	modernists,	 carrying	 the	 torch	 of	 romanticism,	 taught	 us	 that	 linearity,	
rationality,	 consciousness,	 cause	 and	 effect,	 naïve	 illusinism,	 transparent	
language,	 innocent	 anecdote	 and	 middle-class	 moral	 conventions	 are	 not	 the	
whole	story,	then	from	the	perspective	of	these	closing	decades	of	our	century	we	
may	appreciate	that	the	contraries	of	these	things	are	not	the	whole	story	either.		
Disjunction,	 simultaneity,	 irrationalism,	 anti-illusionism,	 self-reflexiveness,	
medium-as-message,	 political	 olympianism,	 and	 a	moral	 pluralism	approaching	
moral	entropy—these	are	not	the	whole	story	either”	(LoR	203).		
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The	End	of	the	Road	frames	the	ideas	people	now	call	postmodern	as	a	rationalized,	self-
interested	status	quo.	Historically,	critics	took	up	cosmoptic	paralysis	as	the	salient	bit	
of	 Barth’s	 early	 work,	 and	 saw	 his	 later	 overt	 “postmodernism”	 as	 his	 way	 of	moving	
beyond	it.		Appreciating	both	the	stylistic	postmodernity	of	his	early	work	and	the	fact	
that	The	End	of	the	Road’s	stylistically	distinctive	default	prose	frames	cosmopsis	and	the	
incoherent	subject	as	starting	points	rather	than	insights	and	upshots,	we	can	appreciate	
his	 specific,	 targeted	 attempts	 to	 treat	 post-existential	 agentive	 paralysis	 as	 a	 solvable	
problem.	 The	 novel	 aims	 to	 recuperate	 the	 kind	 of	 agency	 that	 its	 intellectual	 cotext	
claimed	to	 invalidate,	by	 recuperating	 the	kind	of	prose	 that	 seemed	to	have	died	out	
along	with	 that	older	model	of	 agency.	Critics	have	 continued	 to	 read	 the	 stylistically	
reflexive	anti-mimetic	 fiction	of	 the	60s	to	the	80s	as	a	concerted	articulation	of	post-
structuralist	objections	to	the	practical	reason	associated	with	classic	realism.	But	if	The	
End	 of	 the	 Road	 was	 using	 prose	 innovation	 to	 establish	 these	 postmodern	 ideas	 as	
givens	and	using	opaquely	reflexive	prose	forms	to	look	beyond	their	paralytic	claims	as	
early	as	1958,	then	we	might	revise	our	understanding	not	just	of	Barth’s	career,	but	of	
postmodern	fiction’s	relation	to	postmodern	theory,	and	of	anti-mimetic	prose’s	relation	
to	constructive	philosophical	argument	more	generally.	
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Chapter	2	
Deliberative	Rationality	Amid	Economistic	Rationalization:	Gaddis’	J	R	
	
Coming	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 period	 I	 examine	 rather	 than	 its	 beginning,	William	
Gaddis’	J	R	doesn’t	seem	to	have	much	in	common	with	chapter	1’s	subject,	The	End	of	
the	Road.		Barth’s	short	novel	addresses	deliberative	paralysis	and	the	preferability	of	an	
contingent	 rationality	 to	 an	 error-avoidant	 rationalization	 through	 careful	
manipulations	 of	 prose-psychological	 sentence-structures;	 J	 R’s	 distinguishing	 stylistic	
feature	 is	 its	 complete	excision	of	 transcribed	 thought.	Barth’s	plot	 takes	place	within	
the	self-consciously	narrowed	social	context	of	a	three-person	friendship	on	an	isolated	
college	campus,	whereas	J	R	covers	the	conflict	between	rationality	and	rationalization	
through	a	vast	cast,	over	750	pages,	in	terms	of	the	relationships	between	corporations,	
government	infrastructure,	banks,	schools,	markets,	as	well	as	artists,	students,	retirees,	
children.	But	as	 I’ll	 show,	despite	 its	almost	polar	opposite	stylistic	methods	 from	The	
End	 of	 the	 Road,	 J	 R	 follows	 a	 similar	 narrative	 arc	 driven	 by	 a	 similar	 emergence	 of	
conflict	 between	 different	 styles	 that	 stand	 for	 different	 worldviews,	 beginning	 with	
threats	 to	 practical	 deliberation’s	 viability	 before	 developing	 demonstrations	 of	 its	
philosophical	defensiblity	and	practical	effectuality.	
J	 R’s	 anti-psychological	 universe	 is	 conjured	 not	 only	 by	 the	 absence	 of	
transcribed	 thought,	 but	 by	 the	 linguistic	 qualities	 of	 the	 dialogue	 spoken	 by	 that	
world’s	 presiding	 figures,	 from	 the	 eponymous	 eleven-year-old	 tycoon	 to	 Governor	
Cates,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 corporation	 that	 owns	 the	 infrastructure	 of	 JR’s	 school.	 These	
characters	 speak	 in	 sentences	 that	 fold	 decision	 and	 action	 into	 a	 single	 flow	 of	
performative	sorting	that	can	act	in	the	world	without	recourse	to	unspoken	deliberative	
depths.	 Here,	 working	 out	 how	 to	 turn	 Native	 American	 land-claims	 into	 profit	 for	
Cates,	is	his	PR	man	Davidoff:	
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We	don’t	 do	 it	 first	Beamish	 somebody	 else	will,	 got	 them	under	 the	 gun	now	
with	a	move	to	pull	their	wigwams	right	out	from	under	them	be	lucky	to	get	off	
the	 reservation	with	 their	hats	and	 their	asses,	 spring	 this	historical	pageant	 to	
pull	 them	 together	 follows	up	on	 the	publicity	get	 their	 claims	established	and	
they	can	sink	their	teeth	in	this	royalty	arrangement	with	the	Alaska	subsidiary	
put	a	little	wampum	under	their	belts	for	a	rainy	day	(522).	
I’ll	 have	 more	 to	 say	 later	 about	 the	 colonizing	 vocabulary	 here,	 but	 the	 syntax	
encapsulates	 the	default	 logic	of	 J	 R’s	world.	The	unpunctuated	prose	 figures	Davidoff	
calculating	robotically	on	the	fly,	without	any	mediation	between	thought	and	speech:	
his	spoken	words	are	his	instrumental	reasoning.		Deliberative	rationality	gives	way	to	a	
quasi-physical	rationalization	that	operates	on	the	objects	it	considers.	
In	 this	 respect,	 Gaddis’	 novel	 fits	 into	 a	 lineage	 that	 significantly	 predates	 the	
postmodern	era	that	critics	(as	I’ll	discuss)	usually	take	it	to	mimic.	His	terms	comport	
with	 Horkheimer’s	 wartime	 worries	 about	 the	 re-allocation	 of	 reason	 from	 ends	 to	
means:		
“Complicated	logical	operations	are	carried	out	without	actual	performance	of	all	
the	intellectual	acts	upon	which	the	mathematical	and	logical	symbols	are	based.	
Such	 mechanization	 is	 indeed	 essential	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 industry;	 but	 if	 it	
becomes	the	characteristic	feature	of	minds,	if	reason	itself	is	instrumentalized,	it	
takes	on	a	kind	of	materiality	and	blindness,	becomes	a	fetish,	a	magic	entity	that	
is	accepted	rather	than	intellectually	experienced”	(23).		
The	connection	between	such	thinking	and	J	R’s	corporate-world	context	comes	in	the	
relationship	 between	 industry	 and	 “expansion.”	 The	 details	 of	Davidoff’s	 syntax	make	
clear	how	the	form	of	his	agency	correlates	its	own	momentum	with	the	manipulation	
of	 others.	 As	 his	 prose	 flows	 in	 a	 cause->consequence->new-condition	 sequence	 from	
short	complete	verb	phrase	to	short	complete	verb	phrase,	the	relevant	verbs	establish	a	
clear	conceptual	relationship	between	appropriation	and	manipulation,	orbiting	as	they	
do	the	triptych	“pull/get/put.”	Only	in	the	final	line	is	there	a	standard	conjunction,	the	
consequential	 “and”	which	 renders	 the	 sequence	 a	 culmination.	The	 repeated	 “under”	
combines	 with	 the	 manipulation-verbs	 to	 stress	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 this	 mode	 of	
thought	 and	 overbearing	 flow	 conceptualises	 itself	 in	 terms	 of	 power	 and	 discourse’s	
physical	 effectuality.	 	 Davidoff	 speaks	 almost	 entirely	 in	 clichés,	 allowing	 the	 profit-
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motive	 sequence	of	 clauses	 to	 flow	maximally	unhindered	by	 verbal	 deliberation.	The	
way	this	language	dissolves	the	difference	between	thought,	speech,	and	action	explains	
why	“flat”	and	“flow”	are	the	standard	critical	tropes	for	J	R’s	form.31	
	 Yet	 as	 I’ll	 examine	at	 length	 in	what	 follows,	 this	 isn’t	 the	only	mode	of	
speech	in	J	R,	and	the	novel	in	fact	develops	numerous	ways	of	representing	unvocalized	
thought	 and	 its	 capacities	 even	 within	 the	 JR/Cates/Davidoff	 world	 that	 aims	 to	
eliminate	 it.	 That	 agonistic	 relationship	 is	 constantly	 foregrounded:	 take	 for	 example	
this	comment	on	a	janitor	by	Major	Hyde,	one	of	the	supervisors	Cates	employs	at	J	R’s	
school:	 “One	 thing	 I	 don’t	 trust	 it’s	 a	 sullen	 black,	 not	 a	word	 out	 of	 him	 just	 sitting	
there	taking	it	all	in,	look	at	their	face	and	you	don’t	know	what’s	going	on	inside	[…]”	
(182).	 	The	idea	that	a	character	could	“take	in”	some	of	what’s	going	on	outside	while	
refusing	 to	offer	direct	access	 to	 their	 “inside”	makes	 the	mere-flatness	account	of	 J	 R	
untenable.	We	shouldn’t,	in	other	words,	take	the	absence	of	represented	thought	on	its	
pages	to	indicate	the	absence	of	unvocalised	thought	in	its	world	or	worldview.	In	this	
chapter	 I’ll	 examine	 how	 Gaddis	 articulates	 a	 consequential	 place	 for	 deliberative	
rational	 psychology	 in	 a	 world	 whose	 presiding	 powers	 aim	 to	 rationalize	 it	 out	 of	
existence.		
Paisley	 Livingston’s	 work	 on	 Literature	 and	 Rationality	 distinguishes	 two	
approaches:	 “Not	 only	 can	 we	 ask	 how	 concepts	 of	 rationality	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 the	
understanding	 of	 literature,	 but	 is	 also	 possible	 to	 ask	 how	 literary	 works	 illustrate,	
challenge,	 and	 complexify	 various	 conceptions	 of	 rationality	 advanced	 in	 the	 social	
sciences”	(11).	As	I’ll	show	in	what	follows,	J	R’s	stylistic	arguments	about	deliberation’s	
place	in	the	world	engage	the	most	influential	social	science	of	Gaddis’	time	to	a	degree	
that	 belies	 a	 dichotomy	 presumed	 by	 critics	 of	 postmodern	 fiction	 who	 see	 “stylistic	
description”	as	mere	distraction	from	real	political	criticism.	
**	
																																																								
31	For	 fuller	 examination	 of	 these	 tropes	 and	 their	 saturation	 of	 J	 R	 criticism,	 see	 Chetwynd,	 “Friction	
Problems.”	
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Gaddis’	first	novel,	The	Recognitions,	ends	with	its	artist	hero	heading	off	to	be	a	
hermit:	 “Now	at	 last	 to	 live	deliberately,”	he	says,	without	pausing	to	explain	that	he’s	
quoting	Thoreau.	The	phrase	recurs	in	J	R,	as	the	struggling	writer	Jack	Gibbs,	frustrated	
at	 	a	 lack	of	progress	during	one	of	his	rare	chances	to	sit	down		uninterrupted	by	his	
part-time	 teaching	duties	 and	work	on	his	book	 about	 the	player	piano’s	place	 in	 the	
history	 of	 mechanization,	 laments	 the	 world	 that	 presses	 on	 his	 time:	 “first	 time	 in	
history	 so	 many	 opportunities	 to	 do	 so	 God	 damned	 many	 things	 not	 worth	 doing,	
problem’s	they	start	with	the	sixteen	ninety-five	have	to	start	with	the	doormat,	went	to	
the	woods	to	live	deliberately	Thoreau	says	couldn’t	escape	from	the	Protestant	ethic,	be	
the	 first	 ones	 to	 redeem	 it	 Amy	 make	 monogrammed	 doormats	 deliberately”	 (477).	
Matthew	Wilkens	 reads	 the	 ending	of	The	 Recognitions	 as	 an	archly	nostalgic	 gesture	
toward	the	passing	of	an	era	 in	which	such	a	victory	by	retreat	could	be	possible,	and	
the	combination	of	historical	hindsight,	irony,	despair,	and	self-conscious	impotence	in	
Gibbs’	 lament	 seems	 to	 bear	 out	 the	 shift	 between	 the	 two	 novels.	 	 Wyatt	 in	 The	
Recognitions	 can	 depart	with	 a	 secure	 resignation	 to	 his	 artist’s	 vocation—“The	work	
will	know	its	own	reason”	(900)—but	Gibbs	is	stuck	precisely	because	he’s	so	aware	of	
the	conditions	of	his	and	everyone	else’s	work.	Like	The	End	of	the	Road,	then,	the	basic	
problem	in	J	R	is	the	demystified	impossibility	of	deliberate	living,	which	seems	to	offer	
an	obvious	explanation	for	prose-form	deliberative	thought’s	excision	from	J	R’s	page.	As	
I’ll	show,	the	novel	does	more	than	just	express	this	new	situation.	
J	 R	 explores	 corporate	 and	 supra-human	 forms	 of	 economic	 agency	 as	 the	
eponymous	eleven-year-old	boy	 takes	a	single	share	awarded	on	a	school	 trip	and—in	
trading	it	for	a	set	of	army	surplus	forks—begins	a	brief	career	of	capital	exchange	that	
leads	to	his	heading	a	large	portfolio	of	businesses	and	assets	that,	finally,	spirals	beyond	
his	control.	His	public	face	in	all	this	is	his	music	teacher	Edward	Bast,	whose	attempts	
to	 compose	 a	 symphony	 the	 novel	 traces	 behind	 all	 the	 corporate	 machination.	 The	
novel	also	follows	a	cast	of	secondary	characters	rooted	in	the	school	where	Bast	and	JR	
meet:	 	Gibbs,	Amy	 Joubert—a	 fellow	teacher	who	 is	Cates’	daughter—and	a	variety	of	
other	 functionaries,	 friends,	 peers,	 and	 family	 members	 of	 this	 central	 group.	 Tying	
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human	 relationships	 like	 the	 failed	 romance	 between	 Gibbs	 and	 Joubert	 inextricably	
into	the	 institutional	machinations	of	Typhon	and	the	 JR	Corp,	 the	novel’s	 removal	of	
psychological	 transcription	 is	 usually	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 attempt	 to	 examine	
what	 happens	 at	 a	 stage	 of	 economic	 life	 after	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 individual.	
Deliberative	psychology	of	 the	kind	Barth’s	prose-form	experiments	delineated	are	 left	
behind	 in	a	world	where	dialogue	 is	 instrumental	matter.	But	Barth	and	Gaddis	 share	
two	crucial	aspects.	
Firstly,	they	share	a	convention-foregrounding	anti-mimetic	reflexivity:	Barth’s	in	
the	manipulation	of	 conventional	mind-access	 sentence-forms	 to	 render	 them	opaque	
and	allegorical,	Gaddis	in	the	way	that	the	excision	of	conventional	transcriptive	prose-
psychology	 defies	 novelistic	 expectation.32	J	 R’s	 constantly	 overlapping	 dialogue,	 the	
dialogue’s	internal	breaks,	and	the	lack	of	dialogue	tags	to	indicate	speakers	adds	to	the	
disorienting	 lack	 of	 stipulation	 of	 what	 characters	 are	 thinking: 33 	the	 effect	 is	 a	
foregrounding	of	formal	unconventionality	and	the	need	for	cognitive	reorientation.	The	
novel	 also	 repeatedly	 draws	 attention	 to	 its	 own	 lack	 of	 indications	 of	 informational	
salience,	as	late	on	when	JR	pleads	to	Bast	what	readers	might	to	Gaddis:	“you	need	to	
help	me	 out	 I	mean	 how	do	 I	 even	 know	whose	 voice	 they	 are	 talking…”	 (647).	 J	 R’s	
awareness	of	its	own	seeming	unparsability	leads	Richard	Walsh	to	treat	it	as	something	
beyond	 either	mimesis	 or	 antimimesis:	 it’s	monumentally,	 self-containedly	 immanent	
enough	 to	 be	 “absolutely	 opposite	 to	 metafiction:	 fiction	 that	 presents	 itself	 as	 an	
equivalent	system	to	reality—not	a	fiction	about	fiction	but	a	reality	about	reality”	(NA	
38-9).		This	grants	the	more	standard	mimetic	reading	of	J	R	as	what	Barth	would	call	a	
“technically	 up	 to	 date”	 attempt	 to	 render	 a	 contemporary	 world	 to	 which	 the	
individualist	 psychologism	 of	 the	 traditional	 novel	 no	 longer	 applies.	 But	 those	 self-
reflexive	moments	point	to	the	novel’s	awareness	of	itself	as	an	artefact	in	the	fictional	
tradition,	and	the	number	of	specifications	of	fiction	as	a	theme	in	Gaddis’	composition																																																									
32	As	I	uncovered	in	“Friction	Problems,”	Gaddis’	earliest	versions	of	this	novel,	which	took	18	years	from	
first	sketches	to	publication,	were	in	a	conventional	prose	–	the	novel’s	distinctive	form	took	shape	over	
the	course	of	his	corporate	writing	career.		
33	See	 Letzler’s	 claim	 that	 this	 salience-parsing	 is	 not	 only	 J	 R’s	 method	 but	 its	 main	 contribution	 to	
readers,	who	get	to	practice	information-sifting	useful	elsewhere	in	the	culture	J	R	examines.	
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notes	 on	 the	 novel	 suggest	 that	Walsh	 is	 as	 just	 as	 wrong	 to	 dismiss	 it	 being	 “about	
fiction”	as	he	is	to	downplay	its	being	a	“fiction”	in	general.	
Secondly,	Gaddis’	working	notes,	his	corporate	writing,	and	his	sketches	of	other	
projects	before	and	during	the	composition	of	J	R	all	make	clear	he	shared	The	End	of	the	
Road’s	animating	interest	in	the	texture	and	moral	value	of	deliberation.	An	abandoned	
early	 story,	 for	 example,	 shares	 Barth’s	 specifically	 post-existential	 interest	 in	 how	 to	
make	moral	decisions	in	a	world	of	accident,	while	an	abandoned	civil	war	play	that	he	
wrote	concurrently	with	early	work	on	 J	 R	he	examined	 the	 intersection	of	doubt	and	
free	choice	in	relation	to	the	difference	between	deontological	and	institutional	justice.34	
These	 stories	 pre-date	 the	 majority	 of	 Gaddis’	 corporate	 writing	 career,	 which	 I’ve	
argued	 elsewhere	was	 the	 source	 of	much	 of	 J	 R’s	 distinctive	 form,	 but	 similar	 notes	
post-date	the	novel	as	well.	The	corporate	work	itself	is	equally	notable	for	an	ongoing	
preoccupation	 with	 deliberation	 and	 decision-making,	 as	 Gaddis’	 ventriloquous	
speeches	 and	 training-film	 scripts	 for	 Eastman	 Kodak	 and	 IBM	 constantly	 address	
matters	like	the	difference	between	human	and	computerized	decision-making,	the	self-
perpetuating	 nature	 of	 supra-human	 systems,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 spontaneous	 decisions	
within	corporate	hierarchies.35	What’s	distinctive	about	the	working	notes	for	J	R	itself	is	
																																																								
34	The	original	motivating	questions	for	“Ernest	and	the	Zeitgeist”	 involve	 -“the	moral	 investure	must	be	
moral	 responsibility;	 but	 how	 so	 if	 the	 notion	 of	 Deliberate	 Chance	 operates.	 	 Direct	 contradiction.		
Impossible.	 //	Therefore:	We	must	 turn	 from	the	(Ex.)	notion	of	Logical	moral	 responsibility;	 to	 that	of	
illogical	but	Still	Binding	 responsibility”	 (Archive:	 “Drafts	of	 ‘Ernest	 and	 the	Zeitgeist,’”	 444444444444).	
Once	 at	 Antietam,	 meanwhile,	 sets	 long	 philosophical	 speeches	 about	 chance,	 doubt,	 and	 historical	
agency	in	the	service	of	a	plot	about	how	the	concepts	of	guilt,	justice,	and	responsibility	play	out	in	the	
light	of	forces	bigger	than	single	humans	can	channel.	
35	See	for	example	the	IBM	training	quiz	film	that	would	“open	with	a	series	of	close-ups	and	short	candid	
sequences	 reflecting	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 tension,	 a	 critical	 juncture	 of	 decision-making	 at	 a	 number	 of	
related	 levels”	 (Archive:	 “+-+-+-“,	 box	 31/468),	 the	 Kodak	 speech	 on	 internal	 communications	 between	
technicians	 and	managers	 that	 makes	 institutional	 agency	 conditional	 on	 vocabulary--“these	 technical	
people	 usually	 didn’t	 reach	 the	 top	 echelons	 of	 management,	 where	 the	 real	 decisions	 are	 made…	 in	
management	terms	and	management	language…”	(Archive:	“A	Better	Way”	(1968).	Speech,	Chicago,	Aug	5	
1968.	Corporate	Writings.	Box	No.	135,	Folder	481)	or	the	IBM	educational	film	on	Software	that	sets	the	
usefulness	of	computers	for	processing	cumulative	“Problems	so	complex	that	no	single	mind	could	grasp	
all	 their	 elements	 at	 once,	 and	 act	 on	 them	 at	 the	 same	 time”	 (12)	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 noting	 the	
limitations	 of	 computers	 that	 rely	 human	pre-sorting	 of	 inputs,	 since	 	 humans	 only	 control	 systems	 of	
information-circulation	when	those	can	be	“broken	down	into	a	number	of	single,	precise,	yes…	…or	no	
decisions”	(Archive:	“software	version	1”	13:	Corporate	Writings.	Box	No.	134,	Folder	478).	
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the	way	that	questions	about	existential	and	institutional	agency	interact:	it’s	in	bringing	
the	latter	to	bear	on	the	former	that	Gaddis’	differences	from	Barth	arise.	
Loose	notes	wonder	of	Eigen,	a	minor-character	novelist	who	Gaddis	later	made	
clear	he	based	in	part	on	himself,	“is	he	the	totally	indecisive	person?		Who	works	for	a	
JR	company	in	management	consultant	station,	‘decision-making-	totally	dependent	on	
machines?”	 (Archive).36	The	 conditions	 of	 that	 indecision,	 the	 same	 note	 clarifies,	 are	
The	End	of	the	Road’s	basic	Buridan’s-Ass	conundrum:	“suspended	judgment	=	assigning	
equal	value	to	all	=	total	 indecision	=	paralysis	of	the	will.”	What’s	different	in	Gaddis,	
even	 in	 these	 notes,	 is	 the	 infrastructural	 context.	 Eigen’s	 indecision	 is	 of	 interest	 in	
relation	to	his	place	within	a	particular	business	economy.	Similarly,	notes	about	school	
psychologist	Dan	DeCephalis	 stipulate	 “It	 is	DiCeph	who	 is	 finally	 incapacitated	 from	
making	any	decision	what	so	ever	–	practically	paralysed	(courses	in	decision-making)”	
(Archive).37	What	is	at	stake	here,	more	than	in	The	End	of	the	Road,	is	the	possibility	of	
“making	 any	 decision”	 within	 a	 particular	 social	 formation	 in	 which	 “machines”	 are	
changing	 how	 we	 think	 about	 decision,	 while	 infrastructure	 gives	 some	 institutional	
agents	 and	 not	 others	 the	 position	 from	 which	 to	 teach,	 or	 dictate,	 how	 “decision-
making”	will	work	in	the	new	climate.	 J	R	 in	 its	published	form	is	 less	explicitly	about	
Barth-style	deliberative	paralysis	than	these	notes,38	but	it	develops	their	interest	in	how	
infrastructural	 considerations	 affect	 the	 possibility	 of	 deliberative	 agency	 into	 a	
thorough,	 coherent,	 style-driven	 argument	 about	what	 such	 agency—whose	paradigm	
in	the	novel	is	artistic	composition,	the	project	that	paralyzes	Eigen,	Gibbs,	and	Bast39—
might	 still	 be	 able	 to	 achieve	 in	 a	 world	 whose	 infrastructure	 and	 ideology	 was	 ever	
more	hostile	to	it.		
																																																								
36	Loose	note	headed	‘Eigen’:	Folder	67/274:			
37	Loose	not	headed	‘DiCephalis’:	Folder	67/274:			
38	As	I’ll	discuss	at	the	end	of	the	chapter,	such	concerns	make	an	almost	immediate	return	in	his	notes	
toward	subsequent	projects.	
39	As	Joseph	Tabbi	notes	in	a	direct	comparison	of	Barth’s	and	Gaddis’	self-conscious	form,	“Where	Barth’s	
authorial	 self	 may	 at	 times	 appear	 wholly	 reflexive	 and	 his	 fiction	 refer	 exclusively	 to	 the	 process	 of	
making	fictions”	J	R	 is	concerned	less	“with	its	own	artifice	than	with	defining	the	social,	economic,	and	
technological	conditions	under	which	creative	artifice	can	have	a	place”	(“Comp	Self”	661).	
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As	I’ll	show,	J	R	examines	precisely	what	kind	of	a	place	deliberation	can	retain	in	
a	world	and	textual	form	given	over	to	its	elimination:	the	novel’s	depictions	of	artistic	
composition	have	a	lot	to	do	with	its	answer.	
J	R’s	interest	in	the	connection	between	deliberation	and	agency,	then,	is	not	so	
purely	 logical	 as	 Barth’s,	 but	 addresses	 it	 in	 the	 context	 of	 institutional	 practice	 and	
wider	cultural	politics.	This	development	hinged,	as	 I’ve	argued	elsewhere,	on	Gaddis’	
practical	experience	of	working	in	“business”	for	15	years	after	he	first	mailed	himself	a	
copyright-guarding	 version	 of	 the	 earliest	 sketch	 for	 a	 “novel	 about	 business”	 whose	
protagonist	would	be	an	eleven-year-old	boy.	Gaddis’	corporate-writing	years	with	IBM,	
Eastman	Kodak,	and	others	didn’t	just	contribute	to	J	R’s	form,	but	also	its	thinking	on	
deliberative	agency.	That	corporate	work	often	started	out	wondering	how	to	eliminate	
inconveniently	 “unpredictable	 human”	 elements,	 but	 finally	 advocating	 “human	
judgment”	as	the	only	bulwark	against	the	problems	that	supra-human	systems	treated	
as	 ends	 in	 themselves	 could	 cause	 (Archive).40	That	 work’s	 J	 R-prefiguring	 stress	 on	
“friction”	and	“depth”	opposes	existing	criticism’s	emphasis	on	the	novel’s	figurations	of	
flatness	 and	 flow.	 And	 this	 complicates	 Frederic	 Jameson’s	 influential	 account	 of	
postmodern	 fiction	 as	 flat	 economic	 symptom,	 devoid	 of	 distinctive	 style,	 rhetorical	
implication,	or	oppositional	force.	
**		
Jameson’s	account	of	the	economic	shifts	of	which	postmodern	fiction	can	never	
be	more	than	a	symptom	draw	heavily	on	David	Harvey’s	account	of	the	US	economy’s	
tribulations	 of	 1973	 as	 the	 marker	 of	 a	 shift	 from	 an	 economics	 of	 psychology,	
regimentation,	 and	 efficiency	 to	 one	 of	 proliferation,	 liquidity,	 and	 commodification.	
Jameson	 insists	 that	 in	 its	determination	by	economic	conditions	“the	supreme	formal	
feature	 of	 all	 the	 postmodernisms”	 is	 “a	 new	 kind	 of	 flatness	 or	 depthlessness,	 a	 new	
kind	 of	 superficiality	 in	 the	 most	 literal	 sense”	 (9),	 which	 commitment	 to	 flatness																																																									
40	“Some	Observations	on	Problems	Facing	Eastman	Kodak’s	Advertising	Distribution	Department.”	Dec	
1967.	Corporate	Writings.	Box	No.	135,	Folder	481.	See	Chetwynd,	“Friction	Problems”	for	more	extensive	
discussion	of	this	document	and	its	relation	to	J	R.	
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commits	the	fiction	“to	the	mission	of	criticizing	and	discrediting	this	very	hermeneutic	
model	of	 the	 inside	and	the	outside”	(12).	 Jameson	never	writes	about	Gaddis,	but	 J	R,	
defined	by	the	elimination	of	the	psychological	“inside”	from	its	pages	and	the	speech-
patterns	of	figures	like	JR	and	Davidoff	overtly	 indicating	a	 lack	of	underlying	thought	
behind	the	speech,	should	surely	be	a	paradigm	example,	and	Jameson’s	approach	has	
been	 fundamental	 to	 criticism	 on	 the	 novel.	 J	 R’s	 stylistic	 flatness	 and	 flow,	 on	 this	
account,	 engage	 its	 culture	 by	 reflecting	 money’s	 increasing	 departure	 from	material	
embodiment,	 the	 increasingly	 fast	 and	 global	 processes	 of	 capital	 exchange,	 and	 the	
correspondingly	supra-human	forms	of	systemic	and	networked	agency	that	impel	such	
an	economy.	
Jameson	stipulates	that	his	argument	“is	not	to	be	read	as	stylistic	description,	as	
the	 account	 of	 one	 cultural	 style	 or	movement	 among	 others.	 I	 have	 rather	meant	 to	
offer	a	periodizing	hypothesis…”	(3).	In	other	words,	he’s	interested	in	the	ways	in	which	
shared	historical	context	explains	shared	elements	of	multiple	texts.	No	problem	there,	
except	that	he	uses	the	 flattened	consistencies	such	a	generalizing	approach	generates	
as	evidence	 that	 the	 texts	he	 examines	have	no	distinctive	 elements	beyond	what	he’s	
reduced	them	to:	postmodernism,	once	he’s	flattened	it	into	something	defined	by	that	
flatness,	 means	 “the	 end,	 for	 example,	 of	 style,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 unique	 and	 the	
personal,	the	end	of	the	distinctive	individual	brush	stroke…(15).	This	concept	of	art	as	
distinctive	 personal	 signature	 is	 precisely	what	The	 Recognitions’	 central	 forgery-plots	
examined,	 and	which	Wyatt’s	 final	 retreat	 seemed	 to	move	beyond.	 	 J	 R’s	 artist-plots,	
preoccupied	as	Tabbi	 rightly	noted	with	 the	question	of	where	 it	 could	be	possible	 to	
find	 time	 and	 space	 for	 composition	 at	 all,	 certainly	 leave	 it	 behind.	 But	 Jameson’s	
nostalgic	 attachment	 to	 it	 as	 an	 era-marker	 leads	 him	 to	 over-generalize	 about	 the	
irrelevance	of	 style	 per	 se:	my	 category	 of	 “stylistic	 allegory”	 [see	 intro]	 insists	 on	 the	
“distinctive”	rhetorical	implications	of	“distinctive”	styles,	without	any	attachment	to	the	
idea	 that	 they	 express	 “personal	 signature.”	 	 But	 it’s	 logically	 impossible,	 under	
Jameson’s	 terms,	 for	 the	 differences	 that	 “stylistic	 description”	 could	 reveal	 between	
texts	 characterized	 by	 their	 period	 to	 reveal	 any	 politically	 or	 philosophically	
	 101	
substantive	difference.	A	“periodizing	hypothesis”	of	the	Jamesonian	kind	suggests	that	
economic	 relations	 at	 time	 T1	 are	 X1,	 therefore	 artistic	 forms	 at	 time	 T2	 are	 all,	
superveniently,	form	X(2)	at	heart,	and	consequently	his	readings	in	Postmodernism	are	
actively	 hostile	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 authors	might	 create	 “distinctive”	 effects	 deliberately,	
undetermined	by	underlying	economic	conditions.	Yet	if,	as	my	whole	project	suggests,	
different	 anti-mimetic	 forms	 can	 bear	 different	 arguments	 in	 response	 to	 different	
questions	that	arise	out	of	different	historical	contexts,	 then	we	need	accurate	stylistic	
descriptions	of	the	forms’	distinctions	before	we	can	analyse	what	arguments	they	might	
be	offering	within	their	context.	If	 I	can	show	that	 J	R	 is	not	stylistically	flat	along	the	
lines	Jameson	proves,	then	this	should	force	a	more	complex	account	of	its	relationship	
to	the	flattening	aspects	of	the	culture	it	emerged	from.		
Not	all	 J	R	critics	cite	 Jameson,	but	 they	almost	all	 share	this	commitment	to	a	
“flat”	reading	of	the	novel.	Even	Jamesonian	readings	fall	into	two	categories:	those	that	
take	 Gaddis	 to	 be	 critically	 mimicking	 an	 existing	 state	 of	 postmodernity	 (Spencer,	
Clare),	and	those	who	read	J	R	as	predictive	of	the	distinctive	later	form	of	neoliberalism	
(Allan,	Marsh).	Less	economically	orientated	are	a	pair	of	approaches	that	can	be	yoked	
together	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 post-humanism.	 The	 first	 of	 these,	 epitomized	 by	 John	
Johnston,	 takes	 Gaddis’	 dialogue-heavy,	 hard-to-parse	 textual	 worlds	 to	 embody	 the	
poststructuralist	transfer	of	agency	and	materiality	from	people	and	events	to	language	
and	 writing.	 The	 second	 draws	 on	 Gaddis’	 explicit	 citation	 of	 figures	 like	 Norbert	
Weiner	 to	 read	 his	 work	 in	 terms	 of	 systems	 theory;	 for	 Tom	 LeClair,	 this	 involves	
authors	 like	 Gaddis	 conspicuously	 displaying	 “mastery”	 of	 new	 scales	 of	 information-
processing	 in	 order	 to	 undermine	 Jamesonian	 pessimism	 about	 the	 possibility	 of	
representing	or	“mapping”	a	postmodern	world-system;	for	Joseph	Tabbi,	the	interest	is	
in	the	trans-humanistic	developments	in	subjectivity	that	arise	when	individual	human	
experience	 becomes	 further	 and	 further	 imbricated	 in	 conscious	 awareness	 of	 the	
suprahuman	 systems	 it	 takes	 part	 in.	Michael	 Clune,	meanwhile,	 departs	 so	 far	 from	
Jameson	 that	 his	 account	 of	 J	 R	 ends	 up	 in	 the	 same	 place:	 for	 him,	 the	 novel	 is	 a	
willfully	 unrealistic	 thought-experiment	 about	 what	 the	 world	 would	 look	 like	 if	
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psychology	 were	 eliminated	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 post-psychological	 mode	 of	 human	
interaction	based	entirely	on	the	processing	of	price-exchanges.	What	the	Jamesonians	
treat	as	mimetic	symptom,	Clune	treats	as	willful	and	explicit	antimimesis.	In	all	these	
cases,	 though,	 there’s	 a	 tight	 association	 between	 the	 absence	 of	 linear	 thought-
transription	 prose	 and	 J	 R’s	 putative	 commitment	 to	 the	 obsolescence	 of	 deliberative	
agency.		
The	more	humanistic	trend	in	Gaddis	criticism,	meanwhile,	stressing	his	belated	
modernism	 and	 social	 criticism,	 tends	 to	 avoid	 J	 R,	 and	 to	 decentralize	 questions	 of	
forms	when	it	can’t.	Christopher	Knight,	for	example,	treats	J	R	at	length,	treating	events	
and	 central	 characters	 in	 conventionally	 realist	 terms	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	novel’s	
attitude	to	bildung	 in	 the	context	of	 its	 treatment	of	 the	school	system.	The	humanist	
account	of	Gaddis	that	we	might	expect	to	give	us	an	account	of	deliberative	agency	in	
his	work	is	thus	unhelpfully	detached	from	the	matters	of	form	through	which	I	intend	
to	approach	it	here.	I’m	less	interested	in	hashing	out	the	differences	between	all	these	
critics,	though,	than	in	showing	how	their	insistence	on	“flatness”	can	be	undermined	by	
an	 attentive	 stylistic	 reading	 of	 the	 novel’s	 modes	 of	 implication	 and	 especially	 the	
differing	 syntactical	 constructions	 in	 the	 speech	 of	 deliberating	 and	 non-deliberating	
characters,	 and	 the	 implications	 this	will	 have	 for	 accounts	 of	 the	 novel’s	 critical	 and	
constructive	 formal	 rhetoric.	 The	 persistent	 flatness	 heuristic	 has	 three	 aspects:	 first,	
that	J	R	makes	no	presence	for	the	representation	of	deliberative	thought;	second,	that	
all	 the	novel’s	dialogue	 is	essentially	one	 formal	element,	 lacking	authorial	 indications	
about	the	relative	salience	of	the	information	it	encodes;	third,	monolithic	accounts	of	“J	
R’s	form”	leave	no	room	for	it	to	develop	or	modulate	language-patterns	over	the	course	
of	 its	 750	 pages: 41 	Johnston	 argues	 that	 “J	 R	 intends	 neither	 compensation	 nor	
redemption;	it	is	simply	a	demonstration,	in	the	most	rigorous	terms	imaginable,	of	one	
aspect	of	the	‘postmodern	condition’	in	which	we	now	live”	(205).	The	“demonstration”	
approach	 insists	 on	 a	 narrative	 as	 well	 as	 a	 stylistic	 flatness:	 J	 R	 can’t	 develop	 any																																																									
41	J	R	is	a	particularly	regular	victim	of	the	critical	claim	on	postmodern	form	that	you	could	dip	into	the	
novel	on	any	page	and	enjoy	a	basically	identical	reading	experience.	
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perspective	 beyond	 the	 flatness	 and	 flow	 that	 characterize	 its	 basic	 form.	 The	way	 it	
initially	 frames	 its	world	must	be	 its	entire	 rhetoric.	 It’s	 this	 that	 I	want	 to	dispute	by	
focusing	on	the	novel’s	construction	of	alternatives	to	the	worldview	it	invents	new	form	
to	represent.	
Perhaps	 sharing	 Jameson’s	 presumption	 of	 the	 incompatibility	 between	
“periodizing	 hypothesis”	 and	 “stylistic	 description,”	 few	 critics	 have	 examined	 J	 R’s	
potentially	 critical	 rhetoric	 from	 a	 stylistic	 point	 of	 view.42	I’ll	 show,	 though,	 that	
precisely	 by	 doing	 a	 more	 accurate	 stylistic	 description,	 from	 the	 starting	 point	 of	
demonstrating	 that	 J	 R	 isn’t	 “flat,”	 we	 can	 do	 a	 much	 better,	 more	 precise	 job	 of	
periodizing	 the	 novel	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 way	 economic	 thinkers	 in	 the	 period	 of	 its	
gestation	 addressed	 the	 relationship	 between	 economics,	 institutions,	 and	 agential	
power.	 Even	 by	 the	 standards	 of	 its	 own	 political	 self-conception,	 the	 Jamesonian	
approach	to	postmodern	form	is	too	broad-brushed	and	imprecise	to	be	illuminating.	
	I’ll	make	 this	 case	 first	by	 showing	how	 J	 R	 implies	deliberation	or	 its	 absence	
through	the	stylistics	of	speech	alone—for	example	contrasting	JR’s	unpunctuated	flow	
with	Bast’s	constant	hesitations	and	revisions—then	by	showing	how	these	distinctions	
are	 organized	 into	 an	 argument	 about	 the	 sources	 and	 structures	 of	 anti-deliberative	
political	power.	I’ll	then	show	how	directly	Gaddis’	take	on	the	question	matches	maps	
onto	 the	 Chicago	 school’s	major	 internal	 debate,	 between	Milton	 Friedman’s	 positive	
economics	 and	 its	 suggestion	 that	 human	 idiosyncrasy	 can	 be	 ruled	 out	 of	 economic	
models	 as	 friction	 is	 by	 physicists,	 and	 the	 earlier	 generation	 of	 Frank	 Knight,	 who																																																									
42	Spencer	 or	 Tabbi	 might	 acknowledge	 that	 J	 R	 has	 “critical”	 designs,	 or	 isn’t	 mere	 “imitation	 of	 the	
society	 it	 depicts”	 (113),	 but	 these	 readings	 of	 the	 novel’s	 development	 of	 alternatives	 to	 the	
postdeliberative	“world-system”	it	conjures	tend	to	rest	only	on	the	logic	of	Gaddis’	response	to	a	question	
about	 J	 R’s	 values:	 “the	 opposite	 of	 what	 the	 work	 portrays.”42	Marc	 Chenétier	 alone	 sees	 J	 R	 actually	
representing	 something	 beyond	 flatness,	 taking	 its	 narrative	 passages	 to	 offer	 a	 linguistic	 freshness	
alternative	to	the	banal	 flow	of	dialogue,	a	relationship	he	figures	 in	terms	of	depth	along	the	lines	of	a	
bedrock	underlying	a	 liquid	flow.	Tabbi	examines	the	way	that	the	 levels	of	cognition	involved	in	 intra-
systemic	agency	map	onto	the	relationship	between	reader	and	text,	while	Angela	Allan	reads	the	novel’s	
famed	 “difficulty”	 as	 embodying	 a	 transmission	 of	 intent	 from	 author	 to	 reader	 that	 in	 its	 necessary	
imperfections	undermines	the	presumptions	of	perfect	exchange	that	ground	the	neoliberal	worldview	it	
examines.		
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equated	 human	 qualities	 with	 ineliminable	 friction.	 I	 then	 end	 by	 showing	 how	 the	
novel	 represents	 deliberation’s	 powers	 and	 achievements	 as	 the	 power-relations	
between	 deliberating	 and	 non-deliberating	 characters	 shift	 in	 its	 final	 third.	 These	
organizations	 and	modulations	make	 plot	 events	 depend	 on	 stylistic	 factors	 in	 a	way	
that	reverses	the	mimetic	axioms	about	the	priority	of	event	and	style,	and	thus	makes	
the	case	for	the	constructive	capacities	of	specifically	anti-mimetic	fiction.	
	
Dialogic	Differences,	or	How	J	R	does	Depth	
Recall,	then,	Davidoff’s	blending	of	thought,	speech,	and	manipulation	into	a	single	
instrumental	 flow	 of	 distinctively	 low-punctuation	 speech,	 and	 Hyde’s	 resentment	 of	
being	unable	 to	 “know	what’s	 going	 on	 inside”	 the	 janitor’s	 head.	These	 establish	 the	
anti-deliberative	impetus	of	the	novel’s	politically	dominant	characters,	and	young	JR’s	
initial	 success	 in	 that	 world	 is	 predicated	 on	 his	 sharing	 their	 linguistic	 modes	 of	
thought	and	action.	Late	in	the	novel,	as	his	empire	starts	to	fall	apart,	he	has	to	tell	Bast	
that	 the	 latter	 is	 being	 indicted	 for	 insider	 trading.	 Bast,	 now	 very	 familiar	 with	 the	
world	 inhabited	 by	 JR,	 Davidoff,	 and	 their	 ilk,	 snaps	 “Inside?	 That’s,	 how	 could	 I	 be	
inside	there	isn’t	any	inside	.	How	could	anybody	believe	the,	the	only	inside’s	the	one	
inside	 your	 head	 […]”	 (644).	 Bast	 thus	 suggests,	 even	 in	 objecting	 to	 JR’s	 flattening	
world,	 that	 its	 depthlessness	 actually	 stems	 from	 productive	 depth	 within	 its	 young	
figurehead’s	 mind.	 	 As	 I’ll	 show,	 the	 novel’s	 dialogue	 and	 narrative	 dynamics	 are	
premised	on	the	implication	that	some	characters	more	than	others	retain	a	potentially	
productive	separation	between	their	language,	thoughts,	and	actions.		
The	obvious	example	of	such	a	character	is	Bast	himself.	His	dialogue	throughout	
the	novel	is	usually	interrupted	by	the	overflow	of	language	like	Davidoff’s	and	JR’s,	but	
even	 on	 the	 rare	 occasions	 that	 he	 finds	 himself	 free	 to	 speak	 onward,	 his	 sentences	
contain	 their	 own	 hesitations,	 obstructions	 and	 reversals:	 intimations	 of	 unvocalized	
thought.	For	example,	in	the	live	school-television	scripted	lecture	on	Mozart	that	is	our	
first	 extended	 exposure	 to	 his	 voice,	 his	 isolation	 in	 a	 recording	 studio	 leaves	 him	
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uninterrupted	by	school	administrators	who	watch	him	from	their	control	room,	but	his	
inability	to	stick	thoughtlessly	to	the	script	is	clear	both	in	content	and	prose:	Mozart’s	
family,	we’re	told,		
—spent	about	four	dollars	for	his	funeral	but	that,	that	might	spoil	our	nice	fairy	
tale	 boys	 and	 girls	 his	 few	 friends	 following	 the	 cheap	 coffin	 in	 the	 rain	 and	
turning	 back	 before	 it	 ever	 reached	 the	 pauper’s	 grave	 nobody	 could	 ever	 find	
again	 is,	 do	 you	 know	 what	 a	 pauper	 is	 boys	 and	 girls?	 It	 means	 a	 very	 poor	
person	and	and,	yes	and	we	don’t	like	to	think	about	poor	people	no,	no	let’s	try	
to	 remember	 this	 little,	 little	unspoiled	genius	 in	his	happy	moments	when	he,	
when	he	um,	yes	when	he	wrote	happy	letters	to	people,	yes…	(42).	
This	 passage	 starts	 mid-sentence	 since	 Bast’s	 lecture	 is,	 on	 the	 page,	 constantly	
interrupted	 by	 the	 cavils	 of	 the	 watching	 administrators.	 	 Yet	 its	 internal	 hesitancy	
codes	 it	 as	 resistance	 to	 them,	 even	 before	 they	 get	 agitated	 at	 his	 swearing	 and	 the	
realisation	 that	 they	 can’t	 interrupt	 him	 from	 afar.	 The	 two	 moments	 most	 directly	
coded	 as	 script-departures	 here	 are	 those	 that	 involve	 a	 content-level	 sense	 of	
hesitation,	 obstruction	 or	 reversal:	 Bast’s	 narration	 of	 the	 funeral	 procession	 turning	
back,	and	his	assertion	of	what	“we	don’t	like	to	think	about.”		The	occasion	for	the	non-
verbal	pause	of	an	“um,”	meanwhile,	 is	 the	attempt	to	turn	back	to	“happy	moments”:	
Bast’s	very	effort	to	get	back	to	thoughtless	recitation	of	the	script	is	what	draws	out	the	
most	overt	signifier	of	deliberative	hesitation	and	uncertainty.	 	In	the	tension	between	
linear	script	and	hestitant	objection,	this	scene	separates	language	and	thought	on	the	
basis	of	ideology.	
	 That	Bast’s	deliberative	hesitation	 is	coded	as	dissent	makes	sense	of	 the	
structural	 relation	 his	 form	 of	 speech	 usually	 bears	 to	 that	 of	 his	 interlocutors.	 It	
suggests	 that	 the	 language-agency	 model	 embodied	 by	 Davidoff	 or	 Cates	 is	 not	 a	
universal,	 inherent	aspect	of	 subjectivity	 in	 J	 R,	 but	 a	 local	 cultural	dominant	 that	we	
have	the	option	of	pursuing	or	resisting.	For	that	reason,	the	relationship	between	the	
modes	embodied	by	Bast	and	Davidoff	 is	actively	agonistic,	with	a	default	direction	of	
influence.	 Take	 for	 example	 the	 Hyde+janitor	 scene,	 in	 which	 Bast,	 as	 usual,	 can’t	
articulate	a	sentence	against	the	flow	of	instrumental	talk:	
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—Yes	well	 I’m	sure	he	expects,	 I	mean	you	see	 I	 just	came	 in	originally	 to	help	
him	to…		
[…]		
—No	I	mean	I	thought	that’s	why	the	loan	was	the	only	way	I	could…		
[…]		
—Yes	but	all	I…		
[…]		
—Yes	but	listen	Mister	Davidoff	about	this	stock	opt…		
[…]	
—No	well	you	see…		
[…]	(541).	
Not	 only	 does	 Bast	 fail	 to	 articulate	 a	 content-bearing	 full-sentence,	 but	 his	 attempts	
decline	from	verbs	of	mental	operation	(“mean”	and	“think”)	to	over-ridden	“but”s	to	a	
conforming	 statement	 of	 Davidoff’s	 own	 mental	 operation	 “well	 you	 see.”	 Louis	
Auchincloss	characterises	J	R’s	dialogue	as	containing	“Every	banality	the	brain	of	man	
can	devise	to	evade	thought”	(Auchincloss),	but	the	way	the	differing	language-forms	of	
speakers	like	Bast	and	Davidoff	interact	make	clear	that	the	dominant	mode	of	dialogue	
as	often	serves	to	hunt	and	eliminate	“thought”	in	others	as	to	let	any	given	speaker	to	
evade	it	in	themselves.	
This	 is	 the	organizing	dynamic	of	the	novel’s	central	relationship,	between	Bast	
and	JR.	The	basic	contrast	is	evident	in	Bast’s	first	attempt	to	get	JR	to	slow	his	empire’s	
expansion:		
—No	 now	 stop,	 just	 stop	 for	 a	 minute!	 This,	 this	 whole	 thing	 has	 to	 stop	
somewhere	don’t	you	understand	that?	
—No	but	holy,	 I	mean	 that’s	 the	whole	 thing	Bast	 otherwise	what	 good	 is	 this	
neat	tax	loss	carryforward	and	all	these	here	tax	credits	and	all,	I	mean	that’s	all	
Eagle	 is	 and	 see	where	 Piscator	 says	 here	 Eagle	 probably	 has	 this	 here	 limited	
charter	so	they	can’t	buy	this	brewery	but	if	the	pension	fund	could	like	buy	the	
brewery	 stock	 and	 the	 dividends	 could	 go	 right	 in	 it	 and	 cut	 down	 what	 the	
company	had	to	put	in	then	see	we…	
—Stop	it!	[…]	(298).	
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JR’s	 thinking-practice	 relies	 on	momentum,	 as	 his	 commitment	 to	 the	 “neat	 tax	 loss	
carryforward”	makes	clear	and	the	subsequent	unpunctuated	rush	of	subjunctive	“then”s	
embody	 in	 prose.	 	 This	 instrumental	 profit-mode	 flow	 depends	 for	 impetus	 on	 a	
figuration	 of	 friction:	 Bast’s	 repeated	 entreaties	 to	 “stop”.	 While	 both	 characters’	
responses	 to	 each	 other	 begin	 with	 “no,”	 Bast’s	 is	 continuous	 with	 subsequent	
negativity—his	 “Stop”s	 or	 interrupted	 “I	 don’t”s—whereas	 JR	 reverts	 to	 active	
instrumentality	as	soon	as	his	regains	conversational	control.	JR’s	“no”s,	in	other	words,	
represent	only	 the	 rejection	of	 obstacle,	 not	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	ongoing	 flow	of	 the	
novel’s	 default	 dialogue.	 This	 conversation	 frames	 stylistic	 flow,	 then,	 not	 as	 an	
independent	quality,	but	as	a	deliberate	and	targeted	assault	on	 friction.	The	world	 in	
which	friction	is	a	physical	and	conceptual	given	is,	early	in	J	R,	the	world	that	language	
like	 Davidoff’s	 and	 JR’s	 overwhelms.	 And	 this	 is	 especially	 true	 where	 friction	 is	
associated	 with	 thought,	 with	 a	 mediating	 depth	 between	 judgment	 and	 effectual	
speech.	 This	 dynamic	 of	 threat	 aligns	 our	 sympathies	with	 characters	 associated	with	
depth	psychology,	 like	Bast	 the	artist,	Gibbs	 the	critic,	Beaton	 the	 lawyerly	 cog	 in	 the	
system.	
	 This	alignment	of	sympathies	comes	through	the	persistent	trope	of	colonization.	
Gaddis	figures	deliberativeness	as	a	marginal	identity	category	within	the	social	terms	of	
J	 R’s	 world.	 The	 identity-based	 forms	 of	 colonization	 central	 to	 Hyde’s	 uneasy	
perception	 of	 the	 black	 janitor’s	 interiority	 or	 Davidoff’s	 need	 to	 steal	 physical	 space	
from	 the	 Indians	 function	 as	 frameworks	 for	 understanding	 the	 pressure	 figures	 like	
Davidoff,	 JR,	 and	 Cates	 put	 on	 the	 novel’s	 different-valued	 protagonists.43	Nicholas	
Spencer’s	 geographical	 reading	 of	 J	 R	 stresses	 this	 vocabulary	 in	 drawing	 on	 Roland	
Lefevbre:	 “The	 threat	 of	 the	 colonization	 of	 lived	 space	with	which	Gravity’s	 Rainbow	
concludes	is	realized	in	Gaddis’	JR.		In	this	novel,	abstract	space	takes	dominion	in	the	
urban	 environments	 of	 New	 York,	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 oppositional	 lived	 space	 is																																																									
43	And	as	Bast’s	failure	to	get	through	to	Davidoff	was	represented	in	linguistic	terms,	so	Davidoff’s	work	
on	 the	 Indians	 comes	 through	 language	 that	 enacts	 the	 colonization	 it	 describes:	 	 he	 operates	 by	
translating	interlocutors	on	whose	values	he	might	not	have	a	“claim”	into	agents	who	share	values	he	can	
comprehend—“this	 royalty	arrangement”—in	order	 to	win	over	 them	to	his	own	values,	at	which	point	
he’ll	“pull	their	wigwams	right	out	from	under	them.”	
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eradicated”	(6).	Hyde’s	or	Davidoff’s	equivalent	colonization	of	the	space	behind	speech	
also	 applies	 isomorphically	 to	 words	 on	 the	 page:	 Bast’s	 language	 conjures	 a	 fictive	
world	in	which	thoughts	that	aren’t	vocalized	can	still	exist	and	exert	influence,	whereas	
the	Davidoff	mode	attacks	 this	notion,	aiming	 to	create	a	world	as	 flat	as	a	page.	The	
persistent	 racial	 analogy	 appropriates	 a	 space	 of	 marginality	 for	 central	 characters	
who—like	Hyde’s	 resented	 janitor—refuse,	or	 try	 to	 refuse,	 the	compulsion	 to	give	up	
the	space	of	unvocalised	thought,	of	deliberation	that	acknowledges	uncertainty	and	the	
possibility	of	error	enough	that	it	can’t	simply	join	the	stream	of	instrumental	talk.		
	 Deliberativeness	 in	 J	 R,	 then,	 is	both	a	stylistic	and	an	 identity	category.	Tabbi,	
stressing	the	fracture	and	incoherence	internal	to	each	speech	in	J	R,	claims	that	“There	
is	 no	 question	 of	 staging	 ideological	 conflicts	 or	 religious	 crises	 in	 the	 conversations	
among	 characters.”44		 Yet	 as	 Davidoff’s	 overwhelming	 of	 Bast	 and	 Bast’s	 attempts	 to	
make	JR	hesitate	show,	the	ideological	conflict	is	staged	not	as	debate,	but	precisely	in	
the	 orchestrated	 confrontation	 of	 forms	 of	 speech	 that	 stand	 for	 different	 modes	 of	
thought.	Bast	and	JR	differ	not	just	in	what	they	say	about	hesitation	and	thought,	but	in	
its	 relation	 to	 the	 fundamental	 structures	 of	 their	 prose.	 JR’s	 identification	 with	 the	
market	and	Bast’s	wish	to	escape	its	conditioning	set	them	up	as	opposites	such	that,	if	
the	 intimations	 of	 pre-vocalized	 deliberation	 in	 Bast’s	 speech	 align	 him	 with	 a	
traditional	agency	under	threat,	JR	in	opposition	becomes,	as	Angela	Allan	notes,	hard	
to	think	of	“in	terms	of	his	intentions”	or	as	“having	any	individual	desires	or	agency	at	
all”	(228).	J	R’s	vast	array	of	details	and	dialogues	finally	boils	down,	as	Gaddis	himself	
suggested,	 to	 a	 single	 ideological	 conflict:	 “the	 artist	 as	 ‘inner-directed’	 confronting	 a	
materialistic	 world.”45	In	 effect,	 the	 novel	 represents	 the	 two	 characters	 as	 different	
competing	 types	of	person,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 grounds	Robert	Chodat’s	 examination	of	
changing	ideas	about	human	and	non-human	agency	and	intentionality	in	20th	century	
fiction:	 “personhood”	 is	 the	umbrella	category	 for	different	 types	of	embodied	agency,																																																									
44	Tabbi,	“Autopoesis”,	93	
45	“Finally,	it’s	the	artist	as	‘inner-directed’	confronting	a	materialistic	world—brokers,	bankers,	salesmen,	
factory	workers,	most	politicians,	the	lot—that	JR	himself	represents,	and	which	is	‘outer-directed,’	if	you	
want	it	in	sociological	terms.”	(Gaddis,	“William	Gaddis:	The	Art	of	Fiction…”).	
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from	sovereign	human	subjects	to	consciousness-imputed	objects	to	the	legal	status	of	
corporations.46	Bast	 and	 JR’s	 novel	 represents	 not	 just	 a	 world	 of	 flow	 but	 a	 set	 of	
conflicts	and	stakes	intrinsic	to	that	world,	in	terms	of	the	different	kinds	of	beings	who	
inhabit	it,	and	the	different	linguistic	structures	that	conjure	them.47		
J	R	certainly	takes	a	normative	side	in	this	conflict,	and,	as	I’ll	go	on	to	show,	the	
novel’s	rhetorical	arc	develops	by	modulations	and	transmissions	of	these	patterns	from	
character	 to	 character:	 just	 as	 the	 linguistic	 structures	 are	 not	 “flat”ly	 identical	 from	
character	to	character,	nor	is	the	novel	“flat”	in	the	sense	of	formally	unevolving.48	
**	
All	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say,	 though,	 that	 the	 novel	 merely	 valorizes	 characters	 who	
speak	“deeply”	and	condemns	those	who	speak	“flatly”.	Indeed,	the	stylistic	alignments	
across	the	novel’s	essential	battle-line—between	artists	and	administrators—contribute	
greatly	 to	 its	 development.	 	 Characters	 whose	 ideologies	 align	 with	 the	
Cates/Davidoff/JR	 axis	 speak	 some	 of	 the	 least	 fluent	 language	 in	 the	 novel,	 and	
characters	coded	as	sympathetic	or	resistant	to	that	anti-deliberative	world	speak	some	
of	the	most	relentless	“flow.”		
Take	Gibbs	 for	example,	who	gives	voice	 to	 the	novel’s	most	overt	criticisms	of	
contemporary	 culture	 and	 its	 stupefying	 language.	 As	 Patrick	 O’Donnell	 says,	 Gibbs																																																									
46	Christopher	 Knight	 is	 one	 critic	 to	 have	made	 the	 case	 that	 J	 R	 creates	 different	 kinds	 of	 character,	
suggesting	that	“we	make	a	mistake	if,	propelled	by	our	postmodern	ambitions,	we	choose	to	conflate,	or	
reduce,	all	of	Gaddis’	characters	into	this	single	posthuman	type”	(121).	Knight	doesn’t	go	so	far	as	to	imply	
any	structural	relationship	between	J	R’s	“flat”	and	“deep”	character-types,	however.		
47	If	Johnston	conflated	all	the	novel’s	characters	under	the	claim	that	“What	we	see	of	them	in	any	given	
scene	is	all	there	is,	for	they	cast	no	shadows	of	an	interior	psychological	complexity”	(109),	Gaddis’	fellow	
novelist	Joseph	McElroy	identifies	the	ellipses	in	dialogue	throughout	J	R	and	The	Recognitions	as	a	sign	of	
“a	self	hung	up	in	its	parts,	falling	short,	doubt’s	pause,	second	thoughts”	(67):	his	attribution	of	some	of	
what’s	 on	 the	 page	 to	 underlying	 structures	 of	 unvocalized	 thought	 importantly	 establishes	 that	 J	 R	
represents	persons	capable	of	doubts,	thoughts,	a	self	at	all.	Both	Johnston	and	McElroy	imply	that	all	J	R’s	
characters	speak	the	same	and	so	are	the	same,	whereas	the	core	of	my	argument	is	that,	by	transmission	
of	certain	patterns	of	language,	the	novel	posits	that	different	forms	of	personhood	become	transmissible.		
48	Marc	Chénetier	 argues	 that,	 in	 rejecting	 the	 categories	 of	 “psychology”	 and	 the	 “real”	 in	 the	manner	
postmodernism	is	often	claimed	to,	Gaddis’	first	novel	The	Recognitions	resigns	itself	to	the	abandonment	
of	“promise”	and	“possibility.”	But	J	R’s	convention-foregrounding	disinterest	in	formal	connection	to	“the	
real”	means	that,	while	neither	JR	nor	bast	are	“psychological”	characters	in	the	conventional	way,	he	can	
still	attach	a	greater	degree	of	“possibility”	and	“promise”	to	one	of	the	modes	of	being	they	stand	for	than	
the	other.				
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“serves	 as	 the	 novel’s	 heretical	 voice	 in	 constantly	 questioning	 and	 parodying	 the	
prevailing	 discursive	 orders”	 (5),	 and	 thus	 seems	 an	 obvious	 candidate	 for	 a	 stylistic	
figure	of	 friction.	Yet	Gibbs’	obsessive	excoriation	of	everything	 that	world	 sets	before	
his	eyes	 falls	perfectly	 in	 line	with	 the	novel’s	 starting	dynamic	of	unidirectional	 flow.	
See	 this	 early	 scene	 in	 which	 he,	 Bast,	 and	 his	 fellow	 teacher	 and	 love	 interest	 Amy	
Joubert	 sit	 in	 a	 café	 on	 a	 school	 trip,	 and	 Gibbs	 turns	 self-pity	 into	 criticism	 of	 an	
acquaintance:	
What	who	Urquart?	 	 I’m	God	damn	it	 I	didn’t	 invent	him	look	at	him	think	he	
hasn’t	 got	 a	 skinful	 to	 get	 through	 the	 day	 in	 a	 place	 like	 this?	 	 That	 almost	
distinguished	profile	that	authority	in	his	face	but	it	won’t	stay	still	afraid	people	
will	 notice	 his	 teeth	 don’t	 fit,	 afraid	 he’ll	 lose	 them	 and	we’ll	 all	 laugh	 so	 he’s	
telling	that	sloppy	busboy	to	clean	up	a	table	he’s	almost	finished	anyhow	keep	
his	authority	intact	just	those	God	damned	teeth	can’t	relax	for	an	instant	he’s…		
—Please	stop	it!”	(118).			
Gibbs’	 contrarian	 railing	 forces	 Amy	 into	 the	 Bast	 role,	 trying	 to	 restore	 frictive	
hesitation	to	an	all-encompassing	flow.49	This	paints	Gibbs’	agonism	as	the	other	side	of	
the	coin	he	most	deliberately	of	all	our	characters	opposes.		With	minimal	punctuation	
and	a	sole	“so”	for	semantic	conjunction,	Gibbs’	speech	moves	from	sense	impression	to	
speculation	to	interpretation	and	back	among	these	categories	without	articulating	one	
whole	 idea.	 As	 his	 transitionless	 shifts	 from	 object	 to	 object	 keep	 obsessively	 circling	
back	to	teeth,	they	highlight	the	ways	in	which	a	stylistics	of	flow	doesn’t	have	to	entail	
development	or	progress:	Gibbs’	speech	might	be	better	thought	of	as	a	paralytic	eddy.	
Unlike	Davidoff’s	procession	through	simple	discrete	verb	phrases,	for	Gibbs	utterances	
from	 different	 categories	 of	 thought	 blear	 into	 each	 other,	 losing	 the	 point	 in	
proliferation	and	 indistinction.	 So	 fast	do	 the	 impulses	 flow	 into	 each	other	 that	 they	
create	 secondary	 pseudo-clauses,	 suggesting	 that	 “I’m	 God”	 or	 that	 someone	 is	 “still	
afraid”	 or	 that	 “teeth	 can’t	 relax	 for	 an	 instant.”	 Each	 of	 these	 bears	 ironically	 on	 the	
anxious	self-conception	underlying	Gibbs’	perpetual	oral	agitation.	If	flow	threatens	Bast	
with	 total	 subsumption,	 its	 stylistic	 threat	 to	 Gibbs	 is	 of	 absolute	 possession.	 	 In																																																									
49	Indeed,	Gibbs	is	asked	to	‘stop’	many	more	times	than	JR	in	book	as	a	whole,	almost	always	by	people	
who	share	his	politics.	
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subsequent	scenes,	alone	with	Amy	or	his	daughter,	this	feverish	defensive	torrent	does	
abate,	but	out	in	the	world	he	is	putatively	opposing,	Gibbs’	efforts	at	resistance	take	on	
precisely	 that	 world’s	 semantic	 structures:	 an	 impotent	 accidental	 pastiche	 of	 all	 he	
resents.	Correspondingly,	 he	never	manages	 to	 transmit	 anything	but	 frenetic	 flow	 to	
anyone	 else.	 Gibbs	 shares	 a	 language-structure	with	Davidoff,	 then,	 but	 is	 ineffectual	
where	 Davidoff	 is	 instrumental:	 where	 Davidoff	 can	 calculate	 about	 futures	 and	
distances	so	long	as	they’re	comprehensible	in	terms	of	price	and	exchange,	Gibbs	can’t	
get	 outside	what	 is	 directly	 present	 to	his	 perception.50	He	 contributes	 to	 the	 flow	he	
rails	against,	and	can’t	bend	its	dynamic	to	his	own	uses.	
Even	more	complex	dynamics	between	unvocalized	friction	and	spoken	flow	arise	
at	moments	where	 syntactic	 flow	corresponds	directly	 to	 the	 intimation	of	depth	 and	
hence	 the	 alignment	 with	 the	 novel’s	 normative	 sympathy.	 Amy,	 Cates’	 daughter,	
responds	to	an	 indelicate	question	 from	his	 lawyer	Beaton	about	how	her	divorce	and	
romantic	prospects	might	affect	her	role	in	the	company	by	spilling	forth:		
Mister	Beaton	that’s	what	we’ve	been	talking	about!	He,	Daddy	still	wants	it	all	to	
be	like	it	was	when	I	rode	at	the	garden	myself	with	that	ghastly	Use	girl,	when	
her	 brother	 came	 down	 with	 Dick	 Cutler	 from	 Choate	 and,	 if	 he	 could	 see	 if	
Daddy	 could	 just	 see	 the	 only	 men	 I’ve	 met	 I	 can	 imagine	 getting	 into,	 into	
anything	with	them	he’d	die	[…]	(213).			
Here	is	the	familiar	under-punctuation:	the	Gibbs-ish	correspondence	between	a	torrent	
of	words	and	the	spur	of	wounding	affects.		Yet	Amy’s	subsequent	clarification	that	“I’m	
sorry	Mister	Beaton	 I,	 I	 shouldn’t	 talk	 to	you	 like	 this	but	 there’s	 simply	been	no	one	
else…”	(214)	suggests	a	different	temporality	of	thought	and	speech:	that	of	build-up	and	
burst.	To	get	to	the	point	of	speaking	in	this	flow,	Amy	has	to	have	gone	some	time	with	
thoughts	unexpressed:	 to	have	been,	 like	Bast,	 the	 kind	of	 person	 for	whom	having	 a	
thought	and	expressing	an	action	are	non-identical.		
On	 the	other	 side	of	 the	aisle,	 school	principal	Whiteback	 is	one	of	 the	novel’s	
most	comical	characters	precisely	because,	 in	trying	to	put	Hyde’s	and	Cates’	 ideology																																																									
50	Gibb’s	 problem,	 indeed,	 is	 that	 he	 lacks	 the	 capacity	 to	 sort	 as	 reflexively	 and	 efficiently,	 so	 that	 his	
book	about	disorder	eventually	founders	on	his	inability	to	sort	through	his	profuse	notes.	
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into	practice,	his	language	devolves	into	almost	unintelligible	fracture.	Here	he	is	asking	
school	psychologist	Dan	DeCephalis	to	help	break	a	possible	strike	action:	“As	a	matter	
of	fact	its	already	ahm,	I	thought	Dan	might	be	some	help	to	us	on	this	as	a	matter	of	
fact.	 She,	 his	wife,	 your	wife	 that	 is	 to	 say	Dan,	 orientationwise	 that	 is,	 I	 understand	
she’s	ahm	motivating	factor	there	activationwise	[…]”	(177).	Whiteback’s	 language	is	as	
over-punctuated	and	hesitant	as	Bast’s,	even	more	circular	than	Gibbs’.	His	attempt	to	
discuss	things	“orientationwise”	leave	his	listener	entirely	unoriented,	as	the	preceding	
clauses	offer	at	least	three	modulations	of	“she”	–	“his	wife,”	“your	wife”	and	“that	is	to	
say	Dan.”	Confusion	over	both	 referent	 and	addressee	make	Whiteback’s	proliferating	
clarifications	 into	obfuscations.	This	 is	 far	 from	Davidoff’s	 flatly	 efficient	 instrumental	
speech,	yet	pushing	the	same	politics.	How,	then,	to	make	sense	of	this	 in	the	light	of	
the	equation	between	language-style	and	ideology	that	I’ve	identified	above?		
We	can’t	merely	map	flow	and	friction	onto	sympathetic	and	sceptical	portrayals	
of	 the	 characters	 who	 speak	 them:	 instead,	 they	 suggest	 the	 plurality	 of	 modes	 of	
personhood	that	emerge	when	a	culture	of	“flat”	linguistic	agency	attempts	to	colonize	
one	 of	 traditional	 persons.	 Where	 John	 Johnston	 reads	 any	 given	 instance	 of	 J	 R’s	
dialogue	 as	 “not	 a	 human	 being	 talking	 but	money	 itself”	 (204),	 I’ve	 shown	 that	 the	
novel’s	 varied	patterns	 of	 “talking”	 point	 to	 its	 array	 of	 conceptions	 of	what	 a	 human	
agent	 can	 be	 at	 this	 stage	 in	 history.	 Critics	 who	 have	 read	 J	 R	 as	 formally	 flat	 and	
undifferentiated	 have	 fallen	 into	 the	 Jamesonian	 trap	 of	 thinking	 that	 precision	 in	
“stylistic	description”	can’t	be	of	any	use	in	examining	the	rhetoric	of	a	novel’s	response	
to	 its	 culture.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 I’ll	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 seeming	 similarity	 between	
Whiteback’s	 “ahm”s	 and	 Bast’s	 script-breaking	 “um”s,	 showing	 how	 the	 stylistic	
modulations	 and	 transmissions	 the	 novel	 represents	 between	 characters	 add	 up	 to	 a	
diagnosis	 of	 the	 specifically	 political	 valence	 of	 this	 colonizing	 mode,	 and	 what	 this	
allows	 the	 novel	 to	 suggest	 about	 possibilities	 for	 transmitting	 other	 forms	 of	
personhood.	
	
“Testored	Tailing,”	or	the	Political	Organization	of	Style-Transmission	
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The	fundamental	structure	that	connects	economic	life	to	forms	of	agency	in	J	R	is	
embodied	 in	 a	 seemingly	 innocuous	 Whiteback	 stumble.	 Trying	 to	 explain	 how	 the	
school’s	personality-testing	will	match	each	child	to	an	existing	set	of	punch-cards,	he	
tells	us:	
this	equipment	item	is	justified	when	we	testor	tailing,	tailor	testing	to	the	norm,	
and	 […]	 the	 only	 way	 we	 can	 establish	 this	 norm,	 in	 terms	 of	 this	 ongoing	
situation	that	is	to	say,	is	by	the	testing	itself	(22).			
Whiteback’s	initial	stumble,	his	“testored	tailing,”	flips	phonemes	just	as	his	testing	flips	
the	 sequence	 of	 norm,	 data	 and	 subject. 51 	This	 articulates	 J	 R’s	 central	 structural	
principle:	 the	 top-down	 establishment	 of	 a	 norm	 which	 then	 serves	 to	 delegitimize	
anything	 non-conforming.	 Whiteback’s	 linguistic	 slip	 matches	 cart-before-horse	
promulgations	of	bureaucratic	norm	throughout	the	novel,	from	JR’s	insistence	that	Bast	
legally	change	his	name	to	Edwerd	so	as	to	ratify	a	misprinted	batch	of	business	cards,	
to	Davidoff’s	circulation	of	press	releases	about	events	that	have	to	be	brought	about	by	
the	 people	 reading	 them,	 to	 JR’s	 convincing	 himself	 that	 his	 fabricated	 corporate	
biography	really	does	make	him	a	“man	of	vision”	characterized	by	an	“austere,	indrawn	
indwellingness”	(650).52	The	last	of	these	makes	clear	that	this	model	deals	directly	with	
modes	of	agency	and	personhood;	JR	knows	the	rhetorical	value	of	the	traditional	forms	
of	subjectivity	even	as,	in	practice,	“indwellingness”	is	precisely	what	his,	Davidoff’s,	or	
Cates’	language-actions	seek	to	colonize	and	eliminate.		
Whiteback’s	 “testored	 tailing”	 stipulates	 a	 normative	 psychology	 and	 then	
establishes	 a	 system	 of	 testing	 and	 education	 to	 bring	 it	 into	 being.	 The	 end	 goal,	
though,	is	fiscal,	to	justify	an	expense	already	spent:		
the	 norm	 in	 each	 case	 supporting,	 or	 we	 might	 say	 being	 supported,	
substantiated	that	is	to	say,	by	an	overall	norm,	so	that	in	other	words	in	terms	of	
the	testing	the	norm	comes	out	as	the	norm,	or	we	have	no	norm	to	test	against,																																																									
51	Spencer	 makes	 the	 punchcard	 plot	 his	 main	 example	 of	 Gaddis’	 “critical	 mimesis,”	 though	 without	
analyzing	the	language.		
52	The	archive	reveals	that	JR’s	faith	in	his	bibliography’s	truth	is	one	of	the	fundamental	elements	of	his	
story:	 it’s	 present	 in	 the	 earliest	 full	 description	of	 J	 R’s	 projected	plot,	 surviving	 the	 changes,	 and	 also	
appears	in	fragmentary	notes	that	almost	certainly	precede	that	(“Summary	following	opening	part”	3).	J	R	
Composition	Notes	and	Play.	Box	No.	68,	Folder	278).	
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right?	 	So	that	presented	 in	 these	 terms	the	equipment	can	be	shown	to	 justify	
itself…”	(22/3).	
Self-justification	is	central,	as	the	worldview	seeks	not	only	to	impose	but	to	naturalize	
itself.	 In	 this	 respect,	 J	 R	might	be	 seen	as	prophetic	of	 the	post-postmodern	 stage	of	
economic	living	that	theorists	call	Capitalist	Realism:	the	acknowledgment	that	part	of	
capitalism’s	 ideological	machinery	 is	 to	delimit	 the	 imaginable:	 “Whenever	 ‘realism’	 is	
defined	 as	 that	 which	 is	 measurable	 within	 a	 system	 of	 capitalist	 equivalence,	 then	
everything	 not	 measurable	 according	 to	 this	 standard	 becomes,	 by	 simple	 definition,	
unaffordable	and	unrealistic”	(Shonkwiler	and	La	Berge,	2).	This	is	the	logic	that	makes	
Whiteback’s	 “testored	 tailing”	 part	 of	 the	Catesian	 political	 system	 in	 J	 R,	 and	 as	 I’ve	
shown	elsewhere,	Gaddis’	criticism	of	the	basic	model	was	worked	out	in	his	corporate	
writing	 in	 the	 earliest	 stages	 of	 J	 R’s	 composition.	Not	 only	 that,	 but	 he	 addressed	 it	
there	 through	 the	 same	 vocabulary	 of	 “tailoring.”53	Just	 as	 Gaddis	 blamed	 it	 there	 on	
failures	of	corporate	management	to	understand	the	interaction	of	humans	and	systems,	
so—even	though	critical	treatments	of	the	novel’s	econo-political	vision	tend	to	displace	
human	agency	as	a	category—Whiteback’s	linguistic	confusions	foreground	the	human	
dimensions	and	limitations	of	J	R’s	political	world.	
Testored	 tailing	 is	not	 just	a	quirk	of	Whiteback’s	personality	and	 language:	 its	
top-down	intentionality	becomes	clear	as	the	novel	gradually	reveals	more	information	
about	his	place,	as	school	principal,	 in	a	chain	of	command	down	which	language	and	
ideology	 flow.	 Below	 him,	 administering	 the	 punchcards	 that	 will	 set	 the	 norms,	 is	
school	psychologist	DeCephalis,	and	below	him,	reading	classroom	scripts,	are	teachers	
like	Bast	and	Gibbs.	Immediately	above	Whiteback	is	Hyde,	a	military	man	employed	by																																																									
53	His	 abandoned	 book	 on	 television	 education	 for	 the	 Ford	 Foundation,	 for	 example,	 discusses	 the	
possible	 misuse	 of	 classroom	 technology	 as	 “another	 surrender	 of	 content	 to	 technique,	 with	 test	
questions	tailored	to	electronic	capabilities	and,	eventually,	the	course	material	tailored	to	the	questions”	
(Archive:	Television	 for	Today’s	Education,	IV-46.	Corporate	Writings.		Box	No.	133,	Folder	475)	And	this	
matches	 undated	 notes	 from	 the	 early	 drafts	 of	Agapē	 Agape:	 	 “just	 as	 the	 product	 is	modified	 by	 the	
machine’s	capabilities,	we	ourselves	are	conditioned	 for	 the	criteria	 they	 shall	 set”	 (Archive:	Loose	note	
toward	Agape,	6)	And	in	an	analysis	of	Kodak’s	internal	logistics,	he	lamented	that	failures	“to	follow	the	
prescribed	routines	which	the	system	is	designed	to	handle,”	require	the	humans	involved	to	realise	that	
“such	a	system	demands	orders	tailored	to	the	system	itself”	(Archive:	“Some	Observations	on	Problems	
Facing	 Eastman	Kodak’s	 Advertising	Distribution	Department.”	Dec	 1967.	 Corporate	Writings.	 Box	No.	
135,	Folder	481).	
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a	 subsidiary	 of	 Typhon	 International,	 the	 over-arching	 corporation	 run	 by	 Governor	
Cates.	 Cates’	 language	 embodies	 the	 instrumental,	 non-deliberative	 “management”	
ideology	 in	 the	novel	 even	more	 directly	 than	Davidoff’s	 or	 JR’s,	 as	 in	 this	 passage	 in	
which	he	trouble-shoots	issues	raised	by	lawyer	Beaton:	
First	 thing	 I	 want	 cleaned	 up’s	 these	 damned	mining	 claims	 Beaton	 get	 Frank	
Black’s	 office	 find	 out	 if	 they’re	 worth	 the	 damn	 paper	 they’re	 written	 on	 this	
outfit’s	 in	 there	 on	 mineral	 exploration	 just	 to	 cut	 timber	 get	 hold	 of	 Monty,	
Interior	 serve	 them	with	 an	 injunction	maybe	 they’ll	 be	 ready	 to	 do	 business,	
when	Broos	calls	get	him	onto	that	old	sheep	state…	(433).	
As	the	conversations	I	discussed	above—in	which	Davidoff	or	JR	overflow	Bast	until	his	
objections	 degenerate	 into	 their	 vocabulary—demonstrate,	 this	 flow	 of	 instrumental	
talk	 is	 the	 norm	 to	 which	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world	 must	 be	 tailored,	 a	 norm	 to	 be	
transmitted	 to	 schoolchildren	 through	 Bast’s	 script,	 delivered	 to	 him	 by	 DeCephalis,	
supervised	by	Whiteback,	employed	by	Hyde,	controlled	through	a	variety	of	corporate	
functionaries	who	answer	to	Cates,	whose	corporation	includes	the	manufacturers	of	the	
school’s	TV	equipment.		
Whiteback’s	 seemingly	 incidental	 spoonerism	 epitomises	 Gaddis’	 stylistic	
articulation	 of	 how	 administrative	 capitalism’s	 worldview	 actively	 limits	 permissible	
inputs	 and	 hence	 constructs	 the	 world	 it	 claims	 only	 to	 reflect	 or	 enable.54	And	 the	
connection	 to	 broader	 industrial	 business	 practice	 and	 yet	 broader	 political	 goals	 is	
made	 even	 before	 the	 plot	 leaves	 school	 turf.	 	 The	 scene’s	 conversation	 shifts	
immediately	to	political	matters.		Congressman	Pecci’s	impending	arrival	leads	Hyde	to	
ruminate	on	the	necessity	of	some	top-down	work	on	the	electorate	for	the	funding	of	
infrastructural	 expansion—“Getting	 this	 budget	 across	 is	 going	 to	 take	 everything	we	
can	 give	 it”	 (24)—and	 the	 scene’s	 norm-distorting	 logic	 allows	 him	 to	 frame	 his	 top-
down	 intervention	 in	 the	 language	 of	 liberty,	 repudiating	 an	 objecting	 superior	 who	
would	 “dictate	 to	 the	 parents	 of	 these	 future	 citizens	 that	 they	 can’t	 exercise	 their	
democratic	right	to	vote”	(23/4).		
																																																								
54	Focusing	more	 on	 narrative	 events	 than	 style,	 Christopher	Knight	 usefully	 suggests	 that	 J	 R	 is	 about	
“American	capitalism’s	rather	successful	bid	to	identify	reality	with	itself”	(84).	
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But	if	Cates’	language	dictates	the	terms	of	a	world	made	in	his	own	image,	then	
Whiteback’s	malapropisms,	his	identifying	hestitations	of	“ahm,”	his	incoherent	jargon,	
all	 clarify	 that	 the	 process	 of	 transmitting	management’s	 ideological	 “language”	 down	
the	chain	is	subject	to	human	inefficiencies.	If	Cates,	as	the	absent	aegis	of	this	scene,	is	
the	disconnected	head	suggested	by	DeCephalis’	name,	then	the	passage	shows	how,	at	
an	 institutional	 distance	 from	 their	 motivating	 source,	 the	 local	 pushers	 of	 the	 anti-
deliberative	 ideology	 have	 to	 fall	 back	 on	 their	 own	 agency.	 It’s	 for	 this	 reason	 that	
DeCephalis—desperately	but	voluntarily	straining	to	sound	like	Cates—comes	in	fact	to	
resemble	 Bast	 in	 terms	 of	 hesitation,	 punctuation,	 language-revision.	 As	 Stephen	
Matanle	 suggests,	 “Whiteback’s	 language	 is	 speaking	him,	dragging	him	along	behind	
it,”	and	Whiteback	is	dragged	precisely	because	the	language	isn’t	“his”:	 it’s	pushed	on	
him	 by	 Cates	 through	 Hyde	 (115).	 Everyone	 below	 Cates	 conditions	 their	 language	
towards	 his	 with	 the	 entropic	 imperfections	 of	 human	mediation:	 as	 Joel	 Dana	 Black	
suggests,	 their	half-conscious	 institutional	willingness	 to	 reduce	 their	 inputs	 to	match	
Cates’	mode	of	thinking	makes	them	“willing	captives	of	a	discourse	they	take	to	be	their	
own”	(165).	Just	as	LeClair	notes	that	Cates’	flow	of	language	and	mastery	of	“advanced	
methods	 of	 collecting,	 sorting,	 and	 disseminating	 information”	 are	maintained	 at	 the	
entropic	expense	of	his	body—his	“failing	health	implies	the	energy	cost	of	information	
sorting”	 (98)—so	the	chain	of	human	minds	down	which	he	promulgates	his	mode	of	
thinking	generates	language	scarred	by	a	similar	“cost.”	
As	 Cates’	 passing	 acknowledgement	 that	 he	 needs	 Beaton	 to	 “find	 out”	 some	
information	before	he	can	properly	process	it	shows,	the	system	relies	on	feedback.	But	
throughout	 J	 R	 the	 top-down	 promulgation	 has	 become	 so	 hyperstasized	 that	 any	
upward	feedback	channels	through	which	these	downstream	errors	could	be	corrected	
are	eliminated	or,	more	often,	perverted	toward	testored	tailing.	DeCephalis’	own	most	
reasonable	ideas	get	inverted	to	the	prevailing	norm	as	they	go	back	up	the	hierarchy,	as	
by	Hyde:		
we	key	the	human	being	to,	how	did	you	put	it	once	Dan?		Key	the…		
—The	individual	yes,	key	the	technology	to	the	indiv…		
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—Dan	knows	what	 I’m	talking	about,	key	 the	 individual	 to	 the	 technology	 find	
the	soft	spots	in	this	budget	and	we’re	in	business	(224).	
Hyde’s	 distortion	 conveys	 the	 human	 work	 involved	 at	 each	 step	 of	 perpetuating	 a	
system	that	refuses	to	process	what	LeClair	calls	“negative	feedback”	(98).	Indeed,	some	
of	the	most	notable	examples	of	conversations	in	which	Bast	or	Beaton	are	talked	over	
and	subsumed	come	when	they’re	trying	to	convey	vital	information,	as	with	Davidoff’s	
refusal	 to	 process	 Bast’s	 protestations	 that	 the	 head	 of	 JR	 Corp	 is	 a	 child:	 Davidoff	
instead	confirms	that	he’d	heard	rumours	that	the	boss	“never	got	out	of	6th	grade”	and	
takes	 this	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 insignificance	 of	 formal	 education	 for	 a	 self-made	man.	
Angela	Allan	reads	J	R	as	an	indictment	of	the	way	“the	market	actively	seeks	to	erase	
anything	that	might	exist	outside	of	it,”	but	the	work	individuals	like	Hyde	and	Davidoff	
do	 in	 misconstruing	 countervailing	 feedback	 shows	 that	 this	 erasure	 is	 far	 from	 an	
impersonal	process	(227).		
Ralph	Clare,	in	an	investigation	of	literary	representations	of	the	corporation	that	
devotes	a	chapter	to	 J	R,	 takes	a	broadly	Jamesonian	approach,	 from	which	he	departs	
most	notably	in	his	insistence	on	the	way	that	the	rhetoric	of	corporate	personhood	and	
supra-human	 agency	 can	 serve	 to	 mask	 the	 interests	 of	 specific	 individuals.55	The	
structure	 of	 promulgation	 I’m	 calling	 “testored	 tailing”	 is,	 on	 the	 reading	 above,	 an	
example	both	of	the	systemic	scale	of	J	R’s	diagnoses,	and	of	the	finally	human	scale	on	
which	 it	 suggests	 that	 it	 can	 be	 faulted,	 blamed,	 and	 resisted.	 If	 the	 novel’s	 default	
direction	 of	 influence	 shows	 the	 top-down	 Catesian	 model	 of	 language	 overflowing	
interlocutors	 like	 Bast	 or	 Gibbs	 and	 bending	 their	 syntax	 to	 its	 terms,	 then	 the	
breakdowns	 in	 the	 system	 that	 lead	 Whiteback’s	 imitation	 of	 Cates	 to	 dissolve	 into	
perplexity,	 and	 that	 stop	 people	 being	 able	 to	 relay	 information	 back	 to	 Cates,	 are	
expressed	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 fractured	 transmission	 of	 language	 from	 character	 to	
character.	 Whiteback’s	 various	 mis-meanings	 establish	 the	 possibility	 of	 such	
breakdowns,	and	Gaddis	thus	models	both	the	intended	logic	of	testored	tailing	and	its	
																																																								
55	His	reading	of	J	R	actually	stresses	something	different:	the	novel’s	investigation	of	the	way	the	rhetoric	
of	corporation	as	family	can	serve	to	mask	the	large-scale	interests	involved.	
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human	 limitations	 right	at	 the	novel’s	outset.	And	he	does	so	through	 language,	 form,	
anti-mimetically	foregrounded	style.	
**		
As	 in	Barth	deliberative	rationality	was	recuperated	as	an	unavoidable	response	
to	the	kind	of	unpredictable	situations	and	instinctive	commitments	that	philosophical	
rationalization	couldn’t	eliminate,	so	in	J	R	the	value	of	deliberation	is	set	up	explicitly	
against	 testored	 tailing.	 The	 school	 administrators	 attempt	 to	 refigure	 the	 term	
deliberate	 itself,	 in	 precisely	 these	 anti-contingent	 terms:	 soon	 after	 Gibb’s	 broadcast	
lesson	 has	 put	 deliberateness	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 novel’s	 implicit	 system	 of	 alternative	
values,	Whiteback	up	in	the	control	room	notes	that	among	the	school	expenses	to	be	
budgeted	 for	are	 “predictable,	deliberate,	you	might	even	say	pre-scheduled	breakage”	
(26).	 	Deliberation’s	 relation	 to	 the	unpredictable	 and	unrationalizable	 thus	has	 to	be	
defended	over	the	course	of	the	rest	of	the	novel.		
This	 too	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 Gaddis’	 corporate	 work:	 constantly	 there	 Gaddis	
identifies	 “the	unpredictable	human”	as	 the	source	of	all	management’s	problems,	but	
cautions	against	a	response	that	would	equate	managerial	efficiency	with	the	removal	of	
humans	and	the	promotion	of	systems:	instead,	only	“human	judgment”	could	keep	the	
systems	 targeted	 to	 some	 specific	 end	 rather	 than	 expanding	 in	 and	 of	 themselves.	
Throughout	Gaddis’	 corporate	writing,	human	unpredictability	 is	 valuable	 for	offering	
occasions	for	judgment,	since	“Without	the	stimulus	of	that	sovereign	individual…	there	
wouldn’t	be	any	reason	for	change.	 	And	planning	is	change”	(Archive).56	In	defending	
change-responsiveness,	 “judgment,”	 and	 “decision,”	 Gaddis’	 corporate	 work	 attaches	
value	 to	 the	 other	 “unreasonable”	 psychological	 categories	 that	 Gaddis’	 default	
corporate	 discourse	 sought	 to	 eliminate.	 The	 testored	 tailing	 logic	 of	 J	 R’s	 dominant	
world	 thus	 represents,	 as	 I’ve	 argued	 elsewhere,	 a	 version	 of	 Gaddis’	 corporate	world	
that	 has	 maximally	 failed	 to	 heed	 his	 advice	 about	 the	 necessity	 of	 respecting	 the	
differences	 between	 sorting	 and	 thinking,	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness.	When	 some	 of																																																									
56	V.B.	Phillips.	 “Effective	Generating	and	Screening	of	New-Product	Concepts,”	 16.	Speech,	Oct	 31	 1969.	
Corporate	Writings.	Box	No.	134,	Folder	481.		
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Decephalis’	 students	 fail	 to	 fit	 into	 his	 schema,	 he	 blames	 the	 fact	 that	 “in	 this	
computerised	 scoring	 the	 holes	 that	 have	 been	 punched	 in	 some	 of	 the	 cards	 don’t,	
aren’t	 consistent	with	 forecasts	 in	 the	 personality	 testing”	 (23).	 	 For	 the	mindset	 that	
defines	 JR’s	world,	mechanical	 failures	 are	 a	more	 plausible	 source	 of	model-defiance	
than	human	 inconsistency.	 	As	 I’ll	 argue	 in	 this	 chapter’s	 final	 third,	 the	novel	 finally	
shows	how	unpredictable	human	deliberation	can	push	back	and	create	some	genuine	
friction	against	the	world	that	sought	to	eliminate	it,	and	it	makes	this	case	by	reversing	
the	direction	of	 stylistic	 transmission.	Deliberative	 stylistics	become	contagious	 rather	
than	just	objects	of	attack.		
Before	 I	 show	 that,	 though,	 I’ll	 take	 a	 short	 digression	 to	 show	 how	 directly	
Gaddis’	 diagnosis	 of	 the	 testored	 tailing	 dynamic	 and	 mindset	 engaged	 with	 specific	
economic	arguments	of	his	time.	Where	the	Jamesonian	account	of	literature’s	relation	
to	 politics	 and	 economics	 makes	 it	 a	 mere	 symptom	 of	 zeitgeist-type	 forces,	 leaving	
authors	 little	 rhetorical	 control	and	even	 less	critical	 agency,	Gaddis’	 ideas	came	 from	
decades	 of	 first-hand	 corporate-work	 experience	 that	 almost	 all	 pre-dated	 the	 1973	
events	 that	 Jameson	 wants	 to	make	 postmodern	 antimimesis	 a	 flat	 symptom	 of.	 The	
novel	deals	with	a	very	specific	structure	of	managerial	thought	with	which	Gaddis	was	
intimately	 familiar,	and	the	novel’s	use	of	stylistic	 innovations	 to	raise	 it	as	a	problem	
show	 that	 its	 remit	 was	 much	 more	 specific	 than	 mere	 mimesis	 of	 a	 more	 general	
economic	 zeitgeist.	 Gaddis’	 diagnosis	 engages	 with	 a	 more	 specific	 econo-political	
formation	 than	 generalities	 about	 “postmodernism”	 or	 “neoliberalism”	 can	
accommodate.	
	
Gaddis	Among	the	Economists	
Recent	work	on	Gaddis	and	economics	has	moved	beyond	the	Jamesonian	terms	
of	“late	capitalism”	and	“postmodernity”	to	focus	on	the	concept	of	“neoliberalism.”	The	
basic	components	of	what	I’ve	called	“testored	tailing”	in	J	R—the	skewing	of	inputs	to	
what	 the	processor	 can	 comprehend,	 the	 top-down	political	motives—match	many	of	
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the	 tenets	 of	 neoliberalism	as	 described	by	 critics	 like	Clare,	Allan,	 and	Nicky	Marsh,	
even	 as	 others—testored	 tailing’s	 connection	 to	 language,	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 its	
perpetuation	relies	on	agency	not	just	at	the	top	but	at	every	level	of	its	transmission—
play	little	role	in	discussion	of	the	term.	Allan	and	Marsh	in	particular	stress	the	novel’s	
interest	 in	 imperfection	 and	 failure	 as	 a	 resistance	 to	 the	 neoliberal	 presumption	 of	
market	infallibility.	While	there’s	plenty	of	debate	within	economics	and	political	theory	
about	 whether	 “neoliberalism”	 as	 a	 concept	 describes	 anything	 especially	 distinctive,	
Allan	and	Marsh	are	also	united	 in	addressing	a	more	concrete	source:	 the	writings	of	
Milton	Friedman.	Friedman	embodies	neoliberalism	for	Marsh	in	terms	that	match	my	
account	 of	 testored	 tailing:	 she	 reads	 J	 R	 as	 “a	 refutation	 of	 the	 ‘eager	 and	 terrible	
simplification’	of	Friedman’s	positive	economics,	a	model	that	assumed	it	could	simply	
filter-out	contingency	as	extraneous	to	its	predicative	capacities”	(191).		In	what	follows	
I’ll	examine	J	R’s	relation	not	only	to	Friedman	but	to	the	change	he	brought	about	in	
the	underlying	assumptions	of	his	home	institution,	the	Chicago	school	of	economics.	If	
Marsh	joins	posthumanist	Gaddis-critics	in	seeing	his	treatment	of	economic	agency	as,	
however	 critical,	 essentially	prophetic,	 I’ll	 show	 that	 the	 resistant	 value	he	 attaches	 to	
deliberative	agency	actually	aligns	him	with	Friedman’s	predecessor	Frank	Knight.	J	R’s	
economic	 thinking	 engages	 not	 only	 with	 Gaddis’	 1960s	 corporate	 work,	 but	 with	
Knight’s	 pre-emptive	 warnings	 about	 a	 Friedmanite	 anti-humanism,	 which	 begin	 as	
early	 as	 the	 1930s.	 And	 these	 warnings	 are	 conducted	 in	 precisely	 the	 terms	 I’ve	
identified	as	central	to	the	corporate	work’s	contribution	to	J	R:	the	question	of	how	far	
“human	 judgment”	 and	 the	 “unpredictable	 human	 element”	 are	 analogous	 with	
“friction.”	
So	what	is	Marsh	talking	about	when	she	makes	Friedman’s	“positive	economics”	
an	avatar	for	the	aversion	to	contingency?	Where	Knight	was	Chicago’s	dominant	figure	
from	the	1920s	until	the	1940s,	Friedman	took	over	that	mantle	with	the	publication	in	
1953	 of	 his	 short	 manifesto	 “The	 Methodology	 of	 Positive	 Economics.”	 Leadership	
established,	he	played	a	major	 role	 in	 the	 school’s	 institutionalization	and	subsequent	
rise	 to	dominance	 in	US	politics:	hence	 the	association	with	“neoliberalism”	 insofar	as	
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that	 term	 refers	 to	 the	 post-70s	 political	 landscape.	 The	 crucial	 idea	 in	 “Positive	
Economics”	is	that	the	truth	of	an	economic	model’s	axioms	is	irrelevant	as	long	as	its	
predictions	can	be	found	accurate.57	“Positive”	is	opposed	to	“normative,”	with	the	then-
widespread	presumption	that	a	predictive	“science”	has	no	normative	dimensions.	The	
first	crux	of	the	disagreement	with	Knight	(and	the	relevance	to	Gaddis)	comes	in	this	
presumption’s	 role	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 predictive	models.	 Just	 as	 scientific	models	
often	 leave	 out	 relevant	 factors	 in	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 overall	 causal	 role	 of	
another	 factor	more	clearly,	 so	 in	economics	 “A	hypothesis	 is	 important	 if	 it	 ‘explains’	
much	by	little,	that	is,	if	it	abstracts	the	common	and	crucial	elements	from	the	mass	of	
complex	 and	detailed	 circumstances	 […]	 and	permits	 valid	predictions	on	 the	basis	of	
them	alone”	(14).	This,	of	course,	begs	the	question	of	normativity	by	ignoring	how	we	
choose	 what	 is	 to	 be	 left	 in	 or	 out.	 Friedman’s	 examples	 of	 the	 best	 procedures	 for	
economic	science	all	come	by	analogy	to	physics.58	A	physicist,	he	says	toward	the	end	
of	 the	 book-length	 development	 of	 these	 ideas,	 should	 deplore	 the	 “introduction	 of	
factors	 not	 included	 in	 the	 fundamental	 theoretical	 system,	 exemplified	 by	 the	
introduction	 of	 ‘friction’”	 (289).	 	 And	 his	 example	 of	 equivalent	 economic	 error	 is	 to	
“introduce”	 idiosyncratic	 behaviour,	 imperfect	 competition	 or	 imperfect	 individual	
preference-pursuit:	 to	 acknowledge,	 in	 other	 words,	 what	 Gaddis	 called	 “the	
unpredictable	human	element.”		
Even	 the	 putatively	 Friedman-sceptical	 movement	 of	 behavioural	 economics59	
maintains	 the	major	 implication	 of	 Friedman’s	 approach,	 which	 is	 the	 shifting	 of	 the	
economically-relevant	kind	of	“rationality”	from	the	actors	being	modelled	to	the	model	
itself.	Nicola	Giocoli	 sums	up	his	history	of	 twentieth	 century	 thinking	about	 rational	
																																																								
57	“Hypotheses	 have	 not	 only	 ‘implications’	 but	 also	 ‘assumptions’	 and	 that	 the	 conformity	 of	 these	
‘assumptions’	to	‘reality’	is	a	test	of	the	validity	of	the	hypothesis	different	from	or	additional	to	the	test	by	
implications”	(14).	
58 	As	 Philip	 Mirowski,	 a	 predominant	 chronicler	 of	 the	 normative	 and	 institutional	 forces	 behind	
economics’	 rhetorical	 drive	 towards	 claims	 of	 objectivity	 has	 noted,	 “the	 adoption	 of	 the	 ‘energetics’	
metaphor	and	framework	of	mid-nineteenth	century	physics	is	the	birthmark	of	neoclassical	economics”	
(Against	Mechanism,	15).			
59	Economics	that	acknowledges	the	consistent	imperfection	of	human	behaviour,	and	tries	to	make	this	
into	another	axiom	that	economic	models	can	work	with	to	improve	the	accuracy	of	their	predictions.	
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agency—which	 ends	 shortly	 after	 the	 publication	 of	 Friedman’s	 paper—thus:	 “We	
started	from	the	classical	notion	of	a	rational	agent	inherited	from	the	early	marginalist	
writers,	who	viewed	the	agent	as	a	relentless	maximiser	who	aimed	at	pursuing	his/her	
own	 goals	 and	 desires,	 and	 ended	 with	 the	 shrinking	 of	 rationality	 to	 a	 formal	
requirement	 of	 consistency”	 (3).	 While	 for	 Giocoli	 the	 “requirement	 of	 consistency”	
refers	to	the	actions	of	a	given	individual	within	a	model’s	assumed	set	of	preferences,	
Friedman’s	exercise	in	what	Giocoli	calls	“distilling	the	formal	essence	of	the	notion	of	
rationality	 in	 order	 to	 make	 it	 as	 general	 and	 rigorous	 as	 possible”	 (3)	 represents	 a	
further	 break	 (just	 as	 the	 equation	of	 rational	 economic	behavior	with	 the	 rule-based	
rationality	 of	 physical	 phenomena	 had	 itself	 required	 institutional	 cultivation60).	 For	
Friedman,	 a	 model’s	 task	 is	 “to	 specify	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 the	 formula	
works”	(18).	As	long	as	the	formula	is	consistent,	there	will	be	some	set	of	circumstances	
that	it	corresponds	to:	for	which	it	“works.”		As	long	as	that	set	isn’t	empty,	the	model	is,	
in	Friedman’s	sense,	“positive.”	While	Friedman	talks	about	models’	needing	to	measure	
themselves	 by	 predictive	 accuracy,	 he	 thus	 shifts	 the	 direction	 of	 fit	 involved	 in	
“consistency,”	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 emergent	 evidence.	 A	 contradictory	 piece	 of	
empirical	 evidence	 no	 longer	 has	 to	 prompt	 a	 nuance	 in	 the	 model,	 which	 remains	
consistent,	positive,	and	so	on,	in	any	situation	in	which	the	confounding	evidence	can	
no	longer	be	found.		
Before	 Friedman	 wrote,	 Knight	 had	 already	 objected	 both	 to	 the	 logic	 of	 this	
approach,	and	to	the	misuse	of	one	of	its	practical	implications	that	animates	Gaddis	on	
Testored	 Tailing.	 Knight,	 like	 Friedman,	 is	 best	 known	 for	 offering	 theoretical																																																									
60	As	SM	Amadae	discusses	 in	her	own	history	of	 the	concept’s	development,	 “Enough…	mid-twentieth-
century	 economists	 associated	deliberate	maximization	with	 rational	 behaviour	 that,	 over	 time,	human	
rationality	 came	 to	 be	 explicitly	 defined	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 maximization	 (or	 minimization)	
characteristic	 of	 rational	mechanics.	 	 Thus,	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	
term	 ‘rational’	came	to	apply	 less	 to	 the	science	of	economics	as	a	discipline	and	more	to	 the	nature	of	
deliberation	 on	 the	 part	 of	 economic	 actors”	 (227).	 The	 crucial	 element	 of	 Amadae’s	 account	 for	
understanding	 J	 R	on	deliberation	 is	 that	she	show	 just	how	anxious	 the	 theorists	were	 to	operate	on	a	
pseudo-physical	model,	so	that	‘the	nature	of	deliberation’	had	to	be	one	thing,	part	of	the	formula,	rather	
than	 something	 that	 could	prompt	 a	 formula’s	 revision.	 So	 their	whole	way	 of	 thinking	 about	 ‘rational	
deliberation’	question-beggingly	installed	the	Friedman-type	model-first	version	of	‘rational.’	
	
	 123	
underpinnings	for	the	defence	of	economic	“freedom.”	Yet	perhaps	the	dominant	thread	
of	his	own	theorizing	on	economic	methodology	is	the	precise	opposite	of	Friedman’s:	
the	unavoidable	relevance	of	human	mutability	and	unpredictability,	and	the	disanalogy	
this	 necessarily	 establishes	 between	 economics	 and	 physics.	 While	 “As	 generalized	
description”	 economic	 axioms	 can	 be	 “like	 the	 conceptions	 of	 frictionless	 mechanics	
and…	similarly	justified,”	Knight	notes	that	when	we	move	from	generalised	description	
to	 specific	 model	 and	 hypothesis,	 a	 problem	 arises.	 	 Friction	 is	 a	 constant	 based	 on	
universal	laws,	but	humans	are	not	so	unchanging:	
friction	 in	 mechanics	 involves	 a	 transformation	 of	 energy	 from	 one	 form	 to	
another,	 according	 to	 a	 law	 just	 as	 rigid	 and	 a	 conservation	 principle	 just	 as	
definite	 as	 the	 law	 and	 conservation	principle	which	hold	 good	 for	mechanical	
changes	where	no	energy	disappears.	 	There	is	nothing	corresponding	to	any	of	
this	 in	the	economic	process.	 	What	 is	abstracted	in	equilibrium	price	theory	 is	
the	fact	of	error	in	economic	behavior	(“E+HA”	103).			
Since	error	is	not	a	law	but	a	category	defined	in	relation	to	that	of	truth	or	regularity,	
containing	no	necessary	regularity	of	its	own,	it	is	impossible	to	merely	discount	error	in	
order	 to	 arrive	 at	 a	 generalisable	 truth.	 Knight’s	 case	 for	 the	 relevance	 of	 correct	
assumptions	 is	 founded	 on	 a	 conviction	 that	 humans,	 and	 their	 values,	 and	 their	
cultures,	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 change:	 capitalist	 competition,	 he	notes,	 is	 treated	 as	 a	
state	of	nature	in	economics	textbooks,	“But	all	the	human	interests	and	traits	involved	
in	this	type	of	economic	life	are	subject	to	historical	change.	Moreover,	no	society	is	or	
could	be	entirely	and	purely	competitive”	(168).			The	final	sentence	here	is	irrelevant	to	
historical	change,	but	establishes	the	proximity	of	Knight’s	objections	to	presumptions	
about	 human	 mutability	 and	 to	 the	 lazy	 use	 of	 the	 energetics	 analogy.	 Where	 for	
Friedman	 psychological	 categories	 are	 analogous	with	 ignorable	 “friction,”	 for	Knight,	
they’re	the	animating	category,	“For	the	human	analogue	of	force	is	motive…”	(150/1).		
Gaddis	aligns	with	Knight’s	preemptive	critiques	of	Friedman	 through	a	 shared	
interest	 in	 defending	 human	 unpredictability,	 associating	 it	 with	 deliberative	 agency,	
and—as	 I’ll	 show	 in	 more	 detail	 below—lamenting	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 political	
promulgation	of	a	model	in	which	it	could	be	written	off	as	“unreasonable”	could	lead	to	
targeted	attacks	on	civic	 freedom.	In	other	words,	he’s	 recuperating	a	discourse	under	
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attack,	 rather	 than	merely	 prophesying	 the	 attack	 itself.	 The	 defence	 is	 not	 just	 of	 a	
place	 for	 deliberative	 categories	 in	 Chicago’s	 economics	 department,	 though,	 but	 of	
their	place	in	the	world.	
**	
Crucially,	 to	 recall	 Spencer	 on	 J	 R’s	 geography	 of	 economic	 colonization,	
deliberative	psychology	has	no	place	 in	 the	models	of	 “Positive	Economics.”	 Since	 the	
interest	 is	 only	 in	 decisions’	 predictable	 outcomes,	 the	 mental	 processes	 that	 get	 us	
there	 are	 irrelevant.	 One	 of	 the	 normative	 dimensions	 of	 the	 approach	 is	 thus	 a	
redefinition	of	 the	 relevant	kinds	of	agency	 toward	 instantaneous	sorting	and	parsing,	
away	from	the	kind	of	choices	that	come	with	a	duration.61	Gaddis’	corporate	work	had	
emphasized	 the	 need	 for	management	 to	 build	 systems	 that	 respected	 the	 “time	 and	
other	 pressures	 involved	 in	decision	making”	 (Archive),62	and	 the	 stylistic	 distinctions	
I’ve	drawn	above	between	the	different	kinds	of	persons	in	J	R	show	how	the	presence	or	
otherwise	 of	 a	 gap	 between	 stimulus,	 decision,	 and	 action	 organizes	 the	 novel’s	
characters	 and	 their	 interactions.	 The	 relocation	 of	 “rationality”	 in	 Friedman’s	model	
essentially	 separates	 deliberation,	 rationality,	 and	 agency	 from	 each	 other,	 taking	 the	
establishment	and	negotiation	of	values	out	of	the	realm	of	what	the	economy	can	call	
“action.”	If	Horkheimer’s	beef	from	the	left	was	that	a	capitalist	system	removed	rational	
action	from	the	realm	of	ends	to	that	of	means	alone,	Knight’s	very	different	classical-
liberal	approach	identifies	similar	limitations	to	the	Friedmanite	path:				
Traditional	economic	thought…	accepts	deliberation	regarding	means	as	real,	but	
treats	ends	as	given	in	the	situation	and	argues	that	deliberation	regarding	ends	
(which	common	sense	accepts	without	question)	is	‘really’	deliberation	regarding	
means.	An	objectively	scientific	view,	of	course,	takes	the	further	step	and	argues	
that	all	deliberation	 is	 ‘really	unreal’	at	 least	as	 to	making	any	difference	 in	 the	
process	or	result…	(152/153).		
																																																								
61	This	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 Clune’s	 whole	 reading	 of	 the	 novel,	 which	 takes	 JR	 himself	 to	 be	 a	 thought-
experiment	 about	 the	 possibility	 of	 transacting	 all	 interpersonal	 relationships	 through	 the	 medium	 of	
price-exchange.	
62	“Some	 Observations	 on	 Problems	 Facing	 Eastman	 Kodak’s	 Advertising	 Distribution	 Department,”	 7.	
Dec	1967.	Corporate	Writings.	Box	No.	135,	Folder	481.			
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This	makes	clear	the	fate	of	deliberative	agency	in	a	world	like	J	R’s:	its	lack	of	a	place	in	
predictive	models	makes	 it	 “unreal,”	 immaterial,	 and	hence	genuinely	placeless	 in	 the	
world	the	models	constrain	through	the	logic	of	testored	tailing.		
Testored	Tailing’s	basic	goal	is	the	elimination	of	contradiction.	The	rationality	of	
Friedman’s	models,	when	combined	with	interested	political	power,	became	an	excuse	
to	 rationalize	 contingent	deliberatitive	 rationality	out	of	 existence.	As	EF	Schumacher	
noted	 in	 1973	 after	 Friedman’s	 ideas	 had	 achieved	 institutional	 dominance,	 “in	 the	
current	vocabulary	of	condemnation	there	are	few	words	as	final	and	conclusive	as	the	
word	‘uneconomic.’	If	an	activity	has	been	branded	as	uneconomic,	its	right	to	existence	
is	 not	merely	 questioned	 by	 energetically	 denied”	 (41).	With	 Friedman’s	 work	 having	
redefined	what	“economic”	behaviour	could	be—not	behaviour	in	a	certain	category	of	
action,	 but	 behaviour	 that	 conformed	 to	 a	 certain	 formulaic	 model—the	 “rational”	
models	of	positive	economics	became	norms	that	could	be	culturally	enforced	in	order	
to	widen	the	degree	of	conformity	between	empirical	prediction	and	model	hypothesis.	J	
R	 not	 only	 opposes	 the	 excision	 of	 deliberative	 space	 in	 a	 world	 that	 lets	 itself	 be	
tailored	 to	 a	 Friedmanite	 model,	 but	 gives	 us	 a	 concrete	 diagnosis	 of	 the	 political	
structures	 by	 which	 such	 models	 can	 pursue	 their	 eliminative	 work.	 This	 structural	
analysis	too	was—although	no-one	seems	to	have	articulated	just	how	its	logic	animates	
Friedman’s	work	 in	particular—part	of	 the	 economic	debate	 from	Knight’s	 early	work	
through	the	whole	period	of	J	R’s	composition.	
So	 how	 would	 that	 work?	 The	 logic	 was	 already	 latent	 within	 Friedman’s	
argument.	Recall	that	the	success	of	his	models	was	measured	only	by	their	conformity	
with	 actual	 outcomes.	 Institutional	 power	 gives	 you	 an	 option	 Friedman’s	 anti-
normative	 rhetoric	 couldn’t	 readily	 acknowledge.	 If	 you’re	 wedded	 enough	 to	 your	
formula,	 and	 you	have	 the	necessary	 power,	 you	might	 be	better	 off	 rationalizing	 the	
world	to	your	model	rather	than	spending	time	trying	to	refine	your	model	until	it	can	
do	better	justice	to	the	existing	world.		
Knight	identified	both	this	dynamic	and	his	own	discipline’s	investment	in	it:	he	
points	to	schools	of	thought	that	“treat	the	truth	or	falsity	of	propositions	in	economics	
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as	 a	 matter	 of	 indifference	 or	 even	 as	 illusory,	 judging	 the	 doctrine	 only	 by	 their	
conduciveness	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 desired	 type	 of	 social	 order”	 (“E+HA”	 107).			
His	 examples	 are	 communism	 and	 fascism,	 whereas	 Gaddis	 is	 preoccupied	 with	 the	
“order”	of	relationships	between	kinds	of	persons,	but	the	dynamic	is	the	same.	Knight	
describes	this	constantly	in	terms	of	economics’	academic	ratification	of	the	influence	of	
corporate	 business	 on	 other	 fields,	 be	 this	 education—as	 with	 economics	 textbooks	
“produced,	 like	 any	 other	 commodity,	 to	 satisfy	 a	 demand,	 meaning,	 of	 course,	 as	
always,	to	‘create’	a	demand	for	itself”	(179)—or	electoral	politics—“Both	finally	‘give	the	
people	what	they	want,’	after	doing	their	utmost	to	make	them	want	what	they	want	to	
give”	(204).	The	goal	in	each	case	is	the	elimination	of	the	unpredictable,	and	with	it	the	
psychological.	 	Philip	Mirowski	explains	how	 the	dubious	 literalism	Freidman	granted	
the	analogy	with	physics	reified	this	eliminative	project:	“when	the	physical	metaphor	is	
imported	 into	 the	 social	 sphere,	 neoclassicists	were	 not	 at	 all	 precise	 about	what	 the	
conserved	entity	was,	and	 they	have	not	yet	been	able	 to	 settle	 this	 issue.	 	 If	utility	 is	
conserved,	then	surprize	and	regret	as	psychological	phenomena	have	analytically	been	
ruled	out	of	court”	(26).		To	write	off	“surprize,”	or	“regret”—or	uncertain	deliberation	as	
their	 fundamental	“psychological	phenomen[on]”—is	a	step	on	the	way	to	choosing	to	
eliminate	them.	Friedman’s	essay	marked	the	point	at	which	the	discipline	of	economics	
removed	 the	options	of	uncertainty,	 imperfection,	 or	 inconsistency	 from	 the	 agents	 it	
then	influenced	politics	to	act	as	if	humans	could	be	reduced	to.		
Friedman’s	 own	 language	 in	 “The	 Methodology…”	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 such	 a	
takeover	 almost	 explicitly.	One	 of	 his	 “scientific”	 goals	 is	 to	 eliminate	 civic	 dissensus	
about	policy,	which,	 since	 they’re	 rooted	 in	 “different	predictions	about	 the	economic	
consequences	 of	 taking	 action”	 rather	 than	 “fundamental	 differences	 in	 basic	 values,”	
can	 “be	 eliminated	 by	 the	 progress	 of	 positive	 economics”	 (5).	 This	 eliminative	
“progress”	is	framed	in	terms	of	marketplace	competition	and	expansion,	rather	than	of	
approach	to	the	truth:	“improving	the	accuracy	of	the	predictions”	is	only	in	the	service	
of	 “expanding	 this	 body	 of	 generalizations”	 (40).	 We	 can	 improve	 accuracy	 either	
through	 a	 prediction->world	 or	world->prediction	direction	of	 fit,	 and	Friedman	 cites	
	 127	
Darwin	to	propound	the	 latter:	 “Let	the	apparent	determinant	of	business	behavior	be	
anything	 at	 all—habitual	 reaction,	 random	 chance,	 or	 whatnot.	 	 Whenever	 this	
determinant	 happens	 to	 lead	 to	 behavior	 consistent	 with	 rational	 and	 informed	
maximization	 of	 returns,	 the	 business	will	 prosper…	The	process	 of	 ‘natural	 selection’	
thus	helps	 to	validate	 the	hypothesis”	 (22).	 	 In	a	world	rigged	to	punish	any	deviation	
from	a	promulgated	model	of	rationality,	the	success	of	those	who	“maximize”	according	
to	 the	 model’s	 rules	 ratifies	 the	 definition	 of	 rationality.	 “Modelling	 economic	
behaviour”	can,	for	all	Friedman’s	anti-normative	rhetoric,	be	a	very	pro-active	affair.		
Friedman’s	 peers	 were	 not	 oblivious	 to	 this.	 Like	 Schumacher,	 Nicholas	
Georgescu-Rogen	was	picking	up	on	Knight’s	 covalent	objections	 to	 the	misuse	of	 the	
energetics	analogy	and	the	bad	faith	of	the	promulgation-structure	at	the	same	time	as	
Gaddis	 was	 doing	 his	 most	 concerted	 work	 in	 J	 R.	 His	 focus	 on	 showing	 how	 the	
requisite	precision	about	the	physics	analogy	reveals	the	flaws	of	economic	approaches	
(with	a	 focus	on	entropy	 that	puts	him	 in	a	 self-acknowledged	zeitgeist	with	much	of	
the	era’s	fiction63)	allows	him	to	articulate	the	logic	of	testored	tailing	very	precisely:	
No	social	science	can	subserve	the	art	of	government	as	efficaciously	as	physics	
does	 the	 art	 of	 space	 travel,	 for	 example.	 	 Nevertheless,	 some	 social	 scientists	
simply	refuse	to	reconcile	 themselves	 to	 this	verdict	and,	apparently	 in	despair,	
have	 come	 out	 with	 a	 curious	 proposal:	 to	 devise	 means	 which	 will	 compel	
people	 to	 behave	 the	way	 ‘we’	want,	 so	 that	 ‘our’	 predictions	will	 always	 come	
true…	 the	 first	 prerequisite	 of	 any	 [such]	 plan	 is	 that	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	
material	involved	should	be	completely	predictable	(16).			
He	further	identifies	the	irony	within	economics	that	would	preoccupy	Amadae	in	her	
account	 of	 rational-choice	 theory’s	 hegemony:	 models	 that	 derived	 all	 their	 moral	
authority	from	the	attempt	to	defend	rational	individual	freedom	against	the	threats	of	
totalitarianism	end	up	promulgating	a	no	less	coercive	control.		
																																																								
63	Georgescu-Roegen	 dwells	 in	 more	 depth	 on	 the	 flaws	 in	 comparing	 economic	 models	 to	 physical	
models.	He	also	connects	to	authors	like	Pynchon	and	Gaddis	via	his	interest	in	the	widespread	use	of	the	
trope	of	entropy	in	the	1960s:	“Once	it	was	[esoteric],	but	now	it	is	becoming	increasingly	popular	in	one	
field	after	another”	(4).	 	Literature	is	certainly	one	of	those	fields:	Gaddis	had	published	a	section	of	J	R	
based	on	a	classroom	discussion	about	entropy	just	the	year	before.	
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Recent	historians	of	 the	relationship	between	economics	and	politics	stress	 just	
how	 successful	 this	 was	 in	 practice,64	and	 the	 importance	 of	 language	 for	 making	 it	
happen.65	Jason	Maloy	most	directly	echoes	Knight	in	examining	how	this	process	ended	
up	 promulgating	 the	 logic	 of	 marketing	 in	 the	 political	 civic	 arena:	 “the	 idealized	
rational	actors	that	inhabit	markets	were	introduced	into	not	only	the	voting	booth	(as	
in	Arrow)	but	also	the	halls	of	government”	(754).	As	well	as	 the	 focus	on	elimination	
and	narrowed	 legitimacies	 that	 these	histories	 share	with	Gaddis	 and	Knight,	Maloy’s	
focus	 on	 “introduction”	 makes	 clear	 how	 historians	 have,	 like	 Gaddis,	 seen	 these	
processes	as	consciously	instilled	top-down	processes,	rather	than	the	Jamesonian	flat-
symptomatic	model	 of	 an	 agentless	 dawning	 of	 a	 postmodern	 economy	 or	 condition	
through	which	Gaddis’	own	work	has	usually	been	read.		
	 The	novel	is	explicit	about	testored-tailing’s	logical	saturation	of	electoral	politics	
as	well	as	the	business	world.	As	Hyde’s	earlier	manipulation	of	parents	to	help	“getting	
this	budget	across”	relies	on	fake	outrage	that	someone	would	“dictate”	that	they	ignore	
him,	the	novel	 later	presents	a	number	of	 instances	 in	which	dictation	is	promoted	as	
deliberative	freedom.	One	advert,	read	aloud,	appeals	to	the	business-real	elimination	of	
deliberative	 temporality:	 	 “Executive’s	 Complete	 Portfolio	 of	 Letters	 look,	 letters	 you	
might	 have	 to	 struggle	 over	 for	 just	 the	 right	 phrase	 completely	 written	 for	 you	
guarantee	 save	 you	 hours	 of	 work,	 no	 more	 struggling	 over	 the	 right	 way	 to	 phrase	
																																																								
64	Mirowski	and	Rob	Horn	show	how	the	Chicago	school’s	conscious	institutional	expansion	into	politics	
influenced	 normative	 accounts	 of	 economic	 action	 by	 making	 it	 “impossible	 within	 this	 discourse	 to	
regard	 any	 economic	 transaction	 whatsoever	 as	 coercive,	 which	 was	 a	 massive	 divergence	 from	 prior	
classical	liberal	discourse"	(162).	They	also	show	these	changes	corresponded	with	Knight’s	disappearance	
from	the	Chicago	School’s	public	 face:	 "all	and	sundry	depended	on	Hayek	 to	keep	 the	project	on	even	
keel:	no	one	else	on	home	ground	seemed	to	command	the	intellectual	gravitas	or	deft	punctilio	to	herd	
the	cats.		In	particular,	Frank	Knight	was	nowhere	to	be	seen	in	the	archival	records	of	these	negotiations.”	
These	divisions	within	the	Chicago	project,	in	particular	the	generational	handover	in	which	the	classic-
liberal	 reservations	 of	Knight’s	 era	 of	 “free	market”	 thinking	 got	 left	 behind:,	 are	 not	widely	 known:	 as	
Horn	 and	Mirowski	 note	 "Henry	 Simons	 would	 have	 regarded	most	 of	 this	 as	 an	 utter	 travesty	 of	 his	
beliefs;	but	so	too	would	have	Frank	Knight.		The	neglect	of	this	divide	between	classical	and	neo-liberal	
Chicago	is	one	of	the	most	disturbing	aspects	of	both	the	historical	and	political	secondary	literature."	
65	SM	Amadae	sees	something	similar	happening	in	politicians’	concurrent	adaption	of	the	language	and	
ideology	 of	 rational-choice	 game	 theory	 by	 politicians	 in	 the	 same	 era,	 comparing	 it	 to	 “the	 state-
condoned	 language	 of	 Big	 Brother	 that	 continually	 strikes	 words,	 and	 hence	 concepts,	 meanings,	 and	
practices,	out	of	existence”	(296).			
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letters	[…]”	(386).		Another	shows	explicitly	what	this	looks	like	when	applied	to	politics	
and	civic	feedback	mechanisms:	
Since	we	believe	you	are	a	deeply	concerned	citizen	whose	opinions	on	the	vital	
issues	of	the	day	are	formed	after	careful	and	intelligent	consideration,	and	since	
the	continued	survival	of	our	republic	as	we	know	it	depends	so	heavily	upon	the	
free	expression	of	such	independent	views	as	yours	at	the	highest	levels,	a	letter	is	
enclosed	 for	 your	 convenience	which	 you	may	 rewrite	 in	 your	 own	words	 and	
mail	to	your	Senator	and	Congressman	immediately”	(600).	
The	 logic	 of	 language-replacement	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	 replacement	 of	 human	
capacities	more	generally.	Just	as	JR	himself	 is	always	anxious	to	remove	humans	from	
his	 asset-companies,	 since	 they’re	 so	much	 less	 immediately	 fungible	 than	 any	 other	
kind	 of	 asset, 66 	so	 the	 novel	 clarifies	 what	 a	 world	 in	 which	 “free	 expression	 of	
independent	 views”	 has	 been	 fully	 given	 over	 to	 top-down	 language	manufacture	will	
look	 like.	 That	 advert’s	 reading	 is	 interrupted	 by	 a	 door	 to	 door	 salesman	 who	 is	
incapable	of	speaking	in	any	unit	of	 language	smaller	than	his	entire	spiel:	“Ex,	excuse	
me	madam	if	you	interrupt	me	I’ll	have	to	start	all	over	again	of	similar	cultural	pursuits,	
this	is	why	we	take	pleasure	in	inviting	you	to	[…]”	(601).			
J	R’s	economic	thinking	is	more	restricted	and	more	precise	than	readings	of	it	as	
either	 flat	 mimesis	 or	 capacious	 prophecy	 of	 general	 world-concepts	 like	
“postmodernity”	or	“neoliberalism.”	Rooted	in	his	1960s	corporate	writing,	engaged	with	
questions	that	animated	the	rise	of	Chicago-school	economics,	J	R’s	economic	ideas	all	
elaborate	a	precise	central	concern:	the	top-down	promulgation	of	ideas	of	“reasonable”	
conduct	 through	 politicised	 economic	 institutions.	 And	 these	 are	 expressed	 through	
antimimetic	 style,	 making	 the	 case	 for	 “stylistic	 description”’s	 value	 in	 relation	 to	
examing	 literary	 texts’	 rhetorical	 enagement	 with	 specific	 historical	 and	 political	
formations.	 In	what	 follows,	 I’ll	 show	how	 the	novel’s	 stylistic	 rhetoric	moves	beyond	
the	diagnosis	to	make	an	argument	for	deliberative	agency’s	ability	to	push	back	against	
the	Friedmanite	onslaught	of	testored	tailing.																																																									
66	“that’s	mostly	what	costs	so	much	is	all	these	here	people,	you	know?		See	because	if	we	could	like	get	
them	out	of	there	and	get	his	here	new	machinery	which	you	then	divide	how	long	it	will	take	to	wear	out	
into	how	much	did	it	cost	you	which	you	get	to	take	that	off	taxes	too	you	see?”	(296).	
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Friction-Transmission	
There	are	two	default	directions	of	language-transmission	in	J	R:	testored	tailing’s	
attempt	 to	 push	 the	 Catesian	 flat	 flow	 on	 the	 world,	 and	 other	 characters’	 gradual	
adoption	of	JR’s	mannerisms	as	his	influence	grows.	In	a	conversation	with	Bast	as	the	
intersection	between	working	for	Cates	and	working	for	JR	starts	to	overwhelm	him,	for	
example,	Davidoff	speaks	a	full	sentence	in	JR-ese:	“minerals	gas	timber	up	to	our	ass	in	
Indians	I	mean	holy	shit	Bast	what	am	I	supposed	to	do!”	(540).	Bast	himself	has	already	
lapsed	 into	 something	 similar	 when	 Crawley,	 the	 low-level	 Cates	 employee	 who	 has	
employed	Bast	to	compose	a	soundtrack,	reveals	that	he	expected	a	full	recording,	not	
just	the	sheet	music:	“No	but	but	holy	shit	Mister	Crawley	I	mean	what…”	(446).		But	as	
these	transmissions	express	the	dominance	of	one	mindset	and	the	inability	of	anybody	
stuck	in	that	mindset	to	develop	an	agentive	vocabulary	beyond	that	of	a	child,	so	the	
novel	 develops	 its	 alternative	 to	 that	 mindset	 by	 modulating	 the	 default	 patterns	 of	
linguistic	transmission.	
I’ll	focus	here	on	Bast	and	JR’s	final	scene	as	co-workers,	in	which	the	discursive	
contagion	moves	against	 the	default,	 conjuring	 thought	where	 style	and	narrative	had	
seemed	to	erase	it.	After	the	earlier	scene	in	which	Bast	tries	to	get	JR	to	stop,	the	two	
switch	places	in	relation	to	friction	and	flow	over	the	course	of	400	pages,	so	that	it’s	JR	
who	 finally	 comes	 to	 plead	 “how	 am	 I	 supposed	 to	 stop	 everything!”	 (647).	
Conspicuously	inverting	their	earlier	conversation’s	friction/flow	dynamic,	Gaddis	casts	
into	 doubt	 its	 suggestion	 that	 judgers	 and	 doubters	must	 always	 be	 on	 the	 back	 foot	
against	the	linguistic	flow	of	instrumental	flatteners.	
While	 the	 scene’s	 language	 still	 associates	 JR	 with	 frictionlessness—as	 in	 his	
pleasure	 at	 reading	 himself	 described	 as	 “this	 like	 greasy	 eminence	 behind	 the	whole	
meteoric	 rise	 of	 J	 R	 Corp”	 (647)—and	 begins	 with	 Bast	 still	 on	 the	 back	 foot—“look	
haven’t	I	told	you	to	stop?		When	the	whole	thing	started?		Just	stop	and	let	somebody	
help	you	pull	things	together	instead	of	this	more!	more!”	(647)—the	situation	in	which	
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they	 take	 on	 these	 roles	 has	 changed.	 	 The	 crisis	 in	 JR’s	 empire,	 and	 his	 dawning	
awareness	that	the	number	of	moving	parts	has	exceeded	his	processing	capacities,	sees	
him	looking	outside	himself	for	help,	paying	enough	attention	to	Bast	to	notice	for	once	
that	“You	looked	like	you	weren’t	listening”	(645).	Bast’s	role,	and	style,	similarly	shifts	
when	 his	 frustrations	 spill	 out	 in	 exasperation	 at	 JR’s	 self-conception	 as	 a	 “man	 of	
vision”:	
You	know	it’s	been	right	from	the	start	your	surprise	coup	taking	over	Eagle	you	
were	more	surprised	than	anybody,	you	didn’t	even	know	what	X-L	made	when	
you	had	to	buy	it	you	asked	me	what’s	a	lithograph	you	never	thought	of	flooding	
the	country	with	those	damn	matchbooks	till	you	read	someplace	you’d	already	
done	it…”	(656).			
Bast	 diagnoses	 JR’s	 pretensions	 to	 the	 psychological	 category	 of	 “vision”	 as	 the	
chronology-flipping	rationalization	of	 testored	 tailing.	More	 importantly,	 this	 is	where	
the	pair’s	styles	flip.	For	the	first	time,	Bast’s	words	come	out	as	unpunctuated,	as	free	
from	 implication	of	 consideration	or	 revision,	 as	 JR’s	own.	And	 this	 forces	 JR	 into	 the	
role	of	doubter,	hesitator,	deliberator.	Nowhere	else	in	the	novel	is	JR	so	defensive	and	
lost	for	words.	Bast’s	subsequent	refusal	to	stay	around	and	argue	puts	JR	in	the	position	
of	asking	for	hesitation:		
—No	but,	hey?	hey	Bast?	Wait	up	I	can’t	hardly	see	where	I’m,	hey…?	he	came	on	
kicking	 through	 leaves	 for	 a	 remnant	 of	 sidewalk,	—I	mean	what	 did	 you	 say,	
this,	this	here	man	of	vision	I	mean	what’s	so	trash	about	that!	(658).	
Bast’s	 physically	 outpacing	 JR	 forces	 the	 latter	 into	 a	 querying,	 grasping	 prose	
exacerbated	 by	 the	 obstacular	 world	 under	 his	 feet,	 having	 to	 acknowledge	 his	
sightlessness	while	defending	his	claim	to	“vision.”	In	this	reversal,	JR	takes	on	the	kind	
of	imperative	frictive	or	negative	verbs	he	has	always	over-ridden	from	Bast	and	Amy—
“wait	wait	hey	quit”	(658).	And	this	defensiveness	leads	to	him	taking	on	the	hesitations,	
reconfigurations,	and	other	syntactical	intimations	of	psychological	depth	that	the	novel	
had	 always	 associated	 with	 Bast’s	 defensive	 position.	 For	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 novel,	
there’s	a	gap	between	JR’s	words	and	his	actions	in	which	a	burgeoning	metacognition	
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can	take	root:	 “I	mean	I’m	 just	 finding	out	everything’s	 just	 like	the	opposite	of	how	I	
thought”	(662).	
JR	is	consequently	left	to	fend	for	himself	not	only	against	the	situation	spiralling	
beyond	his	processing	capacity,	but	against	 the	 revealed	contingency	of	 the	 “rules”	he	
adopted	from	his	first	meeting	with	Cates:		
I	do	what	you’re	suppose	to	and	everybody	gets…	
—But	why,	why	are	you	supposed	to!	That’s	what	I’ve…	
—No	sir	boy	you,	I	mean	like	[…]	(660-1).	
The	 four	 discrete	words	 that	 begin	 this	 line	 fail	 to	 quell	 Bast’s	 question.	Where	 their	
previous	 dialogue	 has	 been	 characterized	 by	 JR	 interrupting	 and	 negating	 any	 Bast	
objection	with	sentences	that	begin	interchangeably	with	“yes”,	“no”,	or	“okay”	followed	
by	a	“but”	and	a	continuation	of	flow,	this	passage	suggests	that,	in	the	exhaustion	of	the	
instrumental	flow	style	of	speech,	JR	must	grasp	around	for	new	capacities.	This	is	the	
scene	that	opens	with	Bast’s	“the	only	inside’s	the	one	inside	your	head,”	and	it	goes	on	
to	 bear	 out	 that	 JR	 does	 actually	 have	 an	 inside,	 that	 there’s	 potentially	more	 to	 him	
than	the	processual	mode	of	exchange-thinking.		Forced	to	confront	a	world	and	a	co-
worker	that	won’t	cooperate,	JR	is	left	to	deliberate	a	genuine	answer	to	the	question	of	
“what	 do	 you	 expect	 me	 to	 do”	 that	 can’t	 take	 its	 cues	 from	 the	 “you”	 of	 inherited	
“rules.”	
The	irony	of	Bast’s	finally	transmitting	deliberative	language	patterns	to	JR	is	that	
while	JR’s	empire	attacks	deliberative	space,	the	rhetoric	through	which	he	promotes	it	
and	comes	to	understand	himself	actually	relies,	like	“vision,”	on	the	traditional	prestige	
of	mental	 achievements.	On	 the	 first	 occasion	 Bast	 challenges	 him	 to	 slow	down,	 for	
example,	JR	avoids	the	transmission	of	Bast’s	language-patterns	precisely	by	laying	claim	
to	deliberative	work:	“No	but	holy,	I	mean	listen	I’m	the	one	that	has	to	figure	things	up	
and	like	make	these	here	decisions	with	these	risks	and	all	like	I	mean	I	barely	made	it	
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boy	 […]”	 (300).67	By	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 pattern-transmission	 scene,	 JR	 has	 come	 to	
believe	 in	 the	 truth	 and	 judgments	 of	 the	 promotional	 biography	 he	 has	 had	
commissioned	about	himself:	“Men	who	have	worked	with	him	I	mean	that	means	me	
that	 him,	 with	 him	 for	 years	 say	 his	 chief	 characteristics	 are	 enormous	 powers	 of	
concentration	and	a	dogged	persistence	in	attacking	a	problem	until	he	comes	up	with	a	
completely	satisfactory	answer”	(651).	The	mental	processes	it	describes—concentration	
and	problem-solving—are	the	kinds	of	psychological	qualities	that	his	empire	eliminates	
in	others,	highlighting	the	gap	between	the	prestige	rhetoric	and	the	actual	stakes	of	his	
empire’s	“attacking.”		
Yet	if	the	novel’s	sub-Cates	business	figures	often	lapse	towards	JR’s	immaturity,	
he,	 for	 all	 his	 wish	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 thoughtful	 deliberator,	 seems	 to	 have	 to	
actively	resist	threats	of	mental	deepening,	whether	these	come	from	figures	 like	Bast,	
or	from	within	himself.	After	Bast	reports	on	the	failure	of	one	scheme,	for	example,	JR	
has	 to	 face	 the	 potential	 differences	 between	 plans	 and	 outcomes:	 “I	 just,	 I	 mean	 I	
always	 thought	 this	 is	 what	 it	 will	 be	 like	 you	 and,	 and	 me	 riding	 in	 this	 here	 big	
limousine	down,	down	this,	this	here	big	street…”	(636).	But	the	minute	he	starts	to	feel	
like	 there	might	be	 something	missing,	he	deliberately	 stops	himself	 from	 talking,	 for	
almost	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	novel,	 and	 then	goes	out	of	his	way	 to	 return	 to	 a	profit-
exchange	mode	of	interaction:		
I	just	always	thought	we’d,	we’d,	nothing.		You	want	your	pickle?	
—No.		
—Like	I’ll	trade	it	for	half	my...		
—Just	take	it!	(636/7).			
These	moments	suggest	that,	for	JR	at	least,	the	kind	of	discursive	agency	he	embodies	is	
not	 the	 full	 limit	of	his	 capacities,	 and	 that	he	has	 to	 actively	 resist	 awareness	of	 this	
fact.																																																										
67	Gaddis	manages	to	undercut	this.	Treating	mental	work	as	work,	JR	nonetheless	flattens	his	language,	
his	 “and	 all”	 undercutting	 the	potential	 specificity	 of	 “these”	 and	making	 “risks”	 a	 generic	 term.	 In	 this	
context	“figure	things	up”	can	mean	very	literally	to	reduce	“things”	to	“figures”,	and	to	stress	the	purely	
mathematical	 easily-processable	 sense	 of	 “figures”	 rather	 than	 the	 mental	 processes	 of	 symbolic	
figuration.					
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The	 novel’s	 most	 self-conscious	 evocations	 of	 the	 link	 between	 flatness	 and	
thoughtlessness	actually	point	to	the	potential	presence	of	thought,	and	the	constructed	
contingency	of	the	anti-deliberative	mindset.	The	novel	prepares	this	interpretation	for	
us	in	its	very	earliest	presentation	of	business-world	characters.	As	Whiteback	addresses	
gym	 teacher	 Coach	 Vogel	 about	 the	 weather,	 the	 sun	 “caught	 [Vogel]	 flat	 across	 the	
lenses,	 erasing	 any	 life	 behind	 them	 in	 a	 flash	 of	 inner	 vacancy	 as	 he	 returned	 to”	
vacuous	talk.	The	flattening	and	erasing	of	“life	behind”	is	both	imposed	from	without	
by	the	sun,	such	that	Vogel	is	“caught…	across	the	lenses,”	but	also	ratifies	a	deep	inner	
vacancy	‘flashing’	outward	to	become	visible.	Flatness’	self-announcing	“flash”	thus	not	
only	helps	us	understand	it	in	terms	of	Gaddis’	conspicuous	stylistic	constructions,	but	
also	suggests	that	unthinking	action	that	defines	the	novel’s	business-world	characters	is	
a	matter	of	assent	rather	than	inevitability.	It	answers	to	the	very	motivational	depths	it	
notionally	abolishes.	
This	seemingly	incidental	image	was	important	enough	to	Gaddis	that	his	notes	
toward	the	novel	stipulate	 it	as	the	main	feature	of	the	scene,68	and	it	draws	its	stakes	
from	another	piece	of	writing	on	the	relation	between	thought,	language,	and	political	
agency.	In	“Politics	and	the	English	Language,”	George	Orwell	conjures	“moments	when	
the	light	catches	the	speaker's	spectacles	and	turns	them	into	blank	discs	which	seem	to	
have	 no	 eyes	 behind	 them”	 to	 encapsulate	 the	 relationship	 between	 undeliberative	
language	use	and	a	“reduced	state	of	consciousness”:	“A	speaker	who	uses	that	kind	of	
phraseology	 has	 gone	 some	 distance	 toward	 turning	 himself	 into	 a	 machine.	 The	
appropriate	noises	are	coming	out	of	his	larynx,	but	his	brain	is	not	involved,	as	it	would	
be	 if	 he	 were	 choosing	 his	 words	 for	 himself.”69	Orwell	 claims	 that	 “speech”	 one	 “is	
accustomed	 to	make	over	 and	over	 again”	 is	 “favourable	 to	political	 conformity.”	This	
connects	the	image	of	Vogel’s	glasses	to	those	scenes	of	dictation	I	examined	in	terms	of																																																									
68	A	loose	page	trying	out	different	sequences	for	the	novel’s	early	scenes	makes	the	flat-lens	image	stand	
for	 the	whole	 conversation:	 “Whitebcks	pastels,	 lght	 ac	 ross	 lenses”	 (Archive:	 loose	note,	Box	66	 folder	
271).	
69	David	 Letzler	 has	 recently	 drawn	 parallels	 between	Orwell’s	 argument	 and	 the	way	 JR	 challenges	 its	
reader	 to	 work	 out	 which	 uses	 of	 jargon	 in	 the	 novel	 are	 content-bearing	 and	 which	 low-information	
“cruft,”	but	he	doesn’t	examine	the	echoed	image	or	suggest	that	the	essay	might	be	a	direct	source	for	the	
novel.	
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Friedman’s	 institutionalization.	Whether	 or	 not	 this	 is	 deliberate	 citation	 on	 Gaddis’	
part,	 it	 certainly	establishes	 the	connection	between	 “choosing	his	words	 for	himself”,	
psychological	depth,	and	the	resistance	to	a	coerced	“political	conformity.”	The	rhetoric	
that	contrasts	Bast’s	hesitant	word-choosing	with	 JR’s	 “over	and	over	again”	 fluency	 is	
only	possible	within	the	terms	of	the	style,	and	this	early	stipulation	of	the	contingency	
of	 the	default	 direction	of	 influence	 allows	 the	novel’s	 eventual	 reversal	 of	 it	 to	make	
sense.	
This	 equation	 between	 buying	 into	 the	 business	 world	 and	 assenting	 to	 the	
culture	of	mental	flattening	becomes	particularly	crucial	with	regard	to	JR	himself.		That	
JR	is	not	quite	such	a	lost	cause	as	Vogel	and	co	is	clear	in	the	scene	where	the	structure	
of	his	subsequent	empire	is	established.	As	a	drowsy	Bast	listens	to	JR	and	a	classmate	in	
the	train	seat	ahead	of	him	talking	about	what	they	can	get	for	free	in	the	mail,	JR	trails	
off	“in	a	tone	so	low	it	was	lost	before	it	reached	his	image	on	the	dirty	pane	where	he	
stared	 now	 as	 though	 staring	 through	 at	 something	 far	 beyond”	 (129).	 	 This	 precisely	
inverts	 the	 relation	 of	 thinker	 to	 flat	 surface	 in	 the	 Vogel	 scene,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
association	 between	 possible	 thought	 and	 the	 cessation	 of	 speech.	 Here,	 JR’s	 staring	
points	us	explicitly	 to	 “something	 far	beyond,”	but	unlike	 in	Vogel	where	 the	depth	 is	
real	 and	 is	 cancelled	 out	 by	 the	 assent	 to	 flatness,	 here	 the	prospect	 of	 depth	behind	
depicted	eyes	is	a	matter	of	“as	if”:	if	there	is	something	beyond	the	mirror-JR’s	features	
on	the	“dirty	pane,”	then	it	will	only	come	into	being	through	the	real	JR’s	turning	his	
actually-flat	perception	into	the	depth	of	the	“as	if.”		JR’s	flatness	is	his	childish	starting	
condition,	whereas	Vogel’s	is	attained.		But	JR,	the	scene	suggests,	still	has	the	capacity	
to	develop	a	self-conception	that	could	create	the	kind	of	thoughtful	depth	with	which	
Bast	is	associated.		
Bast	 and	 JR’s	 final	 scene	 as	 co-workers,	 then,	 resolves	 these	 earlier,	 subtler	
suggestions	about	JR’s	capacity	for	change.	It	suggests	that	the	“human	judgment”	Bast	
stylistically	 embodies	 can	 finally	 have	 impact	 outside	 the	 depths	 of	 an	 isolated	mind.	
After	 Gaddis	 shows	 that	 it(s	 style)	 can	 be	 inculcated	 even	 “inside”	 JR(’s	 sentences),	
“human	 judgment”	 in	 the	 novel’s	 final	 hundred	 pages	moves	 outward	 to	 some	 small,	
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effectual	achievements	in	the	wider	narrative.	The	two	most	important	of	these—Bast’s	
successful	composition	of	a	small	artwork,	and	Beaton’s	redirection	of	control	of	Typhon	
from	Cates	 to	Amy	Joubert—happen	 in	 the	hospital	 room	where	Bast	ends	up,	having	
collapsed	 with	 fever	 after	 the	 JR	 conversation.	 Both	 the	 stylistic	 revelation	 and	 the	
narrative	 implications	 of	 these	 achievements	 establish	 the	 dual	 importance	 of	 artistic	
composition	to	J	R’s	value-system:	first	as	a	kind	of	paradigm	example	of	what	practical	
deliberative	work	looks	like,	and	secondly	as	a	process	tied	to	the	creation	of	artefacts	
that	can	circulate	that	work	effectually	in	the	world	and	make	space	for	it.	
	
The	Deliberative	Achievement	of	Composition	
While	 Bast	 manages	 to	 transmit	 deliberative	 hesitancy	 to	 JR,	 he	 does	 so	 only	
after,	earlier	in	the	scene,	failing	to	get	him	to	appreciate	a	passage	of	music	from	Bach.	
The	habits	of	mind	associated	with	artistic	composition	are	central	to	J	R.	By	this	stage	
in	 the	 novel	 we’ve	 already	 seen	 Gibbs	 fail	 to	 make	 any	 progress	 on	 his	 book	 about	
mechanization,	 but	 Bast’s	 success	 with	 JR	 is	 the	 seeming	 precondition	 for	 his	
subsequent	ability	to	compose	the	sonata.	J	R	treats	artistic	composition	as	a	paradigm	
of	the	kind	of	deliberative	personhood	it	recuperates.	Critics	like	Charles	Newman	and	
Joseph	Tabbi	have	suggested	that	postmodern	fiction	characteristically	treats	agency	in	
terms	 of	 what	 both	 call	 “the	 compositional	 self.”70	Tabbi	 draws	 this	 figure	 from	 an	
interview	in	which	Gaddis	discusses	“the	real	work…	the	thought	and	the	rewriting	and	
the	 crossing	out	 and	 the	 attempt	 to	 get	 it	 right.”71	This	 frames	 artistic	 composition	 in	
precisely	 the	 pragmatic	 terms	 of	 long-term	 projects	 and	 contingent	 revision	 that	 I’ve	
suggested	 	 J	R	 values	 in	 general.72		 Bast’s	 characteristic	 stylistic	markers	 of	 hesitation,																																																									
70	Newman	-	“What	is	most	indicative	of	Post-Modern	self-consciousness	is	the	extent	to	which	it	eschews	
the	psychological	for	the	compositional	self”	(44).			
71	Tabbi	cites	Gaddis’	interview	with	Publishers’	WeeklyThe	compositional	self,	the	being	that	undergoes	
‘the	 real	work…	 the	 thought	 and	 the	 rewriting	 and	 the	 crossing	out	 and	 the	 attempt	 to	 get	 it	 right,’	 as	
Gaddis	noted	in	specific	reference	to	JR,	is	the	essential	personality,	the	first-order	phenomenon,	what,	in	
fact,	the	book	‘is	about’”	(657).		
72	One	 of	 the	 novel’s	 foregrounded	 questions,	 and	 foregrounded	 aspects	 of	 its	 American	 philosophical	
heritage,	is	the	question	Gibbs	asks	in	allusion	to	Thoerau:	that	of	“What’s	worth	doing?”	The	resolution	
of	Bast	and	 JR’s	 relationship	 suggests	 that	what’s	worth	doing	may	be	composing	artworks,	 rather	 than	
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after	all	constantly	hinge	on	his	revising	spoken	sentences	in	process.	The	hospital	scene	
represents	 the	 culmination	 of	 the	 novel’s	 covalent	 investigations	 of	 what	 space	
deliberative	agency	can	carve	out	for	itself	in	a	Friedmanite	world,	and	what	it	can	do	to	
consequentially	resist	that	world.		
In	terms	of	space,	Bast’s	compositional	achievement	corresponds	to	his	vanishing	
from	the	page,	and	hence	escaping	the	flow.	Michael	Levine	suggests	that	J	R’s	flatness	
makes	it	a	reading-incompetence	to	speculate	as	to	the	“content	of	its	off-stage	halves	of	
telephone	conversations”	(38).	But	in	four	pages	of	dialogue	in	which	he	is	addressed	by	
name	eleven	times,	Bast	only	speaks	twice:	to	tell	his	lawyer	“I’m	just	listening”	and	to	
ask	“have	you	got	a	pencil?”	(677/678).	He	is	thus	“offstage”	both	from	the	dialogue	and	
from	the	attention	of	the	narrative	voice.		We	only	find	out	what	he’s	been	up	to	when	a	
nurse	 brings	 him	dinner,	 and	 says	 “let’s	 just	move	 all	 these	 papers	 and	 put	 your	 tray	
here,	 you	have	been	busy	haven’t	 you?”	 (681).	 	His	non-presence	on	 the	page	 is	what	
allows	him	to	get	his	own	work	of	writing	done.	The	intimations	of	unvocalised	depth	
that	characterize	his	hesitant	speech	finally	generate	narrative	objects,	undermining	the	
equation—so	 central	 to	 the	 givens	 structuring	 JR’s	 world—between	 speech	 and	 the	
effectual.	
“I’m	 just	 listening”	 has	 a	 dual	 implication	 of	 its	 own:	 Bast	may	 or	may	 not	 be	
paying	attention	to	the	language	from	whose	on-page,	on-stage	flow	he’s	absent,	but	the	
revelation	of	his	 composition	clarifies	 that	he	has	been	 “listening”	 to	 the	music	 in	his	
head.	 This	 provides	 a	 counterpart	 to	 Bast’s	 hospital	 room-mate,	 whose	 blithe	
monologue	(which	actually	reveals	some	important	information	about	events	at	the	JR-
Corp	subsidiary	in	which	Bast’s	family	are	finanicially	involved)	takes	Bast’s	silence	for	
rapt	attention:	 “He’s	a	good	 listener	aren’t	you	Bast,	 that’s	 the	whole	secret	of	making	
people	 like	 you	 be	 an	 American	 you	 want	 everybody	 to	 like	 you”	 (685).	 American	
																																																																																																																																																																																
encountering	them.	Paul	Grimstad	gives	an	account	of	the	relationship	between	composition	and	what’s-
worth-doing	in	his	account	of	Stanley	Cavell’s	place	within	a	lineage	Grimstad	traces	to	Emerson	and	Poe:	
He	takes	the	core	of	Cavell’s	centralising	of	artistic	composition	in	the	value-driven	life	to	be	“What	is	to	
count	as	an	example	of	composition?		Answering	his	own	question,	he	calls	composition	the	‘search	for	an	
object	worthy	of	our	attention’,	a	process	he	describes	as	an	‘experimental	problem’”	(168).72			
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personhood	 is	 framed	 as	 an	 oblivious	 outer-directed	 monologuing	 that	 takes	 the	
absence	 of	 interruption	 for	 endorsement:	 precisely	 the	 mindset	 against	 which	 Bast’s	
inner-directed	listening	finally	works.	Absenting	himself	 from	the	constant	pressure	of	
outer-directed	 communication	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	 flow	 of	 words	 down	 the	 page	
even	as	he	notionally	tries	to	resist	it,	though,	Bast	is	able	to	compose	because	he	works	
out	a	way	to	take	himself	“off-stage.”	His	work	not	only	creates	an	outward	artefact	of	
“inner-directed”	personhood,	but	 carves	out	 a	 space	within	 the	novel’s	world-building	
methods	for	significant	thought	and	action	to	happen	outside	the	flow.	
This	 interest	 in	 deliberation’s	 relationship	 to	 Americanness	 highlights	 the	
distinctively	pragmatist	 account	Gaddis	offers	of	deliberation’s	nature	 and	palce	 in	 an	
antifoundationalist	world.	Gaddis’	critics	have	tended	to	treat	pragmatism’s	 interest	 in	
outcomes	 as	 analogous	 to	 Friedman’s	 for	 the	purposes	 of	 identifying	 J	 R’s	 sympathies	
and	 criticisms,	 as	 in	 Christopher	 Leise’s	 sense	 of	 the	 novel’s	 project	 as	 “working	 to	
rethink	America’s	reliance	on	a	kind	of	‘gold	standard’	that	tends	to	reduce	all	meaning	
to	a	pragmatist’s	cash	value”	(36).	Yet	among	his	teaching	notes	for	a	1971	course	on	“The	
Literature	 of	 Failure,”	 Gaddis	 stresses	 “I	 am	 mainly	 concerned	 with	 the	
misinterpretation	 of	 James’	 Pragmatism,”	 and	 suggests	 that	 in	 bringing	 James	 up	 in	
reading	novels	about	a	specifically	US	kind	of	failure,	the	“point	is	a:	how	it	fit	America,	
b:	how	it	lent	itself	to	misinterpretation”	(Archive).73	Leise,	in	other	words,	is	right	about	
J	R’s	nation-specific	take	on	economic	reductiveness:	the	national	rhetoric	is	central	to	
the	 way	 Hyde	 expresses	 his	 place	 in	 the	 testored-tailing	 system	 that	 promulgates	 a	
Catesian	style	of	personhood	through	his	repeated	tic	about	the	need	to	teach	children	
“what	America’s	 all	 about.”	But	as	Gaddis	 teaching	notes	 from	the	peak	of	 the	novel’s	
drafting	process	suggest,	pragmatism	functions	as	an	oppositional	value	to	 figures	 like	
Hyde,	precisely	because	its	interest	in	outcomes	as	the	measure	of	normative	truth	relies	
so	heavily	on	contingency	and	unpredictability:	 its	 imputed	psychology	is	one	of	 long-
duration,	private	and	public	deliberation	about	ends,	and	conscious	revision	of	means	in	
light	of	new	evidence.	This	is	the	kind	of	agency	epitomized	by	Bast	or	Beaton	in	their																																																									
73	“Teaching	Notes	for	‘Literature	of	Failure.’”	Teaching	Materials.	Folder	128,	Box	454.	
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long-game	projects	and	eventual	achievements,	and	hence	the	kind	of	agency	the	novel	
most	directly	opposes	to	Friedman-style	Testored	Tailing.	
The	association	between	this	pragmatic	model	of	contingent	deliberation	and	the	
work	of	artistic	composition	has	analogues:	Livingston’s	defence	of	literature	and	artistic	
composition	 in	 general	 as	 rational	 processes,	 for	 example,	 relies	 on	 a	 model	 of	
rationality	 derived	 from	 Michael	 Bratman’s	 work	 on	 practical	 agency,	 in	 which	
“Rationality…	is	a	concept	that	is	only	meaningful	in	relation	to	the	framework	of	action	
and	the	intentional	explanations	that	are	appropriate	to	it.		In	other	words,	no	action	or	
no	intentionality,	no	rationality”	(16).	Against	a	Friedman,	this	model	suggests	that	if	we	
can’t	have	a	distinctive	place	for	the	psychological	categories	that	define	intentionality,	
we	 can’t	 have	 anything	 called	 “action.”	Writing	 about	 literature,	 philosophy,	 and	 law	
from	an	overtly	pragmatist	perspective,	meanwhile,	Gregg	Crane	suggests	that	agency	is	
a	category	defined	by	first-person	awareness	of	what	makes	choices	more	than	sortings:	
agency	is	most	relevant	“in	difficult	cases	where	the	facts	are	complex	or	novel	and/or	
the	rules	seem	to	need	some	form	of	reconsideration	and	modification.”	The	emphasis	
on	 reconsideration	 here	 rests	 on	 the	 same	 basic	 insight	 as	 the	 Livingston-Bratman	
definition	of	rationality	in	relation	to	planning:	all	these	categories	become	relevant	only	
when	 we	 are	 uncertain	 of	 future	 outcomes.	 If,	 by	 something	 like	 the	 economist’s	
presumption	of	officially	 transitive	preferences,	our	choice	will	 establish	our	ends	and	
automatically	 be	 “right,”	 we	may	 do	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 computing,	 but	 have	 nothing	 to	
deliberate,	 do	 no	 agentive	 reasoning.	 Crane	 retains	 less	 of	 an	 interest	 in	 rationality,	
since	he’s	examining	the	moments	at	which	agency	articulates	itself	by	the	willful	resort	
to	the	supra-rational	category	of	intuition,	but	in	the	vocabulary	of	willing	“waiting”	for	
an	 external	 impulse	 to	 resolve	 the	 intractable	 problem,	 he	 too	 insists	 on	 the	
fundamentally	pragmatist	importance	of	temporality	that	most	opposes	deliberation	to	
sorting,	Bast	to	Cates.	Both	Crane	and	Livingston	stress	the	relationship	between	artistic	
work	 and	 this	 kind	 of	 revision-driven,	 exploratory	 deliberative	 agency,	 and	 this	 helps	
explain	why	Bast	ends	up	as	its	central	representative	in	the	novel.		
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This	 connection	 between	 the	 deliberative,	 the	 compositional,	 and	 the	 offstage	
has	 animated	 the	 novel’s	 earlier	 depictions	 of	 artistic	 work	 too.	 Just	 as	 the	 forms	 of	
speech	are	often	framed	in	colonizing	terms,	so	there’s	a	literal	elimination	of	the	spaces	
in	the	novel’s	New	York	where	inner-directed	listening	and	deliberation	can	be	achieved	
uninterrupted.	 Before	 he	 finds	 compositional	 sanctuary	 at	 the	 hospital,	 Bast	 has	
struggled	 to	 find	a	 space	after	 the	outbuilding	at	his	aunts’	house	 is	 first	broken	 into,	
then	exposed	to	the	elements,	and	then	mistakenly	demolished	by	JR	contractors.	The	
world	 that	 blithely	 ordered	 that	 demolition	 then	 scorns	 Bast’s	 struggles	 with	 equally	
oblivious	irony.	When	Crawley	finds	that	Bast	hasn’t	finished	the	compositional	work	on	
time,	he	 reads	Bast’s	 obstacles	 in	 terms	 that	 come	 from	presuming	Bast	 to	be	 a	 JR	or	
Cates	 kind	 of	 person:	 “I	 don’t	 like	 the	 word	 slacker	Mister	 Bast	 but	 I	 must	 say	 your	
intention	here	appears	to	have	been	simply	to	bring	this	work	to	a	hasty	conclusion	and	
get	 on	with	 these	 expanding	 business	 ventures	 you’ve	 been	 sitting	here	 discussing	 all	
this	 time”	 (447).	 	Of	 course,	 it’s	 precisely	 because	Bast	 has	 been	 forced	 to	have	 these	
interminable	 ‘onstage’	 conversations	 that	 the	 unvocalised	 compositional	 work	 has	
proved	 impossible	 to	 complete	 within	 the	 novel’s	 stylistic	 logic.	 As	 long	 as	 Bast	 is	
talking,	 he’s	 not	 composing,	 because	 he’s	 not	 doing	 unvocalized	 revisionary	
deliberation.		
The	logic	of	colonization	ensures	that	even	scenes	that	associate	Bast	with	music	
and	 sympathetic	 interlocutors	 reproduce	 this	 distortion	 of	 compositional	 space	 along	
colonizing	 lines.	On	 the	 one	 occasion	 in	 the	 novel	 that	 Bast	meets	 someone	 open	 to	
reading	his	music	on	its	own	terms,	we	get	a	ratification	of	the	successful	transmission	
of	feeling:			
yes	there’s	a	little	Rameau	there	isn’t	there	mmmmmmmmmm…	
—Well	his	his	piece	The	Gnat	I	just	wanted	the	feeling	of…		
—And	you	certainly	caught	it	didn’t	you	I	feel	prickly	all	over	now”	(547).	
Yet	with	 a	 cruel	 irony	Bast’s	 JR-obligations	 require	him	 to	 interrupt	himself:	 “yes	well	
that’s,	 that’s	 the	string	bass	but	about	the	cemetary	I	 think	you’d	better	talk	to	Mister	
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Hop…”	 (547).	 Bast’s	 distracting	 work	 in	 the	 JR	 system	 denies	 space	 to	 the	 kind	 of	
thoughts	that	originate	that	transmissible	prickly	feeling.		
Even	 so,	 Bast	 has	 throughout	 this	 conversation	 been	 doing	 offstage	
compositional	work.	When	the	cab-ride	ends	and	he	gets	back	to	his	crowded,	JR-Corp-
leased	apartment,	he	tries	to	brush	off	a	conversation	by	pleading	“I	just	want	to	finish	
this	while	it’s	still	in	my	head,	just	to	get	this	last	horn	part	written	out”	(551).		But	even	
music	 itself	 then	 joins	 in	 the	 anti-deliberative	 onslaught:	 the	 hippy	 musician	 Al	
notionally	leaves	Bast	to	work,	but	stops	talking	only	to	play	guitar	in	Bast’s	ear,	“like	go	
ahead	 I	 mean	 I’m	 for	 like	 everybody	 doing	 what	 they	 want	 to	 man,	 plunka	 plunka	
plunk….”	(551).	The	plunking	guitar’s	assault	on	Bast’s	compositional	space	is	associated	
with	 Al’s	 ideal	 of	 undifferentiated	 and	 unfiltered	 expression	 and	 desire:	 the	 contrast	
between	 a	merely	 expressive	 and	 a	 deliberative-compositional	 relation	 to	 art	 sets	 the	
former	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 JR	 assault.	 Gaddis	 suggests	 that	 Bast’s	 own	 emphasis	 on	
“listening”	 is	not	a	matter	of	 joining	a	community	of	 inspired	musicians	as	much	as	a	
step	 toward	 the	 crucial	 “real	 work”	 of	 “thinking”	 and	 “writing,”	 with	 all	 the	 revision-
driven	 possibility	 of	 error.	 At	 any	 rate,	 it’s	 this	 ever-expanding,	 sympathetic-figure-
incorporating,	cruel-irony	sequence	that	Bast’s	transmission	of	deliberation	to	JR	breaks,	
and	 hence	 no	 coincidence	 that	 that	 moment	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 an	 uninterrupted	
compositional	success.	
Interruptions	 and	 colonizations	 even	more	 literal	 explain	Gibbs’	 corresponding	
failure,	 who	 for	 all	 his	 talk	 of	 “what’s	 worth	 doing”	 and	 “living	 deliberately”	 never	
finishes	his	book	project.	I’ve	mentioned	earlier	how	Gibbs’	notionally	resistant	speech	
gets	stylistically	co-opted	into	the	very	flow	that	it	seeks	to	oppose,	and	nowhere	is	this	
made	more	literal	than	in	the	scenes	that	present	Gibbs	working	out	loud	on	his	book	
draft.	Tabbi	suggests	that	Gibbs’	critical	attitude	makes	him	“the	strongest	seer	Gaddis	
has	 yet	 created,”	 and	 the	 novel’s	 presentation	 of	 him	 “actually	 at	 work”	 gives	 us	 “a	
compositional	self…	presented	with	a	directness	and	immediacy…	unexampled	in	recent	
American	 literature”	 (661).	 But	 Gibbs’	 presented	 composition	 makes	 only	 the	 barest	
changes	to	the	draft	sentences	it	mulls	over,	nor	does	it	generate	an	artefact,	nor	does	
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Gibbs	ever	prompt	a	change	in	another	character’s	language-patterns.	The	centrality	of	
offstage	thinking	to	Bast’s	success	reveals	the	problem	in	Tabbi’s	approach:	that	Gibbs	
has	 to	 deliberate	 his	 writing	 choices	 out	 loud	 reflects	 his	 more	 general	 inability	 to	
escape	the	determining	terms	of	precisely	the	world	he	wants	to	reject.74	
The	novel	stylistically	posits	an	explanation	for	this:	Gibbs’	vocalised	composition	
is	 interrupted	constantly	by	the	goings	on	at	the	apartment	where	he’s	trying	to	work,	
with	 his	 writing	 impasses	 matched	 by	 his	 interaction	 with	 the	 clutter	 in	 his	 writing	
space	(Bast’s	JR-leased	apartment):	
he	 tapped	 ashes	 into	 the	 enchiladas,	 tapped	 one	 foot	 against	 the	 other	 on	
Thomas	Register.	—Leveling	men’s	 claims	 to	 being	 absolutely	 equal	 since	 they	
were	 absolutely	 free,	 the	 symmetrical	 motion	 of,	 symmetrical	 motion	 of	 God	
damn	 it,	 the	 symmetrical	motion…	he	 sat	 there	 tapping,	—	where	 the	 hell	 did	
that	come	from…	and	he	had	the	guitar	by	the	throat,	plucked	it,	cradled	it	and	
strummed	a	chord	—can’t	be	his	no	whole	God	damned	thing’s	out	of	tune…	he	
hunched	over	it	trying	strings,	tightening	keys	—owner	must	be	a	deaf	mute…	he	
plucked,	tried	chords,	loosened	a	key,	tightened	one,	tried	a	string,	a	chord,	a	bar	
—thing	of	Granados	how	 the	hell	does	 it	 go…	he	made	a	 fresh	 start.	 	Another.		
The	long	hand	crept	from	NO	DEPOSIT,	passed	the	short,	the	second	hand	swept	
past	them	both	to	NO	RETURN,	reappeared	and	was	gone	—almost	had	it	that	
time	God	damn	it	just	try	to	get	anything	done	here”	(573).			
As	Gibbs	 is	unable	 to	get	below	the	noises	or	 ignore	the	objects	of	 JR’s	world,	so	 they	
resist	 his	 composition	 rather	 than	 vice	 versa.	 The	writing	 environment	 functions	 as	 a	
bridge	 across	which	Gibbs’	writing-paralysis	 and	 his	motions	 correspond.	 Tapping	 on	
the	Thomas	Register	box	matches	his	getting	stuck	on	the	phrase	“symmetrical	motion,”	
while	the	guitar	redirects	his	attention	away	from	his	written	critique	of	the	logic	of	the	
novel’s	onstage	world	to	that	world	itself:	“where	the	hell	did	that	come	from”	can	refer	
to	the	guitar	registering	in	his	attention,	but	also	functions	to	remind	us	of	the	history	of	
the	 present	moment	 he’s	 supposed	 to	 be	writing.	 This	 confusion	 then	 becomes	more	
total	as	his	 “fresh	start”	and	“almost	had	 it”	may	refer	either	 to	continued	attempts	 to																																																									
74	Tabbi	reads	Bast	and	Gibbs	as	equally	viable	models	for	a	compositional-deliberative	alternative--“Like	
Bast,	who	 frees	himself	 from	 J.	R.,	Gibbs	provides	 some	hope	 that	participants	 in	 the	 runaway	can,	 like	
Gaddis,	 emerge	 to	 critique	 it	 (Gibbs’	 book)	or	 furnish	 an	 alternative	 to	 it	 (Bast’s	music)”	 (101)—but	 J	 R	
makes	very	clear	that	his	book	never	“Emerges,”	as	Bast’s	piece	does	quite	literally	at	the	nurse’s	words.		
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play	the	“thing	of	Granados”	on	the	guitar	or	his	work	on	the	writing.	The	possibility	of	
these	 verbs	 of	 work	 referring	 to	 the	 distraction—the	 mimicking	 of	 another’s	
composition,	 no	 less—rather	 than	 the	 project	 reveals	 how	 thoroughly	 his	 anathemas	
have	saturated	him.	And	 it	develops	a	contrast	between	Bast,	who	was	assailed	by	the	
guitar,	and	Gibbs	in	the	guitar-plunking	role	of	self-assailer.			
Chenétier	 at	 one	 point	 describes	 his	 conception	 of	 the	 work	 the	 narrative	
passages	do	as	“3D-ing”	the	novel.	Bast	succeeds	where	Gibbs	doesn’t	because	he	is	a	3D	
thinker,	able	to	have	without	immediately	vocalising	them.	Compare	the	presentation	of	
Gibbs’	 failed	 compositional	 work	 to	 the	 first	 occasion	 on	 which	 Bast	 is	 presented	 at	
work,	just	before	his	first	attempt	to	get	JR	to	slow	down:	
he	sat	on	the	sofa’s	edge	staring	down	at	a	fresh	lined	page	[…]	appearing	to	listen	
as	shreds	of	sound	escaped	sporadic	partings	of	his	lips,	scribbling	a	clef,	notes,	a	
word,	a	curve,	still	reaching	fresh	pages	as	light	chilled	the	skewed	leaves	of	the	
blind	[…]	and	read	a	sharper	pencil,	a	fresh	page,	pages	as	shadows	rose,	crossed,	
fell	hunched	as	though	listening	to	bring	sounds	into	being	[…]”	(286).			
Bast	 is	 able	 to	 work	 and	 keep	 “reaching	 fresh	 pages”	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 interaction	
between	his	own	thought	and	the	narrated	world.	The	narrator’s	perspective	explicitly	
treats	Bast	as	an	integrated	element	of	his	scene,	able	to	“listen”	to	himself,	and	having	
all	 his	 mental	 work	 described	 by	 a	 narrative	 voice	 that	 acknowledges	 its	 inability	 to	
penetrate	 into	 the	 offstage	 psychological	 work	 of	 composition:	 it’s	 all	 “as	 if”	 and	 “as	
though.”	Composition	is	thus	figured	as	private	work	beyond	the	reach	of	the	narrating	
flow	 of	 the	 novel’s	 worldly	 voice.	 Bast	 keeps	making	 progress	 registered	 on	 the	 page	
until	he	is	interrupted.	And	that	interruption	comes	from	Gibbs	himself.	The	novel	thus	
consistently	sets	up	the	contrast	between	the	two	composers	and	their	eventual	degree	
of	 success	 in	 getting	 something	 done	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 respective	 ability	 to	 establish	
mental	 space	 in	 a	 novelistic	 world	 that	 formally	 represents	 the	 physically	 literal	
elimination	 of	 the	 spaces	 where	 such	 thought	 can	 occur.	 Gibbs	 gives	 up	 in	 his	
composition	scene	by	exclaiming:	
How	do	people	[…]	have	one	thought	one	God	damned	thought	one	God	damned	
civilized	thought	in	this	whole	God	damned	get	that	God	damned	thing	once	and	
for	all	God	damn	it…!	He	flung	the	mop	handle	pulled	aside	1899’s	bound	Musical	
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Couriers,	Trade	Extra	1902,	1911,	1909	—no	place	to	put	the	God	damned	things”	
(586).			
The	question	of	where	in	a	world	characterized	by	the	clutter	of	JR’s	business	projects	to	
“put”	 the	 “things”	which	 are	 “thought”	 is	 the	 question	 that	 animates	 the	 novel’s	 form	
and	its	narrative	arc,	and	it’s	Bast	not	Gibbs	who	finally	works	out	the	answer	that	the	
only	place	to	cultivate	them	is	offstage.	Having	articulated	this,	and	having	shown	that	
it’s	possible	for	someone	like	Bast	to	transmit	these	things	into	JR	the	boy	and	hence	J	R	
the	novel,	the	novel’s	final	question	is	what	this	recuperation	of	deliberative	space	can	
achieve	in	the	novel’s	wider	world.	
As	Bast’s	transmission	of	deliberative	patterns	to	JR	is	the	achievement	that	paves	
the	 way	 for	 compositional	 achievement	 in	 the	 hospital,	 so	 that	 compositional	
achievement	paves	the	way	for	Beaton	to	enact	the	novel’s	most	concrete	act	of	frictive	
resistance	 to	 the	 Catesian	 hegemony.	He	 reveals	 that,	 despite	 constant	 commands	 to	
sort	 it	out,	he	has	 let	 the	period	 in	which	Amy	needed	to	sign	her	rights	away	expire,	
thus	handing	control	of	the	corporation	to	her	rather	than	the	hospitalized	Cates.		I’ve	
discussed	this	moment	 in	more	detail	elsewhere,	but	what’s	 important	 for	 the	present	
argument	is	that	even	Cates	himself	implies	a	relationship	between	such	obstruction	of	
corporate	 practice	 and	 the	 hestitant,	 frictive,	 revisionary	 deliberation-work	 of	 artistic	
composition.	 In	between	Bast’s	 achievement	and	 the	beginning	of	 the	conversation	 in	
which	 Beaton	 reveals	 his	 own,	 Cates	 complains	 about	 a	 particular	 subset	 of	 his	
employees:	 “Always	 objecting	 to	 something	 only	 damn	 reason	 they’re	 writers,	 make	
their	 damn	 piece	 the	 country	 could	 get	 on	 with	 its	 business”	 (693).	 	 Cates	 thus	
articulates	 exactly	 what	 Gaddis’	 artist-deliberators	 hope	 to	 achieve:	 an	 obstacular	
friction	related	to	the	depth-psychological	nature	of	their	work.		
This	 work’s	 impact	may	 seem	 purely	 negative,	 but	 it	 helps	 frame	 the	 possible	
value	 of	 an	 achieved	 composition,	 over	 and	 above	 the	 process.	 As	with	 the	 brief	 taxi	
conversation	in	which	Bast	realizes	someone	is	getting	what	he	wants	them	to	out	of	his	
musical	score,	artefacts	are	shown	to	be	able	to	transmit	the	mental	qualities	that	went	
into	 their	 creation.	Many	 critics	have	 already	noted	 J	 R’s	 self-consciousness	 about	 the	
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kind	of	artefact	it	is,	as	in	the	scene	in	which	an	advertisement	for	a	recording	device	is	
dictated,	 “stressing	 its	 importance	to	 longer	works	of	 fiction	now	dismissed	as	classics	
and	remaining	largely	unread	due	to	the	effort	involved	in	reading	and	turning	any	more	
than	 two	 hundred	 pages	 new	 paragraph	 getting	 all	 this?”	 (527).	 What	 these	 critics	
haven’t	previously	understood	is	the	importance	of	this	self-conception	in	terms	of	the	
novel’s	 economy	 of	 the	 transmission	 of	 types	 of	 personhood.	 Angela	 Allan	 offers	 a	
reading	of	 J	 R	 itself	 in	 such	 terms,	 suggesting	 that	 its	 famous	 “difficulty”	establishes	a	
relationship	 between	 author	 and	 reader	 in	 which	 the	 latter’s	 speculations	 as	 to	 the	
former’s	 intent	 create	 a	 necessarily	 “imperfect”	 transmission,	marked	 by	 precisely	 the	
same	 kind	 of	 communicative	 “contingency”	 that	Marsh,	 the	 other	 recent	 J	 R	 critic	 to	
address	 Friedman,	 suggested	 represented	 the	 novel’s	most	 substantial	 rejection	 of	 his	
neoliberal	logic	of	predictability.	The	completed	artwork	in	JR,	then,	might	find	its	role	
in	the	transmission	and	dissemination	of	deliberative	space	even	beyond	the	immediate	
depths	of	the	mind	that	created	it.	Gaddis	suggests,	in	other	words,	that	with	the	help	of	
precisely-composed	 artworks	 like	 itself,75	deliberative	 space	might	 not	 just	 hold	 out	 a	
little	 longer	 against	 the	 colonizing,	 eliminative	 Friedmanite	 approach	 toward	
psychological	categories,	but	actually	go	about	re-conquering	some	of	the	lost	territory.	
	
Before	1973,	and	After	1975	
To	 return	 to	 my	 main	 interlocutor,	 then,	 J	 R	 is	 not,	 as	 Jameson’s	 account	 of	
postmodernism	would	entail,	flat	in	the	senses	of	stylistic	undifferentiation,	disinterest	
in	 depth	 psychology,	 or	 lack	 of	 formal	 development	 over	 its	 750	 pages.	We	 can	 only	
appreciate	its	unflat	design	by	the	kind	of	laborious	“stylistic	description”	I’ve	attempted	
throughout	 this	 chapter,	 and	 such	 description	 is	 precisely	 the	 key	 to—rather	 than	 a	
distraction	 from—identifying	 its	 fine-grained	engagement	with	economic	and	political	
aspects	 of	 its	 historical	 context.	Unsurprisingly	 for	 a	 novel	 composed	 over	 a	 near-20-																																																								
75	Christopher	Knight	usefully	clarifies	the	difference	between	being	able	to	generate	contingency	and	the	
frequent	 postmodern	 appeal	 to	 non-deliberate	 composition:	 “Gaddis	 is	 not	 a	 writer	 who	 relies	 on	
accidents;	he	is	probably	our	most	deliberate	writer,	an	author	who,	as	he	says,	‘even	outlines	paragraphs’”	
(131).	
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year	span	before	its	publication	in	1975,	J	R	 is	not	merely	a	symptom	of	events	in	1973.	
This	 counter-Jamesonian	 approach	 also	 gives	 us	 reason	 to	 revise	 the	 usual	
understanding	of	J	R	as	prophetic	posthumanism,	rather	than	an	attempt	to	recuperate	a	
Knight-style	 faith	 in	 the	 robust	 contingency	 of	 “human	 judgment.”	 As	with	 the	 other	
novels	I	examine	here,	what	Gaddis	called	J	R’s	basic	“stylistic	departures”	initially	serve	
to	articulate	 the	challenge	posed	to	deliberative	agency,	but	modulations	within	those	
initial	 formal	 terms	 develop	 a	 recuperation	 of	 that	 agency’s	 viability	 over	 the	 novel’s	
span.	And	the	commitments	are	antifoundationalist	but	essentially	pragmatic.	
Nevertheless,	 to	 go	 right	 back	 to	 where	 I	 began,	 J	 R’s	 very	 different	 stylistic	
procedures	 from	 those	 in	The	 End	 of	 the	 Road	 make	 its	 particular	 recuperation	 very	
different	as	well.	J	R	 focuses	on	recuperating	deliberative	space	rather	than	Barth-style	
scrutiny	 of	 the	 logical	 viability	 of	 forms	 of	 deliberation	 take	 that	 space	 for	 granted.	
Different	 antimimetic	 forms	 make	 different	 constructive	 arguments.	 Yet	 recall	 that	
Gaddis’	working	notes	 for	 J	 R,	 particularly	 the	 early	ones	 that	presumably	predate	his	
shift	into	the	no-transcribed-psychology	form	in	the	1960s,	were	full	of	Barth-style	notes	
about	deliberative	paralysis,	profusion	of	options,	and	so	on.	As	Michael	LeMahieu	has	
shown	 that	 many	 novels	 of	 this	 period	 start	 out	 with	 explicit	 references	 to	 logical	
positivism	 in	 their	 drafts,	 but	 lose	 them	 by	 time	 of	 publication	 while	 remaining	
animated	 by	 the	 basic	 questions,	 is	 there	 a	 case	 for	 seeing	 J	 R	 as	 a	 Barth	 novel	 in	
disguise?	
The	best	argument	against	doing	so	can	be	found	in	the	notes	for	the	first	project	
Gaddis	 started	 and	 abandoned	 after	 J	 R.	 This,	 as	 he	mentioned	 in	 only	 one	 interview	
before	he	gave	 it	up,	was	 to	be	a	western,	 since	 “every	American	writer	 should	have	a	
Western	 in	them”	(Archive).76	His	archive	preserves	some	very	sporadic	notes	on	“The	
Blood	in	the	Red	White	and	Blue,”	which	reveal	that,	J	R	having	made	the	case	for	the	
viability	of	deliberative	 space,	Gaddis	was	 ready	 to	 return	 to	 the	Barth-style	questions	
that	 treat	 that	 space	 as	 well-argued	 for.	 The	 novel	 would	 have	 addressed	 issues	 of	
causality,	 responsibility,	 decision,	 and	 knowledge:	 a	 melancholic	 paralysis-of-the-will																																																									
76	Hunter	Low	Files,	Box	1,	Folder	2.	
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figure	would	be	encouraged	by	a	nihilistic	mythopoesis-advocate	like	Barth’s	Doctor	to	
carry	out	a	violent	action,	unaware	that	the	encouragement	merely	came	as	the	result	of	
a	wager	between	the	nihilist	and	a	judge	that	the	former	couldn’t	get	the	melancholic	to	
step	up	to	agency.	The	western’s	fabric,	the	notes	suggest,	would	be	conversations	and	
internal	deliberations	about	a	“Whole	string	of	these	arguments	that	defeat	wesrern	[sic]	
reason,”	about	“why	have	faith	with	possibility	of	wager	when	things	can	be	manipulated	
and	 the	 end	 made	 certain,”	 or	 about	 the	 agentive	 force	 of	 consciously	 fictive	
motivations.	 	 Crucially,	 Gaddis	 saw	 this	 proposed	 return	 to	 pre-J	 R	 questions	 as	 an	
explicit	continuation	of	J	R’s	arguments:	“the	problem	of	indecision	&	eventual	paralysis	
of	the	will	//	how	[melancholic]	&	Gibbs	(what	is	(not)	worth	doing)	relate”	(Archive).77	
This	 all	 frames	 J	 R’s	 arguments	 about	 resisting	 the	 elimination	 of	 deliberative	
space	 as	 separate	 but	 related	 questions	 to	 those	 of	 paralysis	 caused	 by	 specific	
arguments	and	deliberative	 textures.	 J	 R’s	arguments	about	deliberation	come	17	years	
after	Barth’s	 but	 are	 logically	 precedent	 to	 them.	With	 the	 argument	made,	 literature	
might	 return	 to	 Barth-type	 questions	 on	 surer	 footing.	 Of	 course,	 Gaddis	 abandoned	
this	 project	 almost	 instantly.	 His	 subsequent	 novels	 aren’t	 so	 rigorously	 excised	 of	
transcriptive	psychology	as	J	R	is,	but	nor	can	they	reasonably	be	read	as	about	Barth-ian	
questions.	J	R	thus	stands	almost	alone	as	Gaddis’	novel	about	the	value	of	deliberative	
agency,	 but	 its	 attempt	 to	 recuperate	 viable	 space	 for	 deliberation	make	 it,	 though	 it	
came	 late	 in	 the	 genre,	 perhaps	 the	 most	 logically	 fundamental	 of	 the	 postmodern	
project	novels,	establishing	the	ground	that	all	the	others	require.	
	 	
																																																								
77	“Notes	on	Western,”	Aborted	Projects.	Box127,	Folder	452.	
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Chapter	3	
Daniel’s	Mockery,	Doctorow’s	Satire:	A	Postmodern	Fiction	Against	Postmodern	
Parody	
	
Linda	 Hutcheon’s	 still-dominant	 mid-1980s	 account	 of	 postmodern	 fiction’s	
political	 capacities	 prioritises	 parody.	 The	 genre	 she	 identified	 and	 constructed,	 the	
historiographical	 metafiction,	 combines	 reference	 to	 real	 historical	 events	 with	
foregrounded	 fictionality,	 in	particular	 a	 comprehensive	 assemblage	of	 discourses	 and	
perspectives	 that	 includes	 imitation	 of	 authoritative	 history.	 That	 authority	 is	 thus	
revealed	as	a	portable	discourse	rather	than	a	natural	quality.	All	postmodern	fiction,	on	
this	 account,	 combines	 antifoundationalist	 assumptions	 with	 a	 refusal	 to	 indulge	 in	
modernist	hermeticism:	it	“satisif[ies]	a	desire	for	‘worldly’	grounding	while	at	the	same	
time	querying	the	very	basis	of	the	authority	of	that	grounding”	(“HM”	5).	 Juxtaposing	
forms	 of	 narrative	 discourse,	 in	 this	model,	 is	 intrinsically	 counter-hegemonic	 action	
because	 such	 linguistic	 iconoclasm	 has	 one	 core	 victim:	 whoever	 the	 parodist,	 “the	
battle	 would	 still	 be	 against	 an	 official	 language”	 (Irony	 71).	 	 Historical	 fictions	 that	
acknowledge	 their	 own	 fictionality	 and	 partiality	 should	 help	 counter-narratives	 to	
proliferate,	 and	 thus	 open	 up	 previously	 unheralded	 historical	 possibilities	 at	 the	
margins	of	culture	and	discourse.		In	this	chapter,	I	show	how	one	of	the	central	novels	
in	Hutcheon’s	account—EL	Doctorow’s	The	Book	of	Daniel—in	fact	offers	a	pre-emptive	
critique	of	just	this	kind	of	faith	in	parody’s	historical	capacities.	
The	Book	of	Daniel—a	fictive	retelling	of	the	Rosenberg	executions,	assembled	in	
many	 voices	 by	 the	Rosenberg-analogue	 Isaacsons’	 son	 for	 submission	 as	 his	 doctoral	
dissertation	in	history—is	certainly	self-conscious	about	its	fictionality,	and	its	narrator	
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is	certainly	a	parodist.78	Foregrounding	his	obsessive	acknowledgement	of	his	inherited	
relation	 to	 state	 power,	 veering	 between	 quotation,	 ventriloquy,	 impersonation	 and	
performances	 of	 objectivity,	Daniel’s	 project—and	 the	novel	 that	 is	 the	 text	he	 finally	
“submits”—seem	 to	 fit	Hutcheon’s	 idea	 of	 the	 polyvocal	 parodic	work	 that	 vindicates	
the	marginalized	 against	 the	 forces	 behind	 “official	 language.”	What,	 then,	 should	we	
make	 of	 the	 moments	 when	 Daniel’s	 parody	 is	 clearly	 turned	 not	 against	 “official”	
institutions,	but	the	very	figures	he’s	so	conscious	of	sharing	marginality	with?	
In	 his	 dissertation’s	 compositional	 present,	 for	 example,	 Daniel	 describes	 his	
youthful	response	to	the	fact	that,	at	the	shelter	where	he	and	his	sister	Susan	were	sent	
after	their	parents’	arrest,	the	mentally	handicapped	Inertia	Kid	had	become	aware	that	
Daniel	 courted	 popularity	 by	 mimicking	 him.	 Daniel’s	 explicit	 present	
acknowledgement	 of	 youthful	 cruelty	 already	 takes	 for	 granted	 that	 linguistic	
appropriation	can	be	a	tool	of	the	privileged	rather	than	the	marginal.	This	sense	of	guilt	
leads	him	to	precede	his	tale	of	the	Inertia	Kid	by	demurring	about	his	own	relation	to	
parody:	“This	is	the	only	time	I	my	life	I	have	ever	performed.		I	haven’t	got	a	performing	
nature”	(171).	Yet	the	passage—starting	with	that	duo-temporal	“this”—makes	clear	that	
Daniel’s	 parodic	 performances	 cover	 a	 lifespan	 and	 a	 range	 of	 forms.	 The	 original	
mockery	is	precise:	Daniel	tells	us	that	“without	having	to	think	about	it,	I	was	able	to	
do	a	perfect	takeoff”	(170).	But	in	the	novel’s	present,	his	discourse	is	a	spiral	of	absurd	
exaggeration:	
He	knew	what	I	was	doing.		I	feel	terrible.		I	feel	the	sickness	of	someone	who	has	
sold	 out.	 Occasionally	 in	 certain	 lights	 the	 idiocy	 of	 his	 expression	 was	
momentarily	erased.		His	face	was	comely.		I	knew	he	was	handsome	and	wise.		I	
was	afraid	 to	 look	at	him.	 	 I	adored	him.	 	 If	 I	had	stayed	at	 the	Shelter	 I	could	
have	taken	care	of	him	and	protected	him	from	impersonations.		Could	Roy	[an	
athletic	‘star’	at	the	shelter]	hit	a	ball,	jump	as	high?	(174-5).																																																											
78	Through	his	dissertation,	Daniel	himself	 is	 responsible	 for	voicing	his	world’s	historical	 figures,	while	
the	 narrative	 development	 avoids	 linear	 telling	 to	 trace	 his	memories,	 his	 present-day	 digressions	 and	
obsessions,	 to	 insert	 “official”	 accounts	 of	 events	 or	 reflections	 on	 his	motives,	 all	 building	 toward	 the	
narration	of	the	scene	in	which	his	parents	are	executed	by	electrocution.	
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The	movement	through	this	response	to	the	acknowledgement	of	cruelty	is	itself	cruelly	
parodic:	from	his	reported	sickness,	through	reformulations	of	the	Kid	as	beatific,	wise,	
reverenced,	to	the	punchline	of	projected	athleticism,	Daniel	constructs	his	own	present	
sickness	and	sense	of	sell-out	as	of	equivalent	risibility	to	the	idea	of	the	Inertia	Kid	as	
baseball	star.	 	This	is	discourse	coded	as	travesty	by	its	intensification	from	reasonable	
to	ridiculous.	The	movement	is	away	from	a	plausibly	felt	remorse	and,	through	parody,	
away	from	the	work	of	self-scrutiny	that	it	might	prompt.	It’s	this	novel-long	indictment	
of	 Daniel’s	 parodic	 “performing	 nature”	 for	 its	 aversion	 to	 real	 possibility	 that	makes	
Doctorow’s	novel	a	pre-emptive	rejection	of	Hutcheon’s	postmodern	politics.	
**	
So	 how	 does	 the	 Doctorow/Hutcheon	 conflict	 on	 parody	 fit	 into	 my	 wider	
concern	with	pro-deliberative	stylistic	argument?	The	Book	of	Daniel,	like	all	the	novels	I	
examine,	 starts	 from	 a	 seemingly	 paralysing	 agentive	 problem.	 Where	 Barth	 was	
interested	in	the	logic	of	choice-making,	and	Gaddis	with	finding	space	for	deliberation	
in	a	world	of	depthless	speech-acts,	the	problem	Doctorow	sets	himself	to	investigate	is	
social	 location’s—or,	 in	 Hutcheon’s	 terms,	 ex-centric	 identity’s—subordinate	
relationship	to	hegemonic	narratives.	Daniel’s	particular	paralyzing	problem	is	that	the	
experiences	which	constitute	his	legacy	have	been	mythologised	so	strongly	by	both	the	
state	whose	power	marginalises	him	and	by	the	persisting	Old	Left	 that	any	action	he	
takes	in	relation	to	that	inheritance	looks	like	reiterating	it:	“I	am	deprived	of	the	chance	
of	resisting	my	government…	If	I	were	to	assassinate	the	president,	the	criminality	of	my	
family,	its	genetic	criminality,	would	be	established.		There	is	nothing	I	can	do,	mild	or	
extreme,	 that	 they	 cannot	 have	 planned	 for”	 (72).	 He	must,	 therefore,	 fulfil	 a	 legacy	
without	 embodying	 a	 “genetic”	 determinism,	 and	 so	 must	 generate	 from	 that	
inheritance	 possibilities	 for	 which	 the	 powers	 that	 marginalise	 him	 have	 not	 already	
planned.		What	distinguishes	Doctorow	from	Barth	and	Gaddis	is	that	he	makes	his	case	
about	viable	agency	primarily	by	showing	how	and	why	his	protagonist	fails.	
Hutcheon	rightly	identifies	Doctorow’s	preoccupation	with	discursive	approaches	
to	this	problem.	Daniel	is	dealing	with	the	inheritance	of	a	struggle	and	of	a	symbolism.		
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When	his	sister	Susan	tells	him	early	on	from	her	bed	in	an	insane	asylum	that	“you	get	
the	 picture”	 (9),	 she	 is	 referring	 to	 his	 understanding	 of	 their	 situation,	 but	 also	 to	 a	
literal	 inheritance:	a	protest-poster	of	their	parents	that	she	has	left	for	him	to	collect.		
Later	in	the	novel	and	earlier	in	its	chronology,	Susan	has	berated	Daniel	for	failing	to	
support	her	 establishment	 of	 a	 fund	 in	 their	 parents’	 name,	which	would,	 she	 thinks,	
“indicate…	 the	proper	 assumption	of	 their	 legacy	by	 the	 Isaacson	 children”	 (79).	 	 The	
ambiguity	 of	 “their”	 here,	 like	 that	 of	 “get,”	 establishes	 the	 givens	 of	Daniel’s	 project:	
that	his	parents	leave	their	experience,	and	that	by	doing	so	they	also	leave	a	duty	that	is	
his	 and	 Susan’s:	 to	 turn	 that	 experience,	 his	 got	 understanding	 of	 it,	 into	 something	
alive.	 	 How,	 he	 wonders,	 can	 he	 recuperate	 parental	 experience	 past	 the	 useless	
martyrdom	for	which	“the	picture”	stands:	 “You’ve	got	 these	two	people	 in	the	poster,	
Daniel,	 now	 how	 you	 going	 to	 get	 them	 out?”	 (42/3).	 	 Fidelity	 to	 their	 experience,	
recuperation	of	their	relationship	to	historical	possibility,	a	way	to	avoid	“keep[ing]	the	
matter	in	my	heart”	(17):	Daniel’s	varied	goals	all	require	re-voicing	history	in	such	a	way	
as	 to	 change	 its	 path.	 Yet	 since	 Daniel	 parodies	 his	 parents	 with	 the	 same	 aversive	
cynicism	as	he	does	 the	 Inertia	Kid,	his	novel-long	project	of	 voices	 achieves	no	 such	
path-change.		
Doctorow	 and	 Hutcheon	 differ	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 discourse	 and	
deliberation.	 Characterizing	 postmodern	 fiction	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 textualist	 anti-
foundationalism	 that	 refuses	 to	 adjudicate	 degrees	 of	 correspondence	 with	 the	 pre-
discursive	world,	Hutcheon	stresses	only	the	articulation	of	one’s	own	perspective	and	
the	 reduction	of	hegemonic	discourses	 to	 the	 same	status	as	all	others.	This	 rules	out	
two	 deliberative	 imperatives:	 that	 marginal	 counter-narratives	 must	 compete	 among	
themselves,	 and	 that	 marginalized	 individuals	 must	 self-scrutinize	 and	 hold	 their	
political	programs	to	standards	outside	those	of	self-expression.	If	the	mere	articulation	
of	 a	 counter-narrative	 is	 automatic	 counter-hegemonic	 work,	 there’s	 no	 room	 for	
different	forms	and	structures	of	discourse-appropriation	to	have	different	implications.	
Across	 Hutcheon’s	 many	 accounts	 of	 specific	 novels,	 therefore,	 only	 one	 particular	
narrative	gets	countered:	
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the	decentred	perspective,	the	‘marginal’	and	what	I	will	be	calling	the	‘ex-centric’	
(be	 it	 in	 class,	 race,	 gender,	 sexual	 orientation,	 or	 ethnicity)	 take	 on	 new	
significance	in	the	 light	of	the	 implied	recognition	that	our	culture	 is	not	really	
the	 homogenous	 monolith	 (that	 is	 middle-class,	 male,	 heterosexual,	 white,	
western)	we	might	have	assumed	(Politics	12).	
If	the	Inertia	Kid	is	paradigmatically	marginal,	and	if	Daniel’s	parents	are	paradigmatic	
victims	of	that	monolith,	Doctorow’s	sceptical	treatment	of	Daniel’s	parodic	inclinations	
emphasizes	 not	 the	 evils	 of	 the	 monolith—which	 the	 novel	 takes	 for	 granted—but	
Daniel’s	own	failings.	The	parodist,	more	than	the	hegemon,	is	the	object	of	the	novel’s	
own	satire.	This	satire	suggests	that	Daniel’s	cynical	response	is	not	inevitable,	and	asks	
what	possibility	he	might	have	generated	had	he	acted	otherwise.	
Where	Hutcheon	propounds	parody	as	a	way	to	undermine	any	discourse’s	claim	
to	 greater	 connection	 with	 Reality	 than	 any	 other,	 Doctorow	 faults	 Daniel	 for	
interposing	 parody	 between	 himself	 and	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 world	 he	 has	 to	 change.	
Where	Hutcheon	insists	on	the	counter-hegemonic	sufficiency	of	the	mere	proliferation	
of	articulated	counter-narratives,	Doctorow	faults	Daniel	for	failure	to	weigh	the	relative	
strengths	of	the	narratives	he	can	propound.	Where	Hutcheon	suggests	that	parody	will	
always	direct	 a	 reader’s	 credulity	 away	 from	official	 inscriptions,	 and	 that	away	 is	 the	
only	 important	 direction,	 Doctorow	 insists	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 orienting	 oneself	 in	
relation	 to	 pre-discursive	 reality.79	He	 suggests	 instead	 that	 fresh	 historical	 possibility	
only	 becomes	 accessible	 when	 marginalised	 counter-narratives	 take	 on	 the	
responsibility	 of	 ongoing	 self-scrutiny	 about	 their	 correspondence	 with	 the	 possible	
world.	 His	 presentation	 of	 Daniel’s	 parodies	 is	 less	 a	 Hutcheonian	 handbook	 than	 a	
study	in	failure,	demonstrating	parody’s	 limitations	as	a	tool	of	political	critique	and	a	
mode	of	historical	action.		
In	 this	 emphasis	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 self-scrutinizing	 practical	
deliberation	and	responsiveness	to	pre-discursive	conditions,	Doctorow	argues	not	only																																																									
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against	too	great	a	faith	in	the	delegitimating	modes	of	parody,	but	against	all	forms	of	
postmodernism	that	equate	anti-essentialism	or	antifoundationalism	with	disinterest	in	
narratives’	 correspondence	 with	 the	 prediscursive	 world.80	If	 the	 novel	 pre-emptively	
critiques	 Hutcheon,	 it	 makes	 this	 case	 against	 its	 contemporaries	 more	 explicitly.	
Daniel’s	 dissertation	 director	 is	 named	 after	 one	 of	 Doctorow’s	 most	 vocally	 anti-
correspondence	novelist	peers,	 and	Daniel	 connects	name	and	commitments:	81		 “I	 ask	
the	question	of	professor	Sukenick:	when	do	we	suspend	criticism”	(192).82	This	allusion	
suggests	firstly	that	the	canonically	postmodern	worldview	is	by	1971,	as	official	overseer	
of	Daniel’s	project,	already	institutionalized,	not	marginal.	Today,	even	after	the	passing	
of	postmodern	theory’s	academic	heyday,	Hutcheon’s	model,	with	all	its	suspensions	of	
marginal	self-criticism,	remains	authoritative	in	accounts	of	postmodern	fiction	and	of	
the	triangular	relation	between	conspicuous	fictionality,	historical	politics,	and	marginal	
identity.	 In	 what	 follows,	 I	 aim	 to	 show	 that	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 Doctorow’s	
treatment	of	parody’s	critical	limitations	can	not	only	improve	our	understanding	of	the	
capacities	 of	 anti-mimetic	 fiction,	 but	 restore	 that	 fiction’s	 contributing	 role	 in	
theoretical	investigations	of	that	triangle.	
I’ll	make	 this	 case	 in	 four	parts:	 first,	 some	methodological	 clarifications	 about	
the	 relationship	 between	 parody	 and	 fictionality;	 then,	 the	 ways	 Doctorow	 frames																																																									
80 	While	 most	 of	 my	 subsequent	 examples	 from	 Hutcheon’s	 own	 generation	 of	 both	 postmodern	
theorizers	and	feminist	political	thinkers,	the	obvious	aegis	figure	for	the	disinterest	in	correspondence	is	
Richard	Rorty.	
81	While	 part	 of	 my	 project	 is	 to	 separate	 out	 authors	 whose	 forms	 and	 commitments	 are	 too	 often	
conflated,	Doctorow	and	Sukenick	are	already	far	enough	apart	that	they	tend	to	come	down	on	opposite	
sides	 whenever	 people	 do	 parse	 the	 generation.	 Daniel	 Punday’s	 distinction	 follows	 the	 usual	 dividing	
line:	 “We	 can	 distinguish	 between	 two	 traditions	 within	 recent	 experimental	 American	 fiction:	 the	
historical	 and	 self-reflexive.	 In	 the	 former	 category	 we	 can	 place	 writers	 like	 Thomas	 Pynchon,	 Don	
Delillo,	and	EL	Doctorow;	in	the	latter	we	can	place	writers	like	Raymond	Federman,	Clarence	Major,	and	
Sukenick.	 Although	 early	 criticism	 tended	 to	 celebrate	 the	 radical	 formal	 experiments	 of	 the	 latter	
group—in	part	because	this	group	was	more	 insistent	on	offering	the	explanations	of	their	own	formals	
goals	that	I	have	quoted	in	this	section—the	former	group	has	garnered	the	lion’s	share	of	recent	study”	
(52-3).	What	this	dissertation—and	this	chapter’s	treatment	of	conspicuous	fictionality—shows,	however,	
is	that	the	former	group	are	equally	formally	self-reflexive:	the	difference	between	the	groups	is	not	in	the	
Degree	of	formal	self-consciousness,	but	the	rhetorical	modes	and	philosophical	commitments	they	put	it	
in	the	service	of.	
82	As	I	establish	in	Appendix	A,	Ronald	Sukenick	is	perhaps	the	most	coherent	self-theoriser	until	Kathy	
Acker	 among	 those	of	Doctorow’s	peers	 committed	 to	 the	hyper-articulation	of	 the	postmodern	givens	
against	which	my	tradition	of	authors	work.			
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Daniel’s	 parodies	 of	 marginalised	 figures	 in	 the	 novel’s	 first	 half	 as	 pathologically	
avoidant	 of	 contact	with	 genuine	 historical	 possibility;	 I	 then	 examine	where	 this	 re-
situates	 the	 novel,	 and	 postmodern	 fiction	 in	 general,	 in	 relation	 to	 feminist	 political	
models	of	plurality	and	pluralism;	finally,	I	show	where	Doctorow	suggests	that	the	kind	
of	possibilities	Daniel’s	parody	shirks	might	viably	be	found,	by	examining	what	Daniel’s	
recitations	of	critical-theory	narratively	forestall	in	the	novel’s	second	half.	
	
Part	1:	Entailments	of	Travesty	
The	Inertia	Kid	section	clarifies	that	we	should	understand	Daniel’s	response	to	
his	paralyzing	problem	in	parodic	terms.	Doctorow	and	parody	are	central	not	only	to	
Hutcheon’s	 account	 of	 all	 postmodern	 fiction,	 but	 also	 to	 the	 similarly	 totalizing	
Frederic	 Jameson:	parody	 is	 the	 shared	axis	 across	which	 they	most	 strongly	disagree.	
For	 Jameson,	 postmodern	 fictive	 form	 is	 all	 parody,	 but	 mere	 pastiche,	 “a	 neutral	
practice…	without	 any	 of	 parody’s	 ulterior	motives,	 amputated	 of	 the	 satiric	 impulse,	
devoid	of	laughter	and	of	any	conviction	that	alongside	the	abnormal	tongue	you	have	
momentarily	borrowed,	some	healthy	linguistic	normality	still	exists”	(17).	This	is	parody	
as	 cynicism	 about	 historical	 agency:	 where	 Hutcheon	 finds	 postmodern	 parody	 a	
universal	challenge	to	the	power	of	the	single	discourse	History,	Jameson	sees	it	as	the	
hollowing	 out	 of	 literature’s	 capacity	 to	 represent	 history	 directly.83	Doctorow’s	 value,	
for	Jameson,	is	that	his	formal	innovations	in	novels	like	Ragtime	at	least	register	this	as	
an	inescapable	problem,	presenting	a	world	“condemned	to	seek	History	by	way	of	our	
own	pop	images	and	simulacra	of	that	history	which	itself	remains	forever	out	of	reach.”	
Such	is	that	situation,	though,	that	Doctorow	can	only	present	it	by	a	kind	of	sad	jerry-
rigged	compromise:	“he	has	to	convey	this	great	theme	formally	(since	the	waning	of	the	
content	is	very	precisely	his	subject,	and,	more	than	that,	has	had	to	elaborate	his	work	
by	 way	 of	 that	 very	 cultural	 logic	 of	 the	 postmodern	 which	 is	 itself	 the	 mark	 and	
symptom	 of	 his	 dilemma”	 (25).	 Jameson’s	 language	 suggests	 that	 “formal	 conveying”																																																									
83 	Jameson,	 for	 whom	 all	 productive	 agency	 is	 historical	 in	 the	 Marxist	 sense,	 associates	 the	 “new	
depthlessness”	of	postmodern	form	with	a	“consequent	weakening	of	history”	(6).	
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must	be	a	weak	last	resort	rather	than	a	medium-specific	artistic	achievement,	and	that	
the	 ambitions	 of	 “postmodern”	 form	 must	 be	 limited	 to	 mirroring	 and	 lamenting.	
There’s	 no	 room	 here	 for	 anti-mimetic	 forms	 capable	 of	 constructing,	 modelling,	 or	
arguing	 for	 alternative	 worldviews.	 Hutcheon’s	 counterpart	 optimism—whose	
Bakhtinian	 foundations	 presume,	 against	 Jameson,	 a	 relationship	 between	 mere	
discourse	and	agentive	social	 life—at	 least	avoids	 these	dubious	claims,	but	as	 long	as	
these	 remain	 the	 dominant	 accounts	 of	 postmodern	 fiction, 84 	we’re	 stuck	 with		
competing	 reductions	of	 parody—and	postmodern	 form	 in	 general—to	 a	 single	mode	
with	 a	 single	 rhetoric:	 neither	 can	 account	 for	 the	distinction	between	Doctorow	 and	
Daniel’s	parodic	modes.		
Beyond	 the	 merely	 literary-critical,	 Hutcheon’s	 faith	 in	 parody	 has	 roots	 in	 a	
wider	 mid-1980s	 wave	 of	 feminist	 scholars	 across	 the	 disciplines	 revising	 their	
disciplines’	 thinking	 about	 plurality	 and	 validity	 in	 terms	 of	 discourse-mastery.	 The	
feminist	sociologist	Patti	Lather,	for	example,	aimed	to	“rupture	validity	as	a	regime	of	
truth…	 displace	 its	 historical	 inscription	 toward	 ‘doing	 the	 police	 in	 different	 voices’”	
(674).	 	Exposing	methods	whose	claim	to	objectivity	had	become	naturalised	 for	 their	
actual	 contingency	 and	 self-interest	 would	 open	 a	 space	 for	 “counter-practices	 of	
authority	 that	 are	 adequate	 to	 emancipatory	 interests”	 (674).	 	 Like	 Hutcheon	 Lather	
suggests	 that	 ex-centric	 experience	 will	 be	 “recognised”	 the	 moment	 the	 “official”	
language	 is	 undermined,	 and	 that	 discourse-mastery	 and	 the	 foregrounding	 of	 “self-
conscious	partiality”	(Lather	683)	is	sufficient	to	this	end.		
The	stakes	of	this	movement	were,	finally,	a	re-writing	of	the	concept	of	validity	
in	discursive	terms.85	Doing	away	with	the	dominant	notion	of	truth	as	correspondence	
to	objective	facts—which	Lather	like	Hutcheon	associates	with	hegemony—measuring	a	
project’s	validity	by	its	demonstrated	range	of	methodological	repertoire	rather	than	its	
																																																								
84	Particularly	 since,	 as	 I	 discussed	 in	 the	 introduction,	 no	 alternative	 account	 of	 postmodern	 form	has	
superceded	them	and	Brian	McHale	since	the	1991	publication	of	Jameson’s	book.	
85	Lather,	 propounding	 the	parodic	mode	 for	 a	non-literary	 field,	hoped	 to	 “reinscribe	 validity	 in	 a	way	
that	uses	the	antifoundational	problematic	to	 loosen	the	master	code	of	positivism	that	continues	to	so	
shape	even	postpositivism”	(673).			
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application	of	 dominant	 standard,	 sociologists	 could	pursue	new	 forms	of	 knowledge.	
Hutcheon	and	Lather	both	proceed	from	a	Rorty-an	antifoundationalism	which	suggests	
that,	since	a	narrative	that	foregrounds	its	own	narrativity	foregoes	the	claim	to	greater	
grounding	 in	 some	 “objective”	 account	 of	 experience	 or	 factual	 conditions	 than	 any	
other,	 there	 is	 nothing	 for	 such	narratives	 to	 contest	 other	 than	 discursive	 centrality.		
This	 leads,	 in	 its	 purest	 form,	 to	 an	 attack	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 public	 discussion	 about	
commensurable	stakes.	This	attack	resolves	into	directness	by	the	early	90s,	in	texts	less	
concerned	with	parody	per	se	than	with	the	fundamental	discursive-power	questions	of	
whose	voice	is	granted	public	recognition.	Writing	against	categories	like	pluralism	and	
deliberation	 through	attacks	on	 their	public	 state-mediated	modes,	 thinkers	 like	Ellen	
Rooney	 and	 Lynn	 Sanders	 base	 a	 defence	 of	 marginal	 interests	 on	 that	 basic	 anti-
foundationalism,	 and	 a	 rejection	 of	 the	 category	 of	 “general	 persuasion”	 (Rooney	 63).	
Their	 positive	 proposals	 thus	 align	 with	 Hutcheon’s,	 limited	 to	 articulation	 and	
awareness	alone:	Rooney	recommends	“the	 foregrounding	of	 interests,	with	exclusions	
as	the	inevitable	and	clearly	articulated	consequence”	(63),	and	Sanders	that	testimony	
be	 prioritized	 over	 deliberation. 86 	This	 movement’s	 fundamental	 disinterest	 in	
constructing	grounds	on	which	to	dispute	relative	correspondence	to	the	prediscursive	
world	 rules	 out	 the	 possibility	 that	 marginal	 methods	 like	 Daniel’s	 parody	 may	 be	
invalid,	 that	 the	marginalised	and	excluded	could	have	any	duties	of	self-scrutiny,	any	
external	 standards	 to	hold	 themselves	 to	 in	pursuit	 of	 their	 own	 interests.	This	 is	 the	
underlying	logic	of	Hutcheon’s	account	of	postmodern	fiction’s	political	methods.		
																																																								
86	In	her	Althusserian	argument	against	pluralism,	for	example,	Ellen	Rooney	refuses	“debate”	whose	bad-
faith,	 exclusionary,	 pre-determined	 terms	 encode	 the	 wilful	 exclusion	 of	 marginal	 experiences	 and	
attitudes	 unamenable	 to	 “general	 persuasion.”	 She	 calls	 instead	 for	 modes	 of	 public	 interaction	 that	
acknowledge	 “the	 irreducibility	 of	 the	 margin	 in	 all	 explanation”	 and	 promote	 “the	 foregrounding	 of	
interests,	 with	 exclusions	 as	 the	 inevitable	 and	 clearly	 articulated	 consequence”	 (63).	 Combining	 such	
commitments	with	a	radically-incommensurable	account	of	“interests”	rule	out	public	models	for	even	the	
minimal	sense	of	deliberation	(purposively	weighing	alternative	actions	against	each	other	in	relation	to	
the	value	of	achieving	particular	goals)	with	which	this	dissertation	is	concerned.	And	the	stakes	tend	to	
blur	 public	 objections	 into	 the	 private	 realm.	 Political	 theorist	 Lynn	 Sanders’	 “Against	Deliberation,”	 a	
kind	 of	 culminating	 document	 of	 the	 movement	 in	 which	 Hutcheon’s,	 Lather’s,	 and	 Rooney’s	 work	
constitutes	the	consolidating	stage,	also	treats	deliberation	as	a	merely	public	matter,	acknowledging	no	
connections	between	 the	 internal	 psychological	 forms	of	 deliberation	 and	 the	public	world.	 She	 argues	
against	the	concept	tout	court	on	the	basis	of	its	potential	public	misapplication.	
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Sharing	 terms	 with	 these	 subsequent	 non-art-focused	 thinkers,	 Hutcheon	
suggests	that	“postmodernism	is	about	art’s	dispersal,	its	plurality,	by	which	I	certainly	
don’t	mean	pluralism.	Pluralism	is,	as	we	know,	that	fantasy	that	art	is	free,	free	of	other	
discourses,	 institutions,	 free,	 above	 all,	 of	 history”	 (Politics	 191).	 	 Plurality	 here	names	
the	 postmodern	 preoccupation	 with	 cultivating	 unconstrained	 proliferation	 at	 the	
expense	of	refining	decisions	through	deliberative	weighing.		The	geometry	of	“dispersal”	
recapitulates	Hutcheon’s	implication	that	ex-centric	narratives	never	collide	and	conflict,	
but	 only	 draw	power	 away	 from	a	 contingent	 centre.	 	 “Away”	 is	 here,	 again,	 the	 only	
important	direction.		This	plurality	founds	its	claims	to	political	validity	precisely	on	the	
rejection	of	competition,	of	correspondence,	of	all	forms	of	multi-directional	refutation,	
which	it	calls	pluralism;	it’s	fundamental	to	the	historiographical	metafiction	model	that	
its	marginal	narratives	do	not	compete,	 they	merely	accrue.	 	The	constructive	options	
open	to	marginal	resistors,	then,	become	limited	to	the	generation	of	new	narratives	by	
self-expression,	 and	 the	adding	of	 these	new	narratives	 to	 the	general	 anti-hegemonic	
mass:	both	actions	intrinsically	and	sufficiently	serve	ex-centric	interest.		
Doctorow	 starts	 from	 disagreement	 with	 this	 sufficiency-claim:	 the	 Inertia	 Kid	
passages	show	that	parodic	articulations	can	reinforce	marginality,	while	Daniel	himself	
knows	that	mere	re-voicings	don’t	change	the	underlying	world:	his	parents	“suffer	the	
same	fate	no	matter	what	version	is	told”	(63).	 	 If	their	experience	is	to	be	repurposed	
for	 “emancipatory	 interests,”	 then	 it	 is	 not	 sufficient	 merely	 to	 articulate	 it	 from	 a	
previously	unofficial	angle.	Daniel’s	accuracy	as	a	mimic	of	“official	 language”	is	not	in	
doubt,	 but	 in	 Lather’s	 Dickensian	 terms,	 he	 “do	 the	 police”—the	 official,	 the	
authoritative	and	the	powerful—in	fairly	accurate	voices;	it’s	the	ex-centric	for	whom	he	
reserves	 the	 voices	 caricatured	 enough	 to	 be	 “different.”	 While	 historiographical	
metafiction’s	core	argument	is	often	taken	to	be	the	promotion	of	the	claim	that	there	is	
more	 than	 one	 truth	 in	 any	 history,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 limit	 of	Doctorow’s	 argument:	 he	
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acknowledges	 the	 plurality	 of	 interests	 and	perspectives	while	 insisting	 that	 there	 are	
some	conditions	immune	to	simple	re-narrating.87	
The	 Book	 of	 Daniel	 offers	 an	 alternative	 interest-foregrounding,	
antifoundationalist	account	of	marginal	agency	that	nevertheless	makes	correspondence	
fundamental	 to	 “emancipatory	 projects.”	 Subsequent	 work	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	 anti-
foundationalist	 feminist	 political	 theory	 out	 of	 which	 Hutcheon’s	 model	 grew	 has	
generated	many	accounts	of	agency,	solidarity,	and	praxis	that	row	back	the	disinterest	
in	correspondence	or	formulate	new	accounts	of	validity	that	aren’t	mere	self-assertion.	
But	the	criticism	of	postmodern	fiction	has	remained	in	Hutcheonian	mode.	Happily,	I	
hope	to	show,	the	fiction	 itself	was	already	well	ahead	of	that	game.	The	novel	has	 its	
own	 coherent	 take	 on	 the	 interaction	 between	 concepts	 like	 validity,	 interest,	
marginality	and	possibility	whose	definitions	in	contemporary	literary	scholarship	come	
almost	 entirely	 from	 Hutcheon,	 Lather	 and	 Rooney’s	 critical	 generation.	 	 Closer	
attention	to	the	novels	whose	formal	practice	was	a	model	for	the	theorising,	I	suggest,	
can	make	the	fiction	important	to	the	current	trajectory	of	the	theorizing.	
Finally,	it’s	worth	examining	what	critics	have	lost	in	attempting	to	move	beyond	
Hutcheon	 by	 leaving	 the	 question	 of	 parody	 behind.	 Occasional	 criticisms	 of	 her	
treatment	of	parody	have	emerged,	 in	particular	of	her	model’s	 inability	to	distinguish	
directed	 impersonation	 and	 the	mere	 proliferation	 of	 unhierarchized	discourse-forms:	
this	may	stem	from	conflations	in	her	major	influence	Bakhtin	himself.88	Most	attempts	
																																																								
87	In	the	wake	of	Hutcheon’s	work,	though,	he	is	often	treated	as	a	paradigmatic	example	of	this	approach:	
see	 Philipp	 Löffler,	 for	 example,	 who	 uses	 Doctorow	 as	 the	 paradigm	 “postmodern”	 historical	 novelist	
defined	 by	 “sceptical	 statements	 about	 the	 reliability	 of	 historical	 knowledge”	 to	 contrast	 with	 the	
“pluralist”	 Don	DeLillo,	 characterized	 by	 his	 awareness	 of	 historical	 actions’	 being	 “historically	 limited	
because	they	are	tied	to	the	inner	logic	of	closed	cultural	systems”	(36).	Löffler’s	“pluralism”	is	defined	by	
an	 ability	 to	 imagine	 futurities	 free	 from	 the	 “limitation”	 of	 past	 history,	 which,	 as	 I’ll	 show	 in	 this	
chapter’s	 final	 section,	has	a	 lot	 to	do	with	Doctorow’s	approach.	Complicatedly,	 “pluralism”	 is	Löffler’s	
term	for	an	approach	to	history	and	knowledge	that	treats	it	as	produced	in	the	interest	of	“individual	life	
models”	rather	than	abstractly	or	objectively	(28),	which	is	to	say,	his	version	of	“pluralism”	is	motivated	
by	 the	 same	 logic	 for	 which	 Rooney	 attacks	 “pluralism.”	 I’ll	 complicate	 things	 further	 by	 connecting	
Doctorow’s	deliberative	imperatives	to	a	kind	of	pluralism….		
88	Alan	Singer	identifies	the	weakness	of	Bakhtin’s	model	of	parody	as	his	treating	Syncreisis	(proliferation	
based	 on	 natural	 differences)	 and	 Anacrisis	 (dialogue	 based	 on	 intended	 distinction)	 at	 the	 same	
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to	 re-read	 the	 workings	 of	 postmodern	 historical	 fiction,	 though,	 have	 done	 so	 by	
sidelining	the	question	of	parody,	leaving	Hutcheon’s	account	of	it	intact.	The	focus	of	
such	 rereading	has	 been	whether	 postmodern	 fiction	was	 ever	 so	 disinterested	 in	 the	
accessible	 Real	 as	 Hutcheon	 and	 Jameson	 took	 for	 granted.	 	Where	 Amy	 Elias	 reads	
postmodern	fiction’s	historiography	in	terms	of	its	engagement	with	an	inaccessible	but	
organising	 “historical	 sublime,”	 and	 Eric	 Berlatsky	 includes	 Doctorow	 among	 the	
authors	he	sees	making	an	ethical	case	for	supra-verbally	mimetic	engagements	with	an	
ineffable	 but	 palpable	 historical	 real	 (189),	 both	 downplay	 the	 fiction’s	 interest	 in	 the	
practice	and	stakes	of	discourse-appropriation.	 	Such	approaches	can’t	tell	us	anything	
more	than	Hutcheon	about	Doctorow’s	treatment	of	discourse,	and	they	leave	intact	the	
central	tenet	of	Hutcheon’s	model	that	I	want	to	dispute:	that	wheresoever	postmodern	
fiction	 parodies,	 it	 does	 effectual	 anti-hegemonic	 work.	 In	 the	 occasional	 persisting	
discussions	 of	 the	 fiction’s	 discursive	 politics,	 Hutcheon’s	 model,	 founded	 on	 the	
presumption	of	that	disinterest	in	the	prediscursive	real,	continues	to	dominate.	
The	 strongest	 developments	 in	 line	 with	 my	 counter-Hutcheonian	 reading	 of	
Doctorow	 have	 thus	 tended	 to	 come	 from	 critics	 interested	 in	 postmodernism	 but	
discontented	with	the	totalizing	nature	of	the	dominant	accounts	of	its	formal	politics.	
Timothy	 Bewes,	 for	 example,	 noted	 in	 the	 late	 1990s	 how	 postmodern	 theory	 had	
ossified	 to	 such	 a	 degree	 that	 “any	 attachment	 to	 useful	 notions	 such	 as	 identity	 or	
subjective	agency	is	dismissed	as	‘essentialist’	by	a	banal	sensibility	for	which	‘irony’	and	
‘parody’	 enjoy	 the	 status	 of	 perverse	 creeds”	 (47).	 These	 creeds	 may	 not	 dominate	
literary	 theory	 as	 they	 once	 did,	 but	 insofar	 as	 the	 experimental	 fiction	 of	 the	
postmodern	 era	 remains	 presumed	 to	 share	 values	with	 theoretical	 “postmodernism,”	
authors	 like	Doctorow	remain	presumed	guilty	of	 the	creed.	As	Bewes	suggested	back	
then,	more	precision	about	the	 formal	distinctions	of	 individual	texts	may	be	the	only	
way	 to	 shake	 this	 conflation.	 Sue	 J.	 Kim,	meanwhile,	makes	 a	 similar	 case	 about	 the	
reductive	 equation	 between	 philosophical	 anti-essentialism,	 formal	 anti-mimesis,	 and																																																																																																																																																																																	
level.		Hutcheon’s	use	of	Bakhtin	to	endorse	her	emphasis	on	proliferation	seems	to	suggest	that	any	valid	
Anacrisis	will	essentially	do	the	political	work	of	Syncreisis.		
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the	 promotion	of	 ex-centric	 interests,	 her	 central	 question	being	 “why…	does	 just	 the	
fact	 of	 recognizing	 this	 basic	nonfoundationalism	become	a	means	 toward	 liberation?	
And	why	does	 the	reverse…	 immediately	become	politically	 reactionary?”	 (8).	Offering	
first	 an	 explanation	 for	 the	 discursive	 emphasis	 of	 criticism	 of	 non-realist	 fiction	 by	
authors	 of	marginalized	 identity,89	and	 then	 readings	 of	 specific	 texts	 that	 show	 how	
specific	 forms	offer	differing	arguments	about	 race,	 she	dissolves	 the	conflation	of	ex-
centric	 interests,	 non-realist	 form,	 and	 singular	 counter-hegemonic	 rhetoric.	 For	 both	
Bewes	and	Kim,	the	imperative	is	to	get	at	a	better	account	of	the	political	implications	
by	being	more	precise	about	the	specifics	of	the	form.		
Critics	 who	 approach	 postmodern	 historical	 fiction	 without	 Hutcheon’s	
awareness	of	their	interest	in	the	forms	and	stakes	of	historical	discursivity	lose	a	lot	by	
the	omission,	then,	but	plenty	remains	to	be	done	to	overcome	the	reductiveness	of	her	
formal	account.	Doctorow	pre-emptively	disagrees	with	it,	figuring	Daniel	as	a	master	of	
discursive	appropriation,	whose	interests	are	always	to	the	fore,	yet	whose	methods	fail	
by	 the	standards	Hutcheon,	Lather	and	others	propound.	The	novel	clearly	 traces	 this	
failure	 to	 parody’s	 shirking	 of	 the	 imperative	 to	 deliberative	 self-refinement:	 the	 very	
orientation	 for	 which	 Hutcheon’s	 peers,	 with	 their	 focus	 on	 the	 value	 of	 mere	
articulation,	celebrate	it.	Doctorow,	by	contrast,	suggests	that	readers	should	avoid	the	
temptations	of	revelling	in	delegitimizing	parody	if	they	share	the	novel’s	“emancipatory	
interests.”	 As	 I’ll	 show,	 the	 fundamental	 flaw	 of	 previous	 criticism	 has	 been	 its	
misunderstanding	of	what	the	novel’s	fictionality	allows	Doctorow	to	argue.	It’s	on	this	
aspect	of	his	medium	that	the	novel’s	covalent	treatment	of	parody	and	of	marginalized	
historical	agency	hang	together.	
**	
Berlatsky	defends	postmodernism’s	 capacity	 for	 constructive	ethical	 thought	by	
defending	 its	 capacity	 for	 mimesis:	 “While	 it	 is	 common	 to	 read	 postmodernism	 as																																																									
89	Of	the	critics	who	set	the	agenda	for	this	field	in	the	1980s,	she	notes	“because	their	primary	concern	at	
that	 historical	 moment	 was	 to	 argue	 against	 essentialisms,	 they	 focus	 more	 on	 the	 power	 of	 social	
articulation	than	of	social	structures”	(31).		
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antimimetic	 and	 therefore	 inimical	 to	 ethical	 investigation,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 now	 time	 to	
confront	 the	 postmodern	 as	 a	 version	 of	mimeticism	 and	 as	 a	 confrontation	with	 the	
ethical,	 whatever	 its	 historical	 origins”	 (196).		 His	 apparently	 alternative	 approach	
maintains	the	logic	of	the	“therefore”:	only	by	rejecting	antimimesis	can	a	text	“confront	
the	 ethical.”	 As	 I’ve	 argued	 throughout	 this	 project,	 though,	 the	 ethical	 concern	with	
deliberative	 agency	 in	 the	 novels	 I	 examine	 is	 articulated	 through	 antimimetic	
techniques	 that	 make	 an	 awareness	 of	 their	 fictionality	 and	 prose-conventional	
departures	essential	to	their	rhetoric,	and	Doctorow	is	no	exception.		The	Book	of	Daniel	
does	make	the	difference	between	the	discursive	and	the	real	salient,	but	within	formal	
structures	that	rely	on	readers’	awareness	that	what	we’re	reading	is	discursive	material	
that	operates	on	fiction’s	ontological	conditions.	
These	 conditions	 have	 led	 to	 confusions	 that	 range	 over	 the	 full	 set	 of	 critical	
judgments	about	Doctorow’s	degrees	of	mimesis.	Steven	Weisenburger	(of	whom	more	
later)	 explicitly	 leaves	 The	 Book	 of	 Daniel	 out	 of	 his	 book-length	 account	 of	 the	
“delegitimizing”	 strain	of	 postmodern	 satire	because	he	 sees	 it	 as	 less	 concerned	with	
discursivity	 than	with	 representing	history	 in	 “a	 tense,	 psychological	 treatment	 of	 the	
trial’s	aftermath	as	seen	through	one	of	the	surviving	Rosenberg	sons”	(190).	 	This	odd	
account	treats	Daniel	as	realistic	to	the	point	of	being	real	humans’	offspring.	Hutcheon,	
meanwhile,	 talks	 on	 different	 occasions	 about	 the	 novel	 aiming	 to	 recuperate	 the	
experience	 of	 the	 real	 Rosenbergs,	 and	 of	 Daniel’s	 presentation	 of	 the	 Isaacsons	
entailing	 that	 the	 real	 Rosenbergs’	 failures	 of	 postmodern	 understanding	make	 them	
responsible	 for	 their	 own	 deaths.90	If	 Hutcheon	 and	 Weisenburger	 court	 ontological	
incoherence	by	mixing	 the	blood	of	 real	 and	 fictional	 creatures,	 Jameson	 is	 unable	 to	
acknowledge	 that	 under	 postmodern	 conditions	 one	 realm	might	 viably	 bear	 on	 the	
other:	 he	 denies	 the	 historical	 relevance	 of	 rhetorical	 parallels	 Hutcheon	 identifies	
between	Doctorow’s	presentation	of	three	distinct	families	in	the	much	more	Hutcheon-
compatible	Ragtime	on	the	basis	of	“Houdini	being	a	historical	 figure,	Tateh	a	fictional																																																									
90	Discussing	how	Doctorow’s	novel	narrates	 “The	Rosenbergs”	 leads	her	 to	argue	 that	 “the	victims”	are	
death-culpable	for	their	“faith	in	both	history	and	reason.”	(Poetics	54).	
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one,	and	Coalhouse	an	intertextual	one”	(22).	Before	I	pursue	the	details	of	my	rhetorical	
understanding	 of	 Doctorow’s	 critique	 of	 Daniel,	 then,	 I	 need	 to	 show	 how	 the	 novel	
steers	 its	 readers	 a	 coherent	 path	 between	 taking	 the	 objects	 of	 fictionality-
foregrounding	 fiction	 as	 ontologically	 intermeshed	with	 the	Real,	 and	maintaining	 an	
unbridgable	chasm	of	relevance	between	ontological	kinds.	
Understanding	the	work	parody	does	in	the	novel	requires	understanding	exactly	
how	 the	 varying	 layers	 of	 parody	 depend	 on	 the	 novel’s	 conspicuous	 fictionality.	
Hegemonic	history,	 in	Hutcheon’s	model,	 is	undermined	by	 its	 revealed	 inseparability	
from	fiction,	but	the	equation	cannot	be	total.	Theorist	of	fictionality	Richard	Walsh,	in	
quibbling	with	Hutcheon’s	 reading	of	parody	 in	another	historiographical	metafiction,	
rightly	makes	the	distinctions:	“The	status	and	rhetorical	stance	of	the	author,	Rushdie,	
is	 elided	with	 that	of	his	 fictional	narrator,	Saleem	Sinai…”	 (41/2)	and	 “Saleem	doesn’t	
parody	 here,	 Rushdie	 does”	 (42).	 The	 same	 objections,	 as	 I’ve	 suggested,	 apply	 to	
Hutcheon’s	 treatment	 of	 Doctorow	 and	Daniel:	 the	 root	 problem	 is	 the	 conflation	 of	
narrativity	with	 fictionality.91	It’s	 important	 to	my	 reading	of	 the	novel	 that	Doctorow	
exploits	 the	 pragmatics	 of	 fictionality,	 while	 Daniel	 only	 narrativises.	 	 As	 its	 name	
suggests,	 historiographical	 metafiction	 requires	 that	 readers	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 fiction’s	
fictionality:	 without	 such	 an	 awareness,	 the	 authoritative	 discourse-forms	 of	 ‘history’	
could	not	 be	 undermined	by	 their	 setting	 in	 a	 fictional	 context.92		 Yet	 fiction	 is	more	
than	just	an	ungrounded	form	of	narrative.	It	conjures	“existence”	in	specific	ways	that	
bear	on	its	rhetorical	methods,	and	on	the	question	of	how	possibilities	can	be	said	to	
exist	internally	to	its	world.	
																																																								
91	Debate	rages	over	both	concepts,	but	in	this	context	the	major	difference	is	that	narrativity	concerns	the	
processes	 by	 which	 evental	 material	 is	 selected,	 connected,	 and	 presented,	 whereas	 fictionality	 is	 an	
ontological	category	concerning	the	ontological	distinctions	between	the	narrated	world	and	the	world	in	
which	 the	author	and	 reader	 interact.	Crucially,	 the	narrativity-conditions	of	 real	 and	 fictional	material	
are	 not	 identical,	 as	 the	 conditions	 in	 which	 it	 makes	 sense	 to	 think	 of	 material	 being	 excluded	 from	
narrative	presentation	don’t	match	up.	
92	That’s	brought	to	bear	by	the	shift	from	Rosenberg	to	Isaacson	–	a	kind	of	pseudo-paratext.	Footnote:	
Things	like	triple	ending	might	seem,	but	no	conflict	between	them:	paradigm	narrativity,	the	matter	of	
provisional	selection.	
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Geoffrey	 Harpham’s	 reading	 of	 the	 novel	 gives	 a	 simpler	 example	 of	 how	
fictionality	 and	 narrativity	 get	 conflated.	 Like	 Hutcheon,	 he	 usefully	 sets	 out	 to	
acknowledge	 the	specifically	 formal	qualities	of	Doctorow’s	work,	above	and	beyond	a	
mere	 thematic	 treatment	 of	 history.	 Like	 Hutcheon	 too,	 he	 relies	 on	 the	 fact/fiction	
opposition	 to	 account	 for	 what	 he	 calls	 Doctorow’s	 narrative	 “technology”,	 and	 like	
Hutcheon	he	identifies	Doctorow’s	central	“project	of	treating	historical	fact	in	fictional	
terms”	(?),	eventually	“settl[ing]	the	opposition	of	fact	and	fiction	in	favor	of	the	latter”	
(?).	 The	 Book	 of	 Daniel,	 on	 his	 reading,	 shows	 how	 epistemologically	 responsible	
narrative	 generates	 itself	 out	 of	 the	 very	 impossibility	 of	 assembling	 a	 single	 stable	
historical	 truth	 from	 facts	 accessible	 only	 through	 mediation. 93 	The	 conflation	 of	
fictionality	 and	 narrativity	 comes	 when	 he	 talks	 about	 the	 competing	 credibility	 of	
different	 assemblies:	 “The	 factor	of	plausibility	 introduces	 a	 fictional	 element	 into	 the	
description”	 (82).	 What	 he	 means	 here	 is	 that	 acknowledging	 the	 selectivity	 and	
presentedness	of	facts	casts	them	back	into	the	realm	of	fiction.94	But	narrativity	selects	
details—through	whatever	kinds	of	mediation—from	an	array	of	them	that	do	exist.	By	
contrast,	fictive	events	don’t	pre-exist	their	articulation.	Their	relationship	to	narrative	
is	hence	different:	narrativity	applied	to	the	factual	can	miss	or	mischaracterize	events,	
but	 fictional	events	construct	 their	world	without	being	selected	 from	an	array.	When	
Harpham	and	Hutcheon	talk	about	fact/fiction	relations	in	Doctorow,	they	use	“fiction”	
interchangeably	 with	 narrativity.	 The	 ontological	 difference,	 though,	 is	 crucial	 to	 the	
novel’s	rhetoric.	My	interest	will	be	less	in	how	Doctorow	reduces	fact	to	the	status	of	
fiction	 than	 in	 how	 he	 uses	 antimimetic	 fictionality	 to	 make	 arguments	 about	 our	
relation	to	prediscursive	fact.		
Narrativity	 for	 Harpham	 grants	 an	 ethical	 freedom:	 “In	 redescribing	 the	
Rosenberg	case,	 the	novelist	 can	 feel	 that	he	 is	not	violating	an	original	 factuality,	 for																																																									
93	In	an	interview,	Doctorow	has	said	that	criminal	trials	particularly	interest	him	in	general	as	exemplars	
of	 the	 instability	 of	 narrativity:	 “facts	 are	 buried,	 exhumed,	 deposed,	 contradicted,	 recanted”	 so	 that	 a	
“trial	 shimmers	 forever	with	 just	 that	 perplexing	 ambiguity	 of	 a	 true	novel	 (“False	Documents”	 227,	 on	
Harph	82).	
94	As	Hayden	White	notes,	that	selection	and	presentation	gives	an	authority	and	sanction	to	the	chosen	
arrangement,	in	the	literal	sense	of	“author.”	
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the	event	 is	already	only	accessible	 through	 fiction”	 (82).	Yet	consider	 the	 Inertia	Kid:	
Doctorow’s	use	of	the	“technology”	of	prose	fictionality,	rather	than	narrativity,	lets	him	
argue	that	Daniel	is	violating	the	figures	he	parodies.	This	phrasing	might	seem	to	lapse	
into	the	ontological	confusions	of	Jameson	or	Weisenburger.	In	a	novel	that	foregrounds	
its	own	 fictionality,	why	 talk	about	 figures	who	can	be	violated	or	undermined	at	 all?		
Daniel	 disavows	 his	 “performing	 nature,”	 but	 as	 a	 fictive	 dissertation-compiler,	 that	
“nature”	is—following	William	Gass’	anti-mimetic	model	of	character	as	“any	linguistic	
location	 in	 the	 book	 toward	 which	 a	 great	 part	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 text	 stands	 as	 a	
modifier”	(“A	Debate”	28)—to	be	the	modifying	interface	through	which	all	the	novel’s	
language	gets	organized.	But	Daniel	himself	is	a	purely	discursive	existent.	What	can	it	
even	mean	 to	 talk	 about	 corresponding	 to	 pre-discursive	 objects	 in	 his	 world?	 How,	
more	rhetorically	saliently,	can	a	fiction	as	overt	as	Doctorow’s	about	its	own	fictionality	
offer	its	reader	worldly	imperatives,	let	alone	imperatives	about	the	political	importance	
of	 correspondence?	 As	 a	 Gassian	 modifying-location,	 Daniel’s	 modifications	 of	 other	
characters	are	always	inflected	in	terms	of	performed	motive.		And	those	inflections	and	
organizations	 are	 constantly	 coded	 as	 cruel,	 reductive,	 cynical.	How	can	one	 “reduce”	
another	character	who	equally	has	no	existence	beyond	their	discursified	form?	That	is	
the	core	of	Doctorow’s	exploitation	of	the	“technology”	of	fictionality.	
Daniel’s	travestying	parody	of	ex-centric	figures	like	his	family	and	the	Inertia	Kid	
conjure	a	difference	between	discursive	and	real	material,	internal	to	the	fictional	world.	
The	purest	example	of	this	is	his	grandmother,	Daniel	narrates	only	in	order	to	reference	
her	 confusion	at	her	daughter’s	 conviction.	As	a	minor	character,	who	 shares	Daniel’s	
sense	of	unmoored	bewilderment	in	part	because	she	is	an	immigrant	who	still	doesn’t	
speak	fluent	English	or	understand	the	workings	of	American	politics,	the	grandmother	
is	presented	through	a	parody	of	 immigrant	testimonial	narrative.	Daniel’s	ventriloquy	
of	her	wartime	suffering	and	immigrant	alienation	is	mockingly	couched	in	a	wheedling	
address	 to	 a	 “Mr	 Editor”	 whose	 name	 is	 repeated	 like	 a	 charm	 against	 obscurity	 and	
impermanence	 (64/5).	 Playing	 up	 her	 ex-centricity,	 Daniel	 doesn’t	 posit	 it	 as	 of	
equivalent	value	and	seriousness	to	the	“official”	state-promulgated	justification	for	her	
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daughter’s	execution,	but	travesties	her	wish	for	her	ex-centric	experience	to	find	public	
recognition.	 	 While	 Daniel’s	 parodic	 presentation	 foregrounds	 the	 market	 logic	 by	
which	experiences	like	his	grandmother’s	are	mediated,	it,	rather	than	recuperating	the	
experience	or	transforming	the	logic,	just	reiterates	their	existing	subordination.	Insofar	
as	 his	 mastery	 of	 ex-centric	 discourses	 points	 us	 to	 marginal	 experience,	 it’s	 to	
compound	 that	 experience’s	 prior	 defeats	 and	 rule	 it	 out	 as	 a	 source	 of	 present	
possibility.	
That’s	 the	 rhetoric,	 but	 it	 relies	 on	 an	 ontological	 technology.	 Since	 she’s	
fictional,	we	can’t	 talk	about	a	grandmother	 that	pre-exists	Daniel’s	parody:	 she	exists	
only	in	the	language	coded	as	cruelly	distorting	her.	Yet	that	coding	entails	a	difference	
between	 real	 and	 parodic	 woman.	 Our	 notion	 that	 Daniel	 scornfully	 exaggerates	 her	
experience	 (which	 we	 know	 doesn’t	 exist)	 is	 a	matter	 of	 generic	 pragmatics:	 travesty	
presumes	 a	 less	 risible	 original,	 so	 recognising	 the	 forms	 that	 code	 travesty	 posits	 an	
undistorted	originary	experience.	 	Thus,	 though	 it	 is	never	narrated	 in	 its	origin	state,	
and	 so	 doesn’t	 exist	 in	 our	 world	 even	 as	 text,	 we	 still,	 thanks	 to	 the	 pragmatics	
Doctorow	exploits,	conjure	grandmotherly	experience	as	an	anchor	for	the	exaggeration.	
Elias	 suggests	 that	 in	 postmodern	 fiction,	 “whether	 or	 not	 such	 a	 historical	 sublime	
exists	 is	 less	relevant	than	whether	a	literary	text	posits	 its	existence”	(44).	Doctorow’s	
approach	doesn’t	suggest	that	the	grandmother’s	experience	is	sublimely	ungraspable	by	
Daniel:	quite	the	opposite;	if	language	couldn’t	do	justice	to	her	it	wouldn’t	reflect	badly	
on	 him	 that	 he	 distorts	 her.	 But	 Elias	 is	 right	 to	 identify	 the	 act	 of	 positing	 as	 the	
fundamental	 operation.95	If	 Doctorow’s	 interest	 was	 in	 the	marginal	 experience	 itself,	
which	corresponds	to	Elias’	sublime,	he	could	have	invented	some	specifics	to	present.	
But	he	sticks	to	positing	it	in	absentia	as	a	pretext	to	suggest	Daniel’s	failings.			
																																																								
95	What	she	and	Berlatsky	lose	in	departing	from	Hutcheon’s	focus	on	discourse-wrangling	is	the	ability	to	
give	an	account	of	why	parody	could	still	remain	a	relevant	category.	When	she	suggests	that	“Allusion,”	
as	“the	presenting	of	the	unpresentable	without	presentation”	(60),	is	a	major	postmodern	mode,	she	loses	
the	thread	that	allows	Doctorow	to	“posit”	 the	grandmother’s	presentably	undistorted	origin-experience	
without	presenting	it.	
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This	is	the	logic	by	which	Doctorow,	without	narrating	it,	is	able	to	suggest	that	
historical	 possibility	 ‘exists’	 to	 be	 better-	 or	worse-corresponded-to	within	 the	 novel’s	
frame.	 It	 suffices	 that	 Daniel’s	 discourses	 are	 coded	 as	 missing	 it.96	And	 this	 coding	
conditions	what	we	can	reasonably	say	Doctorow’s	novel	offers	us.	We	can’t	access	the	
experience	 of	 the	 novel-world’s	 marginalized,	 as	 Berlatsky’s	 re-mimeticising	 gestures	
suggest.	 But	 the	 propositions	 and	 imperatives	 that	 make	 sense	 internally	 to	 Daniel’s	
world—“resorting	to	parody	will	distort	your	relation	to	real	conditions”—for	example,	
can	 be	 extrapolated	 and	 applied	 within	 our	 own. 97 	Where	 Hutcheon’s	 sense	 of	
postmodern	fiction’s	rhetoric	relies	on	the	blending	of	fiction	and	the	“real”	to	enact	a	
unidirectional	 undermining	 of	 the	 latter,	 the	 logic	 by	 which	 Doctorow	 can	 criticize	
Daniel’s	 parody	 just	 by	 presenting	 it	 exploits	 the	 separate	 logical	 conditions	 of	
fictionality	 to	 generate	 extrapolable	 imperatives	 about	 historical	 reality	 and	 historical	
action	that	we,	in	the	world	we	share	with	him	and	his	book,	can	adhere	to.	The	novel	
can	provide	its	readers	conceptual	models	that	apply	within	frames	of	existence,	models	
that	can	be	extrapolated	from	the	fictional	realm	to	our	own	so	long	as	the	concepts	at	
work	 in	 each	 are	 shared	 (which	 given	 the	 intelligible-language-composition	 of	 the	
fiction,	they	must	be).	These	propositions	themselves	are	then	equally	deliberable	in	the	
world	the	fiction	conjures	as	a	hook	on	which	to	hang	them,	and	in	our	historical	world	
on	which	it	aims	to	bear.	
Such	 propositions	 would	 lose	 validity	 if	 the	 novel	 shed	 its	 conspicuous	
fictionality	 and	 tried	 to	 ground	 them	 on	 an	 existent	 human	 Daniel,	 of	 the	 kind	
Weisenburger	presumes.	The	novel’s	 antimimetic	 reading	pragmatics	do	 require	us	 to	
think	of	Daniel	in	terms	of	human	motive.	But,	to	return	to	Gass’	definition	of	character	
as	 a	 modifying	 “linguistic	 location,”	 the	 novel’s	 language,	 rather	 than	 its	 fictional	
characters	and	events,	 is	the	existent	entity	that	can	actually	do	work	in	our	historical																																																									
96	By	 the	 same	 token,	 the	 ex-centric	 figures	 of	Daniel’s	world	may	not	 exist,	 but	 the	 coding	 of	 travesty	
suffices	to	frame	him,	in	Harpham’s	terms,	as	“violating”	a	duty	of	recognition	towards	them.		
97	Doctorow’s	 skeptical	 treatment	 of	 Daniel’s	 discursifications	 generates	 a	 historiographical	metafiction	
within	 which	 parody	 harms	 the	 ex-centric	 more	 than	 it	 promotes	 their	 recognition,	 and	 in	 doing	 so	
provides	 an	 extrapolable	 rhetorical	 imperative	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 discourse	 and	 pre-
discursive	experience	in	our	own	historical	world.	
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world.	Daniel	 is	not,	 therefore,	 a	presentation-independent	human	mind,	but	 just	 the	
“location”	 through	 which	 the	 novel’s	 language	 becomes	 intelligible	 in	 motivational	
terms:	a	rhetorical	depiction	of	a	parodic	rhetor,	a	discursive	figuration	of	a	discursive	
figurer.	 	 The	 “motives”	 our	 fictional	 pragmatics	 attach	 to	 him	 are	 thus	 just	 coded	
intersections	of	interests	in	the	light	of	which	we	can	judge	certain	modes	of	discourse-
dealing	 in	 terms	 relevant	 to	 our	 own	 agency	 (and	 to	 that	 agency’s	 own	 relation	 to	
interests	that	Doctorow	suggests	we	should	share	with	Daniel’s	project).			
If	 Daniel’s	 problem	 is	 to	manipulate	 pre-coded	 discourses	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	
open	up	historical	possibility,	it	is	Doctorow’s	to	manipulate	the	codings	he	attributes	to	
Daniel	 in	 a	 way	 that	 influences	 his	 historical	 reader.	 	 The	 novel’s	 posited	 historical	
possibilities	 emerge	 rhetorically,	 therefore,	 through	 the	 implication	 that	 Daniel’s	
language	has	 scanted	 them.	Doctorow	 is	 thus	 able	 to	 create	 imperatives	 about	 taking	
correspondence	between	agency	and	reality	seriously	through	fiction	that	denies	that	it	
narrates	a	world	of	correspondable	objects.		
If	we	grant	this	account	of	fictionality’s	fundamental	role	in	the	novel’s	rhetorical	
pragmatics,	 we	 see	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 Doctorow’s	 authorial	 agency,	
fictionality	 and	 productive	 agency	 within	 his	 world	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	 relationship	
between	Daniel’s	 authorial	 agency,	 narrativity,	 and	 productive	 agency	 within	 his.	 For	
Hutcheon,	 “introverted	 intertextuality”	 and	 “the	 ironic	 inversions	 of	 parody”	 make	
history	and	fiction	entirely	interchangeable	in	their	ability	to	ratify	or	interrogate	each	
other:	 “there	 is	 no	 question	 of	 a	 hierarchy,	 implied	 or	 otherwise”	 (Poetics	 28).	 This	
makes	sense	of	her	conflation	between	Doctorow’s	and	Daniel’s	parodic	authorial	work.	
But	it	is	the	asymmetry	between	fictive	and	historical	agency	with	which	Doctorow	must	
work	 to	 have	 fiction	 generate	 rhetorically	 exportable	 arguments	 about	 how	
deligitimation,	discursive	power	and	historical	possibility	interact.	 	In	what	follows,	I’ll	
show	just	how	precisely	he	exploits	this	asymmetry’s	pragmatics.	
	
Part	2:	Rhetoric	and	Refutation	
	 168	
Parodying	the	Parodist	
On	the	above	account,	The	Book	of	Daniel’s	pragmatics	of	travesty	foreground	the	
stakes	 of	 discursive	 practice’s	 correspondence	 with	 real	 conditions.	 The	 novel	 makes	
clear	early	on	that	the	standards	by	which	Daniel	can	judge	his	fulfilment	of	his	legacy	
need	 to	 take	 account	 of	 actualities	 beyond	discourse.	 	His	 fierce	 sense	 of	 his	 parents’	
failure	follows	from	his	awareness	of	how	wilfully,	blindly	doctrinaire	their	communism	
had	been:	he	scorns	his	father	because		“the	final	connection	was	impossible	for	him	to	
make	between	what	he	believed	and	how	the	world	reacted”	(32).	 	“World”	here	could	
refer	to	the	physical	objects	of	the	universe,	to	a	population	of	people,	or	to	the	various	
interacting	 belief-systems	 and	 discourses	 within	 which	 his	 father’s	 politics	 operate.		
Which	the	novel	is	emphasizing	is	clearer	in	the	light	of	Susan’s	earlier	claim	about	the	
rhetorical	importance	of	setting	up	the	foundation	to	“indicate”	the	“proper	assumption”	
of	 the	 legacy:	 “Indicate	 to	whom?	Daniel	wanted	 to	 know.	 	Why	 to	 the	world,	 Susan	
said”	 (79).	 	 Daniel’s	 disregard	 for	 this	 “world”	 contrasts	with	 his	 indication	 of	 one	 to	
which	his	father	ought	to	have	conformed.		The	only	sense	of	“world”	that	applies	to	the	
latter	and	not	the	former	is	that	of	“the	world”	as	the	set	of	things	which	are,	regardless	
of	judgment	or	perception.	If	Daniel’s	project	is	a	discursive	one,	Doctorow	suggests	that	
it	needs	to	take	account	of	non-discursive	conditions.	Daniel	needs	to	avoid	reiterating	
the	 version	 of	 history	 already	 presumed	by	 the	 consensus-world	 Susan	 addresses,	 but	
also	to	make	sure	whatever	he	generates	corresponds	to	the	world	of	historical	existents	
better	than	his	father’s	beliefs	did.		
If	 simply	uncovering	 and	articulating	historical	 experience,	 rather	 than	actively	
repurposing	 it,	 were	 Doctorow’s	 intent,	 he	 would	 gain	 little	 from	 fictionalising	 the	
Rosenberg	 trial.	 	 One	 of	 the	 novel’s	 epigraphs,	 from	 Walt	 Whitman,	 stresses	 the	
imperative	to	mobilise	past	defeat:	“I	play	not	marches	for	accepted	victors	only,	I	play	
marches	for	conquer’d	and	slain	persons.”		The	fictionalisation,	with	its	ability	to	imply	
failures	of	correspondence,	allows	Doctorow	to	depict	the	failings	of	one	such	project	of	
mobilisation.	 	 Daniel’s	 travesties	 never	 generate	 a	 march:	 his	 critical	 voicing	 of	 his	
grandmother	 or	 his	 parents	 merely	 reiterates	 the	 conditions	 in	 which	 their	 legacy	
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strands	him,	his	cause	and	his	interests.	For	Hutcheon	“the	villain”	against	which	Daniel	
has	to	strive	“is	not	one	known	individual	but	the	US	government	and	judiciary,	perhaps	
even	all	of	American	society”	(Poetics	24/5).	If	this	villainous	 ‘all’	derives	its	coherence	
and	its	villainy	from	its	perpetuation	of	“an	official	language,”	then	both	Daniel’s	parody	
of	his	parents’	language	and	Doctorow’s	criticism	of	Daniel’s	reductionism	can	be	judged	
by	 their	 capacity	 for	 generating	 action	 incompatible	with	 the	 narrative	 that	 language	
encodes.	We	need,	that	is,	to	share	Daniel’s	oft-expressed,	rarely	practiced	belief	that	we	
should	 judge	 a	 resistance	project’s	 success	 by	 the	worldly	 productiveness,	 rather	 than	
the	mere	articulation,	of	 its	 counter-narrative.	The	 starting	point	 for	 investigating	 the	
novel’s	 critique	should	 thus	be	 the	moments	where	Daniel’s	practices	match	up	worst	
with	his	goals,	where	Doctorow	figures	practices	as	wrong	options.		
The	 cruel	 exaggeration	 of	 the	 grandmother	 passage	 conditions	 the	 more	
obviously	political	process	of	 giving	his	parents	 voice.	Early	on,	 for	 example,	he	notes	
that:	 “they	 were	 Stalinists	 and	 every	 example	 of	 Capitalist	 America	 fucking	 up	 drove	
them	wild.		My	country!		Why	aren’t	you	what	you	claim	to	be?		If	they	were	put	on	trial,	
they	didn’t	say	Of	course,	what	else	could	we	expect,	they	said	You	are	making	a	mockery	
of	 American	 justice!”	 (40).	They	 lacked	knowledge,	he	 suggests,	 that	would	have	been	
obvious	 to	 anyone	 without	 their	 ideological	 blinkers,	 while	 their	 Stalinism	 followed	
from	buying	too	strongly	into,	rather	than	sensibly	scorning,	the	traditional	hagiography	
of	America.	 	For	all	his	hindsight,	 though,	Daniel’s	mode	of	parodic	presentation	here	
doesn’t	tell	us	anything	new	about	American	justice;	it	merely	ridicules	an	obsolescent	
discourse	 while	 blurring	 it	 self-defeatingly	 into	 his	 own.	 	 The	 repeated	 exclamation-
points	are	the	marker	of	exaggeration,	shifting	statements	designated	as	reported	speech	
into	the	fatuity	of	his	grandmother’s	invented	appeals	to	Mr	Editor.		Yet	we	can	read	the	
second	exclamation	point	either	as	a	bathetic	intensifier	of	his	parents’	indicated	speech	
or	as	Daniel’s	own	exclamation	at	the	silliness	of	the	appeal;	the	first,	coming	outside	of	
a	specified	quotation,	we	can	take	both	as	Daniel	parodying	a	similar	despairing	cry	and	
as	his	own	exclamation.		Through	this	ambiguity,	Daniel	identifies	his	own	sense	of	ex-
centricity	 with	 that	 of	 his	 parents,	 an	 identification	 rendered	 impotent	 by	 the	 same	
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mocking	punctuation	that	established	it.	 	Neither	identification	nor	mockery	advances	
the	appropriated	discourse	beyond	the	state-compromised	point	at	which	he	found	it.	
The	phrase	‘fucking	up’	points	us	back	to	that	central	question	of	correspondence.	
The	parents’	outrage	is	prompted	not	by	any	error—to	use	that	sense	of	fuck-up—on	the	
state’s	 part,	 but	 precisely	 by	 the	 system	 working	 as	 intended.	 	 The	 error	 is	 in	 their	
inability	to	adapt	their	expectations	and	beliefs	to	the	consistent	workings	of	hegemony	
that	are	part	of	“the	world.”	Daniel’s	mastery	of	his	parents’	discourse,	his	awareness	of	
their	 ineffectuality	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 system	 that	 didn’t	 play	 by	 its	 own	 justificatory	
rhetoric,	is	a	warrant	for	his	seeing	their	old-left	worldview	as	not	merely	defeated	but	
refuted	by	its	failure	to	conform	with	conditions	outside	their	heads.		Yet	in	reiterating	
that	narrative	of	defeat,	Daniel’s	travesty	aligns	his	methods	with	those	of	the	state	he’s	
supposed	 to	 be	 resisting.98	His	 compounding	 of	 his	 parents’	 defeat	 here	 endorses	 the	
words	 they	didn’t	 say:	 “what	 else	 could	we	 expect.”	 	 Such	words	disavow	perception’s	
relation	 to	 possibility,	 and	Daniel’s	 greater	 hindsight	 accuracy	 leads	 him	 to	 a	 greater	
passivity,	 an	 even	 more	 thorough	 acceptance	 of	 the	 status	 quo,	 than	 his	 deluded	
parents’.	 Rather	 than	 seeking	 ground	 for	 action,	 he	 compounds	 his	 sense	 of	
predestination.		This	is	parody	as	a	mode	of	exacerbation,	not	recuperation.		
Daniel	doesn’t	lack	for	awareness	of	his	world’s	real	workings.	Critics	like	Steven	
Cooper,	on	this	basis,	read	his	critique	of	the	old	left	as	something	like	Doctorow’s	own	
view,	valued	even	in	the	absence	of	a	practical	upshot	for	doing	justice	to	the	historical	
objects:	 “the	 result	 is	 a	 sympathetic	 but	 clear-eyed	 portrait	 of	 his	 parents	 and	 their	
policies.”	(116).	 	But	 in	combination	with	his	tendency	to	travesty,	Daniel’s	“clear	eyes”	
lead	him	toward	passivity,	a	wilful	blindness	about	possibilities	beyond	those	officially	
handed	down.	His	particular	form	of	clarity	is	thus	a	failing:	its	take	on	correspondence	
																																																								
98	In	 1994’s	 The	 Waterworks,	 which	 post-dates	 Hutcheon’s	 take	 on	 The	 Book	 of	 Daniel,	 Doctorow’s	
narrator,	 the	 aging	 newspaper	 editor	 McIlvaine,	 considers	 the	 fact	 that	 so	 many	 of	 the	 most	 scornful	
people	 he	 knows	 have	 at	 least	 one	 person	 they	 treat	 with	 uncritical	 faith:	 “We	 have	 our	mothers	 and	
brother…	whom	we	exempt…	for	whom	the	unrelenting	intellect	relents”	(122).	 	Daniel’s	 intellect,	which	
ranges	 over	 the	 book	 in	 an	 unrelenting	 quest	 to	 reiterate	 existing	 refutations,	 has	 little	 interest	 in	
exemption,	and	indeed	is	turned	most	fiercely	on	those	with	whom	it	most	identifies.	
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pays	 attention	 to	 what	 actually	 is,	 but	 not	 what	 could	 actually	 be.99		 Cooper	 accepts	
Daniel’s	 practical	 aversion	 to	 possibility	 rather	 than	 his	 notional	 commitment	 to	 it,	
because	he	like	Elias	and	Berlatsky	ignores	what	Hutcheon	gets	most	right:	Doctorow’s	
central	 concern	 with	 parody.	 Seymour	 Chatman,	 attempting	 to	 parse	 the	 different	
currents	within	Hutcheon’s	monolithic	model	of	postmodern-parody,	expresses	a	wish	
to	"reaffirm	the	centrality	of	ridicule	to	parody"	(33).	For	all	Jameson’s	refusal	to	believe	
that	 postmodern	 parody	 can	 suggest	 that	 “alongside	 the	 abnormal	 tongue	 you	 have	
momentarily	 borrowed,	 some	 healthy	 linguistic	 normality	 still	 exists,”	 Doctorow	 can	
only	 indict	 Daniel	 for	 the	 limitations	 of	 his	 travestic	 mode	 if	 some	 standard	 “exists”	
within	 Daniel’s	 world	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 pre-discursive	 and	 the	
“linguistic”	 by	 which	 travesty	 can	 be	 judged	 to	 fail.	 If	 Daniel	 can	 be	 blamed	 for	 his	
failings	by	standards	he	himself	acknowledges,	then	we	have	to	see	postmodern	fiction’s	
use	of	parody	as	something	more	susceptible	of	rhetorical	control	than	a	mere	symptom	
of	some	pervasive	“postmodern	condition.”100	
So	 why	 does	 Doctorow	 suggest	 that	 Daniel	 shirks	 possibility	 in	 this	 project-
sabotaging	manner?	 	 The	 questions	 of	 cause	 and	motive	 emerge	 in	 the	 relationships	
between	 different	 kinds	 and	 targets	 of	 parody:	 imitations	 of	 official	 language	 and	
imitations	of	incidental	characters,	grotesque	exaggerations	and	pitch-perfect	mimickry.	
The	 Inertia	Kid	 section	 is	 a	 crucial	 axis	 for	 these	 relationships.	Daniel’s	parody	moves	
outward	 from	 the	 uncomfortable	 realization	 of	 his	 own	 guilt,	 of	 the	 Inertia	 Kid’s																																																									
99	Catharine	Walker	 Bergstrom	 endorses	Daniel	 as	 one	 among	many	 narrators	who	Doctorow	 “endows	
with	 the	 right	 to	mete	out…	 justice	 through	narration,	 they	constitute	his	call	 for	 the	balance	of	power	
available	in	a	‘narratocracy’”	(39).		Her	model	doesn’t	treat	such	a	‘narratocracy’	as	a	space	of	deliberation-
forestalling	 narrative	 equivalence,	 but	 she	 still	 gives	 Daniel	 too	 much	 credit.	 like	 Doctorow’s	 other	
narrators,	has	 “a	gift	 for	 truthfulness,	a	portrayal	which	becomes	all	 the	more	convincing	 through	 their	
expression	of	uncertainty	about	this	gift…”	(39).		Daniel’s	truth	is	at	the	level	of	personal	honesty:	however	
much	 his	 treatment	 of	 his	 fellow	 ex-centrics	 might	 make	 us	 pause	 before	 handing	 over	 the	 justice-
allocation	 reins,	 he’s	 certainly	 up	 front	 about	 his	 own	 failings	 and	 predilections.	 The	 more	 that	 what	
Daniel	 tells	 us	 is	 coded	 as	 true,	 the	more	 thoroughly	 it’s	 coded	 as	 inevitable	 and	 unproductive.	 As	 I’ll	
discuss	later,	there	are	various	potentially	new	truths	he	approaches,	but	actively	forestalls	telling.	
100	Disagreeing	with	Hutcheon	about	Doctorow’s	Ragtime,	 Jameson	is	curiously	averse	to	acknowledging	
Doctorow’s	 plausible	 control	 of	 the	 novel’s	 rhetoric,	 or	 readers’	 capability	 of	 understanding	 it:	 a	 clear	
parallel	Hutcheon	points	out	between	three	families	is	written	off	as	“thematic	coherence	few	readers	can	
have	 experienced,”	while	 any	 connection	between	 the	way	 the	novel	writes	 about	 its	 early	 20th	 century	
narrative	 and	 its	 relevance	 to	 the	 world	 in	 which	 Doctorow	 wrote	 can	 be	 no	 more	 deliberate	 than	
“something	like	an	unconscious	expression	and	associative	exploration”	(23).	
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awareness.	 Travesty	 is	 a	 shirking	 of	 the	 unease	 that	 acknowledgment	might	 prompt.		
This	aversion’s	centrality	to	a	scene	so	distant	from	national	politics	figures	it	as	a	part	
of	 Daniel’s	 psychology	 that	 underlies	 parodic	 articulation	 of	 his	 parents’	 experience,	
rather	than	a	mode	exclusive	to	his	recuperative	project.	
Recalling	 the	 journey	 to	 the	 shelter,	 Daniel	 notes	 that	 “In	 times	 of	 crisis	 I	 am	
always	 sensitive	 to	 people	 on	 the	 periphery.	 	 The	 cab	 driver	 was	 named	 Henry	
Lichtenstein,	 and	 his	 number	 was	 45930”	 (148).	 	While	 this	 is	 clearly	 self-ironic,	 the	
conflation	 between	 sensitivity	 to	 people	 and	 accurate	 replication	 of	 detail	 provides	 a	
model	for	Daniel’s	unproductive	treatment	of	the	Inertia	Kid	and	other	marginal	figures.	
The	 self-indicting	 irony	 of	 his	 claim	 to	 have	 been	 extending	 empathetic	
acknowledgment	 by	 mimicking	 the	 Kid	 highlights	 that	 he	 knows	 that	 the	 parodic	
intellect	is	as	strong	a	tool	for	compounding	authority	as	for	accessing	alterity.		Daniel	is	
shown	content	 to	dwell	 in	what	Emma	Goldman	 in	Ragtime	 calls	 “the	consolations	of	
cynicism,	of	scorn,	of	contempt…”	(49).			
Goldman	is	suggesting	that	in	accepting	these	consolations	the	ravaged	socialite	
Evelyn	Nesbit	merely	perpetuates	the	system	at	the	hands	of	which	she	first	benefitted	
then	 suffered,	 and	 Daniel’s	 cynicism	 too	 involves	 complicity.	 Specifically,	 Doctorow	
consistently	suggests	that	Daniel	cherishes	his	marginality.	 	As	Charles	Altieri	suggests	
of	postmodern	art’s	ubiquitous	claims	to	counter-hegemonic	power,	“the	very	clarity	of	
the	 moral	 situation	 offers	 dangerous	 temptations	 to	 revel	 in	 righteousness,”	 (475).	
Daniel	 laments	 Susan’s	 reductive	 “moral	 clarity,”	 but	 finds	 a	 similar	 opportunity	 for	
revelling	 in	 the	 seeming	 inevitability	 of	 his	 project’s	 failure,	 of	 the	 incorporation	 and	
subsequent	complicity	of	all	forms	of	resistance	to	working	hegemony.	His	“revelling”	in	
Goldman’s	“consolations”	 is	thus	a	way	to	preserve	the	marginality	from	which	he	and	
many	of	the	other	characters	in	the	novel	gain	cultural	capital,	while	also	being	able	to	
congratulate	 himself	 for	 being	 “clear-eyed.”	 This	 approach	 travesties	 the	 truth-
correspondent	model	of	validity:	he	knows	that	the	state	has	not	changed	and	is	unlikely	
to	 change,	 and	 so	 in	 picking	 a	mode	 of	 historical	 action	 that	 reiterates	 that	 fact,	 his	
actions	 are	 hardly	 likely	 to	 be	 proved	 erroneous.	 	 The	 affects	 here—comfort,	 self-
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congratulation,	 and	 so	 on—are	 subjects	 of	 Doctorow’s	 critique	 just	 as	 much	 as	 the	
epistemological	laziness	they	motivate.	
Daniel’s	affective	motives	evolve	his	mockery	from	tendency	to	compulsion.	This	
is	clear	 in	his	earlier	admission	that	while	he	may	have	“reasoned”	that	 impersonating	
the	Inertia	Kid	would	win	him	the	admiration	of	an	audience,	“I	found	myself	doing	the	
Inertia	Kid	when	nobody	was	looking”	(171).		As	in	the	stylistic	tics	that	I	examined	in	my	
earlier	chapter	on	John	Barth,	this	syntax	emphasises	the	lack	of	reasoned	control	over	
action:	in	“found	myself	doing”	the	action	precedes	the	awareness	that	could	regulate	it.		
The	syntax	also	figures	“the	Inertia	Kid”	as	a	set	of	moves,	as	much	like	the	Watusi	as	a	
person.	 	The	compulsive	 roteness	of	 this	 imitation	makes	a	 ritual	of	Daniel’s	mode	of	
barely-reflective	parody,	 and	 so	dehumanises	him	 too.	 	 “Doing	 the	 Inertia	Kid”	 alone,	
without	 inspiration	or	 audience,	 he	dwells	 in	 a	 state	 of	mimicry	 sufficient	 unto	 itself.	
Divorced	 from	 the	 purposiveness	 of	 satire	 or	 parody	 and	 prompting	 tortuous	
retrospective	 rationalisations,	 mimicry	 is	 as	 much	 a	 pathology	 here	 as	 the	 political	
capability	Hutcheon	calls	it.101		
Various	critics	have	yoked	together	Hutcheon’s	sense	of	Daniel’s	productiveness	
with	interest	in	the	positive	value	of	wilful	unproductiveness,	by	attributing	postmodern	
interest	 and	 effectuality	 to	 the	 affective	 patterns	 Doctorow	 foregrounds	 here.	 	 For	
Patrick	 McHugh’s	 understanding	 of	 Pynchon’s	 Gravity’s	 Rainbow,	 for	 example,	 some	
kind	 of	 paradoxical	 resistance	 might	 emerge	 from	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	 its	
impossibility:	he	sees	a	character	dwelling	in	“the	realm	of	postmodern	affect,	enjoying	
his	 anger	 and	 frustration,	 enjoying	 the	 pleasure	 of	 impossible	 resistance,”	 suggesting	
that	the	only	“ground”	for	future	action	will	come	from	giving	up	on	“the	truth	derived	
from	 historical	 consciousness,	 which	 teaches	 him	 only	 about	 powerlessness.	 Rather,																																																									
101	The	connection	recurs	throughout	Doctorow’s	work.		For	example,	in	The	Waterworks,	the	equivalences	
between	 the	 mimicries	 of	 the	 frustrated	 satirist	 Martin	 and	 of	 the	 “tic-ridden	 stuttering	 spastic”	 (271)	
Monsieur	 replicate	many	 of	 the	 conditions	 that	make	The	 Book	 of	 Daniel	 sceptical	 about	 the	 political	
sufficiency	of	 linguistic	 appropriation.	 	The	 links	between	Martin’s	 frustrations	 and	 the	emergence	of	 a	
pathology	 apply	 also	 to	 Daniel,	 whose	 sense	 of	 endless	 complicity	 is	 as	 plausible	 an	 outcome	 of	 his	
tendency	to	nihilism	as	a	source.	
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potential	 liberation	 rests	 with	 his	 own	 futility	 and	 frustration”	 (18).	 Exactly	 how	 this	
would	work	is	not	specified	except	by	the	implication	that	if	historical	consciousness	=	
powerlessness,	 then	 non-historically-conscious	 mental	 states	 should	 generate	 power,	
but	 the	 pattern	 matches	 the	 way	 that	 critics	 of	 Doctorow	 have	 associated	 affective	
extremity	with	the	novels’	rhetorical	imperatives.	John	McGowan	notes	of	Ragtime	that	
“What	I	think	we	can	fairly	say	is	that	[Doctorow]	is	fascinated	by,	and	to	some	extent	
able	to	get	inside,	the	mentality	that	is	attracted	to	pure	destruction,	the	acte	gratuite	of	
the	 anarchist	 bomber,	 no	 matter	 what	 motivates	 it”	 (166).	 Eric	 Dean	 Rasmussen,	
meanwhile,	 notes	 how	 Daniel’s	 sexualized	 cruelty	 permeates	 the	 whole	 novel,	
identifying	 “the	 text’s	 global	 affect	 –	 vicious	 eroticism”	 (192).	 Viciousness	 and	
destruction	 are	 particularly	 ‘global’	 in	 The	 Book	 of	 Daniel	 because	 they’re	 so	 clearly	
attributed	 to	 the	character	who	assembles,	and	hence	 in	Gass’	 terms	 “modifies,”	every	
piece	 of	 discourse	 in	 the	 book.	 Doctorow	 attributes	 Daniel’s	 parodic	 methods	 to	
particular	psychological	predelictions,	and	reading	his	treatment	of	his	parents	in	terms	
of	his	treatment	of	the	Inertia	Kid,	we	can	see	that	among	these	is	a	“fascination”	with	
the	 processes	 of	 dehumanisation	 and	 agential	 paralysis.	 	 But	 while	 McGovern	 and	
Rasmussen	 both	 go	 on	 to	 offer	 McHugh-vague	 accounts	 of	 how	 their	 affects	 might	
escape	hegemony,	Doctorow	seems	pretty	explicit	that	Daniel’s	parodic	political	practice	
merely	 promulgates	 an	 already	 destructive,	 vicious	 and	 pathological	 attitude	 to	
experience	and	possibility.		
The	stakes	of	Daniel’s	seeming	contentment	in	this	pathological	dehumanisation	
of	 his	 parodic	 models	 are	 set	 out	 by	 Molly	 Hite	 in	 an	 essay	 on	 Robert	 Coover’s	
metafictive	 Rosenberg	 novel	 The	 Public	 Burning	 that	 takes	 its	 title,	 “A	 Parody	 of	
Martyrdom,”	from	a	pro-execution	essay	by	Leslie	Fiedler.	 	Hite	notes	that	Fiedler	and	
Robert	Warshow	were	“concerned	to	establish	the	Rosenbergs	as	ontologically	lacking:	
as	 not	 possessing	 humanity	 in	 Fiedler’s	 account,	 as	 not	 possessing	 full	 existence	 in	
Warshow’s”	 (89).	 	 In	 both	 cases,	 Hite	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 essayists	 derive	 such	
conclusions	 from	 analyses	 of	 the	 Rosenbergs’	 written	 documents,	 their	 ideologised	
language;	 they	 treat	 speaking	 from	within	 a	 paradigm	as	 inherently	 dehumanising,	 as	
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evidence	of	human	unsalvagability,	and	hence	as	a	warrant	for	the	execution.		Pointing	
to	 someone	 else’s	 language	 as	 evidence	 of	 their	 being	 already	 discursified	 works	 to	
refute	not	just	their	worldview,	but	their	right	to	full	acknowledgment.		Daniel	applies	
this	 logic	 to	 his	 own	 parents:	 like	 the	 reduction	 of	 the	 Inertia	 Kid	 to	 a	 set	 of	moves,	
Daniel’s	parody	reduces	his	parents	to	imitable	language,	and	so	treats	them	as	refuted.		
In	 a	 mode	 of	 public	 pluralism	 like	 Karl	 Popper’s	 Open	 Society	 (at	 the	 peak	 of	 its	
normative	 influence	 around	 the	 time	 Doctorow	 wrote),	 refutation	 is	 the	 prompt	 to	
search	for	newer	and	better	ways	of	working,	but	Daniel’s	reiterative	mode	of	refutation	
generates	no	such	search	for	improvement.	His	energy	goes	toward	refuting	that	which	
already	lacks	force,	rather	than	present	practices	whose	refutation	might	generate	new	
investigative	 avenues	 and	 possibilities.	 He	 constantly	 parodies	 that	 which	 he	
acknowledges	a	duty	to	generatively	recognise,	and	the	parody	does	exactly	the	opposite	
of	the	possibility-generating,	horizon-expanding	work	that	Hutcheon	claims	for	it.		
The	historiographical	metafiction	model,	 then,	 leaves	us	 little	 room	to	consider	
the	 sceptical	 portrayal	 of	 parodists	 in	ostensibly	parodic	novels.	 	 Parody	 can	 figure	 in	
canonically	postmodern	 fiction—fiction	 that	exploits	 its	 conspicuous	 fictionality—as	a	
method	of	complicity	with,	rather	than	subversion	of,	dominant	narratives.	Doctorow’s	
novel	repudiates	both	the	validity	of	hegemonic	power,	and	the	old-left	grand	narrative	
that	arises	to	fail	to	sweep	it	away,	yet	it	reserves	its	fiercest	and	most	direct	criticism	for	
the	default	response	to	that	narrative’s	failure:	the	resort	to	reiterative	parody.	Doctorow	
offers	Daniel’s	 failures	up	for	satiric	scrutiny.	 	 In	a	move	that	Hutcheon’s	genre	hardly	
permits,	he	parodies	the	parodist.		
	
Refutation,	Self-Criticism,	Competition	
If	Hutcheon’s	model	doesn’t	allow	us	 to	deal	with	 this	asymmetrical	 reflexivity,	
there	are	readings	of	postmodern	discourse-appropriation	that	do.	Steven	Weisenburger	
usefully	 distinguishes	 between	 traditional,	 generative	 satire	 and—his	 own	 coinage—
degenerative	satire:	 “The	purpose	of	 satire	 in	 the	degenerative	mode	 is	delegitimizing.		
	 176	
Loosely	in	concord	with	deconstructionist	thought,	it	functions	to	subvert	hierarchies	of	
value	and	to	reflect	suspiciously	on	all	ways	of	making	meaning,	including	its	own”	(3).		
Weisenburger	 shares	 an	 investment	 in	 “delegitimizing”	with	Hutcheon	 or	 Lather,	 but	
they	differ	 on	 the	 stakes.	 	 For	Lather,	marking	 “provisional	 space”	was	 the	motive	 for	
pursuing	 a	 “generative	 methodology,”	 her	 search	 for	 a	 “new	 science”	 judged	 its	 own	
validity	by	the	degree	to	which	it	“registered”	fresh	“possibility.”		Weisenburger	suggests	
that	 the	 novels	 of	 his	 tradition—from	 which	 he	 pointedly	 excludes	 Doctorow	 as	 a	
realist—are	 less	 interested	 in	new	potential	 than	 in	merely	pointing	to	 the	way	things	
are.	 	 In	 their	 refusal	 of	 claims	 to	 generativity,	 he	 shows	 how	 those	 novels	 fetishize	
complicity,	self-implication,	the	compromise	of	human	subjecthood:	the	very	obsessions	
for	which	I’ve	suggested	Doctorow	faults	Daniel.		Doctorow’s	clear	sense	that	disinterest	
in	new	possibility	 is	 a	 failing	aligns	him	against	Weisenburger,	 and	alongside	Lather’s	
sense	of	a	discursive	project’s	goals	(if	not	of	how	to	pursue	them).		
While	 Weisenburger’s	 model	 allows	 us	 to	 conceive	 of	 a	 fiction	 in	 which	 the	
parodist	may	himself	be	subject	to	parody,	then,	it	still	doesn’t	let	that	reflexivity	ground	
an	imperative	to	self-refinement.		He	and	Hutcheon	have	in	common	that	they	neither	
propose	nor	desire	 that	one	counter-narrative	might	be	 judged	 superior	 to	another	 in	
relation	 to	 some	 external	 standard	 implied	 by	 the	 parodist.	 	 He	 can	 thus	 no	 better	
account	 than	 she	 for	 Doctorow’s	 analysis	 of	 parody’s	 strategic	 failings.	 Just	
acknowledging	 the	 parodist’s	 susceptibility	 to	 parody	 won’t	 get	 us	 from	 Hutcheon’s	
model	to	one	where	counter-hegemonic	programs	can	be	judged	more	or	less	viable.	
To	 dismiss	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 delegitimation	 is	 not	 at	 all	 to	 dispense	 with	 the	
generative	value	of	refutation,	however.			Why,	for	example,	does	the	novel	focus	more	
on	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 programs	 of	 resistance	 than	 on	 delegitimizing	 the	 “official”	
narratives	against	which	those	programs	range	themselves?		Daniel’s	parodies	are	more	
self-indicting	 the	more	directly	 they	have	 to	do	with	 the	analogy	between	his	parents’	
situation	and	his	own,	the	more	the	parents’	proven	historical	wrongness	seeps	into	his	
putatively	still-open	present.	This	is	summed	up	in	the	way	he	treats	his	father’s	relation	
to	 the	 history	 he	 lives	 in	 as	 overly	 mediated	 by	 the	 one	 he	 projects:	 “American	
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democracy	 wasn’t	 democratic	 enough.	 	 He	 continued	 to	 be	 astonished,	 insulted,	
outraged,	that	it	wasn’t	purer,	finer,	more	ideal.		Finding	proof	of	it	over	and	over	again	
–	 the	 struggle	 is	 still	 going	on,	 Pop!	 –	 like	 a	 guy	 looking	 for	 confirmation”	 (40).	 	 The	
present	 “still”	 of	 the	 interjection	may	 come	 either	 from	 a	 collaborative	 young	 Daniel	
giving	his	father	the	confirmation	he	seeks,	or	an	older	Daniel	ironically	confirming	the	
failure	of	his	father’s	procedures	of	proof	by	interjecting	untimely	enthusiasm.	In	either	
case	he	acknowledges	the	ongoing	“it”	for	which	Paul	repeatedly	seeks	an	incentivising	
proof,	which	in	a	similar	ambiguity	may	refer	either	to	the	work	of	state	machinery	or	
the	necessity	of	struggle	against	it.		The	interjection’s	complexity	thus	at	once	points	up	
Daniel’s	 predicament	 –	 the	 inheritance	of	 an	unchanging	 legacy	of	 struggle	 –	 and	 the	
inadequacy	of	his	parodic	response.		Doctorow	shows	Daniel’s	cynicism	to	be	as	wilfully	
unproductive	as	his	father’s	idealism.	Daniel’s	cynicism-reflex,	as	it	instantly	negates	his	
struggle-impulse,	applies	parodic	 refutation	 to	 two	 figures	who	are	determinedly,	 self-
constructedly,	marginal.		The	language	of	the	left	points	to	the	respective	failings	of	two	
generations	 of	 the	 left.	 	 As	 a	 subject	 for	 parody	 American	 Democracy,	 the	 syntactic	
subject	of	the	initial	sentence,	barely	gets	a	look-in.	
As	 do	 all	 its	 central	 figures,	 then,	 The	 Book	 of	 Daniel	 takes	 the	 evils	 and	 the	
strategies	of	state	hegemony	absolutely	for	granted:	rather	than	its	insights,	these	are	its	
givens.	Instead,	it	prioritizes	careful	scrutiny	of	the	way	that	those	characters	respond,	
the	counter-narratives	that	they	manage	to	propose.		As	Daniel	is	scornfully	parodic	of	
the	discourses	that	sustained	his	parents,	so	The	Book	of	Daniel	is	sceptical,	subversive	
and	humorous	mainly	against	 those	who	share	 its	 emancipatory	 interests.	 It	does	 this	
satirical	work	on	 such	marginal	 figures,	 I	 suggest,	precisely	 to	help	 readers	who	share	
interests	with	them	resist	better,	and	look	in	the	right	places	for	possibilities	of	doing	so.	
The	 Book	 of	 Daniel	 figures	 its	 goals	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 ability	 to	 generate	 new	
knowledge	for	the	characters	in	the	novel	and	for	Doctorow’s	readers.	These	two	groups	
are	 consistently	 connected	 by	 Daniel’s	 treating	 the	 reader	 as	 a	 peer,	 at	 the	 level	 of	
interest	and	commitment,	and	at	the	level	of	knowledge	of	the	historical	conditions	he	
and	they	ostensibly	share.		The	questions	I	have	suggested	that	The	Book	of	Daniel	poses	
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are	predicated	on	the	reader’s	acceptance	of	two	circumstances	(available	to	readers	of	
even	Doctorow’s	earliest	fiction)	that	Daniel	mocks	his	father	for	eliding;	the	historical	
failures	of	the	left’s	own	grand	narrative	in	undermining	hegemony	even	as	it	attained	
its	 own	 forms	 of	 cultural	 authority,	 and	 the	 present	 evidence	 of	 the	 incorporation	 of	
resistance	by	hegemonic	structures.	Daniel’s	marginal	heritage	 is	 sufficiently	assumed,	
indeed,	 that	 he	 can	make	parody	 of	 it;	 he	 notes	 of	 the	 Sacco/Vanzetti	 case	 that	 “The	
story	of	this	trial	is	well	known	and	often	noted	by	historians	and	need	not	be	recounted	
here”	 (25).	 	 For	 Hutcheon,	 by	 contrast,	 historiographic	 metafiction	 provides	 that	
“implied	recognition	that	our	culture	is	not	really	the	homogenous	monolith	we	might	
have	assumed…”	(my	italics).		Her	implied	audience,	her	“we,”	thus	comes	to	each	new	
text,	or	 to	the	contemplation	of	 the	genre	as	a	whole,	without	any	prior	knowledge	of	
the	 role	 that	marginal	 forces	have	played	 in	 the	history	 of	 the	monolith’s	 inscription.	
Parody	 always	 alters	 their	 horizon	 away	 from	 the	 officially	 inscribed	 expectation,	 and	
away	is	the	only	important	direction.		
When	Hutcheon	says	“Perhaps	 it	 is	another	 inheritance	from	the	60s	to	believe	
that	challenging	and	questioning	are	positive	values	(even	if	solutions	to	problems	are	
not	 offered),	 for	 the	 knowledge	 derived	 from	 such	 inquiry	 may	 be	 the	 only	 possible	
condition	of	 change”	 (7/8),	 she	 suggests	 that	questioning	can	always	uncover	 relevant	
novelty	 valuable	 enough	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 neglected	 practical	 endpoint.	 Both	
Doctorow	 and	 Daniel,	 though,	 write	 for	 an	 audience	 that	 is,	 to	 some	 degree,	 aware	
already	 of	 the	 history,	 the	 voice,	 and	 the	 specific	 historiographical	 perplexities	 of	 the	
American	 Left.	 Fictions	whose	 narrative	modes	 differ	 from	 the	 “official”	 can’t	 rest	 on	
that	alone,	but	have	to	use	 those	 forms	to	offer	viable	new	knowledge,	approaches,	or	
insights	 judgable	 in	 relation	 to	 future	 solutions.102	The	 requirement	 to	 improve	 the	
challenge	a	counter-narrative	is	able	to	pose	in	response	to	its	failures	is	the	particular																																																									
102	Plenty	 of	 postmodern	 fiction	 falls	 into	 precisely	 this	 trap.	 Marilyn	 Maxwell,	 for	 example,	 rightly	
criticizes	the	limitations	of	Donald	Barthleme’s	attempts	to	dethrone	the	“official”	and	promote	the	“ex-
centirc”	 in	 The	 Dead	 Father:	 “he	 presents	 female	 emancipation	 in	 the	 text	 as	 a	 form	 of	 linguistic	
experimentation	 that	 is	 intended	 to	 offer	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 self-aggrandizing,	 often	 violent	 tenor	 of	
male	 ‘speechifying’…	[but]	By	reducing	Julie’s	feminist	anger	to	a	new,	but	incoherent,	female	discourse,	
Barthelme	flattens	out	her	identity	to	a	voice	that	breaks	free	from	the	traditional,	linear	speech	patterns	
of	the	Dead	Father	,	but	which	carries	no	pragmatic	value	or	political	import…”	(46).	
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“inheritance	from	the	60s,”	in	Hutcheon’s	term,	with	which	Doctorow	and	Daniel	have	
to	work.		
Daniel	 is	 already,	 like	 the	 reader	 he	 addresses,	 well	 aware	 of	 everything	 that	
Hutcheon	 expects	 to	 shock	 them	 with	 the	 force	 of	 the	 new.	 	 Daniel’s	 presumed	
addressee	 and	Doctorow’s	 implied	 reader,	 in	 1971	 when	 left	 commentary	 was	moving	
overground	due	to	resistance	to	the	Vietnam	war,	already	knows	more	than	Hutcheon’s	
of	 nearly	 twenty	 years	 later.	 Daniel	 himself	 has	 this	 as	 taken-for-granted	 general	
knowledge	 because	 of	 his	 father:	 “he	 told	 me	 about	 Sacco	 and	 Vanzetti.	 	 About	 the	
Scotsboro	boys.		He	ran	up	and	down	history	like	a	pianist	playing	his	scales”	(35).	The	
exclusive	voice	of	the	“history”	that	legislated	the	deaths	of	Sacco,	Vanzetti,	Isaacson	is	
conflated	with	 the	 rote	 voice	 of	 his	 father’s	 counter-history.	 	 The	problem	 is	not	 that	
Daniel’s	 reader	needs	 illuminating	as	 to	Sacco	and	Vanzetti’s	place	 in	 left	history,	but	
that	 Daniel’s	 treatment	 of	 his	 parents	 reduces	 them	 to	 the	 scale-y	 husk	 that	 they	
themselves	 made	 of	 Sacco	 and	 Vanzetti.	 The	 novel’s	 sceptical	 treatment	 of	 Daniel’s	
response	 entails	 that	 a	 better	 response	 could	 (by	 someone	 in	 his	 fictionalised-history	
position)	and	can	(by	readers	of	the	novel	made	aware	of	the	failings	of	his	program)	be	
developed	by	moving	onward	in	accordance	with	each	particular	refutation.	And	as	ex-
centric	 interests	 can	 be	 pursued	 better	 and	 worse,	 so	 the	 novel	 suggests	 that	 the	
confrontation	of	different	ex-centric	approaches—for	example	between	those	of	Daniel	
and	his	parents—should	compel	each	other	to	self-scrutiny	about	how	to	improve.	Such	
projects,	in	other	words,	need	to	compete.	
The	 novel’s	 investment	 in	 genuine	 competition	 between	 narratives,	 whose	
relationships	should	force	each	to	strive	for	greater	validity,	is	specifically	a	warrant	for	
self-criticism.	 	 Bimbisar	 Irom	 is	 one	 critic	 to	 have	 noted	 the	 significance	 of	 that	
competition	 to	Doctorow’s	work,	 and	 rightly	 sees	 it	 as	 crucial	 to	Daniel’s	 sense	of	his	
parents’	 wrongness:	 “To	 Daniel,	 his	 parents	 exist	 in	 a	 hermetic	 cocoon	 where	 the	
possibilities	of	competing	 interpretations	are	missing”	(71).	He	reasonably	extends	this	
to	 the	 novel’s	 portrayal	 of	 both	 Old	 and	 New	 Left,	 each	 as	 guilty	 as	 the	 other	 of	
“deafness	to	other	competing	voices	and	narratives”	(76).		Yet	for	all	his	sense	that	this	is	
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one	 of	 the	 novel’s	 central	 questions,	 he	 sees	 Daniel’s	 parodic	 ability	 to	 juggle	 and	
juxtapose	 many	 voices	 as	 solving	 it.	 In	 identifying	 Daniel’s	 achievements	 with	 the	
novel’s,	 he	 cites	 both	Hutcheon’s	model	 of	 parody	 and	 Rorty’s	 of	 irony,	 even	 though	
both	resist	the	notion	that	facts	beyond	discourse	can	bear	on	the	competition	between	
narratives,	 let	 alone	 constrain	 marginal	 figures	 in	 their	 discursive	 pursuit	 of	
emancipatory	interests.	That	constraint	is	deliberative	in	subjecting	the	competition	to	
criteria	external	to	mere	self-expression.	
Insofar	as	its	correspondence	with	the	actual	possibilities	of	the	situation	dictates	
the	 validity	 of	 a	 program	 of	 action,	 refutation	 and	 the	 forms	 of	 challenge	 that	 work	
through	 delegitimation	 are	 only	 likely	 to	 generate	 new	 knowledge	 if	 they	 work	
sequentially	 to	 hunt	 those	 possibilities	 down.	 Questioning	 is	 not	 the	 same	 thing	 as	
measurably	approaching,	and	Hutcheon’s	lack	of	concern	for	“solutions”	seems	to	accept	
the	neopragmatist	 idea	 that	 if	 solutions	are	never	 final,	 then	 it	becomes	 impossible	 to	
make	 practical	 judgments	 about	whether	 or	 not	 each	decision,	 each	 action,	 brings	 us	
nearer	to	them.	Sean	McCann	and	Michael	Szalay,	as	part	of	a	far	more	pessimistic	take	
on	the	60s	inheritance,	critique	the	contemporary	persistence	of	New	Left	idealisations	
of	 spontaneity	 and	 chance:	 “Any	 plan	 of	 action	 seemed	 in	 this	 context	 an	 overly	
rationalizing,	 managerial	 endeavor”	 (444).	 This	 attitude	 saturates	 Daniel’s	 paralyzing	
awareness	that	“there	is	nothing	I	could	do…	for	which	[the	state]	cannot	have	planned.”	
Planning	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 what	 threatens	 Daniel:	 no	 wonder	 he	 affectively	 aligns	
himself	against	programs	that	would	demand	it	of	himself.	Yet	Doctorow	also	seems	to	
suggest	 that	 such	planning	 is	Daniel’s	own	best	option:	 if	public	 rationalization	 is	 the	
threat,	private	rationality	may	be	the	solution.	
	In	this	 lineage,	too	great	a	sense	of	meliorative	consistency	between	actions,	of	
consecutive	refutation,	of	 informed	sequencing,	of	 investigation	as	a	sustained	project,	
is	 critical	 anathema.103	Daniel’s	 aversion	 to	 this	 ongoing	 meliorative	 work	 is,	 like	 his	
compulsion	to	mimic	the	Inertia	Kid,	characterized	in	terms	of	affective	motive:	 in	his																																																									
103	Daniel’s	 own	 encounters	 with	 the	 New	 Left	 leave	 him	 queasy	 at	 the	 spectacle	 of	 just	 this	 kind	 of	
fetishized	disconnection,	but	it’s	a	mode	to	which	he	himself	gives	in,	fully	aware	of	its	failings.		
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ironic	portrayal	of	the	effect	Paul’s	arrest	has	on	the	fabric	of	his	youthful	experience,	he	
laments	that	“I	missed	my	father’s	voice	analyzing,	endlessly	analyzing	and	exposing	the	
lies	in	the	newspaper…	I	missed	his	truth”	(160).		Paul’s	refutations,	his	exposures	of	lies,	
are	 valued	 here	 more	 for	 their	 amniotically	 comforting	 ambience	 of	 “truth”	 than	 for	
anything	they	actually	achieved.		Daniel	figures	the	sense	of	certainty	that	comes	from	
repetitively	critiquing	what	you	know	to	be	wrong	in	a	tempting,	nostalgic	light.		For	all	
that	 Paul’s	 refutations	 are	 “endless,”	 they	 apply	 to	 only	 the	 one	 “newspaper,”	 aligning	
them	with	Daniel’s	recursive	refutations	of	Paul’s	own	beliefs.		This	opposition	between	
comfort	 and	 generativity,	 tied	 to	 Daniel’s	 retreat	 from	 possibility	 into	 repetitive	
refutations	of	 the	 same	 few	narratives,	 establishes	pathological	 reiteration	as	a	 failing,	
and	 thus	 posits	 a	mode	 of	 sequential	 thinking	 that	 could	 actually	 sustain	 the	 project	
whose	 duty	 he	 bears.	 	 Refutation	 can	 only	 be	 a	 spur	 to	 the	 provisional	 if	 it	 itself	 is	
mobile,	 sequential,	meliorative,	 planned:	 it	 should	 get	 us	 closer	 to	 knowing	what	 the	
actually-existing	possibilities	are,	 rather	 than	 reiterate	 our	 awareness	 that	 obsolescent	
narratives	are	 still	where	 the	possibilities	aren’t.	 	Practical	deliberation	 is	 the	category	
under	which	refutation	and	the	uncovering	of	possibility	can	be	related.	It	is	precisely	in	
the	procedures	the	New	Left	identified	with	rationalization	that	Doctorow	suggests	we	
can	rationally	pursue	emancipatory	interests	against	rationalizing	state	power.	
The	 Rorty-an	 ‘neo’	 version	 of	 pragmatism	 I’ve	 suggested	 underlies	Hutcheon’s,	
Lather’s,	 and	 Rooney’s	 antifoundational	 claims	 departs	 from	 the	 originary	 pragmatist	
heritage	 in	 its	 complete	 erasure	 of	 Charles	 Peirce’s	 overtly	 sequentialist	 thinking.	 For	
Sidney	 Hook,	 writing	 in	 Doctorow’s	 time	 from	 within	 that	 Peircean	 tradition,	 “All	
technological	behaviour	is	purposive	behaviour;	the	purpose	provides	a	test	of	relevance,	
and	the	achievement	of	purpose,	a	test	of	the	adequacy	of	alternative	means	suggested”	
(54).	 	Technology—the	term	Harpham	had	used	to	describe	Doctorow’s	self-conscious	
foregrounding	of	the	conditions	of	historical	narrative—refers	in	Hook’s	formulation	to	
any	adaptation	of	knowledge	about	existing	 situations	 for	 their	 improvement.	 	Hook’s	
model,	which	prioritizes	 the	 abductive	 identification	 of	 testable	 new	means,	 reveals	 a	
limitation	in	Harpham’s:	if	the	goal	is	“alternative	means,”	then	Harpham’s	stress	on	the	
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narrative	 re-organization	 of	 known	 building	 blocks	 gives	 us	 no	 path	 beyond	 what	
Doctorow	faults	Daniel	for:	the	failure	to	realise	what	alternative	blocks	might	exist,	or	
what	the	blocks	we	misread	really	are.	The	value	Hutcheon’s	account	of	parody	attaches	
to	“recognition”	finds	an	echo	in	Hook,	for	whom	this	technology	frames	“knowledge	as	
a	form	of	acknowledgement—an	acknowledgement	of	the	nature	of	materials”	(540).			If	
Daniel’s	parents	are	among	his	materials,	then	clearly	Daniel	knows	their	nature,	but	his	
technology	of	parody,	with	the	deontologising	implications	Hite	notes,	is	both	a	failure	
of	 acknowledgement	 in	 terms	 of	 alterity,	 and	 crucially	 forecloses	 on	 “alternative	
means.”104		
The	 idea	 that	 we	 won’t	 find	 “technologically”	 reliable	 means	 except	 through	
purposively	 structured,	 sequential,	 directed	 inquiry	 is	 where	 Doctorow’s	 interest	 in	
refutation	meets	with	his	investment	in	the	recuperation	of	possibility.	
	
Part	3:	Deliberation,	Private	and	Public	
Plurality	and	Pluralism	
The	 Hutcheonian	 model	 that	 advocates	 plurality	 over	 pluralism	 prioritizes	
accruing	narratives	and	dispersing	authority;	these	narratives	never	orient	towards	each	
other	but	only	take	on	direction	in	relation	to	the	single	centric	narrative.	As	a	result,	
their	only	direction	 is	 “away.”	 	Pluralism,	 for	 all	 that	 it	means	very	different	 things	 to	
William	 James,	 Karl	 Popper,	 and	 Ellen	 Rooney,	 differs	 most	 fundamentally	 from	
plurality	in	its	requirement	that	interpretations	interact,	compete.		For	the	purposes	of																																																									
104	Berlatsky	 rejects	 “Postmodern	 meaninglessness…”	 in	 similar	 instrumental	 language:	 “the	 claim	 that	
there	 is	no	meaning,	no	 truth,	 and	no	 reference	 is	 a	 version	of	 totalization	 that	denies	 the	 tools	we	do	
have	both	to	access	the	past	and	to	construct	an	ethics	in	response	to	our	encounter	with	it”	(35/6).	Hook	
gives	us	a	 framework	 in	which	 to	 judge	Daniel’s	 language-appropriation	relative	 to	a	purpose:	 it	gets	at	
Doctorow’s	 project	 better	 than	Hutcheon	 or	Weisenburger	 because	 it	 acknowledges	 pragmatically	 that	
“we	do	not	have	to	know	what	is	ultimately	or	absolutely	true	or	good	in	order	to	know	what	is	truer	or	
better”	 (Hook	 48).	 	 David	 Herman,	 writing	 just	 as	 the	 plurality	 model	 was	 emerging	 into	 critical	
dominance,	wrote	 a	 notably	 less	 influential	 rebuttal	 of	what	 he	 defined	 as	 its	 “vacuous	 pluralism”:	 the	
“nonsensical...	idea	that,	at	any	given	time,	an	unconstrained	plurality	of	legitimate	interpretations	holds	
for	 one	 and	 the	 same	 artifact,	 situation,	 event	 or	 object”	 (“Ulysses”	 65).	 	 His	 most	 practical	 objection	
comes	 in	 the	 Peircean	 terms	 raised	 by	 Szalay	 and	McCann’s	 stress	 on	 planning:	 “vacuously	 pluralistic	
interpretations	have	not	even	a	minimal	structure	of	directedness”	(69).	
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my	argument,	 it	may	be	 thought	of	as	 “plurality	competing	 relative	 to	 standards.”	For	
Rooney,	this	competition	enshrines	standards	determined	by	hegemonic	interest	as	the	
falsely	naturalized	condition	of	public	inclusion,	and	so	entails	the	rhetorical	exercise	of	
power	under	the	guise	of	a	mere	meeting	of	rhetorics:	“pluralism’s	hegemony	is	due	in	
part	to	its	broad,	generous	invitation	to	all	comers	to	join	the	‘dialogue,’	that	is,	to	try	to	
persuade	 all	 the	 other	 members	 of	 the	 pluralist	 community”	 (61).	 	 The	 processes	 of	
exclusion,	the	workings	of	power,	the	constitution	of	centricity	and	ex-centricity,	rely	on	
the	masking	rhetoric	of	pluralism,	which	will	grant	everyone	franchise	as	long	as	they’re	
willing	to	be	convinced	along	existing	lines.	This	is	a	model	of	pluralism	as	an	entirely	
public,	 entirely	 supervised	 form	 of	 contestation.	 	 It	 treats	 deliberation	 as	 a	 public	
practice	of	persuasion	defined	by	the	exercise	of	power	over	those	already	marginalized.	
Yet	my	minimal	 definition	of	Doctorow’s	 pluralism	makes	no	 claims	 about	 the	
public	origins	of	 the	standards	to	which	a	narrative	should	hold	 itself.	 	Discussing	the	
academic	legacy	of	the	1960s	in	terms	that	could	be	equally	applied	to	the	legacy	of	the	
1980s	theorists	I	discuss,	McCann	and	Szalay	note	that	inquiry	in	the	humanities	is	now	
dominated	 by	 “theories	 that	 invoke	 the	 singular,	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 inassimilable	
against	the	basic	elements	(norms,	institutions,	deliberation)	of	the	public	realm”	(459).	
All	Doctorow’s	novels	are	to	some	degree	about	the	consequences	of	public	discourse:	
he	examines	not	only	the	processes	of	private	deliberation,	but	its	public	procedures	and	
constraints.	 	The	 Book	 of	 Daniel’s	 imperatives	 to	 deliberation,	 however,	 are	 primarily	
about	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 private	 interests	 can	 seek	 grounds	 to	 resist	 publicly	
promulgated	consensus.	Doctorow’s	fiction’s	rejection	of	the	sufficiency	of	proliferative	
plurality	 does	 not	 range	 it,	 as	 Rooney	 and	 Hutcheon	 suggest	 it	 must,	 against	
emancipatory	interests.	
The	 core	 ethical	 objection	 in	 Rooney	 and	 Sanders	 is	 that	 pluralism	 and	 public	
deliberation,	 in	 their	 requirement	 that	 the	marginal	 play	 by	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 centric,	
structurally	perpetuates	something	like	Daniel’s	bad-faith	dismissal	of	his	grandmother	
or	the	Inertia	Kid:	a	refusal	to	take	them	seriously	as	loci	of	experience,	knowledge,	and	
interests.	Sanders,	 for	example,	propounds	 testimony	as	an	alternative	 to	deliberation,	
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since	 it	 “more	 plausibly	 encourages	 mutual	 respect—something	 that	 advocates	 of	
deliberation,	 after	 all,	 really	 want”	 (350),	 while	 “What	 is	 fundamental	 about	 giving	
testimony	 is	 telling	 one’s	 own	 story,	 not	 seeking	 communal	 dialogue”	 (372).	 	 The	
Doctorow/Hutcheon	axis,	though,	hinges	not	on	whether	the	ex-centric	should	testify,	
but	what	public	use	that	testimony	goes	on	to	have.	Hutcheon’s	model	only	provides	for	
testimony	 to	be	articulated,	 to	add	 to	 the	non-hegemonic	mass,	and	 then,	as	Sanders’	
rejection	 of	 dialogue	 seems	 to	 suggest,	 to	 be	 left	 without	 further	 engagement.	
Doctorow’s	critique	of	Daniel	seems	to	raise	similar	issues	insofar	as	it	matches	Charles	
Altieri’s	 critique	 of	 the	 merely	 delegitimating	 strain	 of	 postmodernism	 as	 something	
incapable	 of	 generating	 new	 respect:	 “It	 cannot	 actually	 focus	 substantial	 political	
discussion,	because	its	language	of	resistance	allows	neither	the	self-representation	nor	
the	respect	for	the	other	necessary	for	significant	debate”	(238).	On	Hutcheon’s	model,	
new	 testimony	might	 redistribute	 a	 quantum	of	 the	 zero-sum	 respect	hoarded	by	 the	
hegemon	 across	 all	 testifiers,	 but	 any	 given	 testimony	 receives	 none	 of	 the	 respect	 of	
subsequent	engagement.		
Sanders	doesn’t	seem	to	want	to	imply	this:	she	hopes	that	“testimony	could	open	
the	 possibility	 of	 reasonable,	 collective	 consideration	 of	 novel,	 if	 disquieting,	
perspectives”	(372).	But	what	would	that	“collective	consideration”	be	if	not	some	form	
of	public	deliberation?	Testimony	adds	to	what	Hook	called	our	“material”	in	ways	that	
Doctorow	 faults	Daniel	 for	 not	 seeking	 out.	 The	 simplest	way	 to	 grant	 testimony	 the	
value	Sanders	attaches	to	its	material	possibilities,	is	to	see	it	as	a	pre-requisite	for	good	
subsequent	deliberation.105	Once	articulated,	for	it	to	be	of	any	subsequent	value,	it	has	
to	 be	 subject	 not	 only	 to	 endorsement	 and	 ratification,	 but	 to	 practical	 service	 of	
external	 conditions	 and	goals.	Her	 critique	 is	not	of	deliberation	per	 se,	but	of	public	
deliberation	organized	badly.	In	a	review	of	Rooney’s	book,	Harpham	suggests	that	the	
Althusserian	worldview	of	pervasive	false	consciousness	is	as	much	a	matter	of	ethical	as	
of	poltical	paralysis:	we	would	be	“poorly	served	by	the	rejection	of	pluralism	in	favor	of																																																									
105	if	for	Rooeyn	the	problem	is	“inevitable”	“exclusion,”	the	solution	for	deliberators	is	to	exclude	as	little	
as	possible.	
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a	model	of	an	aggregation	of	exclusivist	discourses,	practices,	and	values	that	presume	a	
condition	of	general	incomprehension	and	unpersuadability”	(12).	That	“aggregation”	is	
the	imperative	at	the	heart	of	Hutcheonian	models	of	postmodern	fiction’s	politics,	but	
Doctorow’s	 treatment	 of	 Daniel’s	 polyvocal,	 mono-insight	 parody	 suggests	 that	 the	
compiling	of	voices	 is	no	guarantee	of	 respect	 for	each.	Nor	of	practical	benefit:	mere	
delegitimation	has	a	hard	time	organizing	alternatives.	
It’s	 perhaps	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 subsequent	 work	 in	 the	 lineage	 of	 Lather,	
Hutcheon,	 Rooney,	 or	 Sanders	 has	 reconsidered	what	 ex-centric	 deliberation	 of	 goals	
could	 look	 like,	 often	 by	 redefining	 respect	 and	 validity	 in	 relation	 to	 disagreement.	
Such	models	 take	the	plurality	of	viable	criteria	and	knowledges	 for	granted	but	build	
outward	from	this	insight.	From	Chantal	Mouffe’s	development	of	an	agonistic	model	of	
public	politics	that	makes	the	construction	and	negotiation	of	new	hegemonies	part	of	
the	 promotion	 of	 worthwhile	 interests,	 to	 Linda	 Zerilli’s	 Arendtian	 redefinition	 of	
validity	through	redefinition	of	human	difference	from	the	“passive”	and	“ontological”	to	
“an	active	and,	as	I	show	below,	 imaginative	relation	to	others	in	a	public	space”	(145),	
the	 goal	 has	 generally	 been	 to,	 in	 Zerilli’s	 terms,	 make	 the	 intrinsic	 competition	 of	
marginal	 worldviews	 “the	 condition	 of,	 rather	 than	 the	 problem	 of,	 intersubjective	
validity”	 (146),	and	hence	of	 respect	 for	 subjects.	The	goal	 is	not	 to	attack	one	central	
power	through	mere	articulation	of	correspondence-evasive	testimony,	but	the	granting	
of	a	supra-discursive	“worldly	reality”	that	“involve[s]	challenges	to,	and	changes	in,	our	
criteria”	 (145).	 This	 is	 precisely	 the	 correspondence-driven	 self-criticism	 Doctorow’s	
indictment	of	Daniel’s	parody	promotes.	And	as	self-criticism,	it	works	at	the	private	as	
well	as	the	public	level	of	practice,	with	Doctorow’s	focus	on	Daniel’s	psychology	setting	
up	 a	 clear	 sequential	 subordination.	 As	 McCann	 and	 Szalay	 suggest,	 though,	 these	
developments	 in	the	theory	of	plurality	and	marginal	 interests	haven’t	made	their	way	
back	 into	 criticism	of	 postmodern	 fiction,	which	 remains	 resolutely	Hutcheonian	 and	
consequently	anti-deliberative.	
If	 Rooney	 and	 Sanders,	 in	 their	 arguments	 against	 Pluralism	 and	Deliberation,	
focus	on	the	public	risks	of	coercive	“persuasion,”	it’s	not	clear	how	their	conflations	of	
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appeals	 to	 worldly	 correspondence	 and	 enactments	 of	 that	 public	 coercion	 would	
warrant	 their	 critique	 applying	 in	 the	 private	 realm.	 Taking	 Rooney’s	 insights	 about	
intrinsic	 exclusion	 to	 be	 a	 general	warrant	 against	 deliberation,	 for	 example,	 requires	
two	unjustified	extrapolations.	My	minimal	definition	of	pluralism—plurality	competing	
relative	to	standards—doesn’t	entail	that	those	standards	originate	in	centric	structures	
of	power.		As	Doctorow’s	treatment	of	Daniel	shows,	ex-centric	interests	are	a	standard	
by	 which	 some	 counter-hegemonic	 narratives	 can	 be	 judged	 better,	 because	 more	
effectual,	 than	 others.	 The	 imperative	 that	 emerges	 from	 granting	 the	 plurality	 of	
criteria	 is	 for	 the	 ex-centric	 agent	 to	 choose	 among	 them	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 own	
definition	 of	 their	 interests.	 	 This	 imperative,	 though,	 commits	 us	 to	 comparative	
criticism	 of	 marginal	 narratives,	 voices,	 or	 actors	 by	 standards	 they	 may	 not	 have	
provided.		
The	 second	 contention	 is	 that	 ex-centric	 narratives	 can	 gain	 nothing	 by	 being	
subjected	to	such	standards,	or	from	coming	off	worse	in	interaction	with	discourses	of	
power.			As	with	responses	to	refutation,	a	sequential	model	of	failures	or	defeats	gives	
direction	 to	 the	 search	 for	 generative,	 effectual	 possibilities	 and	 procedures.	 The	
possibility	of	a	marginal	narrative’s	refutation	in	its	interaction	with	conditions	outside	
itself	merely	establishes	the	importance	of	a	directed	program	of	action,	as	against	the	
plausibly	refutable	belief	that	acting	in	one’s	own	interests	regardless	of	countervailing	
external	 conditions	 will	 willy	 nilly	 redistribute	 power.	 	 Doctorow’s	 foregrounding	 of	
Daniel’s	 ex-centric	 legacy,	 the	 novel’s	 focus	 on	 exclusion	 and	 refutation,	 and	Daniel’s	
own	 sense	 of	 complicity	 in	 pursuing	 methods	 he	 knows	 don’t	 fulfil	 his	 project,	 are	
pluralistic	insofar	as	they	acknowledge	the	possibility	of	external	constraints	on	validity	
and	 hence	 promote	 the	weighing	 of	 alternatives	 relative	 to	 various	 valid	 standards.106	
Absent	 from	 the	 plurality-model’s	 vision	 is	 the	 potential	 for	 parody,	 rather	 than																																																									
106	Seyla	Benhabib	 argued	 against	 trying	 to	make	 a	 feminist	 politics	 out	 of	 the	 combination	of	Rooney-
style	 Althusserian	 distrust	 of	 any	 compromise	 between	 articulated	 interests	 and	 what	 Herman	 called	
postmodernism’s	 “vacuous	 pluralism”	 for	 precisely	 this	 reason:	 “The	 rhetorics	 of	 language	 Lyotard	
espouses	 does	 not	 distinguish	 between	 raising	 a	 validity	 claim	 and	 forcing	 someone	 to	 believe	 in	
something,	between	the	coordination	of	action	among	participants	on	the	basis	of	conviction	generated	
through	agreement	and	the	manipulative	influencing	of	the	behaviour	of	others”	(114).	
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undermining	the	dominant	culture,	to	spur	marginal	narratives	to	scrutinise	themselves	
and	 become	 more	 effective	 resisters,	 capable	 of	 constructing	 better	 alternatives.	
Harpham’s	 review	 of	 Rooney	 stresses	 that	 “the	 commitment	 to	 truth	must	 include	 as	
part	 of	 its	 interior	 self-description	 the	 willingness	 to	 modify,	 qualify,	 complicate,	 or	
reverse	 any	 commitment	 as	 a	 response	 to	 compelling	 arguments,	 a	 response	 to	 facts”	
(“Review”	 11).	 This	 willingness	 can	 help	 organize	 public	 practice,	 but	 it	 is	 first	 and	
foremost	an	attitude	of	individuals:	the	basic	form	of	private	pluralism	and	deliberation.	
And	it’s	this	that	Doctorow	emphasizes	in	his	depiction	of	Daniel:	someone	who	has	to	
sort	 these	 commitments	 out	 at	 a	 personal	 level	 before	 he	 can	 start	 pursuing	
“emancipatory	interests”	out	in	the	public.	
Among	 the	 rhetorical	 imperatives	 generated	 by	 Doctorow’s	 technology	 of	
conspicuous	 fiction,	 then,	 is	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 current	 methods	 of	 emancipatory	
programs	 can	 be	 refuted	 if	 they	 fail	 to	 turn	 an	 acknowledgement	 of	 excluded	
experience’s	 existence—the	 Hutcheon,	 Rooney,	 Lather	 sense	 of	 “acknowledgment”—
into	something	genuinely	workable	and	sustainable	against	the	excluder—Hook’s	sense.	
Doctorow’s	 is	 a	model	 of	 historical	 counter-narrative	whose	onus	 extends	beyond	 the	
point	of	articulation	at	which	the	proliferative	postmodernists	would	circumscribe	it,	to	
a	duty	of	self-scrutiny	and	self-improvement	in	relation	to	emergent	conditions.		Since	
articulation	 represents	 a	 goal	 in	 itself	 for	 those	 postmodern	 thinkers,	 it’s	 no	 surprise	
that	ex-centric	self-scrutiny	is	so	little	of	their	concern:	parodic	counter-narratives	bear	
no	self-critical	obligation,	since	their	wilful	provisionality	made	no	claims	to	correspond	
to	 fact,	 truth	or	history	 in	the	 first	place,	and	their	good	work	rests	 in	the	act	of	 their	
formulation	and	expression.		
The	 thinkers	 I’ve	 focused	 on	 thus	 value	 singular	 ruptures	 over	 sustained	
programs	of	investigation.	However,	in	doing	so	they	fail	to	give	any	reason	why	any	one	
counter-narrative	 should	 retain	 attention	 after	 the	 moment	 of	 its	 own	 articulation:	
without	 that	 attention,	 the	 value	 of	 mere	 ‘recognition’	 is	 harder	 to	 defend.	 	 This	
animates	 Seyla	 Benhabib’s	 preference	 for	 a	 feminism	 that	 would	 acknowledge	
postmodernism	 without	 making	 what	 Herman	 called	 its	 “vacuous	 pluralism”	 into	 an	
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excuse	 to	 prioritize	 mere	 articulation	 over	 practical	 engagement	 with	 pre-discursive	
conditions:	 she	 like	Doctorow	 and	 all	 the	 novelists	 I	 examine	 seeks	 “an	 epistemology	
and	politics	which	 recognizes	 the	 lack	of	metanarratives	and	 foundational	guarantees,	
but	 which	 nonetheless	 insists	 on	 formulating	 minimal	 criteria	 of	 validity	 for	 our	
discursive	and	political	practices”	(125).	This	posits	two	stages	of	deliberation:	first	that	
of	choosing	criteria	 that	align	with	your	 interests,	and	secondly	 that	of	choosing	what	
actions	will	interact	with	the	world	to	best	advance	those	interests.	In	the	second	half	of	
the	 novel,	 Doctorow’s	 elaboration	 of	 Daniel’s	 failure	 to	 do	 either	 begins	 to	 indicate	
where	we	might	actually	seek	recuperable	historical	possibilities:	by	cultivating	habits	of	
recognition	based	on	surprising	continuity	rather	than	reliable	rupture.			
	
Part	4:	Misuses	of	Mimicry	
Perhaps	aware	of	 the	problems	of	 letting	his	private	affinity	 for	 travesty	dictate	
his	notionally	 outward-working	project,	Daniel,	 around	 the	novel’s	halfway	point,	 lets	
up	on	the	 travesty	and	starts	 to	venture	outward	 in	 the	narrated	present,	meeting	the	
celebrity	New	Left	 “revolutionary”	Artie	 Sternlicht	 and	getting	beaten	up	 at	 a	protest.	
The	latter	bathetically	echoes	his	earlier	description	of	his	father’s	beating	by	a	crowd	of	
anti-communist	protesters.		Daniel’s	desultory	attendance	at	the	protest	contrasts	with	
his	conviction	that	his	father’s	beating	had	been	a	conscious	decision	to	die	for	beliefs.		
After	the	beating	fails	to	kill	him,	Paul	puts	back	on	the	glasses	he	had	handed	off	before	
he	went	to	meet	the	crowd:	Daniel	watches	his	broken	face,	noting	that	“he	 looked	at	
me	through	glasses	that	were	unbroken”	(51).		This	physically	ratifies	Daniel’s	sense	that	
whatever	 the	 world	 did	 to	 his	 father	 could	 not	 change	 the	 filters	 through	 which	 he	
viewed	it;	Daniel’s	own	brief	contact	with	the	front	line	of	public	dissent,	though,	leaves	
him	similarly	barren	of	new	insight	or	historical	possibility.	
He	 turns	 instead	 to	 the	 narration	 of	 three	 crucial	 encounters:	 his	 mother’s	
courtroom	encounter	with	Mindish	(the	family	friend	who	informed	on	them);	his	own	
trip	in	the	novel’s	present	to	visit	the	senile	Mindish;	and	his	 last	visit	to	his	catatonic	
	 189	
sister	 in	her	 room	at	 the	 asylum	where	 she	has	 ended	up	 after	 giving	up	on	her	 own	
ability	to	“assume	the	 legacy”	productively.	Yet	each	of	 these	encounters	 is	delayed	by	
Daniel’s	 second	mode	of	parody:	not	 the	 travesties	he	directs	against	 those	who	share	
his	ex-centric	relation	to	power,	but	his	accurate	renditions	of	authoritative	discourses.		
While	Daniel	 is	 constantly	 to	be	 found	appropriating	 a	 flat	 academic	discourse	
that	 might	 be	 aligned	 with	 power	 structures	 and	 with	 his	 thesis’	 “official”	 Sukenick-
audience,	this	language	is	rarely	employed	to	subversive	effect.		For	Hutcheon,	accurate	
replicative	parody	“is	not	imitation;	it	is	not	a	monologic	mastery	of	another’s	discourse.		
It	 is	 a	 dialogic,	 parodic	 reappropriation	 of	 the	 past”	 (72).	 She	 takes	 the	 novel	 to	
unequivocally	 endorse	 Daniel’s	 occasional	 Frankfurt-school	 riffs,	 reading	 the	 novel’s	
most	famous	passage—Daniel’s	critique	of	Disneyland—as	the	author’s	own	contention	
that	theme-park	history	is	“not	a	critical	and	parodic	transgression	that	might	provoke	
thought;	 it	 is	 intended	 for	 instant	 consumption	 as	 a	 spectacle	 void	 of	 historical	 and	
ethical	significance”	(Poetics	25).		Daniel’s	ventriloquistic	critique,	by	implication,	is	just	
such	a	 transgression.	 	For	 readers	who	can	by	 this	 late	point	of	 the	novel	 identify	 the	
Disneyland	spiel	as	an	instance	of	a	repeated	tendency,	though,	the	“provoked	thought”	
might	 be	 less	 about	 the	 capitalist	 apparatus	 of	 spectacle	 (which	 the	 novel	 takes	 for	
granted	 throughout)	 than	 about	 why	 Daniel	 prefaces	 all	 his	 narrations	 of	 important	
personal	encounters	with	drawn	out	recitation	of	other	people’s	critique.107	When	Daniel	
spiels,	monologic	mastery	 is	 all	he’s	displaying.	 	FrankfurtSchool	 is	 an	entirely	 centric																																																									
107	McCann	and	Szalay	have	little	time	for	“the	frequently	reiterated	conviction	that	merely	adopting	that	
language	amounts	 to	a	political	challenge	to	contemporary	society”	 (459).	Adopting	 left	 language	 is	not	
enacting	 left	 politics.	 Andrew	 Pepper	 reads	 such	 citations	 and	 adoptions	 in	 concert	 with	 Hutcheon’s	
conflation	 of	Doctorow	 and	Daniel,	 suggesting	 that	 “Doctorow	 even	 invokes	Marx	 to	make	 this	 point”	
(480),	when	noting	Daniel’s	comment	that	“that	is	why	Marx	used	the	word	“slavery”	to	define	the	role	of	
the	working	class	under	capitalism”	(BoD	134).	He	not	only	conflates	their	language,	but	their	attitude	to	
historical	phenomena.	The	effect	 is	 to	give	 far	 too	much	credit	 to	 the	source	materials	 for	 fresh	 insight	
relevant	 to	Daniel’s	 situation,	 and	 for	 novelty	 to	 the	 reader	Doctorow	 addresses.	 	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 to	
treat	all	ventriloquy	of	authoritative	right-wing	discourse	as	delegitimating	while	treating	all	ventriloquy	
of	 authoritative	 left-wing	 discourse	 as	 insight-generating.	 	 There	 are	 no	 grounds	 in	 the	 novel	 for	 this	
distinction.		We	should	read	them,	I	suggest,	as	equally	barren	iterations	of	what	Daniel	and	his	audience	
have	already	heard,	deployed	to	forestall	the	narration	of	possibilities	that	do	not	yet	exist	for	Daniel,	and	
of	sections	of	coded-significant	discourse	not	yet	given	fictional	imagination	by	his	readers.107		Doctorow	
locates	 possible	 insight	 in	 the	 encounters	 that	 are	 being	 deferred	 rather	 than	 the	 accurate-parody	
language	that	is	deferring	them.			
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discourse	 in	 Daniel’s	 academic	 and	 political	 circles;	 what’s	 most	 salient	 about	 the	
Disneyland	 “analysis”	 is	 not	 the	 old	 insights	 it	 repeats,	 but	 the	 way	 it	 delays	 the	
narration	(and	hence	the	fictive	existence)	of	his	encounter	with	Mindish.	Before	each	of	
his	encounters	with	crucial	relationships,	changes	in	which	between	narrated	past	and	
narrative	present	threaten	to	alter	Daniel’s	paradigms,	he	unspools	general,	impersonal	
critique	 of	 institutions:	 discourse	 of	 which	 he	 is	 a	 comfortable	 master	 and	 which	
therefore	bears	little	relation	to	the	uncertain	encounters	it	delays.		Daniel	shuns	the	re-
cognitive	possibility	that	may	inhere	in	his	family’s	experience	by	repeatedly	travestying	
that	 experience,	 and	 he	 defers	 the	 possibility	 that	 may	 inhere	 in	 unparodiable	
encounters	by	 interposing	pseudo-critical	ventriloquy.	 	 It	 is	when	parody	drops	out	of	
the	text,	as	it	tends	to	after	these	palate-cleansing	delays	of	monologic	mastery,	that	we	
are	in	closest	contact	with	the	possibilities	of	historical	experience.	
	
State	as	Parodist	and	the	Problem	of	Complicity	
There	are	three	relationships	that	stay	clear	of	parody,	that	resist	Daniel’s	efforts	
to	 parody	 them:	 those	 between	 Daniel	 and	 Susan,	 Daniel	 and	 Mindish,	 and	 the	
Isaacsons	and	law.	 	The	last	of	these	is	central	because	it	 is	the	one	thing	in	the	novel	
whose	 details	 Daniel	 has	 mastered	 without	 being	 able	 to	 mock.	 Where	 Susan	 and	
Mindish,	 catatonic	 and	 senile,	 each	 represent	 something	 of	 the	 ineffable,	 the	 legal	
system	 is	 all	 discourse.	 	 It	 is	 an	 element	 of	 the	 novel	 (and	 the	 history)	 that	 is	
conspicuously	ridiculous	and	resolutely	unparodied.		Hutcheon	is	right	to	see	the	legal	
system	as	the	villain,	precisely	because	the	ludicrous	logic	of	conviction	is	played	out	for	
us	in	the	novel	so	often,	by	so	many	different	figures,	all	of	whom	are	unable	to	halt	it.		
Her	 notion	 that	 the	 powerful	 institutions	 are	 the	 parodied	 ones,	 though,	 is	 entirely	
undermined	by	the	seriousness	of	its	portrayal.		
The	 legal	 system	 appropriates	 everything	 in	 the	 exaggerative	 manner	 Daniel	
appropriates	ex-centric	discourse.		This	is	clear	for	example	in	the	way	that	the	defence	
her	 lawyers	 cook	 up	 for	 his	 mother	 Rochelle,	 the	 “sexual	 motivation,”	 is	 “not	 true	
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because	it	makes	too	much	of	the	truth”	(202).		The	necessity	of	going	through	a	“ritual”	
of	 defence	 about	 which	 Rochelle	 “doesn’t	 care”	 (202)	 nevertheless	 forces	 her	 into	 a	
public	parody	of	both	her	convictions	and	her	private	affections.	 	The	trial’s	ridiculous	
logic	is	described	to	Daniel	by	journalists	and	lawyers,	who	might	be	expected	to	speak	
from	within	the	hegemonic	discourse,	and	by	his	parents	and	Sternlicht,	who	might	be	
expected	 to	 speak	 from	outside	 it.	 	But	 the	 terms	each	uses	 are	 the	 same,	 and	Daniel	
himself	 finds	 no	 way	 to	 appropriate	 them	 beyond	 the	 morbid,	 comic	 recurrence	 of	
electrical	 imagery,	 drawn	 from	 the	 trial’s	 outcome	 rather	 than	 its	 process.	 	 Here	 the	
novel’s	location	of	pejorative	parody	on	the	side	of	the	powerful	is	almost	unavoidable,	
and	it	is	precisely	the	impossibility	of	parodying	this	parodist	that	motivates	the	novel’s	
historical	questioning.	
The	 historiographical	metafiction	model	 suggests	 that	 articulation	 of	 one’s	 ex-
centric	 experience	 is	 sufficient	 work	 to	 undermine	 the	 centric	 power-structures	 of	
discourse,	 but	 Doctorow’s	 figuration	 of	 the	 state	 establishes	 that	 any	 articulation	 is	
immediately	 susceptible	 to	 the	 state’s	 own,	 much	 more	 efficient,	 parodic	 apparatus.		
Nothing	 Paul	 and	 Rochelle	 say	 or	 feel	 can’t	 be	 exaggerated,	 deontologised,	 turned	
against	them.		The	picture	out	of	which	Daniel	needs	to	get	his	parents	started	out	as	a	
protest	 image—one	 that	he	 first	 saw	 looking	down	 from	stage	 in	 the	process	of	being	
presented	as	a	protest	rallying	point	himself—and	ends	up	as	hegemonic	narrative.		Not	
for	nothing	 is	 that	moment	on	stage	narrated	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	novel	and	again	
immediately	 after	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 trial	 scene.	 	 The	 state’s	 dominion	 over	
expression	 is	 an	 alpha-to-omega	 axiom	 for	Daniel,	 and	 he	 can’t	 ridicule	 it.	 	 After	 the	
investigators	 first	 come	 to	 his	 parents’	 house,	 he	 watches	 them	 talking	 before	 they	
depart:	 “the	 sense	 is	 of	 serious	 and	 irrevocable	 paperwork,	 and	 I	 find	 it	 frightening”	
(106).		The	present	tense	applies	equally	to	the	narrated	and	the	narrating	temporality.		
Daniel’s	 fright	 may	 be	 leaking	 into	 the	 present	 from	 the	 past,	 or	 the	 past	 from	 the	
present.	 	 The	 state’s	 ubiquity,	 in	 this	 instance,	 dictates	 his	 own	 temporal	 language-
games.	
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The	 state	 is	 not	 unlike	Daniel	 in	 its	 aesthetic	 taste	 for	 the	 trivialising	 and	 the	
delegitimating,	 but	 is	 a	 great	 deal	 more	 effectual.	 	 Early	 on	 in	 the	 novel,	 Daniel	
establishes	how	much	of	his	own	political	 tradition	 is	composed	entirely	by	the	 forces	
against	which	it	ranges	itself:	“I	tell	you	this	(who?)	so	that	you	may	record	in	clarity	one	
of	the	Great	Moments	of	the	American	left.		The	American	Left	is	in	this	great	moment	
artfully	 reduced	 to	 the	 shabby	 conspiracies	 of	 a	 couple	 named	 Paul	 and	 Rochelle	
Isaacson”	(110).	Nowhere	is	this	“artful	reduction”	clearer	than	in	the	language	through	
which	he	finally	narrates	the	execution	scene	to	which,	he	suggests,	the	whole	novel	has	
been	building	up.	 	His	 long	delay	 in	getting	 to	 this	point	has	been	due	 to	his	wish	 to	
renarrate	 it	 in	 an	 “out	 of	 the	 picture”	mode,	 but	 it	 was	 state-authored	 theatre	 at	 the	
time,	and	is	doubly	so	in	his	retelling:		Daniel	is	not	really	in	control	of	the	electrocution	
even	 in	 his	 own	book.	 	 This	 narrative’s	 careful	 authorial	 decisions	 are	 attributed	 to	 a	
force	beyond	the	narrator:	“First	they	led	in	my	father.		They	had	rightly	conceived	that	
my	mother	was	 the	stronger.	 	All	 factors	had	 to	be	considered…	They	wanted	 it	 to	go	
smoothly”	(296).108	Here	again	is	the	association	between	state	and	planning	that	Daniel	
uses	to	avoid	planning	of	his	own.	
The	 electrocution’s	 consequences,	 meanwhile,	 are	 similarly	 orchestrated.	 The	
great	 left	 counternarrative	 conspicuously	 fails	 to	 manifest	 itself:	 “Nothing	 had	 gone	
right.	 	 No	 cause	 had	 rallied.	 	 The	 world	 had	 not	 flamed	 to	 revolution”	 (296).	 	 The	
implied	 inevitability	 and	 meta-historical	 causality	 of	 the	 Marxian	 grand	 narrative	 is	
shown	powerless	beside	the	constructed	aesthetic	narrative	of	the	trial.			
Nothing	new	can	emerge	 in	such	a	situation.	 	For	 the	reader	 too,	 this	 is	all	old	
knowledge;	 as	 the	 definite	 article	 demonstrates,	 “the”	 electrocution	 was	 what	 was	
coming	all	along,	fulfilling	a	narrative	desire	by	bestowing	the	ending	that	was	decreed	
as	an	ending	by	history,	implicitly	by	the	central	power-structures	that	Daniel	wishes	to	
critique.	 Daniel’s	 implied	 reader,	 then,	 has	 always	 known	what	 was	 coming,	 and	 has	
always	relied	on	Daniel	to	try	to	avert	it,	or	at	least	make	it	new,	make	it	open.		Daniel																																																									
108	Recall	again	Daniel’s	awareness	that	“there	is	nothing	I	cannot	do…	that	they	cannot	have	planned	for”:	
the	way	he	narrates	the	electrocution	establishes	a	consistent	lineage	for	this	planning	mastery.	
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has	tried	to	do	so	by	parody,	his	projected	reader	perhaps	has	hoped	that	he	might	do	so	
by	unearthing	fresh	information	or	fresh	openings	in	moments	of	encounter	along	the	
narrative	way.	 	But	he	has	not,	and	 the	novel	 immediately	begins	 the	 first	of	 its	 three	
endings.		The	final	message	with	regard	to	parody	is	one	of	complicity.			
The	 earlier	 courtroom	 scene,	 meanwhile,	 is	 followed	 by	 a	 pessimistic	 passage	
about	 resistance’s	 contribution	 to	any	 functioning	circuit.	 	 So	 if	not	 all	delegitimating	
parody	 is	 generative,	 and	all	non-exaggerative	parody	 is	 compromised,	does	 the	novel	
suggest	 that	 all	 historical	 action	 exacerbates	 central	 power,	 that	 all	 resistance	merely	
strengthens	its	own	chains?	 	For	critics	who	equate	Daniel	with	Doctorow,	the	answer	
may	well	be	yes.		Harpham	and	TV	Reed	both	read	the	novel	as	primarily	about	readerly	
complicity	in	the	language	games	by	which	hegemony	is	narrativised	and	promulgated.	
Crucial	to	such	readings	are	the	novel’s	various	meditations	on	the	electrical	circuit	and	
its	 requirement	 of	 resistance.	 	 For	 Reed,	 “ubiquitous	 electrical	 metaphors	 come	 to	
embody	 the	 simultaneously	 destructive	 nature	 of	 power.	 	 The	 electrical	 metaphor	
becomes	 pervasive	 until	 it	 takes	 on	 a	 kind	 of	 ominousness	 even	 in	mundane	 places”	
(296),	while	Harpham	takes	 these	metaphors	as	Doctorow’s	way	of	 saturating	 the	 text	
with	something	other	than	state	power	(which	seems	to	ignore	the	reasons	Daniel	has	a	
distinctive	 relationship	 to	 electricity	 in	 the	 first	 place).	 	 This	 formulation	 gives	 the	
agency	 to	 the	 metaphor,	 as	 if	 it	 has	 insidiously	 wormed	 its	 way	 through	 the	 text,	
independent	of	the	narrator.		
Often,	 though,	 it	 seems	 more	 reasonable	 to	 see	 such	 moments	 deployed	 by	
Daniel	 for	 the	sake	of	morbid	humour	or	pejorative	parody.	 	For	example,	when	he	 is	
seeking	 out	 the	 psychiatrist	 to	 revenge	 Susan‘s	 exposure	 to	 electro-treatment,	 Daniel	
notes	 that	 “had	 he	 been	 a	 killer	 he	 would	 have	moved	 quietly.	 	 But	 preceded	 by	 his	
shock	 waves	 he	 alerted	 the	 supposed	 victim,	 sending	 him	 a	 signal	 of	 the	 ritualistic	
nature	of	his	fury…	He	was	GONE!.		A	lucky	thing	too,	I	would	have	killed	him”	(206).		
Here	the	 language	of	shock-waves	 is	part	of	a	set-up	for	a	punchline;	elsewhere	 in	the	
text	the	mention	of	electricity	can	be	a	joke	of	its	own.	The	joke	is	tied	to	his	project	of	
parody,	 relying	 on	 language’s	 non-transparent	 relation	 to	 the	 world	 he	 conveys:	 	 the	
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language	 of	 ‘shockwaves’	 is	 part	 of	 a	 ritual,	 not	 a	 part	 of	 the	 fabric	 of	 the	 novel’s	
projected	world.			Reed	thus	misreads	the	way	that	the	electrical	tropes	are	deployed,	109	
deriving	the	dubious	claim	that	the	novel	is	resigned	to	complicity	from	the	evident	fact	
that	our	narrator	is	obsessed	with	it.	
As	 such,	 resistance	 as	 inherent	 complicity	 seems	 less	 an	 inevitability	 than	 a	
product	 of	 Daniel’s	 morbid,	 cynical	 approach	 to	 his	 project.	 	 Electrical	 tropes	 flow	
through	 the	book	as	a	matter	of	pathologically	compulsive	parody,	not	as	elements	of	
Doctorow’s	own	project	of	which	his	narrator	is	unconscious.	They	can	be	understood,	
since	 electricity	 is	 the	 State’s	 province,	 as	 Daniel	 delaying	 a	 real	 reckoning	 with	
alternatives	 to	 the	 State	 narrative	 by	 reiterating	 its	 saturating	 power.	 It	 is	 in	 the	
relinquishing	 of	 this	 reflexive	 tendency	 to	 discursification	 that	 Doctorow	 posits	 that	
Daniel	might	access	historical	possibility.	
	
Parody-Free	Relationships	and	the	Location	of	Possibility	
Early	 in	 the	 novel,	 Daniel	 introduces	Mindish	 for	 the	 first	 time	 with	 youthful	
present-tense	 thoughts	 on	 this	 family	 friend:	 “I	 hate	 Mindish.	 	 He	 seems	 to	 me	 an	
insincere	man”	 (43).	 	Though	we	as	 readers	do	not	at	 this	point	know	anything	about	
Mindish’s	role	in	the	trial,	reading	Daniel’s	judgement	in	the	available	sense	of	a	present	
narrator’s	expostulation	establishes	how	clearly	Daniel,	 in	the	narrative	present,	thinks	
he	understands	what	Mindish	stands	for.		There	is	little	sense	this	early	in	the	project	of	
Mindish	as	complex	or	unfamiliar.		However,	after	narrating	his	mother’s	perception	of	
Mindish’s	 testimony	 in	 the	 trial	 scene,	 the	 wonder	 he	 is	 able	 to	 feel	 on	 her	 behalf	
encourages	 Daniel	 to	 take	 the	 trip	 to	 Florida.	 	Managing	 not	 to	 parody	 his	mother’s	
perspective	in	the	trial	scene	opens	up	into	realisation	that	the	experiences	he	travesties	
elsewhere	may	be	yet-unknown	to	him,	that	possibility	may	inhere	in	them.	
																																																								
109	Daniel	evokes	electricity	 in	his	parents	or	his	sister	 just	as	one	might	mirthlessly	pun	Reed/read;	 the	
association	is	annoyingly,	compulsively	available,	and	an	ironist	 like	Daniel	can	shore	his	resignation	by	
giving	in	to	it.	
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This	 establishes	 for	 the	 first	 time	 the	novel’s	 contention	 that	 something	which	
resists	 parody	 is	 something	 of	 historical	 value,	 worth	 encountering.	 Rochelle	
contemplates	 the	 forthcoming	 court	 scene	 with	 this	 knowledge	 that	 is	 only	 about	 to	
dawn	on	Daniel	as	he	narrates	her:	“suspense	as	to	her	own	instinctive	response	to	the	
sight	of	Mindish	 is	her	only	 interest”	 (202).110		Yet	neither	Rochelle’s	nor	Daniel’s	 final	
encounter	with	Mindish	is	either	a	confirmation	of	prejudices	or	subjection	to	the	state	
power	 he	 colluded	 with.	 	 In	 both	 cases,	 our	 perceivers	 are	 surprised,	 and	 have	 their	
paradigms	undermined.	
Rochelle	narrates	the	long-anticipated	catching	of	Mindish’s	eye	in	court	in	terms	
of	what	 it	 isn’t	 before	 she	gets	 to	her	 surprise	 at	what	 it	 is:	 “he	presented	 the	private	
faith	 of	 a	 comrade”	 (281).	 	 This	 prompts	 her	 to	 remember	 she,	 Paul	 and	Mindish	 in	
better	times.		Encounter	with	Mindish	is	encounter	with	the	past	with	which	she	and	he	
are	 both	 continuous;	 it	 undermines	 her	 anticipatory	 assumption	 that	 “We	 have	 all	
changed	in	seven	months.		All	the	cells	of	our	brains	are	changed	and	our	beings	are	no	
longer	 what	 they	 were”	 (202).	 	 Yet	 his	 conspiratorial,	 private	 gesture	 refutes	 her	
anticipation	that	her	knowledge	of	his	betrayal	will	render	him	conveniently	other.		The	
hope	that	discontinuity	might	provide	a	way	to	evade	such	personal,	relational	history	is	
undermined	similarly	for	Daniel.	
When	he	turns	up	at	Linda	Mindish’s	home,	Daniel	thinks	of	himself	as	the	valid	
historical	refutation;	he	will	coerce	what	new	historical	knowledge	he	needs	from	them	
by	threatening	them	with	the	history	he	embodies:	“I	am	potentially	the	public	exposure	
of	what	neither	of	them	right	now	wants	exposed”	(273).		In	his	final	encounter	with	the	
senile	Mindish,	Daniel	seems	to	set	himself	for	conflict,	noting	in	the	old	man	the	traits	
of	 an	 adversary:	 “there	was	 still	 in	 him	 the	 remnant	 of	 rude	 strength	 I	 remembered”	
(292).		In	this	light,	his	opening	line,	“Hello	Mr	Mindish.		I’m	Daniel	Isaacson.		I’m	Paul	
and	Rochelle’s	 son.	 	Danny?”	 (292)	seems	 like	 it	 should	be	read	 in	a	sarcastic,	parodic																																																									
110	It	might	in	fact	be	said	that	she	is	thinking	this	as	Daniel,	rather	than	like	him.		The	previous	scene,	a	
tally	of	historical	record,	ends	with	Daniel	saying	“I	give	this	all	to	her”	(202),	and	the	implication	is	that	a	
certain	 amount	 of	 his	 own	 perplexity	 as	 to	 where	 next	 to	 seek	 insight	 has	 been	 transposed	 into	 his	
mother’s	narrative,	as	has	his	perspective	into	the	narrative	voice	he	gives	her.	
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manner,	 challenging	 the	old	man	 to	 remember	his	own	misdemeanours	 in	 the	 spaces	
evoked	 by	 the	 names.	 	 Yet	 these	 are	 the	 last	 words	 Daniel	 speaks	 in	 the	 scene,	 and	
instead	the	authoritative	energy	transfers	to	Mindish:	“For	one	moment	of	recognition	
he	was	restored	to	life”	(293).		The	kiss	Mindish	bestows	relinquishes	this	imbued	power	
of	revelation,	as	he	relapses	into	senility,	but	it	has	confirmed	the	continuity	in	the	pair’s	
relationship.	 	It	also	echoes	Daniel’s	grandmother	giving	a	similar	top-of-the-head	kiss	
earlier	 in	 the	 novel	 (67).	 	 For	 all	 that	 it	 is	 a	 moment	 of	 ritual	 and	 gesture,	 though,	
Mindish’s	kiss,	its	allusive	recapitulation,	and	its	intimations	of	connection	are	entirely	
free	from	parody.		They	don’t	enter	Daniel’s	store	of	parodiable	material,	since	Mindish	
is	never	narrated	again.	 	The	effect	 instead	 is	 to	widen	 the	call	 to	 recognition	back	 to	
Daniel’s	travestied	grandmother.	
The	 novel	 then	 moves,	 via	 a	 series	 of	 anecdotes	 about	 bodies	 rejecting	
transplanted	 hearts,	 to	 a	 memory	 of	 the	 Isaacsons’	 circle	 struggling	 and	 failing	 to	
accommodate	Daniel	and	Susan	after	the	trial.		The	implication	seems	to	be	that,	just	as	
the	 encounter	with	Mindish	 is	 resistant	 to	 parody	 and	 instrumentality,	 so	 is	 the	 core	
situation	of	Daniel	and	Susan.		Their	hermetic	relationship	embodies	a	kind	of	historical	
unassimilibility	to	others,	even	as	its	own	internal	dynamic	is	of	constant	rejection	and	
renewed	 dependence.	 As	Mindish	 is	 the	 counter-narrative	 that	 won’t	 quite	 fit	 into	 a	
coherent	story	 for	any	 Isaacson,	 the	unpredictable	heart	of	 the	 trial-narrative,	and	the	
falsification	of	any	paradigm	about	it,	so	Daniel	and	Susan’s	shared	history	generates	an	
inscrutable	bond	that	 leaves	them	unassimilable	to	anyone	but	each	other,	and	hardly	
then.		
Daniel’s	 relationships	 to	Mindish	 and	his	 sister	 resonate	 throughout	 the	novel.		
When	Daniel	 first	 sees	 Susan	 in	 the	 asylum	after	her	 suicide	 attempt,	he	 tells	us	 in	 a	
surprisingly	unironic	tone	that	his	“heart	 leaps”,	and	particularly	how	relieved	he	 is	 to	
see	 that	 she	 is	 “still	her”	 (8).	 	This	 interest	 in	 continuity	 connects	Susan	 to	Rochelle’s	
surprise	at	Mindish	still	being	Mindish:	continuity	rather	than	rupture	is	at	the	heart	of	
the	novel’s	process	of	unease-generating	recognition.		As	Mindish-in-the-flesh	promised	
both	Daniel	 and	Rochelle	 revelation	 through	presence,	we	 find	Daniel	 early	on	at	 the	
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scene	of	Susan’s	suicide	attempt	“trying	to	see	what	there	was	about	a	Howard	Johnson’s	
that	would	make	 Susan	want	 to	 die	 here”	 (25).	 	 This	 hope	 for	 empathetic	 experience	
rooted	in	presence	stands	out	against	the	travestic	mode	of	the	rest	of	the	novel’s	first	
hundred	pages.		Daniel	does	subsequently	try	to	bring	Susan	into	the	realm	of	discourse,	
of	the	narratable,	and	hence	for	him	of	the	parodiable,	but	she	is	one	thing	that	he	can’t	
narratively	forestall,	however	he	tries.	
When	he	breaks	into	her	room	at	the	care	home,	Daniel’s	ambivalence	in	Susan’s	
presence	can	be	gauged	by	the	degree	to	which	his	voice	varies	within	single	paragraphs,	
from	 the	 repeated	 clause	 of	 “to	 be	 objective”	 (208)	 opposed	 to	 “My	 involvement	with	
Susan	has	to	do	with	rage”	(208),	which	moves	from	historical	to	self-psychologising,	or	
from	quoting	Ulysses	on	death	and	food	to	“I’ll	want	a	Hamburger	with	everything	on	it”	
(208).	 	 These	 opening	 paragraphs	 of	 the	 encounter	 depict	 Daniel	 straining	 to	 find	 a	
parodic	 heuristic	 that	 will	 make	 it	 intelligible,	 but	 finally,	 in	 Susan’s	 unresponsive	
presence,	 expressing	 something	 like	 the	 real	 relationship	 in	 voices	 that	 do	 not	 feel	
entirely	his	own.			
This	becomes	clearest	in	a	paragraph	which	Daniel	begins	by	addressing	Susan	in	
a	manner	that	could	be	understood	as	address	to	the	reader:		
“You	know	 I’m	not	 shittin’	 you,	man,	 I	 can	 live	with	anyone’s	death	except	my	
own…	You	don’t	 talk,	you	don’t	 reinforce	 their	 sense	of	you…	how	can	 I	expect	
them	to	remember	your	voice.		You	can’t	write	out	voices…	I	cannot	perceive	the	
world	except	with	your	voice	framing	the	edges	of	my	vision”	(209).			
This	 echoes	 the	 last	 fight	 the	 two	 had	 before	 her	 suicide	 attempt,	 after	 which	 he	
speculates	 in	 parodically	 clinical	 language	 that	 “he	 is	 ‘written’	 out	 of	mind…	 there	 is	
some	evidence	 that	she	was	driven	 finally	 to	eradicate	him	from	her	consciousness	by	
the	 radical	 means	 of	 eradicating	 her	 consciousness”	 (82).	 	 The	 various	 echoes	 and	
ambiguities	in	the	passage	establish	Susan’s	centrality	to	Daniel’s	project;	in	attempting	
to	assure	himself	that	he	can	live	without	her,	he	comes	across	the	idea	of	what	can’t	be	
represented,	 a	 voice	 that	 can’t	 be	 imitated,	 assimilated	 and,	 in	 Hite’s	 terms,	
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deontologised.	 	“They”	here	might	initially	seem	to	refer	to	the	psychiatrists	or	even—
recalling	Artie	Sternlicht’s	plan	for	disregarding	the	court	process—the	judicial	system,	
but	 it	 soon	 becomes	 apparent	 that	 “they”	 refers	 to	 the	 readers	 who	 should,	 for	 a	
sentence	or	two,	initially	have	felt	that	they	were	addressed.		This	dissociates	the	reader	
from	Daniel’s	experience	 in	much	 the	same	way	as	Susan’s	 is	currently	 inaccessible	 to	
him;	her	voice	cannot	be	“written	out”	of	the	scene,	precisely	because	it	is	impossible	for	
Daniel	 just	 to	write	 it	 out,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 flatly	 present	 it,	 as	 he	 does	 so	many	 other	
voices	in	either	of	his	parodic	modes.	The	reader	thus	does	feel	written	out,	in	the	sense	
of	 discursively	 excluded	 from	 the	 repetitive	 intimations	 of	 readerly	 solidarity	 and	
complicity	that	they	have	come	to	expect	from	Daniel.		The	unparodiable,	the	language	
of	this	scene	suggests,	is	both	the	unrelatable	and	that	which	escapes	control.	
The	paragraph	 ends	 by	making	 the	 problem	of	 presence	 explicit	 and	 removing	
Susan	 to	 the	 land	 of	 the	 iconic:	 “It	 is	 the	 feminine	 voice	 that	 passes	 solidly	 through	
ontological	mirrors…	We	understand	St	 Joan.	 	You	want	to	 fuck	her	but	 if	you	do	you	
miss	the	point”	(209).		Daniel,	fitting	his	sister	into	a	discourse,	slips	back	into	his	usual	
mode:	 “we”	 and	 “you”	 here	 are	 unambiguous	 readerly	 address,	 rather	 than	 the	
precarious	 “they”	 and	 “you”	 that	 began	 the	 paragraph.	 	 Daniel	 regains	 his	 narrative	
mastery	 of	 the	 moment,	 but	 only	 by	 abandoning	 the	 address	 to	 his	 present	 sister,	
turning	away	from	her	to	a	martyr	from	a	past	distant	enough	to	be	mythic.		Susan,	like	
Mindish,	embodies	the	novel’s	sense	that	certain	presences,	old	relationships	that	have	
changed	but	whose	continuity	demands	self-reassessment,	offer	historical	novelty	when	
the	guard	of	parody	is	let	down.	Unassimilable	presence	is	the	novel’s	refutation	of	the	
parodic	historical	mode	it	consistently	presents	as	ex-centric	historicism’s	default	mode.	
And	while	Daniel	can’t	quite	stick	with	 it,	his	brief	 relent	makes	a	case	 for	cultivating	
openness	 to	 historically	 existing	 objects	 and	 people	 as	 shifting,	 evolving,	 continuous	
phenomena.			
Benjamin	Schreier,	making	the	case	for	cynicism’s	productive	value,	attributes	to	
Henry	Adams	 the	 insight	 that	 “thought	needs	 to	be	 responsible	 to	 its	 occasion	 rather	
than	 to	 established	habits	 and	prejudices	whose	 virtue	 is	 recognized	 legitimacy…	 that	
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responsibility	to	the	unrecognizable	is	the	central	axis	of	historiography”	(59).		Elias	and	
Berlatsky,	 similarly,	 suggest	 that	 history	 is	 of	 ethical	 and	 affective	 relevance	 in	
postmodern	 fiction	 only	 when	 it	 embodies	 the	 ineffable,	 or	 in	 Elias’	 terms,	 “the	
unknowable	and	unrepresentable	in	discourse;	it	is	the	space	of	the	chaotic,	and	hence	
to	rational	beings,	the	terrifying,	past”	(42).	Doctorow’s	central	sense	of	recognition,	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 requires	 the	 historical	 existence	 of	 possibility	 to	 have	 been	 knowable	
and	 recognisable	 enough	 that	 we	 can	 be	 faulted	 for	 acting	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 deny	
ourselves	access	to	it.		He	repudiates	the	cynical	mode	that	Schreier	sees	as	sufficient	to	
grant	 us	 access	 to	 what	 can’t	 be	 recognised,	 and	 the	 insistence	 that	 the	 past	 is	 an	
undifferentiable	 sublime.	 In	 doing	 so,	 he	 stresses	 continuity	 over	 chaos,	 even	 as	 he	
makes	 the	 unrecognized-recognisable	 the	 source	 of	 all	 the	 novel’s	 posited	 possibility.	
Mindish	and	Susan	both	take	on	this	aura	of	possibility	because	of	Daniel’s	uncertainty	
about	whether	to	expect	continuity	or	rupture	from	his	encounter	with	them.		It	is	the	
residual	recognisability	in	these	figures	whose	shared	history	has	been	lost	to	discourse	
that	gives	Daniel	 a	 sense	of	what	possible	connections	unratifiably	exist	 in	 their	now-
aphasiac	 presences.	 In	 this	 sense,	 Schreier’s	 emphasis	 on	 the	 unrecognizable,	 which	
seems	to	forestall	a	deliberative	effort	to	recognise	better,	might	be	replaced	with	a	duty	
to	the	latent	yet-unrecognised.	This	duty,	Doctorow	suggests,	is	the	framework	through	
which	Zerilli’s	possible	new	deliberation-organizing	criteria	have	to	be	sought.	
	
Getting	the	Picture	and	Communicating	Potential	
For	all	 that	Daniel’s	 language	 in	the	scene	finally	reverts	back	to	parody,	 it	also	
contains	his	most	significant	outward	gesture.		He	sellotapes	a	poster	that	he	has	made	
of	himself	to	Susan’s	ceiling.		The	entire	scene	echoes	Daniel’s	hunt	for	Susan’s	presence	
at	 the	 ice-cream	 shop	 where	 she	 had	 slit	 her	 wrists,	 a	 scene	 in	 which	 the	 rolled	 up	
Isaacson	poster	in	her	car	is	all	that	is	left	of	her.		“You	get	the	picture,”	says	her	note,	
and	this	gift	raises	the	novel’s	usual	angst	about	inheriting	a	picture	that	even	Susan	has	
become	ambivalent	about	preserving;	she	can	no	longer	bear	its	weight,	but	could	still	
not	 face	giving	 it	over	 to	Artie	Sternlicht’s	poster-wall	of	undifferentiated	 images,	 that	
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Jamesonian	 graveyard	 of	 historical	 reference.	 	 In	 the	 same	 scene,	 Daniel	 is	 briefly	
convinced	that	a	waitress	has	given	the	peace	sign,	and	he	uses	the	phrase	“to	be	just”	in	
order	to	both	excuse	himself	and	explain	his	historical	actions	(21).		When	we	get	to	the	
room-invasion	 scene,	Daniel	 himself	 is	 the	 peace-sign	 giver,	 he	 oscillates	 between	 an	
imperative	“to	be	objective”	and	addressing	Susan	about	her	death	“to	be	truthful”	(208).		
The	scene	thus,	in	its	echoes,	posits	itself	as	the	resolution	of	the	get-the-picture	issue.		
This	might	be	summarised	as	the	problem	of	what	Hutcheon,	developing	another	
author’s	words	into	a	literary	trope	of	her	own,	labels	“emblem	fatigue”	(Poetics	7).		The	
constant	 reduction	 of	 oneself	 to	 a	 symbol	 for	 a	 group	 or	 cause	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	
novel’s	 concern	 with	 inheritance,	 from	 the	 early	 scene	 in	 which	 Daniel	 and	 Susan,	
presented	 to	 a	 crowd	of	 Isaacson	 supporters	 simply	 as	 “the	 children”	 (20),	 look	down	
from	the	stage	where	they	are	made	a	spectacle	at	blown-up	posters	of	their	parents,	to	
Sternlicht’s	spiel	about	the	image	and	its	potential	overwhelmingness,	to	Daniel’s	sense	
of	 the	 aesthetic	 composition	 of	 the	 trial.	 	 Getting	 the	 picture	 is	 a	 duty,	 not	 an	
achievement,	 and	 by	 the	 time	 Daniel	 makes	 the	 poster	 of	 himself	 for	 Susan,	 the	
imperative	to	alter	the	picture	in	question	is	clear.	
These	concerns	define	Daniel’s	gift;	we	know	how	much	it	cost	to	blow	up,	it	is	
“posed,”	we	see	that	it	contains	“a	Daniel”	rather	than	anything	appropriate	to	his	self-
conception,	it	doesn’t	lay	to	bed	the	ghost	of	emblem-fatigue,	since	later	Daniel	ends	a	
description	of	 the	 young	he	 and	Susan	 together	with	 “That	 is	 a	 famous	news	picture”	
(253).		And	yet	the	gift	seems	meaningful	and	sincere.		Although	it	takes	place	within	a	
whole	novel	of	discourse	about	the	appropriability	of	the	narratives	‘pictures’	encode,	it	
is	 a	 significantly	 private	 moment.	 	 That	 it	 figures	 Daniel	 in	 the	 guise	 of	 a	 young	
revolutionary	 of	 the	 sort	 Susan	 tried	 and	 failed	 to	 be	 in	her	 last	 grasp	 for	 an	 identity	
before	the	suicide	attempt	could	be	a	cruel	taunt,	but	the	whole	process	of	its	giving	is	
described	only	with	tenderness.	
On	this	basis,	 it	seems	like	a	successful	gesture	that	works	outside	the	realm	of	
parody.		Rather	than	extending	his	ironic	appropriative	mode,	the	Daniel	she	has	always	
loved	and	 resented,	 into	Susan’s	unresponsive	presence,	Daniel	offers	her	a	version	of	
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himself	 and	 his	 own	 presence	 that	 is	 entirely	 discontinuous	 with	 their	 prior	
understanding	 of	 each	 other.	 	 Just	 as	 the	 scene	 provides	 a	 central	 encounter	 with	
unassimilable	history	for	the	novel,	so	his	picture,	private,	unassimilable	by	the	various	
discourses	from	which	both	he	and	Susan	are	in	retreat,	works	as	a	gesture	towards	her.		
Since	he	himself	never	returns	to	her	room,	or	to	narrating	her	in	the	present	tense,	it	
also	renounces	his	attempts	to	comprehend	her	presence	in	language,	and	so	represents	
a	rejection	of	parodic	engagement.		It	is	Daniel’s	major	achievement	of	communication,	
even	as	it	enacts	a	ritual	of	farewell.	
As	 a	 gesture	 outward	 to	 someone	 who	may	 not	 ever	 recognise	 it	 as	 such,	 the	
poster	 seems	 structurally	 similar	 to	 Daniel’s	 summary	 of	 the	 political	 logic	 behind	
Susan’s	withdrawal:	“A	certain	portion	of	the	energy	must	be	used	for	the	regeneration	
of	energy.		That	way	you	don’t	just	die	like	a	bird	falling,	like	a	rock	sinking,	you	die	on	a	
parabolic	curve.		You	die	in	a	course	of	attack.		Susan	knows	this”	(210).		Daniel,	though,	
having	 just	 had	 a	 fight	 with	 Susan’s	 supervising	 psychiatrist,	 relinquishes	 the	 idea	 of	
attack.	 	 Just	 as	 in	 the	 encounter	 with	Mindish	 the	 force	 of	 recognition	 dispelled	 his	
intent	 to	 parodic	 attack,	 Daniel	 here	 has	 premeditated	 a	 gesture	 that	 works	 on	 that	
failing	 ‘parabolic	 curve,’	 aimable	 equally	 at	 an	 undefeatable	 adversary	 or	 at	 an	
unassimilable	presence	lost	to	deliberative	communication.		Those	are	the	two	realms	in	
which	 the	 attack	 of	 parody	 is	 shown	not	 to	work,	 and	 from	which	 his	 ventriloquistic	
parody	cannot	finally	keep	Daniel.			
Little	changes	for	Daniel	after	this	encounter.		Nor	does	the	later	encounter	with	
Mindish	result	in	a	permanent	shift	of	approach.	What	both	scenes	do	posit,	though,	is	a	
sense	 in	 which	 getting,	 or	 giving,	 the	 picture	 does	 not	 have	 to	 mean	 reduction	 to	 a	
world	 of	 undifferentiated	 image,	 one	 in	 which	 problem-seeking	 rather	 than	 parody,	
communication	rather	than	attack	or	adversion,	are	viable	historiographical	conduct.		In	
the	 end,	 the	 novel	 offers	 the	 unassimilable	 rather	 than	 the	 undefeatable	 as	 the	 first	
object	 of	 a	 sensible	 parabolic	 curve.	 	 If	 potential	 change	 can	 be	 located,	 then	 it’s	 in	
personal	 rather	 than	 public	 history.	 	 It’s	 in	 the	 relinquishing	 of	 parody	 in	 encounter,	
rather	than	its	wielding	in	attack.		
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Irom,	 grounding	 a	 diagnosis	 of	 the	 novel’s	 politics	 on	 Hutcheon	 and	 Rorty’s	
antifoundational	 model	 of	 narrative	 politics,	 suggests	 “that	 further	 attending	 [than	
Hutcheon]	to	the	operations	of	irony	in	The	Book	of	Daniel	will	reveal	how	fiction,	in	a	
process	 of	 recuperating	 its	 traditional	 function,	 gestures	 toward	breaking	 through	 the	
antimony	between	retreat	and	praxis”	(65).		What	Irom	proposes	for	irony,	I	propose	for	
parody;	Hutcheon	is	absolutely	right	to	say	that	the	novel’s	ideas	on	praxis	proceed	from	
its	treatment	of	parody,	and	building	on	this	insight	better	reveals	these	ideas	than	can	
those	avowedly	Political	critics	who	treat	Hutcheon’s	focus	on	literary	style	and	genre	as	
a	distraction.	Against	what	Bewes	 called	 the	 “perverse	 creed”	of	 total	political	 faith	 in	
irony	and	parody,	though,	and	in	line	with	Kim’s	call	to	distinguish	the	specific	political	
practices	argued	for	by	specific	anti-mimetic	forms,	I’ve	attempted	to	better	describe	the	
book’s	 actual	 rhetoric	 by	 refuting	 the	 parts	 of	 Hutcheon’s	 genre-wide	 argument	 that	
least	correspond	to	the	text	itself.		The	building	I	propose	involves	a	shift	from	treating	
The	 Book	 of	 Daniel	 as	 a	 parodic	 novel	 in	 which	 Daniel’s	 assemblage	 of	 styles	 and	
Doctorow’s	are	one	to	treating	it	as	a	novel	about	the	historical	effectuality	of	parody	by	
whose	 overall	 prescriptions	 we’re	 rhetorically	 required	 to	 see	 that	 its	 narrator’s	
appropriations	of	discourse	come	up	short.				
If	 Berlatsky	 and	 Elias	 figure	 historical	 experience	 as	 a	 clearly-located	 but	
unreachable—because	 totally	 sublime—source	 of	 rupture,	 Doctorow	 figures	 it	 as	
locatable	by	an	orientation	toward	continuity:	if	Daniel	weren’t	so	patly,	postmodernly	
averse	to	continuities,	or	to	surprise	in	general,	Doctorow	suggests	that	the	possibility-
resources	 of	 the	 past	 might	 become	 graspable	 for	 him.	 Doctorow	 believes	 in	 the	
existence	 of	 possibility,	 and	 hence	 the	 existence	 of	 moral	 imperatives	 that	 connect	
recognition	 with	 correspondence.	 	 His	 commitment	 to	 the	 notion	 that	 there	 is	 a	
something	 that	 underlies	 experience	 and	 in	 conformity	 to	 which	 discourses	 must	 be	
judged	 for	 their	effectuality	 invites	 the	challenge	of	 refutation:	 it	grants	 the	axioms	of	
productive	deliberation.	Being	as	historically	postmodern	and	stylistically	anti-mimetic	
as	 Hutcheon’s	 model,	 Doctorow’s	 might	 thus	 help	 provisionalise	 an	 account	 of	 the	
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relationship	 between	 parody	 and	 politics	 in	 postmodern	 fiction	 that	 has	 become	 as	
naturalised	as	any	of	the	villainous	discourses	against	which	literary	theory	sets	itself.	
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Chapter	4	-	A	Coda	
“The	World	(This	One)”:	Pynchon’s	Deliberative	Ontologies	
	
In	 the	 previous	 chapters	 I’ve	 examined	 single	 postmodern	 novels	 at	 length	 to	
establish	 how	 they	 defend	 rational	 practical	 deliberation	 against	 various	 forms	 of	
rationalization.	I’ve	disputed	existing	readings	of	the	era’s	fiction	that	presume	it	takes	
all	forms	of	reason	as	a	single	adversary.	I’ll	end	with	a	broader,	briefer	examination	of	a	
postmodern	 author	who,	 unlike	 the	 others	 I	 address,	 explicitly	 critiques	 the	 legacy	 of	
Enlightenment	 Reason.	 Nevertheless,	 I’ll	 show,	 the	 commitments	 Thomas	 Pynchon	
expresses	 through	 his	 antimimetic	 formal	 arguments	 about	 that	 history	 insist	 on	 the	
moral	 and	 metaphysical	 necessity	 of	 deliberation,	 and	 give	 us	 a	 kind	 of	 degree-zero	
definition	 of	 deliberative	 historical	 agency.	 Pynchon’s	multi-layered	 ontologies	 finally	
ask:	 How	 could	we,	 in	 the	 world	 and	 timeline	 we	 share	 with	 Pynchon	 and	 his	 texts,	
recuperate	 the	 lost	 or	 cynically	 destroyed	 possibilities	 of	 the	 past	 such	 that	 they	 can	
become	 present	 again,	 and	 operate	 to	 improve	 that	 world?	 His	 novels	 are	 a	 call	 to	
identify	 preferable	 states	 of	 affairs	 and	 to	 work	 out	 how	 to	 overcome	 seemingly	
impossible	barriers	to	bringing	them	about.	This,	finally,	is	a	call	to	deliberate	in	the	face	
of	doubt.	
	
Post-Enlightenment	Narrowing,	and	the	Inadequacy	of	Ontological	Proliferation	
In	Mason	&	Dixon	 (1997),	Pynchon’s	embedded	narrator,	Reverend	Cherrycoke,	
quotes	one	of	his	own	tracts	on	“Christ	and	History.”	From	a	backward-facing	vantage,	
he	 describes	 history	 as	 “a	 great	 disorderly	 Tangle	 of	 Lines,	 long	 and	 short,	 weak	 and	
strong,	 vanishing	 into	 the	Mnemonick	Deep,	with	only	 their	Destination	 in	 common”	
(349).	 If	 we	 turn	 180	 degrees,	 though,	 these	 lines,	 each	 representing	 a	 “life”	 and	 the	
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possibilities	 attached	 to	 it,	 narrow	 toward	 another	 destination.	 A	 few	 pages	 earlier,	
Cherrycoke	describes	the	Mason-Dixon	line’s	metaphysical	work:		
changing	all	from	subjunctive	to	declarative,	reducing	Possibilities	to	Simplicities	
that	 serve	 the	 ends	 of	 Governments,—winning	 away	 from	 the	 realm	 of	 the	
Sacred,	 its	 Borderlands	 one	 by	 one,	 and	 assuming	 them	 unto	 the	 bare	mortal	
World	that	is	our	home,	and	our	Despair	(345).		
Possibilities	narrow	as	 “our”	world	goes	on,	 and	must	 finally	 converge	on	 the	 state	 to	
which	the	world	tends:	a	“Destination”	defined	by	the	“Despair”	that,	in	its	literal	sense,	
means	simply	the	exhaustion	of	 the	possibility	 that	hope	requires.	 In	“the	bare	mortal	
World,”	the	possibility-bandwidth	of	 irreversible	time	must	always	narrow,	In	“History	
of	Christ,”	Cherrycoke	insists	that	without	the	active	work	of	memory,	the	“Mnemonick	
Deep”	 is	 “a	Past	we	 risk	 losing	our	 forebears	 in	 forever”	 (349).	Maintaining	a	plurality	
and	breadth	of	 “lines”	 thus	 requires	 the	 active	memorial	work	of	 keeping	 the	dead	 in	
mind.	These	central	pages	of	Pynchon’s	most	overtly	historiographical	novel,	 then,	set	
up	 the	 inevitability	 of	 a	 historical	 narrowing	 associated	 with	 the	 political	 “ends	 of	
Governments.”	The	political	alternative	is	figured	in	terms	of	a	perceptual	widening	that	
would	keep	the	past	accessible	to	the	present.	As	long	as	we	can	still	orient	ourselves	to	
see	 the	 prior	 possibilities	 from	 our	 present	 vantage,	 we	 do	 some	 work	 against	 their	
vanishing.	The	novel	makes	clear,	though,	that	one	of	these	is	metaphysically	inevitable	
history,	and	the	other	is	hard	work	dependent	on	human	exertion	that	can	only	forestall	
the	inevitable	for	so	 long.	Even	if	we	can	keep	those	possibilities	 in	sight,	they	still,	 in	
terms	of	practical	presence,	remain	“something	lost	and	already	unclaimable”	(98).	This,	
then,	is	the	basic	historical	problem	in	all	Pynchon’s	work:	how	to	keep	past	possibilities	
presently	 viable	 when	 the	 “Destination”	 we’re	 tending	 toward	 seems	 politically	
suboptimal.		
	 Pynchon’s	 fiction	consistently	 looks	back	to	the	turning	points	when	a	valuable	
possibility	 was	 closed	 off.	 His	 most	 recent	 novel,	 Bleeding	 Edge	 (2013)	 examines	 the	
corporatization	of	 the	 internet,	Vineland	 (1991)	 the	betrayal	of	60s	utopianism,	and	so	
on.	 Above,	 all,	 he	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 promise	 and	 reality	 of	
America.	In	perhaps	the	most	widely	cited	passages	of	The	Crying	of	Lot	49	(1966)	and	
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Gravity’s	 Rainbow	 (1973)	 respectively,	 our	 central	 characters	 seek	 “another	 set	 of	
possibilities	to	replace	those	that	had	conditioned	the	land…	how	had	it	ever	happened	
here,	with	the	chances	once	so	good	for	diversity”	(125),	and	lament	“the	fork	in	the	road	
America	 never	 took,	 the	 singular	 point	 she	 jumped	 the	 wrong	 way	 from”	 (556).	 Sam	
Thomas,	in	Pynchon	and	the	Political,	reads	Pynchon’s	novels	in	chronological	order	not	
of	 publication,	 but	 of	 setting,	 showing	 how	 each	 one	 addresses	 just	 such	 a	 wrong	
historical	 turning	 and	 the	 subsequent	 vanishing	 of	 another	 round	 of	 possibility.	 The	
originary	 narrowing	 is	 in	 Mason	 &	 Dixon,	 as	 the	 titular	 geo-political	 straight	 line	
promulgates	 abstract	 Enlightenment	 rigidity	 over	 an	 open	 land.	What	 this	means	 for	
individuals	 in	his	world	 is	clear	 from	the	view	that	 the	dimension-crossing	boy’s-book	
adventure	heroes	the	Chums	of	Chance	get	as	they	fly	their	balloon	up	through	the	US	
toward	the	Chicago	World’s	fair	at	the	beginning	of	Against	the	Day	(2006).	They	get	a	
top-down	view	of	the	plains	where	“on	adventures	past,	[they]	had	often	witnessed	the	
vast	herds	of	 cattle	adrift	 in	ever-changing	cloudlike	patterns”	but	 this	 time	 “saw	 that	
unshaped	 freedom	 being	 rationalized	 into	movement	 only	 in	 straight	 lines	 and	 right	
angles	and	a	progressive	reduction	of	choices,	until	the	final	turn	through	the	final	gate	
that	led	to	the	killing-floor”	(10).	Enlightenment	rationalization	means	the	“reduction	of	
choices”	 associated	 with	 an	 approach	 to	 capitalist	 spectacle.	 Pynchon’s	 recent	 world-
historical	 novels,	 then,	 offer	 us	 unsubtle	 avatars	 of	 the	 ongoing	 attack	 on	 “Worlds	
alternative	to	this	one”	(359).	 
Yet	 if	 initially	 it	seems	 like	Pynchon’s	plural	ontologies	exist	 to	 impel	us	 to	any	
world	except	the	present,	some	of	his	most	overtly	optimistic	writing	points	 in	almost	
the	opposite	direction.	 In	 the	 years	between	his	 first	 three	novels	 and	his	 subsequent	
five,	one	of	the	few	things	Pynchon	published	was	a	review	of	Gabriel	Garcia	Marquez’	
100	Years	of	Solitude,	in	which	he	focuses	on	the	restoration	of	lost	past	possibilities:		
This	novel	is	also	revolutionary	in	daring	to	suggest	that	vows	of	love	made	under	
a	presumption	of	immortality—youthful	idiocy,	to	some—may	yet	be	honoured,	
much	later	in	life	when	we	ought	to	know	better,	 in	the	face	of	the	undeniable.	
This	 is,	 effectively,	 to	 assert	 the	 resurrection	 of	 the	 body,	 today	 as	 throughout	
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history	an	unavoidably	revolutionary	idea.	Through	the	ever-subversive	medium	
of	 fiction,	 Garcia-Marquez	 shows	 us	 how	 it	 could	 all	 plausibly	 come	 about,	
even—wild	 hope—for	 somebody	 out	 here,	 outside	 a	 book,	 even	 as	 inevitably	
beaten	at,	bought	and	 resold	as	we	must	have	become	 if	only	 through	years	of	
simple	residence	in	the	injuring	and	corruptive	world…	(review).	
This	little-known	review	is,	I’ll	suggest,	something	of	a	key	to	the	moral	metaphysics	of	
Pynchon’s	recent	fiction,	which	in	turn	casts	light	on	what	he	has	been	doing	with	the	
trope	of	“world”	throughout	his	career.	The	kind	of	resurrection	that	Pynchon	identifies	
with	 in	 Marquez	 is	 not	 a	 first-person	 escape	 from	 this	 world	 and	 re-emergence	 in	
another,	but	 the	 restoration	of	possibilities	 that	were	 lost	 to	 this	world	back	 into	 this	
same	 world.	 The	 emphasis	 is	 on	 “revolution,”	 or	 changes	 within	 the	 present	 sphere.		
Resurrection,	 especially	 in	 the	very	 literal	guise	of	ghosts	 and	 revenants,	 is	 a	 constant	
preoccupation	in	both	Mason	&	Dixon	and	Against	 the	Day	and	is	always	resurrection	
into	that	same	central	world.	When	Cherrycoke’s	narration	tells	us	that	“Men	of	Reason	
will	define	a	Ghost	as	nothing	more	otherworldly	than	a	wrong	unrighted,	which	like	an	
uneasy	 spirit	 cannot	 move	 on,—needing	 help	 we	 cannot	 usually	 give”	 (68),	 he	
establishes	the	tension	at	the	heart	of	the	novel’s	complex	ontologies	and	proliferating	
supernatural	 encounters.	 The	 America	 Mason	 and	 Dixon	 move	 through	 is	 full	 of	
genuine	 overlaps	 between	 their	 secular	 world	 and	 other	 ontologies,	 which	 their	 Line	
truly	 threatens	 to	 eliminate.	 But	 as	 that	 elimination	makes	 the	 Line	 itself	 a	wrong,	 it	
comes	to	accumulate	spectral	ontologies	around	itself,	which	require	help	from	within	
“our”	world	 to	 either	 “move	on”	 into	 the	 “Mnemonick	Deep”	or	 to	 re-enter	our	world	
and	restore	their	wronged	possibility	across	an	ontological	divide.	Righting	wrongs,	this	
construction	 makes	 clear,	 is	 a	 genuinely	 “otherworldly”	 project.	 And	 although	 his	
emphasis	here	is	on	the	capacities	of	fiction	to,	ontologically	and	stylistically,	represent	
things	that	are	impossible	in	our	world,	the	emphasis	is	once	again,	as	in	Cherrycoke’s	
tract,	on	making	them	“plausible”	for	readers	in	“the	injuring	and	corruptive	world,”	the	
bare	 mortal	 one	 in	 which	 Pynchon	 and	 his	 readers	 both	 live.	 	 It’s	 this	 stress	 on	
resurrecting	possibilities	within	 the	non-fictional	world—changing	our	world,	 not	 just	
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getting	 out	 of	 it—that	 I’ll	 suggest	 is	 central	 to	 Pynchon’s	 fundamentally	 deliberative	
arguments	against	rationalization.	
	 Pynchon’s	emphasis	on	what	seems	 like	“idiocy”	 in	the	 face	of	 “the	undeniable”	
shows	that	he’s	aware	that	the	project	he	describes	here	is,	in	our	current	metaphysics,	
entirely	impossible.	And	yet,	as	I’ll	show,	the	more	his	fiction	insists	that	we	are	stuck	in	
our	ever-narrowing	world,	 the	more	 it	 insists	 that	 the	only	alternative	 is	a	miraculous	
restoration	of	what	was	once	possible	back	into	the	present.	This	double	emphasis	gives	
the	recent	fiction	a	verydistinctive	affect,	but	as	I’ll	show,	the	increasing	explicitness	of	
this	particular	metaphysical	concern	in	the	recent	fiction	actually	renders	it	legible	as	a	
career-long	 preoccupation	 which	 defies	 some	 of	 the	 most	 canonical	 accounts	 of	
Pynchon’s	formal	rhetoric,	particularly	those	that	equate	his	rejection	of	rationalization	
with	 a	 rejection	 of	 first-person	 agency	 questions.	 An	 early	 excerpt	 from	 Lot	 49	 was	
published	under	the	title	“The	World	(This	One),	The	Flesh	(Mrs	Oedipa	Maas),	and	the	
Testament	 of	 Pierce	 Inverarity.”	 Criticism	 of	 postmodern	 fiction	 usually	 seeks	 to	
transcend	“The	World	(This	One).”	Pynchon	critics	have	paid	plenty	of	attention	to	his	
representations	 of	 these	 “subjunctive”	 other	worlds	 and	 their	 political	 stakes,	 but	 not	
enough	to	the	importance	of	their	literal	“junctures”	with	our	own	“bare	mortal	World”.	
Such	 attention	 reveals	 the	degree	 to	which—in	Pynchon’s	 universe—resistance	 to	 the	
narrowing	 set	 in	motion	 by	 enlightenment	 “Reason”	 actually	 depends	 on	 the	 logic	 of	
practical	rationality,	rather	than	supra-rational	proliferations.	
**	
Like	 Hutcheon’s	 reading	 of	 Doctorow,	 though,	 our	 most	 canonical	 account	 of	
Pynchon’s	 ontological	 constructions—and	 the	 one	 of	 the	 1980s	 Big	Three	 accounts	 of	
postmodern	 form	 most	 directly	 founded	 on	 readings	 of	 Pynchon—insists	 on	
proliferation	 as	 a	 self-sufficient	 good.	 Brian	McHale	 describes	 the	 difference	 between	
modernist	 and	 postmodernist	 fiction	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 change	 of	 “dominant”	 from	
epistemology	to	ontology.	Drawing	on	categories	established	by	Dick	Higgins,	McHale	
suggests	that	if	modernists	created	forms	that	helped	readers	ask,	“how	can	I	interpret	
this	world	 of	which	 I	 am	part,	 and	what	 am	 I	 in	 it?”	 then	 postmodernism	makes	 the	
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questioning	more	fundamental:	“which	world	is	this,	what	is	to	be	done	in	it,	which	of	
my	selves	is	to	do	it?”	(CP	146).	Fiction	like	Pynchon’s,	which	plays	with	the	ontological	
conventions	of	narrative,	thus	contributes	to	“the	loss	of	a	world	that	could	be	accepted,	
willy-nilly,	 as	 a	 given	 of	 experience”	 (PF	 26).	 As	 Hutcheon	 puts	 political	 faith	 in	 the	
proliferating	 narratives,	 so	 McHale	 sees	 in	 Pynchon	 a	 proliferation	 of	 worlds	 that	
reduces	 the	 dubiously	 naturalized	 authority	 of	 the	 world	 that	 our	 dominant	 culture	
insists	 is	 not	 only	 an	 experiential	 but	 a	 political	 given.	 Proliferation	 draws	 authority	
away	from	that	centre,	and	that’s	all	the	political	we	can	hope	for	in	a	postfoundational	
world.	
This	 limits	 formal	 rhetoric:	 don’t	 make	 your	 counter-narrative	 better,	 more	
persuasive,	more	valid,	it	suggests:	just	crank	out	more	of	them.		If	ontological	profusion	
is	 hegemonic	 determinacy’s	 kryptonite,	 just	 keep	 adding	worlds.	McHale’s	 descriptive	
analyses	 of	 world-crossing	 passages	 in	 Pynchon	 are	 illuminating	 in	 their	 detail	 and	
fidelity,	 but	 fizzle	 out	 at	 the	 point	 of	 rhetorical	 accounting.	 After	 one	 passage,	 “once	
again,	 we	 are	 faced	 with	 potential	 for	 confusion”	 (99).	 After	 another,	 “possibilities	
multiply,	 to	no	definite	 conclusion”	 (101).	The	 implictations	of	 specific	world-crossing,	
world-bending	 sentences	 and	 ambiguities	 can’t	 be	 distinguished	 outside	 of	 a	
conglomerate	effect.	After	the	detail	of	the	description,	the	account	of	rhetoric	that	such	
an	 approach	 can	generate	 for	 a	novelist	 as	historically-specific	 and	politically	 overt	 as	
Pynchon	 is	 anaemic,	 a	 problem	 exacerbated	 when	 McHale	 then	 makes	 Pynchon	 his	
model	for	every	other	postmodernist	novel	he	examines.	Gravity’s	Rainbow’s	final	effect,	
for	 McHale,	 is	 “the	 salutary	 one	 of	 disrupting	 the	 conditioned	 responses	 of	 the	
modernist	 reader”	 (81).	 	 This	 is	 a	 literary-generic	 deconditioning,	 with	 no	 obvious	
bearing	on	the	political	world	 in	which	Pynchon,	his	 reader,	and	his	material	book	all	
exist.	 If	 this	 were	 indeed	 the	 limit	 of	 Pynchon’s	 rhetoric	 then	 each	 novel’s	 different	
historical	 setting	would	 be	 rhetorically	 irrelevant.	McHale’s	 exhaustive	 centralising	 of	
play	with	worlds	goes	no	further,	rhetorically,	than	play	with	literary	genres.		It	gets	us	
little	 further,	 therefore,	 than	does	 the	earliest	work	on	Pynchon	 in	 terms	of	Worlds:	a	
1975	 essay	 by	 James	 Rother	 that	 concludes	 from	 scrutiny	 of	 the	 “adjacent	 worlds”	
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constructed	 by	 Pynchon,	Nabokov	 and	 Barth	 that	 their	 profusions	 just	 highlight	 “the	
final	pointlessness”	of	all	human	endeavor	(36).	
Thomas	writes	his	Pynchon	and	the	Political	against	the	idea,	dominant	until	the	
new	 millennium,	 that	 “to	 talk	 of	 coherent	 (let	 alone	 legitimate)	 forms	 or	 ideas	 [in	
Pynchon’s	 work]	 is	 to	 ‘trespass’	 on	 it,	 to	 become	 barbarians	 stomping	 through	 the	
splendour	of	Roma.		If	there	is	a	consensus	to	be	had	about	Pynchon	then	this	is	it:	all	
hail	 the	 high	 priest	 of	 uncertainty”	 (10).	 Yet	 a	 decade	 on,	 mainstream	 criticism	 of	
Pynchon	has	become	politically	focused,	historical	and	context-driven	to	the	extent	that	
the	antimimetic	elements	of	his	text	are	treated	as	incidental	to	the	guiding	worldview.	
Where	 these	 elements	 remain	 of	 interest,	 descriptions	 of	 them	 have	 become	
correspondingly	 isolated	 from	 accounts	 of	 the	 rhetoric:	 Jeeshan	 Gazi,	 for	 example,	
explicitly	renounces	any	interest	in	the	significance	of	Pynchon’s	ontologies	in	his	article	
on	 the	world-intersectional	 logic	of	Against	 the	Day.	As	 the	centrality	of	Cherrycoke’s	
life-line	 model	 to	 Mason	 &	 Dixon’s	 ideas	 about	 the	 meaning	 of	 America	 suggests,	
though,	this	isn’t	a	viable	division.	As	I’ll	show,	Pynchon’s	world-models,	evolving	from	
novel	to	novel	in	attempts	to	viably	answer	that	question	about	how	we	could	plausibly	
resurrect	 lost	 possibility	 within	 our	 bare	 mortal	 world,	 are	 constitutively	 rhetorical.	
Gazi’s	disinterest	in	their	function	leads	him	to	merely	recapitulate	McHale’s	account	of	
Pynchon’s	earlier	novels—the	“unnaturally	shaky	quality	of	his	reality,	his	present	that	
flickers	 between	worlds”	 (92)—rather	 than	 identifying	 any	outputs	 distinct	 to	Against	
the	Day.	
These	 limitations	 finally	 cohere	 around	 McHale’s	 typically	 postmodern	
conflation,	in	his	account	of	Pynchon’s	evolution	between	V.	and	Gravity’s	Rainbow,	of	
“freely	 exploit[ing]	 the	 artistic	 possibilities	 of	 the	 plurality	 of	 worlds…”	 and	 “the	
unconstrained	 projection	 of	 worlds	 in	 the	 plural”	 (PF	 25).	 Artistic	 possibilities	 are	
fulfilled	 in	 proportion	 to	 the	 loss	 of	 hierarchical	 precedence	 for	 any	 one	 world,	
including—or	 particularly—our	 own.	 Defining	 postmodern	 art	 in	 terms	 of	
unconstrained	proliferation	generates	similar	problems	for	McHale	on	Pynchon	as	it	did	
for	Hutcheon	on	Doctorow.	In	particular,	McHale	misses	the	structural	centrality	of	our	
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“bare	mortal	World”	 to	 Pynchon’s	 various	 ontologies.	Gazi	 and	Nina	 Engelhardt	 both	
show	 how	 world-crossings	 in	 Against	 the	 Day	 model	 themselves	 on	 the	 quaternion	
mathematics	 practiced	 by	 some	 of	 the	 novel’s	 central	 characters:	 a	 stable	 coordinate	
around	 which	 three	 other	 dimensions	 can	 be	 rotated:	 travel	 through	 the	 fourth	
dimension	allows	these	rotations	to	move	and	change	their	objects	in	the	central	world’s	
timeline.	As	Engelhardt	summarizes	it,	“The	unreal	worlds	are	set	perpendicular	to	the	
‘real’	world,	connected	by	[what	Against	the	Day	calls]	a	‘spine	of	reality…’”	(226).	As	one	
of	 the	novel’s	adepts	 in	such	ontology	tells	us	nearer	 the	end	of	 the	novel,	 this	means	
that	“Travel	to	other	worlds	is	therefore	travel	to	alternate	versions	of	the	same	earth”	
(1020).	 	 By	Against	 the	 Day,	 then,	 Pynchon	makes	 rootedness	 in	 our	 own	 world	 the	
condition	of	movement	into,	through,	and	back	from	others.	Yet	as	I’ll	show,	Pynchon’s	
novels	 have	 been	 interested	 in	 world-crossing	 from	 the	 beginning,	 and	 each	 one’s	
precisely-organised	ontological	constellation	addresses	sme	version	of	this	question.		
**	
If	 it	 takes	 the	 later	novels	Mason	&	Dixon	 and	Against	 the	Day	 for	Pynchon	to	
have	his	characters	talk	explicitly	about	the	metaphysics	of	history	and	world-crossing	
that	 the	 novels	 rely	 on,	 “our	 bare	mortal	World”	 is	 the	 structurally	 indispensible	 one	
throughout	his	career.	
In	 V.,	 which	 McHale	 treats	 as	 pre-postmodern	 and	 hence	 ontologically	
uninteresting,	 the	 trope	 of	 “world”	 establishes	 a	 dominant	 one	 with	 subordinate	
shadow,	mirror,	or	conceptual	counterparts.		Inertial	pseudo-hero	Benny	Profane	drifts	
in	The	Street,	while	in	its	counterpart	the	sewer	he	takes	a	job	hunting	alligators	and	a	
priest	 tries	 to	 convert	 rats	before	 judgment	day;	 first	world	war	pilot	Evan	Godolphin	
escapes	the	trenches	of	the	Western	Front	to	fight	in	a	sky-world	free	from	“the	taint	of	
gas	and	comrades’	decay”	(98);	on	Malta,	the	“real”	world	gets	bombed	while	afterward,	
in	the	wreckage,	children	replicate	bombers	and	dogfights	in	imaginative	but	grounded	
play.	 Occasionally,	 such	 world-divisions—like	 college	 girl	 Rachel	 Owlglass’s	 longing	
after	Profane’s	 “boy’s	 road”	of	 “Places	 I	won’t	know”	(20)—flaunt	their	epistemological	
grounds,	 but	 there	 are	 binary	 world-boundaries	 in	 V.	 that	 have	 little	 to	 do	 with	
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perspective.	 	 At	 the	 plastic	 surgeon	 to	 have	 her	 nose	 corrected,	 for	 example,	 Rachel	
wonders		
did	 real	 time	plus	mirror	 time	equal	zero	and	 thus	 serve	 some	half-understood	
moral	 purpose…	 or	 was	 it	 only	 the	mirror-world	 that	 counted;	 only	 a	 promise	
[…]that	 the	 inward	bow	of	 a	 nose-bridge	 […]	meant	 reversal	 of	 ill-fortune	 such	
that	the	world	of	the	altered	would	thenceforth	run	on	mirror-time	(46).			
Here,	 it	 is	 alteration	 in	 the	 physical	 world	 that	 determines	 fortune,	 time,	 and	 first-
person	 experience,	 not	 thought	 that	 delineates	 the	 world.	 The	 moral	 stakes	 are	
specifically	 “half-understood,”	 establishing	 a	 dual	 world,	 knowledge	 of	 only	 half	 of	
which	 is	 accessible	 at	 a	 time,	while	 full	 understanding	would	 require	 an	ontologically	
strange	 straddling.	 The	 two	 realms	match,	 but	 there	 remains	 a	 subordination:	 one	 is	
originary,	one	derivative.		They	are,	though,	in	Rother’s	term,	definingly	“adjacent.”	
Occasionally,	such	worlds	do	get	to	overlap	and	co-exist,	most	often	through	the	
ostensibly	mythical	land	of	Vheissu,	from	which	old	spy	Hugh	Godolphin	claims	to	have	
returned,	and	which	may	be	at	the	heart	of	the	political	machinations	about	which	the	
father	of	our	other	pseudo-hero	Herbert	Stencil	left	unclear	messages	before	dying.		On	
top	of	 its	own	debatable	reality,	Vheissu	 is	 located	both	inside	and	outside	the	known	
world:	while	Godolphin	wants	 to	 locate	 it	outside	 the	political	 and	historical	world	 in	
which	he	works—he	calls	it	“a	dream,	of	what	the	Antarctic	in	this	world	is	closest	to”	
(217)—it	is	on	other	occasions	merely	an	extremity	of	intensity	within	our	world,	where	
“dreams	are	not,	not	closer	 to	 the	waking	world,	but	 somehow,	 I	 think,	 they	do	 seem	
more	 real”	 (171).	 Vheissu’s	 oscillating	 world-location	 and	 definition	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
differing	 world-categories	 of	 dream,	 politics,	 and	 so	 on,	 may	 depend	 on	 Godolphin’s	
oscillating	psychology,	but	they	establish	it	as	the	sort	of	object	McHale	had	found	new	
to	Gravity’s	Rainbow	and	whose	terms	almost	all	subsequent	examination	of	Pynchon’s	
ontology	 has	 maintained:	 	 “elements	 whose	 ontological	 status	 is	 unstable,	 flickering,	
indeterminable”	(CP	70).	Yet	the	terms	in	which	Godolphin	himself	describes	Vheissu’s	
persistent	incursions	on	his	mind—“the	bad	faith	of	dreams	that	send	surprise	skirmish-
parties	 across	 a	 frontier	which	ought	 to	be	 stable”	 (335)—establish	 that	 its	 relation	 to	
the	novel’s	core	world	is	not	simply	to	de-hierarchize	ontological	levels	as	McHale	finds	
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them	 in	 Gravity’s	 Rainbow,	 but	 to	 figure	 subordinate	 realms	 crossing	 into	 the	 solid	
dominant	world.		
V.’s	 ontological	 flickerings	 all	 involve	 eruptions	 of	 past	 into	 present,	 or	
resurrections.		In	Florence	in	the	1920s,	Victoria	Wren,	the	mysterious	woman	who	may	
be	 the	 V.	 Stencil	 seeks	 and	 who	 first	 crossed	 paths	 with	 Godolphin	 when	 she	 was	
travelling	and	he	was	spying	 in	Egypt	at	 the	end	of	 the	 19th	century,	meets	him	again,	
and	has	an	 intimation	of	 the	past:	 “the	halo	of	a	second	and	more	virile	self	 flickering	
about	old	Godolphin”	(210);	she	herself	becomes	such	a	double-presence	to	old	Stencil	
during	the	epilogue.		He	remembers	her	describing	herself	as	a	“girl”	as	he	took	off	her	
shoe	 twenty	 years	before:	 “Girl?	 She	was	nearly	 forty,”	he	 thinks	 in	 the	present	 tense,	
judging	her	old	talk	and	her	present	self	as	issue	of	the	same	moment.	A	paragraph	later,	
Godolphin’s	 son	 says	 to	 Stencil	 in	 the	narrative	 present	 “We	both	have	 an	 interest	 in	
her…	I	am	her	servant”	-	“I	too”	replies	old	Stencil,	which	could	apply	equally	to	his	son,	
who	may	 or	may	 not	 be	writing	 and	 Stencilizing	 these	words,	 this	 scene,	 himself	 ten	
years	 on.	 By	 the	 epilogue—itself	 of	 indeterminate	 authorship	 and	 ontological	 status	
within	 the	 novel’s	 framework—the	 existential	 levels	 of	 narrative	 past	 and	 narrative	
present	begin	to	fully	coincide.		
While	such	incorporations	of	past	within	present	have	a	positive	political	valence	
in	 the	 later	 novels,	 they	 spur	V.’s	 characters	 for	 the	most	 part	 to	 “retreat.”	 Hermetic	
world-shoring	is	their	natural	mode,	as	with	Fausto	Maijstral,	writing	letters	to	his	just-
born	 daughter	 during	 the	 bombing	 of	 Malta,	 requiring	 “a	 room,	 sealed	 against	 the	
present,	before	we	can	make	any	attempt	to	deal	with	the	past”	(305).		The	aversion	to	
other	worlds	 is	actively	pathologized	 in	many	of	 the	characters,	as	 in	 the	chapter	 that	
follows	atmospheric	scientist	Kurt	Mondaugen	in	Namibia	as	he	holes	up	with	colonial	
staff	during	a	rebellion.	The	hothouse	logic	of	the	siege-party	builds	up	to	a	scene	where	
the	 revellers	 gather	 on	 the	 roof	 to	watch	 some	 of	 the	 native	 fighting	 in	 the	 distance:	
“such	was	their	elevation	that	they	could	see	everything	spread	out	in	panorama,	as	if	for	
their	amusement”	(275).	“Everything”	here	suggests	the	full	visibility	of	a	self-contained	
world	 from	 a	 position	 outside	 it,	 and	 the	 scene	 is	 bookended	 by	 visitations	 from	 the	
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atmospheric	signals	Mondaugen	has	started	to	randomly	pick	up	on	his	equipment,	the	
second	of	which	brings	 the	code-broken	message	 that	 “Die	Welt	 Ist	Alles,	das	der	 fall	
ist.”	This	has	been	 the	animating	assumption	of	 the	party:	 if	you	 isolate	yourself	 from	
the	world	to	making	one	of	your	own,	and	the	world	is	all	that	the	case	is,	then	what’s	
beyond	your	case-world	 loses	existential	relevance.	 	But	as	the	briefly-framed	world	of	
the	siege-spectacle	makes	clear,	there	are	other	worlds,	and	just	as	the	isolated	world	of	
the	party	turns	cruel	and	violent,	so	intersections	between	such	hermetic	worlds	lead	to	
global	political	violence.	
Beneath	these	willfully	hermetic	world-constructions,	the	novel	points	us	to	a	no	
less	 threatening	 material	 world:	 “This	 One.”	 Rachel,	 in	 a	 poetic	 moment,	 appeals	 to	
Profane	to	consider	 their	situation	among	“Only	this	quarry,	 the	dead	rocks	 that	were	
here	 before	 and	 will	 be	 here	 after	 us…	 Isn’t	 that	 the	 world?”	 (26).	 	 A	 passage	 listing	
disasters	from	an	almanac	breaks	off	to	identify	their	harms	with	the	“congruent	world	
which	simply	doesn’t	care”	(309).	Maijstral	combines	this	attitude	with	his	response	to	
what	he	sees	on	Malta	to	justify	his	isolation	“once	the	inadequacy	of	optimism	is	borne	
in	on	him	by	an	inevitably	hostile	world,	to	retreat	 into	abstractions”	(310).	 	What	V.’s	
narrator	calls	the	“inevitably	hostile	world”	is	the	forerunner	of	“the	bare	mortal	World”	
in	Mason	&	Dixon,	which	was	framed	as	“our	Despair.”	The	difference	is	that	V.	 is	the	
one	among	Pynchon’s	novels	that	frames	this	problem	without	offering	solutions	to	it.	
	The	 flickerings	 of	 past,	 the	 late	 vindication	 of	 Vheissu’s	 existence,	 and	 so	 on,	
argue	 that	 there	 are	 things	 in	 the	world	beyond	 the	uncaring,	hostile,	 and	 inanimate.	
Pynchon’s	 debut	 novel	 works	 outward	 from	 a	 sense	 of	 necessary	 change,	 framed	 as	
necessary	ontological	supplement.	And	yet,	its	focus	on	characters	who	collaborate	with	
the	world’s	entropic	slide	towards	inanimacy	means	that	such	occasional	world-overlaps	
exist	only	to	ironize	their	passivity.	The	world’s	death-orientation	figures	throughout	as	
a	product	of	people’s	wilful	inclination	to	restrict	their	ontological	array.	Pynchon	show	
us	that	the	world	doesn’t	have	to	make	us	so	resigned,	but	he	doesn’t	give	his	characters	
any	plausible	way	to	achieve	contact	with	the	subjunctive	that	could	alter	their	and	our	
world.	V.	 may	 argue	 against	 forms	 of	 rationalization,	 then,	 but	 it	 provides	 no	 viably	
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deliberative	 contingent	 alternative.	 	 It	 doesn’t	 stress	 the	 recuperable	 nature	 of	 past	
possibility	in	ontological	terms,	but	it	does	establish	both	the	inescapable	centrality	of	a	
particular	 historical	 world,	 and	 the	 dangerous	 stakes	 of	 narrowing	 the	 world-options	
around	 it.	 It	 thus	 sets	 out	 the	 problem	 to	 which	 the	 subsequent	 seven	 novels	 of	
Pynchon’s	career	will	offer	deliberative	imperatives	in	response.	
	
Regretful	Action	and	Deliberative	Recuperation	
Mason	&	Dixon	and	Against	the	Day	respond	to	the	basic	problem	V.	poses,	and	
do	so	with	a	more	specific	sense	of	past	history	as	 the	ontological	category	 that	could	
expand	 the	possibilities	of	 “our”	present	world.	Against	 the	Day	 in	particular	offers	 at	
least	four	modes	for	access	to	other	worlds:	Iceland	spar	(a	real	variety	of	crystal)	refacts	
light	to	give	a	double	image,	and	within	Against	the	Day	that	image	is	of	adjacent	worlds	
that	run	alongside	our	own	but	are	usually	inaccessible;	the	novel	narrates	the	Tunguska	
event	of	 1908,	 a	 still	 unexplained	explosion	 in	 the	 sky	 that,	 in	 the	novel,	 opens	up	an	
ontological	 rupture	 at	whose	 site	 crossings	 between	 dimensions	 become	 possible;	 the	
novel	establishes	the	trans-dimensional	implications	of	quaternionism;	and	finally,	near	
the	end	of	 the	novel,	 characters	 invent	a	device	 called	 the	 integroscope	 that	 can	 start	
history	running	again	from	the	moment	any	photo	was	originally	taken.	Together,	these	
offer	two	models	for	recuperating	historical	possibility;	first,	the	access	to	the	presents	
of	parallel	worlds	whose	own	narrowing	 trajectory	sheared	off	 from	our	own	at	a	past	
moment,	 and	 second,	 the	 recuperation	 of	moments	 at	which	 time	was	 frozen,	which	
might	then	take	different	directions	second	time	round.		
As	Pynchon’s	novels	start	 to	 invent	antimimetic	world-structures	and	sentence-
grammars	with	which	to	convey	hypothetical	modes	of	restoring	lost	possibilities	to	our	
present,	they	also	begin	to	change	affectively.	The	pessimism	of	V.	shifts	to	an	emphasis	
on	 regret.	 From	 Mason	 and	 Dixon’s	 growing	 awareness	 of	 the	 anti-subjunctive	
significance	 of	 their	 own	work,	 to	Vineland’s	 focus	 on	 the	 retrospective	 experience	 of	
having	 been	 a	 betrayer,	 to	 the	 central	 plot-line	 in	 Against	 the	 Day	 by	 which	 four	
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children	must	work	out	how	to	sustain	the	legacy	of	their	anarchist	father	(murdered	by	
union-busters)	regret	becomes	a	persistently	motivating	force.	It	saturates	the	language	
of	the	latter	novel,	even	for	minor	characters,	as	with	one	lamenting	another	death,	this	
time	of	the	artist	Tancredi:	“creation	that	would	not	happen	now,	the	regret	and	horror	
at	what	 she	 had	 almost	 been	 a	 part	 of…	He	was	 a	 virtuous	 kid,	 like	 all	 these	 fucking	
artists,	too	much	so	for	the	world,	even	the	seen	world	they	were	trying	to	redeem	one	
little	rectangle	of	canvas	at	a	time”	(744).		The	connection	between	regret	at	one’s	own	
actions	and	art’s	effort	to	“redeem”	our	one	“seen”	world	expresses	the	core	connection	
between	ontology	and	deliberation	in	Pynchon’s	post-V.	work.	
**	
As	those	later	novels	devote	their	thinking	to	ontologically	structuring	available	
alternatives,	 regret	 becomes	 ontologically	 consequential.	 William	 James,	 in	 “The	
Dilemma	of	Determinism,”	 established	 regret	 as	 the	necessary	 emotional	 condition	of	
the	indeterminate	world.		If	we	lament	that	a	decision	forecloses	a	particular	event,	we	
must	 believe	 in	 that	 event’s	 having	 been	 genuinely	 available	 for	 existence:	 “The	
question”	 says	 James,	 “relates	 solely	 to	 the	existence	of	possibilities”	 (DoD	591).	 	 If	we	
grant	 that	 existence,	 we	 live	 in	 “a	 world	 in	 which	 we	 constantly	 have	 to	 make…	
judgements	of	regret”	(DoD	596).	Regret—and	the	possibilities	it	entails—is	of	intrinsic	
value	for	James,	because	it	makes	living	exciting:	“What	interest,	zest	or	excitement	can	
there	be	in	achieving	the	right	way,	unless	we	are	enabled	to	feel	that	the	wrong	way	is	
also	a	possible	and	a	natural	way”	(DoD	605).		Even	if	we’re	wrong	to	regret	things,	“the	
error	of	supposing	that	the	past	could	have	been	different,	justifies	itself	by	its	use.		Its	
use	is	to	quicken	our	sense	of	what	the	irretrievably	lost	is…”	(DoD	599).		So	for	James,	
regret	is	intrinsically	valuable,	precisely	because	it	spurs	us	to	action,	and	makes	us	care	
about	those	actions	we	do	take.		
In	Against	the	Day,	regret	stores	up	motivation	even	before	the	fresh	possibilities	
it	 could	 operate	 on	 are	 unleashed.	 Against	 the	 Day’s	 middle	 section	 of	 desolate	
wandering—after	 the	 murder	 of	 Webb	 Traverse,	 before	 the	 Tunguska	 event—for	
example,	is	characterised	by	the	Monstrosity	Museum	“swept	by	generations	of	sighing,	
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which	occasionally	had	reached	wind	force—a	sadness,	a	wild	exclusion”,	which	one	of	
Webb’s	 sons	walks	 through	discussing	 fate’s	 triumph:	 he	 and	his	 interlocutor	 “moved	
along	in	regret	and	reluctance”	down	“corridors	commemorative	of	the	persons	they	had	
once	imagined	themselves	to	be”	(635).	Similarly,	as	he	ventures	into	Russia	on	a	quest	
further	and	 further	away	 from	his	Colorado	home,	Kit	Traverse	 sees	 the	effects	of	 the	
same	 capitalism	 that	 killed	 his	 father	 back	 there,	 the	 silk	 road	 populated	 by	 “dust-
covered	spectres”	and	the	generally	disenfranchised	who	“have	nothing”,	“Kit	had	begun	
to	understand	that	this	space	the	Gate	had	opened	to	them	was	less	geographic	than	to	
be	measured	along	axes	of	sorrow	and	loss”	(771).	Regret	is	at	this	point	an	unactivated	
principle	indistinguishable	from	“Despair.”	
Yet	if	at	this	stage	both	the	past	and	the	historical	world-present	of	Against	 the	
Day	 are	 saturated	with	 regret,	 the	Tunguska	event’s	eruption	 into	 that	world	grants	a	
sense	of	 “overture	and	possibility”	 that	 restores	 those	 regretted	 imaginings	 to	viability	
(805).	In	my	chapter	on	John	Barth	I	discussed	the	choice	that	James’	anti-determinism	
forces	 on	us:	 between	 acting	 and	 engaging	with	 the	possibility	 of	 error	 and	 regret,	 or	
deferring	action	in	an	awareness	of	the	risks	you	might	run	by	doing	so.	In	the	ontology	
of	Against	 the	Day	 this	 dilemma	doesn’t	 apply,	 since	with	world-crossing	possibilities	
opened	up,	characters	who	leave	the	novel’s	central	world	can	leave	the	plot	behind	and	
avoid	any	of	the	complications	of	deliberative	action.	On	McHale’s	reading	of	Pynchon’s	
ontologies,	the	world-departures	Pynchon	discusses	under	the	rubric	of	“transcendence”	
ought	not	to	be	given	any	particular	moral	valence:	 they	should	epitomise	the	kind	of	
free	 play	 among	 ontologies	 that	 undermines	 modernist	 reading	 habits.	 But	 as	 I’ve	
argued	at	length	elsewhere	Pynchon’s	later	fiction	is	marked	by	the	number	of	scenes	in	
which	central	characters	turn	back	from	ontological	access	points	at	which	they	could	
go	into	transcendent	realms	and	leave	the	agentive	complexities	of	“our”	world	and	its	
“Despair”	behind.111	They	return	instead	to	what	Against	 the	Day	constantly	refers	to	as	
“Work	in	the	World,”	the	province	of	“The	Compassionate”	(749).	This	is	work	on	behalf	
of	precisely	the	disenfranchised	figures	who	stimulated	Kit’s	regret.																																																									
111	See	Chetwynd,	“Inherent	Obligation.”
	 218	
The	 Traverse	 sons	 are	 among	 those	 who,	 as	 the	 Tunguska	 event	 saturates	 the	
novel	with	 possibility,	 have	 their	 political	 imaginings	 restored	 and	 turn,	with	 varying	
degrees	 of	 dedication,	 back	 to	 the	 indicative	 world.	 	 One	 of	 their	 family	 friends,	
meanwhile,	 has	 a	more	 concrete	 encounter	with	 that	 ghostly	 sense	 of	 obligation	 that	
Mason	and	Dixon	had	made	the	paradigm	of	supernatural	ontological	influence:	“Some	
dead	 striker,	 reaching	 back	 through	 the	mortal	 curtain	 to	 try	 and	 find	 something	 of	
Earth	 to	 touch,	 anything,	 and	 that	 happened	 to	 be	 Frank.	 	Maybe	 even	Webb’s	 own	
hand.		Webb	and	all	that	he	had	tried	to	make	of	his	life,	and	all	that	had	been	taken,	
and	all	 the	paths	his	 children	had	gone	off	on”	 (1016).	 	The	double	 sense	of	 “taken”—
suggesting	 both	 the	 specific	 injustices	 of	 expropriation	 that	Webb	wanted	 to	 avenge,	
and	also	 the	 Jamesian	agential	 regret	of	 fork-in-road	choices	made	and	 the	paths	 that	
follow	from	them—frames	the	intent	and	value	of	the	striker’s	ghostly	return	in	terms	of	
its	literal	impact	on	the	present	world.	Similarly,	Webb’s	voice	returns	to	his	sons	not	in	
order	to	bring	them	over	to	join	him,	but	to	spur	their	actions	in	the	indicative	world.		
On	 this	 logic,	 honouring	 his	 transcendently	 powerful	 voice	 is	 precisely	 a	 matter	 of	
changing	 the	path,	 increasing	 the	possibilities,	 of	 indicative	history:	 the	 “bigger	 fight”	
that	his	world-crossing	spurs	expands	one	particular	historical	world,	not	an	ontological	
array.	 Transcendence	 and	 mere	 ontological	 play	 is	 subordinated	 to	 its	 practical	
consequences	 for	 those	 who	 remain	 in	 the	 indicative	 world:	 the	 world	 of	 obligation,	
choice,	and	imminent	error	in	which	we	his	readers	have	to	live.	
Against	the	Day,	then,	prioritises	our	central	historical	world	just	as	V	does,	but	
conjures	fictive	mechanisms	by	which	existent	possibilities	can	make	their	way	into	the	
fiction’s	 version	 of	 that	 world,	 and	 what	 political	 imperatives	 they	 communicate	 to	
those	 they	 “touch.”	 Those	 imperatives	 also	 carry	 out	 the	 project	 of	 historical	
recuperation	 at	 the	 verbal	 level.	The	 verbs	 in	which	 the	work	of	 possibility-seeking	 is	
figured	before	the	Tunguska	event	makes	lost	possibilities	present	again	almost	all	that	
begin	with	‘re-’.	Quaternionism’s	dissolution	and	recomposition	of	bodies	is	described	as	
“Translation	of	 the	body,	sort	of	 lateral	 resurrection	 if	you	 like”	(432),	establishing	the	
relationship	 between	 trans-dimensional	 crossing	 and	 the	 “revolutionary”	 work	 of	
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recuperating	the	lost	past.	Mystical	isolationism	gets	rejected	with	a	“What?	Remain	in	
the	 exile	 of	 the	 present	 tense	 and	 never	 get	 back	 in,	 to	 reclaim	 what	 was?’”	 (759).	
Reclamation	and	redeeming	are	the	work	at	stake	for	human	agents	in	the	novel’s	most	
hopeless	stretch,	and	similar	verbs	characterise	the	Tunguska	event’s	inhuman	action.	A	
character	 present	 at	 the	 site	 describes	 it,	 “as	 if	 something	 in	 the	 Transfinitum	 had	
chosen	 to	 re-enter	 the	 finite	 world,	 to	 reaffirm	 allegiance	 to	 its	 limits,	 including	
mortality…	 to	 become	 recognisably	 numerical	 again…”	 (783).	 	 The	 triple-‘re’	 here	 is	
noteworthy:	 re-entering	 and	 reaffirming	 are	 arguably	 actions	 only	 available	 to	
transcendent	 powers,	 but	 “recognizably”	 puts	 the	 onus	 on	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 re-
entered	world	to	re-cognise,	deliberately	change	their	thinking,	to	pave	the	way	for	any	
subsequent	work	of	reclamation	and	redemption.	
The	emphasis	on	‘re’-verbs	establishes	the	major	difference	between	Pynchon	and	
James’	sense	of	the	value	of	regret:	for	James	the	precise	value	of	lost	possibilities	is	 in	
their	lostness,	in	the	future	loss	of	possibilities	now	open:	this	is	what	makes	us	care;	if	
they	were	recuperable,	we	might	not.		But	while	Pynchon’s	‘regret’	logic	follows	from	the	
current	 practical-logically	 inaccessibility	 of	 the	 relevant	 options,	 it	 locates	 their	 value	
only	in	their	plausible	recuperation,	not	in	their	staying	regrettably	lost.	This	concept	of	
“access”	 is	 crucial	 to	Against	 the	 Day:	 as	 the	 borders	 between	 dimensions	 within	 its	
universe	 become	 increasingly	 crossable,	 many	 of	 its	 central	 figures	 have	 to	 choose	
between	 transcendence	 of	 our	 core	 world	 and	 remaining	 within	 working	 reach	 of	 its	
indicative	realm.		The	Chums	of	Chance,	for	example,	end	by	establishing	a	floating	city	
that	 will	 set	 out	 on	 its	 own	 independent	 social	 history.	 They	 find	 themselves	 pre-
emptively	 regretful,	 entirely	unsure	about	how	 their	own	subjunctive	achievements	 in	
this	 city	 could	 ever	 do	 useful	 work	 in	 the	 indicative	world	with	which	 they	 about	 to	
close	junctures:	“For	every	wish	to	come	true	would	mean	that	in	the	known	Creation,	
good	unsought	and	uncompensated	would	have	evolved	somehow,	 to	become	at	 least	
more	accessible	to	us”	(1085).		Only	with	an	evolution	in	ontologies	will	they	be	able	to	
let	 regret	 go	Until	 then,	 it’s	 the	 defining	 condition	 of	 any	 attempt	 they	 can	make	 to	
impove	their	or	anybody	else’s	lot.	The	“us”	here,	though	focalised	through	the	Chums,	
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is	a	plausible	address	outward	to	 the	reader	who	remains	 in	 the	world	 the	Chums	are	
about	to	sever	duties	to.		This	establishes	which	world	such	access	to	goodness	is	meant	
to	 ramify	within,	 and	how	much	 it	 depends,	 there	 and	 elsewhere,	 on	 a	willingness	 to	
make	difficult	decisions.		
	
Deliberative	Metaphysics	
“Accessible”	 is	 the	 crucial	 word:	 it	 holds	 open	 the	 question	 of	 what	 junctures	
within	 our	 Creation	 can	 make	 what	 we	 know	 to	 be	 good	 graspable.	 	 It	 also	 has	 a	
technical	 meaning	 in	 the	 logic	 of	 possible	 worlds,	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 Pre-existing	
possibility,	 what	 Ruth	 Ronen	 calls	 “sub-systems	 of	 worlds	 of	 various	 degrees	 of	
possibility	(accessibility)	relative	to	the	world	actually	obtaining”	(25).		Pynchon	in	this	
passage	 refigures	 the	 term	 into	 an	 open	 agential	 question,	 central	 to	 the	 rhetorical,	
imperative	 dimensions	 of	 his	 fiction.	Addressing	 an	 “us”	who	 shares	 “our”	world	with	
Pynchon,	 the	novels,	 rather	 than	neutrally	 operating	within	 an	 accessibility-structure,	
confront	us	with	the	imperative	of	working	out	how,	in	our	world,	denied	the	science-
fictional	metaphysics	 of	 Pynchon’s	worlds,	we	 can	 still	 go	 about	 recovering	 a	 present	
activity	for	lost	possibilities	or	achievements	that	are	currently	trapped	in	logically	and	
historically	inaccessible	worlds.		
We	can	see	this	questioning	imperative	in	Pynchon’s	increasing	use	of	the	term	
“subjunctive”	 to	 define	 the	 possibility-worlds	 his	 novels	 suggest	 would	 be	 worth	
recovering.	As	the	etymology	of	juncture	suggests,	the	subjunctive	tense	is	supervenient	
on	 the	 indicative,	 contingent	 on	 it	 through	 a	 kind	 of	 ontological	 hinge.	 Remove	 the	
junctures,	 and	 you	 remove	 the	 hinge	 through	 which	 the	 two	 realms	 may	 interact.	
Pynchon’s	 novels	 posit	 an	 array	 of	 hinge-types	 and	 universe-structures,	 all	 figuring	
worlds	that	already	have	some	hinge	by	which	they	can	interact	with	our	own.	Even	the	
transcendent	ontological	exception	of	the	Tunguska	event—which	opens	a	geographical	
hinge	but	is	logically	isolated	from	any	other	aspect	of	the	novel’s	parallel	worlds—has	
its	defining	 consequences	 in	 the	 indicative	world	with	which	 it	has	now	become	 sub-
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junctive.	These	models	may	differ—from	the	trope	of	religious	revelation	in	The	Crying	
of	Lot	49		to	that	of	cyclical	return	in	Gravity’s	Rainbow	to	the	living	dead	in	Vineland—
but	they	all	operate	in	answer	to	that	vocabulary	of	regret	and	imperative	re-verbs.		The	
basic	question	in	each	case	remains	the	same.	What	recuperative	work	can	we	do	in	our	
world	that	could	match	the	metaphysical	possibilities	open	to	fiction?	And	this,	finally,	
is	a	pro-deliberative	question	insofar	as	it	asks	us	
Although	 they	disagree	on	 the	 relation	between	existent	possibility,	 regret,	 and	
present	action,	Pynchon	has	since	V.	shared	James’	commitment	to	the	present	world,	a	
commitment	 his	 ontological	 experiments	 intensify,	 not	 diffuse.	 His	 imperatives	 to	
resurrection,	 reclamation,	 redemption,	 reject	 the	 option—hardly	 available	 to	 his	
historical	readers—of	a	simple	transcendent	hop	out	of	our	own	unsatisfying	world.	The	
normative	and	practical	relationship	he	establishes	between	regret,	history,	possibility,	
and	 ontology	 is	 more	 complex	 and	 specific	 than	 the	 postmodern	 rhetoric	 of	 mere	
proliferation	will	allow	for,	and	it	does	its	political	work	by	an	almost	inverse	structure.		
Rather	 than	 advancing	 a	 McHale	 or	 Hutcheon-style	 proliferation	 of	 openings	 and	
loosened	 constraints	 that	 draw	 legitimacy	 away	 from	 the	world	 that	we	 already	 share	
with	him—the	world	that,	in	Ronen’s	term,	“obtains”—Pynchon’s	ontological	rhetoric	is	
All	 about	 strengthening	and	 improving	 that	world,	our	world,	by	working	out	what	 it	
would	take	to	replenish	it	with	past	possibility,	and	thus	scour	it	of	“Despair.”	
Each	 Pynchon	 novel	 investigates	 the	metaphysical	 means	 necessary	 to	 ground	
any	project	in	which	we—stuck	forever	in	our	one	“bare”	“mortal”	“injuring”	“corruptive”	
world—can	 rationally	 deliberate,	 and	 pursue,	 and	 perhaps	 somehow	 recuperate	 and	
accommodate	within	it,	the	“betterness”	of	particular	worlds	alternative	to	our	own.	The	
ingredients	of	such	a	process	 look	simple:	 first,	we	need	to	 judge	what	states	of	affairs	
we	find	preferable	to	our	own;	second,	we	need	to	work	out	what	means	are	most	likely	
to	bring	them	about;	third,	we	need	to	do	that	“Work	in	the	World.”	These	three	steps	
add	up	to	a	minimal	description	of	deliberation.		
Even	an	author	committed	to	the	idea	that	Enlightenment	Reason	originated	the	
rationalizing,	possibility-narrowing	course	on	which	a	world	of	“Despair”	currently	finds	
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itself,	then,	uses	antimimetic	forms—world-constellations	so	unlike	our	world	that	they	
may	 seem	 like	 “youthful	 idiocy”—to	 pursue	 the	 doubt-driven	 project	 of	 recuperating	
deliberation	through	antimimetic	prose	fiction.	His	emphasis	on	the	miraculous	in	the	
face	of	“the	undeniable”	matches	the	apparent	joint	impossibilities	engaged	with	by	each	
author	 of	 postmodern	 project	 fiction:	 how	 to	 change	 real-world	 beliefs	 through	 the	
medium	of	fiction,	and	how	to	warrant	action	in	a	postfoundational	world.		
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APPENDIX	A	–	A	History	of	the	Consistent	Premises	of	Criticism	on	
Postmodernism	and	Antimimetic	Fiction		
	
For	 the	 present,	 establishing	 the	 archive	 of	 the	 postmodern	 project	 novel	
challenges	a	variety	of	accounts	of	the	era’s	experimental	 fiction	that	rest	on	the	same	
basic	axiom	of	anti-mimetic	fiction’s	intrinsically	negative	formal	rhetoric.	In	particular,	
we	can	identify	four	tendencies:	A)	“positive”	readings	of	postmodern	fiction	that	limit	
its	rhetoric	to	the	undermining	of	literary	conventions,	the	undermining	of	hegemonic	
discourses,	 or	 the	 construction	 and	 revelling	 in	 of	 indeterminacies	 (these	 are	 the	
readings	through	which	postmodern	fiction	was	institutionalized	as	worthy	of	study);	B)	
“negative”	 literary	genealogies	which	accept	“A”	 in	 less	celebratory	fashion,	 in	order	to	
frame	 postmodern	 fiction	 as	 a	 problem-generating	 dead	 end	 to	 which	 a	 succeeding	
trend	 had	 to	 offer	 solutions:	 call	 “B1”	 accounts	 in	which	white	male	 postmodernism’s	
unworldly	 gameplaying	 gives	 way	 to	 the	 work	 of	 authors	 from	 marginalized	
communities	 whose	 work,	 whether	 conventional	 or	 experimental,	 is	 presumed	 to	 be	
intrinsically	more	connected	to	urgent	real-world	questions,	call	“B2”	accounts	in	which	
postmodernism’s	smug	unworldly	gameplaying	gives	way	to	David	Foster	Wallace	and	
his	 heroic	 “New	 Sincerity,”	 which	 connects	 formal	 experiment	 to	 the	 real	 world	 by	
embodying	 real-world	 angsting	 about	 the	 otherworldly	 limitations	 of	 formal	
experiment;	call	C)	the	rare	rereadings	of	the	era’s	experimental	fiction	that	are	driven	
by	form,	but	which	nevertheless	find	only	non-cognitive	or	prediscursive	upshots	in	the	
fiction;	and,	finally,	call	D)	rereadings	of	the	“postmodern”	generation	that	find	interest	
only	 in	 their	 relation	 to	historical	events	or	 ideas.	Such	work	 takes	existing	models	of	
their	 formal	 rhetoric—as	 essentially	 de-centring,	 deconstructive,	 and	 paralyzingly	
sceptical—as	 givens	 to	 be	 explained	 in	 extra-literary	 terms,	 rather	 than	 distinctively	
literary	modes	susceptible	to	literary,	prose-formal	rhetorical	rereading.	
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Headings	A	and	B	cohere	around	the	oft-remarked	fact	that	postmodern	fiction,	
once	it	was	given	that	name,	was	both	advocated	and	repudiated	for	the	same	putative	
qualities.	Writers	 like	 Ronald	 Sukenick	 and	 Raymond	 Federman,	 who	 came	 onto	 the	
scene	 slightly	 later	 than	 Barth,	 Gass	 or	 McElroy	 and—initially—self-identified	 as	
postmodernists,	 pitch	 their	 manifestoes	 in	 the	 vocabulary	 of	 deconstruction.	 For	
Federman,	
Masterpieces	of	literature	were	now	void	of	meaning,	or,	what	comes	to	the	same	
thing,	 filled	 with	 an	 excess	 of	 meaning,	 their	 language	 indeterminate,	
contradictory,	without	any	 foundation,	 their	organization,	 structures,	grammar,	
logic,	 and	 rhetoric,	 mere	 verbal	 performances.	 	 Whatever	 meaning	 these	
masterpieces	may	have	had	was	simply	provisional	and	conferred	on	them	by	the	
reader…	(118).		
Sukenick	clarifies	that	meaning,	logic,	rhetoric	would	be	superceded	by	correspondence	
with	a	fallen	world:	“In	freeing	the	processes	of	thought	from	any	particular	purpose,	the	
random	 consciousness	 makes	 contact	 with	 the	 vagrant	 world,	 itself	 disengaged	 from	
utilitarian	ends,	 and	wins	 insight	 into	 the	nature	of	mind	and	 reality”	 (xvii/xviii).	The	
disconnection	of	“insight”	from	“logic”	and	“rhetoric”	generates	an	account	of	literature’s	
capacities	 based	 on	 a	 reformulation	 of	 standard	 accounts	 of	 experience:	 Federman	
explains	that	“Reduced	to	non-sense,	non-signification,	non-knowledge,	the	world	is	no	
longer	to	be	known	or	to	be	explained,	it	is	to	be	experienced	as	it	is	now	recreated	in	
the	New	Fiction…”	(16).	An	antimimetic	fiction	might	not	immerse	us	in	an	alternative	
world	 of	 imagined	 experiences,	 but	 would	 give	 us	 experiences	 of	 disconnection	 and	
discombubulation	in	our	own	world	that	match	that	world’s	true	incoherence.	
Sukenick	 and	 Federman	 soon	 coined	 the	 name	 “surfiction”	 for	 their	 kind	 of	
centrifugal	writing,	but	it	remained	tied	to	the	philosophy	called	postmodern	thanks	to	
the	 critics	who	 promoted	 both.	 Jerome	Klinkowitz,	 as	 Barry	Chabot	 notes,	 essentially	
took	on	Sukenick’s	terms	wholesale	in	his	critical	advocacy	of	this	“New	Fiction”:	“a	lack	
of	a	priori	structures	can	show	the	world	in	its	own	madness…”	such	fiction	is	“honest,	
organic	to	the	materials	of…	study,	and	reveals	the	ultimate	truth	of	what’s	really	going	
on”	(26).	 	Klinkowitz’	title	Literary	Disruptions	 foregrounds	his	preference	for	negative	
rhetorics:	he	explicitly	prefers	the	surfictionists	to	writers	like	Barth	or	Pynchon	who	he	
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faults	for	retaining	constructive	philosophical	interests.	Yet	even	Larry	McCaffery,	anti-
mimetic	fiction’s	other	mid-70s	booster-critic,	and	more	sympathetic	to	Barth	or	Gass,	
shares	Klinkowitz’s	vocabulary	when	 it	 comes	 to	 identifying	what	 such	 fiction	 is	good	
for:	fictions	with	“reflexive	methods”	necessarily	“abandon	the	attempt	to	deal	with	the	
world	 outside	 of	 literature”	 (263),	 and	 hence	 have	 a	 rhetoric	 entirely	 “radical	 and	
disruptive”	(18).		
Gerald	Graff,	 the	 earliest	 book-length	 sceptic	 of	 such	 approaches,	 rightly	 notes	
that	anything	that	disavows	 interest	 in	 “the	world	outside	 literature”	will	have	trouble	
“disrupting”	anything	very	specific.	He	gives	a	persuasive	historical	explanation	for	why	
this	schtick	might	appeal	 to	 institutionally	comfortable	professors	who	came	of	age	 in	
the	 civil	 rights	 era:	 “As	 the	 political	 radicalism	 of	 the	 sixties	 has	 waned,	 cultural	
radicalism	 has	 gorwn	 proportionately	 in	 influence…	 a	 style	 of	 thinking,	 a	 pattern	 of	
typical	 oppositions	 and	 identifications	 whose	 rationale	 is	 often	 unformulated”	 (63).	
Along	similar	 lines,	Thomas	Schaub	later	argues,	 in	terms	of	paralysis,	 that	the	retreat	
into	 artistic	 “disruption”	 served	 as	 a	 distraction	 from	 a	 pressing	 awareness	 of	 the	
paralyzed	possibilities	 for	 political	 dissent	 in	 the	 post-60s	 era,	 treating	 that	 retreat	 as	
alogical	truth	about	language:	“The	divorce	between	politics	and	literature	appears	here	
most	 forcefully	 as	 a	 divorce	 of	 idea	 and	 action,	 language	 and	 experience”	 (76).	 The	
disconnection	that	Klinkowitz	or	McCaffery	had	made	the	basis	of	radical	action	hence	
appears	as	rationalization:	as	Graff	puts	 it,	 fiction	with	a	Sukenick-style	selfconception	
merely	 reflected	 that	 “we	have	begun	 to	 resign	ourselves	 to	 this	kind	of	world	 and	 to	
learn	how	to	describe	this	resignation	as	a	form	of	heroism”	(62).	This	refutation	of	the	
early	 boosterism	 crucially	 maintains	 exactly	 the	 non-inevitable	 limitations	 of	 the	
heroism-narrative	 it	 attacks.	Graff’s	 solution	 to	 the	hermetic,	 simplisticly	 anti-rational	
justification	the	surfictionists	give	for	any	and	all	departures	from	realist	expectation	is	a	
simple	return	to	realism,	an	abandonment	of	anti-mimesis	on	the	presumption	that	 it	
necessarily	forsakes	the	world	and	rejects	the	rational	perspective	necessary	for	worldly	
critique.	
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As	 the	 first	wave	 of	 postmodern	 fiction	 and	 even	 the	 subsequent	 surfictionists	
stopped	 being	 so	 readily	 identifiable	 with	 “contemporary	 literature”	 or	 “the	 New	
Fiction,”	 Graff’s	 and	 Schaub’s	 combined	 skepticism	 of	 its	 capacities	 and	 motives	
established	its	role	for	criticism	of	the	generations	that	succeeded	it.	In	the	narrative	I’ve	
called	 B1	 above,	 the	 thoroughly	 white-male	 canon	 established	 by	 early	 promoters	 of	
anti-cosmic	fiction	reflects	the	willful	disengagement	from	the	world	beyond	fiction	that	
those	promoters	had	made	the	condition	of	its	claims	to	radicalism.		It	was	thus	ripe	for	
supercession	 by	 a	 literature	 that	 would	 engage	 with	 the	 world,	 a	 shift	 that	 critics	
understood	in	demographic	terms.	Patricia	Waugh,	for	example,	demonstrated	that	the	
anti-subjective	 tendency	 that	 1980s	 postmodern	 theory	 celebrated	 in	 experimental	
fiction	was	a	distinctly	male	privilege:	women’s	experimental	fiction	of	the	era	dwelt	less	
on	 dissolution,	 she	 suggested,	 since	 “Those	 excluded	 from	 or	 marginalized	 by	 the	
dominant	 culture…	may	never	have	experienced	a	 sense	of	 full	 subjectivity	 in	 the	 first	
place.	They	may	never	have	 identified	with	that	stable	presence	mediated	through	the	
naturalizing	conditions	of	fictional	tradition”	(2).		Philip	Brian	Harper,	meanwhile,	used	
historical	 comparisons	 to	 showed	how	 the	alienation	effects	prized	as	 insight	by	early	
critics	 actually	 had	 their	 roots	 in	 fiction	 by	 marginalized-identity	 authors	 of	 earlier	
generations.	 	Waugh	and	Harper	both	usefully	suggest	that	anti-mimetic	fiction	didn’t	
have	to	be	disconnected	from	pressing	worldly	questions.	Indeed,	Waugh’s	descriptions	
of	the	workings	of	experimental	texts	by	women	can	sound	like	my	own	understandings	
of	 authors	 like	 Barth	 and	 McElroy:	 “What	 they	 do	 not	 reject	 is	 the	 necessity	 for	
assuming	a	self-concept	which	recognizes	the	possibility	of	human	agency,	the	need	for	
personal	 history,	 self-reflexiveness,	 and	 the	 capacity	 for	 effective	 action	 in	 the	world”	
(210).	Yet	for	both,	this	capacity	is	granted	only	by,	first,	a	move	back	toward	neocosmic	
versions	 of	 anti-mimesis,	 and	 secondly,	 by	 authorial	 identity.	 These	 two	 crucial	
contextualizations	of	 the	 limitations	of	 the	postmodern	canon	 thus	had	 less	 influence	
on	 accounts	 of	 how	 anti-mimesis	 could	 be	 constructive	 than	 on	 the	 subsequently	
development	of	what	Sue	J	Kim	calls	“Otherness	Postmodernism”:	the	idea	that	identical	
departures	 from	 realist	 convention	 have	 constructive	 or	 merely	 negative	 capacities	
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based	 entirely	 on	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 author,	 so	 that	 “experimental	 texts	 by	minority	
and/or	female	writers	[necessarily]	constitute	political	resistance	by	contravening	realist	
narrative	forms”	(4).	When	Kim	has	to	ask,	“why,	in	one	essay	and	book	after	another,	
does	just	the	fact	of	recognizing	this	basic	nonfoundationalism	become	a	means	toward	
liberation?	And	why	does	the	reverse…	immediately	become	politically	reactionary?”	(8),	
she	suggests	that	identity	differences	don’t	explain	rhetorical	capacities,	and	reveals	just	
how	little	progress	Graff,	Waugh,	or	Harper	have	helped	us	achieve	in	overall	accounts	
of	what	specific	arguments	specific	anti-mimetic	forms	can	generate,	and	how.	
Tendency	B2,	meanwhile,	 conflates	 the	 Barth-McElroy	 and	 Sukenick-Federman	
versions	of	 antimimetic	 fiction	 to	 set	 them	up	as	 a	point	of	departure	by	which	more	
recent	 fiction	 can	 take	 credit	 for	 ethical	 engagement.	 	 This	 tendency,	 based	 almost	
exclusively	 on	 what	 one	 might	 call	 David	 Foster	Wallace’s	 autohagiography,	 is	 most	
clearly	expressed	in	the	interest	in	what	Adam	Kelly	calls	“The	New	Sincerity”	in	post-
Wallace	 fiction.	The	necessary	 part	 of	 the	 old	 insincerity	 is	 played	by	 first-generation	
postmodernists,	in	the	guise	assigned	them	by	Wallace’s	mid-career	manifesto	essay	on	
the	 relationship	between	 then-contemporary	 fiction	 and	mid-90s	TV,	which	he	 found	
“about	 ironic	 self-reference	 like	 no	 previous	 species	 of	 postmodern	 art	 could	 have	
dreamed	of”	(159).	On	this	model,	self-reference	was	an	end	in	itself,	one	that	Wallace’s	
predecessors,	on	his	account,	put	in	the	service	of	a	negative	rhetoric	of	pure	irony	and	
negation:	 “Burroughs’	 icky	 explorations	 of	 American	 narcotics	 exploded	 hypocrisy;	
Gaddis’	 exposure	 of	 abstract	 capital	 as	 dehumanizing	 exploded	 hypocrisy;	 Coover’s	
repulsive	 political	 farces	 exploded	 hypocrisy”	 (183).	 Postmodernism,	 on	 this	 account,	
promoted	 “a	 transition	 from	 art’s	 being	 a	 creative	 instantiation	 of	 real	 values	 to	 art’s	
being	 a	 creative	 instantiation	 of	 deviance	 from	 bogus	 values”	 (178).	 Wallace	 then	
recycles	Graff’s	basic	criticism	of	the	blanket	valuation	of	deviance:	“irony,	entertaining	
as	 it	 is,	 serves	 an	 exclusively	negative	 function.	 It’s	 critical	 and	destructive,	 a	 ground-
clearing.	 Surely	 this	 is	 the	 way	 our	 postmodern	 fathers	 saw	 it.	 But	 irony’s	 singularly	
unuseful	when	it	comes	to	constructing	anything	to	replace	the	hypocrisies	it	debunks”	
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(183).	Wallace’s	“surely”	lets	him	ground	his	own	exagerratedly	tentative	departure	from	
the	certainties	of	now-mainstream	cynicism:		
The	next	real	literary	‘rebels’	in	this	country	might	well	emerge	as	some	weird	
bunch	of	‘anti-rebels,’	born	oglers	who	dare	to	back	away	from	ironic	watching,	
who	have	the	childish	gall	actually	to	endorse	single-entendre	values.	Who	treat	
old	untrendy	human	troubles	and	emotions	in	U.S.	life	with	reverence	and	
conviction.	Who	eschew	self-consciousness	and	fatigue.	(192-3).	
The	 conflation	 of	 “self-consciousness”	 and	 unproductive,	 cynical	 “fatigue”	 somewhat	
belies	the	route	that	Wallace	himself	took	in	attempting	to	move	beyond	the	détente	he	
had	identified.	The	“Sincerity”	that	critics	like	Kelly	credit	Wallace	with	single-handedly	
restoring	to	experimental	US	fiction	takes	the	form,	in	Wallaces’	own	fiction,	of	a	kind	of	
meta-metafiction	 whose	 hesitant	 rhythms	 and	 contrite	 self-reflexivity	 embody	 the	
author’s	own	uncertainty	about	how	a	fiction	aware	of	its	own	post-postmodernity	can	
“treat	 old	 untrendy	 human	 troubles	 and	 emotions”	 without	 downplaying	 that	
awareness.	 New	 Sincerity	 readers	 like	Mary	Holland	 see	 in	 this	 a	 formal	 rehearsal	 of	
authorial	straining	for	connection	with	individual	readers	that	creates	an	unprecedently	
direct	 ethical	 relationship.	 The	 text	 becomes	 less	 a	 communication	 than	 an	 occasion:	
“we	can	come	together	in	ways	that	build	relationship	and	community	rather	than	the	
alienation	and	solipsism	of	antihumanistic	postmodern	literature”	(6).	
This	is	useful	insofar	as	it	suggests	explicitly	that	anti-mimesis	doesn’t	have	to	be	
the	 blanket	 negativity	 Wallace	 defined	 himself	 against.	 But	 the	 criticism	 shares	
Wallace’s	own	limits.	It	relies	on	an	equation	of	postmodernism	and	poststructuralism	
as	 jointly	 superceded	 modes—for	 Holland,	 pre-Wallace	 postmodernism’s	 gestures	 at	
uncynical	 action	 are	 doomed	 by	 coming	 “from	 within	 poststructuralism	 itself”	 (3);	 it	
ignores	the	centuries-long	prehistory	of	anti-mimetic	fiction	to	build	a	reverse-lapsarian	
narrative	 of	 thirty	 years;	 it	 relies	 as	 heavily	 on	 Wallace’s	 own	 self-descriptions	 as	
Klinkowitz	had	on	Sukenick’s;	and	it	treats	“solutions”	to	postmodernism’s	antihumanist	
problems	as	 available	only	 through	Wallace-enlightened	meta-metafiction	 rather	 than	
within	 the	 terms	of	 anti-mimesis	per	 se.	 Strangely,	 though,	 this	 criticism	 immediately	
departs	 from	 Wallace’s	 practice	 by	 framing	 recent	 fiction’s	 enlightened	 engagement	
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with	 worldly	matters	 in	 terms	 of	moves	 back	 toward	mimesis.	 Nicoline	 Timmer	 sees	
post-Wallace	fiction	re-engeaging	with	questions	of	engagement	and	shared	feeling	by	
working	out	new	ways	 to	present	 characters	 as	 real	 human	peers	 of	 their	 readers;	 for	
Irmtraud	 Huber,	 the	 major	 lesson	 postmodern	 antimimesis	 taught	 us	 is	 that	 “If	 all	
narrative	acts	are	contingent,	the	choice	of	mimetic	realism	at	the	end	of	the	day	is	just	
as	valid	as	any	anti-illusionist	metafictional	disruption:	it’s	just	a	different	kind	of	game	
to	 play”	 (26);	 while	 Josh	 Toth,	 one	 of	 contemporary-literature-study’s	 rare	
poststructuralist	 true-believers,	 offers	 an	 ingenious	 account	 of	 why	 returns	 to	 realist	
form	 bring	 poststructuralism	 back	 into	 critical	 relevance.	 Postmodern	 fiction	 and	
poststructuralism	were	 too	 straightforwardly	 identical,	 Toth	 suggests,	 so	 that	 it	 takes	
the	shift	back	to	realism,	with	a	permanent	awareness	of	its	un-naturalness,	to	bring	the	
urgent	 questions	 and	 affects	 of	 poststructuralist	 thought	 back	 into	 literary	 relevance:	
“the	 shift	 away	 from	 postmodern	metafiction	 is	 marked	 by	 a	 pronounced	 realization	
that	faith	in,	or	a	gamble	on,	the	possibility	of	absolute	certainty	must	necessarily	haunt	
any	 claims	 or	 narrative	 act,	 even	 the	 claim	 that	 such	 faith	 is	 a	 dangerous	 ideological	
illusion”	(106).	In	all	these	accounts,	then,	anti-mimesis	takes	on	a	dual	role,	as	the	dead	
end	 from	which	 literature	 has	 happily	 escaped,	 but	 also	 as	 the	 permanently	 hovering	
mark	of	having	been	there	which	gives	literature	its	newly	dashing	glow.		
There’s	 little	 place	 in	 this	 narrative	 for	 any	Wallace-type	 doubling	 down	 into	
meta-metafiction,	 beyond	 his	 own,	 and	 even	 less	 for	 straight	 anti-mimesis	 having	
unexplored	resources.	This	suggests	that	his	project	of	establishing	a	viably	constructive	
anti-mimesis	on	a	repudiation	of	metafiction	as	intrinsically	cynical	leaves	his	approach	
supervenient	on	 the	original	 and	hence	 itself	 constrained	 to	 a	 single	blanket	 rhetoric.	
“New	Sincerity,”	then,	despite	taking	all	 its	cues	from	an	author	obsessed	with	turning	
anti-mimesis	into	constructive	rhetoric,	perpetuates	the	axiom	of	mono-rhetorical	anti-
mimesis	as	thoroughly	as	Otherness	Postmodernism.	
A	 very	 small	 group	 of	 texts	 make	 up	 tendency	 C,	 which	 deliberately	 take	 up	
rereadings	of	the	era’s	fiction	from	a	formal	perspective.	These	texts	all	have	something	
to	 contribute	 to	 anyone	 interested	 in	 my	 own	 project,	 but	 they	 nevertheless	 tend,	
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almost	exclusively,	to	argue	that	the	upshots	of	the	formal	tendencies	they	identify	are	
discombobulating,	 pre-discursive,	 and	 comprehensible	 more	 in	 the	 old	 terms	 of	
“disruption”	than	of	precise	“argument.”	The	exception	to	the	latter	tendency	is	Richard	
Walsh’s	explicit	stipulation	that	the	era’s	fiction	“does	not	abandon	the	conventions	of	
realist	representation	out	of	adolescent	posturing,	glib	nihilism	or	sheer	frivolity,	but	the	
better	 to	 pursue	 something	 else:	 an	 argument”	 (42).	 	 As	 he	 stresses	 “the	 capacity	 for	
innovative	 fiction	 to	 offer	 formally	 sophisticated	 means	 of	 confronting	 substantial	
social,	political	and	cultural	themes”	(24),	Walsh	is	probably	my	most	direct	forerunner,	
but	 in	practice,	his	 readings	 tend	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	novels	 in	question	 firstly	hew	 to	
arguments	 that	 equate	 real	 life	 with	 fiction,	 and	 secondly	 that	 merely	 articulate	
problems	rather	than	starting	from	them	and	moving	toward	a	solution.	Those	familiar	
of	 postmodern	 criticism	 and	 theory	 don’t	 need	 to	 know	what	 novel	Walsh	 is	 talking	
about	to	be	able	to	mouth	along	with	his	paraphrase	of	its	upshot	as	“problematiz[ing	a]	
distinction…	 turning	 the	 reader’s	 affective	 implicative	 in	 the	 narrative	 to	 unsettling	
effect”	(109).	Affect	is	currently	literary	study’s	ruling	anti-discursive	commitment,	and	
the	 core	 category	 of	 Alex	Houen’s	 account	 of	 the	 specifically	 political	 implications	 of	
experimental	US	 fiction	and	poetry	since	 1960.	 I	agree	that	 the	era	makes	a	great	case	
that	“literary	works	can…	whether	at	the	level	of	style	or	content…	extend	the	range	of	a	
person’s	 capacities	 for	 thinking	 and	 feeling”	 (12),	 but	 his	 readings	 make	 literary	
“thinking”	entirely	supervenient	on	“feeling”:	experimental	 fictions	are	valuable	 insofar	
as	 they	 can	 “generate	 novel	 compounds	 of	 feeling”	 (252).	 These,	 he	 suggests,	 can	
“potentiality	 bear[]	 on	 one’s	 other	 interactions	 in	 the	 world,	 as	 when	 planning	 or	
improvising	a	course	of	action	requires	imagination	in	weighing	up	various	possibilities	
of	comportment,	affect,	and	outcome”	(254).	But	again,	the	terms	of	“imagination”	and	
“thinking”	 are	 never	 argued	 for,	 presumed	 to	 follow	 from	 “feeling,”	 which	 remains	
figured	in	terms	of	surprise,	shock,	and	disruption	rather	than	anything	more	specific	to	
individual	constructions.		
Most	 recently,	 Christopher	 Breu	 takes	 another	 non-discursive	 approach,	
attempting	 to	 separate	 postmodernism	 whose	 concerns	 are	 limited	 to	 metafictional	
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navel-gazing	from	that	which	forms	“the	late-capitalist	literature	of	materiality	(25-6),	a	
tradition	he	identifies	with	the	legacy	of	William	Burroughs,	whose	models	of	language	
as	 runaway	 virus	 and	 self-consuming	 tissue	 require	 self-conscious	 experiments	 with	
form	 to	 think	 about	 what	 kinds	 of	material	 vectors	 they	 create.	 	 Yet	 from	 his	 neatly	
articulated	wish	to	trace	how	“text	continuously	shifts	from	the	language	of	realism	to	
the	antirealistic	language	of	the	real”	(42),	Breu	leads	us	to	a	familiar	anti-cognitivism:	
“fragmentation	 is	 valued	 over	 coherence	 and	 the	 rhetorical	 effect	 of	 obscenity	 and	
hyperbole	on	readers’	or	 listeners’	bodies	over	any	commitment	 to	representational	or	
conceptual	truth”	(43).	The	goal,	as	ever,	is	“to	disrupt	narrative	meaning”	(44)	with	the	
limited	 extra-textual	 upshot	 of	 “ideological	 demystification”	 (45).	 Breu	 usefully	 shows	
how	 often	 the	 authors	 of	 the	 era	 figure	 this	 in	 terms	 of	 analogy	 between	 language	
structures	 and	 the	 uncontrolled	 proliferation	 of	 flesh,	 but	 positive	 articulations	 are	
linked	only	 to	proliferation	and	the	exceeding	of	cognitive	categories.	Form-driven	re-
readings	of	postmodern	fiction’s	rhetoric,	then,	remain	tied	to	the	equation	between	the	
anti-mimetic	and	the	anti-rational.	
Finally,	tendency	D,	the	non-formal	re-readings.	I’ve	already	discussed	above	how	
Michael	LeMahieu’s	 archivally-driven	 rereading	of	 the	era’s	 fiction	 in	 terms	of	deleted	
passages	about	 logical	positivism	still	 ends	up	 leaving	antimimetic	 fiction	 to	 the	post-
structuralist	 equation,	 but	 most	 rereadings	 have	 been	 less	 interested	 in	 recovering	
compositional	 process	 than	 sociological	 context.	 Amy	 Hungerford,	 writing	 about	 the	
consequences	 of	 the	 final	 division	 between	 her	mid-2000s	 contemporary	 era	 and	 the	
texts	 through	 which	 “contemporary	 literature”	 was	 established	 as	 a	 viable	 object	 of	
study,	 notes	 that	 approaches	 to	 those	 earlier	 texts	 have	 taken	 a	 cultural-explanatory	
approach	 so	 pervasive	 that	 historicism	 is	 now	 just	 “the	 water	 we	 swim	 in”	 (“EFKAC”	
416).	 The	 last	 decade	 of	 re-readings	 of	 the	 novels	 I	 focus	 on	 in	 this	 project	 has	
consequently	 been	 less	 interested	 in	 challenging	 hoary	 accounts	 of	 their	 formal	
centrifuge	and	deconstructive	rhetoric	than	in	explaining	these	through	new	historical	
lenses.	 In	 the	 most	 persuasive	 of	 these	 accounts,	 Daniel	 Grausam	 shows	 that	 the	
preponderance	 of	 metafictive	 novels	 in	 this	 period	 that	 have	 open,	 multiple,	 or	
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unnarrated	 endings	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 era’s	worries	 about	 nuclear	
apocalypse.	After	all,	Grausam	points	out,	if	no-one	would	survive	the	bomb,	who	would	
be	 left	 to	narrate	 its	happening?	He	explains	a	pattern	of	 formal	 features	 in	a	 specific	
group	of	texts,	and,	most	usefully,	he	makes	that	explanation	consistent	not	only	with	
that	pattern	but	with	 the	metafictive	 impulse	underlying	 the	novels:	 they	have	 to	pay	
attention	 to	 logically	 impossible	 forms	 of	 narration,	 and	 so	 “a	 sustained	 attempt	 to	
answer	 the	 representational	 challenge	 posed	 by	 thermonuclear	 war,	 especially	 in	 the	
missile	 age,	 would	 have	 to	 take	 a	 metafictional	 form”	 (16).	 By	 demonstrating	 this	
connection	between	acknowledged	form	and	acknowledged	history,	he	even	manages	to	
make	a	fresh	case	for	the	non-hermetic	world-relation	of	the	era’s	metafiction.	Yet	what	
he	 doesn’t	 do,	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	 investigation,	 is	 tell	 us	 something	 new	 about	 the	
novels’	 form	and	 rhetoric	 themselves.	Open-endedness,	 self-reflexivity,	 indeterminacy,	
balanced	 ambiguities:	 Grausam	 takes	 his	 first-page	 cues	 from	 Derrida	 on	 nuclear	
endings,	 and	 painstakingly	 explains	 how	 an	 inherited	 pseudo-Derridean	 account	 of	
metafiction’s	 internal	workings	 can	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 certain	 historical	 events.	
The	 current	 historicist-water	 dynamics	 of	 rereading	 postmodern	 fiction,	 then,	 are	
unlikely	to	help	us	understand	how	a	novel	like	PLUS	puts	its	antimimesis	in	the	service	
of	 a	 constructive	 argument	 about	 how	 to	 build	 an	 agentive	 consciousness	 and	
recuperate	deliberation.	
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APPENDIX	B	–	Definitions	and	Vocabulary	Choices	About	Context	
	
Much	of	the	terminology	I	rely	on	throughout	this	project,	particularly	in	terms	
of	grouping	and	contextualizing	texts,	 is	controversial,	 specialized,	or	overdetermined.	
Take	postmodern,	for	example.	Exhaustive	debates	over	what	it	actually	meant	occupied	
much	 of	 the	 80s	 and	 90s	 without	 settling	 on	 a	 very	 clear	 answer;	 as	 I’ve	 already	
discussed,	 it	 refers	 to	 a	 generation	 of	 fiction-writers	 and	 to	 a	 generation	 of	 literary	
theory	 that	 I	want	 to	distinguish	 from	each	other;	within	 the	merely	 literary	sphere	 it	
still	leads	to	confusions	over	whether	it’s	a	description	of	formal	qualities	or	contextual	
origins;	those	80s	and	90s	debates	were	so	grindingly	unproductive	that	the	very	term	
prompts	an	anticipatory	sigh	of	tedium	from	many	people.	So	why	not	coin	a	new	term	
for	 the	 authors	 I	 address	 in	 order	 to	 save	 their	 study	 from	 that	 disinterest	 and	 the	
thousand	confusions	the	term	is	heir	to	for	both	specialists	and	outsiders?	There	are	two	
basic	reasons.	The	first	is	that	these	novels	are	the	product	of	a	conscious	move	beyond	
modernism:	they	proceed	from	the	“exhaustion”	of	 the	melioratively-realist	attempt	to	
come	closer	and	closer	to	representing,	and	immersing	readers	in,	the	real	structures	of	
mental	 experience	 through	 linear	 sentences.	 They’re	 also,	 for	 better	 or	 worse,	 known	
and	canonized	as	“postmodernism.”	This	underlies	my	second	reason	for	using	the	term,	
which,	 ironically	 enough,	 is	 as	 a	 merely	 disruptive	 or	 exploding	 gesture.	 I	 aim	 to	
disallow	two	putative	entailments:	that	there’s	an	equation	between	the	two	categories	
we	 currently	 call	 postmodern	 fiction	 and	 postmodern	 theory,	 and	 that	 “postmodern	
fiction”	 is	 a	 mere	 symptom	 of	 the	 cultural	 era	 of	 “postmodernity.”	 Referring	 to	 the	
fiction	by	another	name	would	leave	these	entailments	untouched	for	anyone	trained	to	
think	 “oh	yes,	postmodernism”	when	 they	heard	 the	names	Barth	or	Gaddis	 (and	vice	
versa).	Insofar	as	people	still	know	what	groupings	“postmodern	fiction”	or	“postmodern	
theory”	refer	to,	what’s	left	to	attack	are	the	logical	operators,	the	“=”	or	“->”	signs	that	
express	 the	 equation	 or	 the	 entailment.	 These	 I	 can	 best	 de-establish	 by	 precise	
descriptions	of	the	fiction	that	was	once	used	to	establish	them.	 	This,	 I	hope,	will	 re-
animate	 a	 term	 that	 has	 become	 both	 diffuse	 and	 sclerotic,	 allowing	 future	 critics	 to	
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grant	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 fiction’s	 range	of	 forms	and	 ideas	 and	 the	 cultural	
and	 philosophical	 contexts	 of	 its	 time	 without	 suggesting	 that	 the	 latter	 logically	
determines	the	former.		
Critics	 and	 philosophers	 like	 James	 Battersby,	 Charles	 Altieri,	 Alan	 Singer,	 or	
Paisley	 Livingston	 insist	 on	 the	 essential	 rationality	 of	 literary	 artworks	 as	
communicative	artefacts	of	composition,	and	their	isomorphic	relationship	to	matters	of	
rational	 worldly	 action.	 My	 account	 of	 the	 postmodern	 project	 novels’	 concern	 with	
viable	agency,	and	their	defiance	of	poststructuralist	attacks	on	that	viability	under	the	
umbrella	 of	 broader	 attacks	 on	 the	 category	 of	 reason,	 require	 clear	 definitions	 of	 a	
whole	set	of	related	terms:	rationality,	reason,	rationalization,	and	rationalism,	as	well	as	
of	 my	 central	 term	 deliberation,	 which	 I’ll	 often	 collocate	 with	 practicality	 and	
rationality.	
To	begin	with	deliberation,	 it’s	 relevant	 to	 the	novels	 I	examine	 in	 its	phronetic	
guise,	 insofar	 as	 it	 identifies	 the	weighing	 up	 of	 options	 towards	 a	 practical	 choice.	 I	
examine	this	mainly	regarding	mental	processes,	though	there	are	connections	between	
this	and	the	more	public,	vocal	contestation	and	negotiation	of	commitments	and	plans	
of	action	that	preoccupy	social-scientific	investigations	of	deliberation.	The	crux	of	this	
definition	is	that	deliberation	as	it	interests	the	novelists	in	question	is	inextricable	from	
the	intent	to	act.	This	sets	it	against	what	Derrida’s	later	work	makes	of	the	concept:	his	
account	 of	 the	 role	played	by	 the	undecidable	 in	 any	 act	 of	 decision	 first	 disconnects	
deliberation	 from	 true	 decision	 as	 contaminated	 by	 the	 presumptions	 of	
commensurability	 that	 he	 says	make	 any	 calculated	 decision	 the	mere	 operation	 of	 a	
rule,	and	then,	having	disconnected	it,	he	finds	a	value	for	it	separable	from	decision,	as	
the	enjoyment	of	weighing	considerations	from	many	angles	without	having	to	reduce	
them	to	commensurables.	Deliberation	as	I	refer	to	it,	by	contrast,	will	be	entirely	under	
the	rubric	of	making	practical	choices.	
When	 I	 talk	 about	 rational	 deliberation,	 it	 might	 seem	 like	 I	 run	 the	 risk	 of	
redundancy,	 since	 both	 terms	 involve	 the	 attribution	 and	 comparison	 of	 values.	 The	
particular	structure	I	have	in	mind	is	this:	rational	covers	the	initial	process	of	allocating	
	 235	
relative	 value	 to	 comparable	 entities	 or	 ends.	Deliberation	 then	 covers	 the	 process	 by	
which	 those	 values	 are	 weighed	 against	 each	 other	 in	 relation	 to	 plans	 of	 action,	 in	
situations	 marked	 by	 the	 passing	 of	 time,	 which	 should	 eventuate	 in	 an	 action	
susceptible	 to	 at	 least	 partial	 judgments	 of	 responsibility.	 Rational	 then	 takes	 on	 a	
secondary	relevance	 in	the	question	of	whether	the	deliberation	actually	hewed	to	the	
established	 values,	 ends,	 intentions,	 and	 criteria	 by	 which	 the	 deliberator	 took	
themselves	to	be	planning	and	acting:	the	counterpart	would	be	the	classical	concept	of	
akrasia,	or	failure	to	act	according	to	your	own	judgment.112	It	should	be	clear	from	this	
that	practical	first-person	deliberation	in	these	terms	makes	no	claim	to	the	sanctions	of	
a	 reason	 beyond	 the	 deliberator’s	 immediate	 investments.	 Derrida’s	 association	 of	 it	
with	rule-guaranteed	calculation,	though,	shows	how	thinkers	and	literary	critics	in	the	
postmodern-theory	 vein	 have	 tended	 to	 conflate	 all	 terms	 associated	 with	 the	
commensuration	of	 values	 into	 their	 attack	on	 rationalism.	 Rationalism,	 I’m	happy	 to	
agree	 with	 them,	 refers	 to	 any	 philosophy	 that	 operates	 on	 the	 conviction	 that	 by	
accurate	 enough	 value-assignment	 and	 logical	 deduction	 we	 could	 understand	 the	
world	and	act	infallibly	within	it.	It	presumes	that	at	heart	all	elements	of	the	universe	
can	be	reconciled	according	to	a	single	value	system.	Practical	deliberation,	though,	is	a	
matter	 of	 constrained	 timelines,	 imperfect	 information,	 and	 subjective	 valuation.	
There’s	a	contrast,	in	my	understanding	of	the	value-system	animating	the	generation	of	
novelists	in	question,	between	reason	and	rationality	on	the	one	hand,	and	rationalism	
and	rationalization	on	the	other.	They	advance	articulations	of	the	former	as	solutions	
to	problems	posed	to	and	caused	by	the	latter.		In	this	sense,	rationalization	can	refer	to	
rationalism’s	harmful	social	practices:	its	attempts	to	make	the	world	comprehensible	by	
manipulating	 its	 rough	 edges	 and	 incommensurabilities	 out	 of	 existence.	 In	 related,	
mental	terms,	 it’s	 the	bad-faith	process	of	bending	understandings	of	prior	events	and	
actions	to	a	desirable	pattern.	Against	this,	when	I	talk	of	rationality,	I’m	talking	about																																																									
112	Akrasia	was	a	 live	 issue	 in	US	philosophy	of	 the	postmodern	era,	and	among	the	challenges	posed	to	
deliberative	 agency	 that	 the	 authors	 I	 address	 responded	 to	 directly	 or	 indirectly.	 Like	many	 of	 those	
challenges,	it	was	thoroughly	engaged	in	the	novels	of	the	US	fin	de	siècle:	see	Wharton’s	House	of	Mirth	
in	particular.	For	the	central	texts	of	akrasia’s	revival	as	a	philosophical	concern	during	the	postmodern	
period,	see	Davidson.	
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the	present-tense	capacities	of	judging	better	or	worse	ends	and	better	or	worse	means	
to	pursue	them,	and	when	I	talk	of	reason,	I’m	talking	about	the	faculties	and	standards	
that	have	to	undergird	those	capacities.		
Beyond	 the	 critical-theoretical	 lineage	 that	 treats	 all	 of	 these	 terms	 as	 equally	
obnoxious	 because	 of	 their	 shared	 commitment	 to	 commensuration,	 there’s	 a	 further	
problem	in	using	rational	or	reason	 to	talk	about	 literature,	which	is	that	they	already	
have	more	specialized	uses	in	much	of	the	criticism	I’m	trying	to	dispute.		Defences	of	
literature’s	 rationality	 against	 an	 irrationalist	 foe	 have	 tended,	 first	 and	 most	
consistently,	 to	 motivate	 a	 return	 to	 naïve	 realism	 and	 a	 disinterest	 in	 literary	 self-
consciousness	that	maintains	the	equation	between	rational	and	mimetic,	anti-mimetic	
and	anti-rational	that	I’m	writing	against,	and	second,	to	treat	good	rational	literature	as	
entailing	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 political	 commitments.	 In	 the	 first	 case,	 see	 the	
comprehensive	 though	 tendentious	 genealogy	 of	 anti-rationalist	 thought	 that	 Lukács	
establishes	 as	 grounds	 for	 associating	 the	 rise	 of	 experimental	 fiction	with	 the	 rise	 of	
fascism	 in	 Destruction	 of	 Reason,	 or	 concerning	postmodernism	 in	particular	 the	way	
that	Graff’s	convincing	excoriation	of	the	post-structural	identification	of	literature	with	
unreason,	and	that	unreason	with	necessarily	effectual	radicalism,	then	fails	to	imagine	
any	 version	 of	 literature	 that	 could	 be	 both	 rational	 and	 non-mimetic.	 In	 the	 second	
case,	 the	 defence	 of	 literary	 reason	 has	 been	 put	 in	 the	 service	 of	 arguments	 about	
historical	inevitabilities,	from	Ben	Agger’s	Marxist	utopianism,	to	Lukács’	more	specific	
assertion	that	the	Reason	experimental	literature	has	deluded	everyone	away	from	is	the	
potential	 of	 1950s	 Stalinism	 to	 bring	 about	 a	 perfect	 world,	 to	 Richard	Wolin’s	 very	
different	conclusions	at	the	end	of	his	own	genealogy	of	contemporary	unreason,	which	
suggests	that	 its	worst	 legacy	 is	widespread	anti-Americanism	in	European	intellectual	
circles.	None	of	these	defences	of	reason	and	literary	rationality	express	much	interest	in	
contingent	 deliberative	 rationality	 at	 either	 the	 practical-individual	 or	 public-agon	
levels.	 Graff’s,	 Agger’s,	 Lukács’s,	Wolin’s,	 are	 not	 the	 versions	 of	 reason	 or	 rationality	
that	the	postmodern	project	novel	propounds,	and	I	use	the	terms	throughout	according	
to	the	priorities	of	the	fiction	rather	than	other	critics.	
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Finally,	 as	 my	 title	 suggests,	 I’m	 arguing	 that	 these	 novels	 recuperate	
deliberation.	By	this	I	just	mean	that	they	acknowledge	rather	than	denying	the	various	
challenges	 that	 their	 preceding	 century	had	posed	 to	 the	kind	of	 rational	 deliberative	
agency	I’ve	described,	and	then	go	about	establishing	warrants	for	 living	and	acting	in	
that	 challenged	world.	As	 the	distinctions	 I’ve	made	above	 should	 convey,	 I	 see	 them	
interested	 in	 rational	 agency	 at	 the	 practical	 decision-warranting	 level,	 from	 a	
contingent,	 deliberative	 perspective,	 but	 having	 no	 interest	 in	 either	 rehabilitating	
rationalization	 (private	or	public/infrastructural)	 from	 its	pejorative	 connotations,	nor	
in	restoring	faith	in	grand-narrative	reason.		They	acknowledge	the	challenges	of	a	world	
in	which	anti-foundationalist	ideas	have	become	uncontroversial	givens,	and	they	work	
within	 those	 terms.	 This	 philosophical	 structure	 is	 isomorphic	 with	 their	 stylistic	
innovations,	which	usually	work	out	a	new	way	to	epitomise	those	challenges,	and	then	
use	 modulations	 of	 style	 within	 the	 new	 format	 to	 convey	 the	 salvage	 of	 agentive	
warrants.	
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APPENDIX	C	–	Relevant	Antifoundational	Philosophies	
	
	
Since	the	majority	of	the	authors	I	examine	had	already	begun	publishing	before	
poststructuralism	arrived	in	the	US	with	Derrida’s	presentation	of	“Structure,	Sign,	and	
Play”	at	 Johns	Hopkins	 in	 1966,	and	since	their	recuperative	orientation	was	 in	almost	
every	case	apparent	within	their	first	two	novels,	the	most	relevant	antifoundationalisms	
are	existentialism	and	pragmatism.	While	the	latter	may	have	been	the	native	tradition,	
the	former	was	the	more	pervasive	in	the	intellectual	atmosphere	in	which	these	authors	
wrote.	 	 As	 George	 Cotkin	 and	 Jennifer	 Ratner-Rosenhagen	 have	 demonstrated,	 there	
had	been	significant	waves	of	interest	in	Kierkegaard	and	Nietzche	in	the	US	since	the	
end	of	the	first	world	war,	the	former	in	particular	exerting,	through	theological	circles,	
major	 influence	 on	 national	 politics.	 The	 end	 of	 the	 second	world	war	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	
similar	boom	in	interest	in	French	existentialism,	with	the	added	boon	of	the	celebrity	
philosophers’	 willingness	 to	 visit	 the	 US	 and	 promote	 themselves.	 Ideas	 about	 the	
ungroundedness	 of	 all	 decision,	 the	 incoherence	 of	 selves	without	 action,	 the	 leap	 of	
faith	 that	 constitutes	 self-determination,	 were	 briefly	 omnipresent.	 William	 Barrett’s	
introductory	 survey	 of	 existential	 thought,	 Irrational	 Man	 (1958)	 sold	 more	 than	 a	
million	copies,	while	the	existential	influence	is	obvious	in	successful	literary	novels	that	
end	with	the	hero	resolving	to	be	their	own	man	by	beginning	a	directionless	leaping	or	
running:	 the	 two	most	widely	 known	 today	 are	 probably	 Saul	 Bellow’s	Henderson	 the	
Rain	King	(1959)	and	John	Updike’s	Rabbit	Run	(1960).	Yet	these	novels’	male,	middle-
class	 settings	 reflect	 both	 the	 swift	 domestication	 of	 the	 ideas,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	
existentialism’s	starting-point	pessimism	and	dramatic	tendencies	made	it	a	strange	fit	
for	 a	 country	 increasingly	 characterized	 by	 widespread	 affluence	 and	 cultural	
homogeny.113	Existentialism	lost	its	distinctive	glamour	and	its	philosophical	singularity	
as	its	contentions	became	givens.	
																																																								
113	Abigail	 Cheever	 and	 Andrew	 Hoberek	 trace	 how	 US	 literature	 and	 culture	 of	 the	 era	 soon	 diffused	
worries	 about	 existential	 categories	 like	 authenticity	 and	 autonomy	 respectively	 into	 other	 realms	 and	
other	idioms,	becoming	the	terms	that	undergirded	discussions	of	clothes	and	career-paths.		
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It’s	 in	 this	 atmosphere	 that	 postmodern	 authors	 came	 to	 write:	 EL	 Doctorow	
recalls	how	 in	 1955,	 “When	 I	went	 to	college,	 the	existentialists	were	very	current	and	
important	 in	 college	 halls”	 (Bevilacqua	 129),	 but	 clarifies	 how	 unusual	 he	 was	 in	
remaining	interested	in	the	ideas	four	years	later.	William	Gaddis’	notes	towards	stories	
in	the	1940s	and	50s	stipulate	“(existential)”	whenever	they	mention	the	topics	of	choice	
or	decision,	but	by	the	70s	his	notes	on	the	same	topic	never	mention	the	word.	Barth’s	
The	 End	 of	 the	 Road	 engages	with	Camus	and	Sartre	at	 length,	 though	 their	 ideas	are	
mouthed	 by	 a	 quack	 doctor	 whose	 attempts	 to	 rouse	 the	 philosophically	 literate	
narrator	from	deliberative	paralysis	only	lead	him	to	do	harm.	The	postmodern	project	
novels	 move	 beyond	 existentialism’s	 answer	 to	 the	 how-to-act-without	 foundations	
question	in	a	number	of	ways.	They	depart	from	Sartre’s	insistence	that	literature	should	
be	 straightforwardly	 mimetic:	 his	 unwillingness	 to	 interrogate	 the	 foundations	 of	
literary	 rhetoric.	 Their	 preoccupation	 with	 agency	 in	 terms	 of	 long-duration	 projects	
sets	 them	 against	 the	 idea	 that	 agency	 and	 self-creating	 action	 can	 be	 located	 in	
directionless	one-offs	 like	 the	 leaping	and	running	at	 the	end	of	Henderson	or	Rabbit:	
Sartre’s	 idea	 of	 the	 “project”	 as	 the	 context	 in	which	men	 could	 find	 a	 source	 of	 self-
generating	action	had	explicitly	framed	that	action	in	terms	of	momentary	commitment.	
And	 they	 reject,	most	 fundamentally,	 the	 category	 in	which	 existentialism	 had	 found	
something	 like	 a	 foundational	 value	 to	 aspire	 to:	 authenticity.	The	 End	 of	 the	 Road’s	
narrator	sees	himself	 first	and	foremost	as	a	self	without	a	stable	character.	Pynchon’s	
unpublished	 late-50s	 operetta	Minstrel	 Island	 had	 featured	 a	 band	 of	 artists	 defining	
their	purity	against	the	colonizing	force	of	IBM:	within	five	years,	V.	was	arguing	for	the	
irrecoverability	of	an	era	when	humans	had	grounds	to	think	of	themselves	as	more	real	
than	robots.		
The	postmodern	project	novelists	examine	the	problems	of	acting	in	service	of	a	
project,	whereas	 existentialism	and	 its	 literature	had	prioritized	 the	 escape	 from	 such	
constraints,	 seeking	 ways	 to	 be	 free	 and	 authentic	 in	 isolation	 from	 longterm	 goals.	
These	failings	of	existentialism—its	literary	conservatism,	its	contentment	with	pseudo-
foundations,	 and	 its	 disinterest	 in	 long-duration	modes	 of	 being—were	 givens	 to	 this	
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generation	of	authors:	insofar	as	the	failings	were	failings	at	establishing	viable	agency-
conditions,	 the	 fiction	 should	be	understood	as	an	attempt	at	greater	adequacy	 to	 the	
challenges	of	its	time.	
As	 various	 critics	 have	 argued,	 poststructuralism	 too	 was	 a	 post-existential	
movement	 devoted	 to	 undermining	 two	 of	 the	 same	 problems:	 existentialism’s	
unsophisticated	 literalism	 about	 the	 instrumentality	 of	 language,	 and	 its	 tendentious	
way	of	making	the	emptiness	of	the	subject	a	path	to	reliable	authenticity.	The	shared	
concerns	 about	 the	 limitations	 of	 a	 preceding	 antifoundationalism	 and	 the	 temporal	
overlap	make	the	frequent	equation	of	postmodern	fiction	and	poststructuralist	theory	
understandable.	But	neither	in	terms	of	language	nor	of	subjectivity,	and	even	less	so	of	
the	 accounts	 of	 literary	 mechanics	 and	 agency-conditions	 that	 arise	 from	 these	
concerns,	are	they	at	all	compatible.	
When	 literary	 critics	 first	 linked	poststructuralism	and	postmodern	 fiction,	 the	
former	referred	almost	exclusively	to	Derrida’s	work,	with	an	occasional	nod	to	Barthes’	
work	on	 literary	conventionality	and	“The	Death	of	the	Author.”	Since	Barthes	had	no	
interest	 in	 connecting	 his	 literary	 linguistics	 to	 claims	 about	 practical	 agency,	 that	
connection	rests	almost	entirely	on	Derrida’s	generalization	of	the	structural	concept	of	
différance	into	the	realm	of	practical	reason.	In	structural	terms,	différance	is	a	“deferral”	
in	 the	 sense	 that	 insofar	 as	 the	 structures	 of	 social	 concepts	 are	 linguistic	 structures,	
they	have	no	transcendant	guarantees	of	stable	meaning,	and	so	are	subject	to	infinite	
substitutions	of	parts:	
the	 nature	 of	 the	 field--that	 is	 language,	 and	 a	 finite	 language--excludes	
totalisation.		 This	 field	 is	 in	 effect	 that	 of	play,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 a	 field	 of	 infinite	
substitutions	only	because	it	is	finite,	that	is	to	say,	because	instead	of	being	an	
inexhaustible	field,	as	in	the	classical	hypothesis,	instead	of	being	too	large,	there	
is	 something	 missing	 from	 it:	 a	 centre	 which	 arrests	 and	 grounds	 the	 play	 of	
substitutions.	(289).	
Insofar	as	“reason”	(or	“authenticity”)	is	one	such	social	concept,	Derrida	suggests,	this	
possibility	of	deferral	arises	whenever	we	might	attempt	to	use	“reason”	as	an	arresting	
centre,	 as	 in	 matters	 of	 decision.	 Consequently,	 what	 is	 true	 in	 terms	 of	 resolving	
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structural	contradictions	is	true	in	terms	of	practical	agency:	“I	do	not	believe	that	today	
there	is	any	question	of	choosing…	we	are	in	a	region	(let	us	say,	provisionally,	a	region	
of	 historicity)	 where	 the	 category	 of	 choice	 seems	 particularly	 trivial”	 (293).	 Choices	
defer	themselves	to	the	extent	that	they	rely	on	any	stipulation	of	reason:	the	necessity	
of	 choice	 generates	 deliberative	 paralysis.	 Unlike	 a	 Wittgensteinian	 or	 Peircean	
approach	which	would	only	let	the	hestitations	of	doubt	arise	within	contexts	in	which	
other	assumptions	are	stable	enough	to	“arrest	and	ground”	the	doubt’s	local,	practical	
significance,	 Derrida	 suggests	 that	 any	 ungrounding	 of	 reason	 relinquishes	 from	
agentive	channeling:	his	conception	of	viable	human	action	thus	rests	not	on	directed	
choices,	but	on	“the	joyous	affirmation	of	the	play	of	the	world	and	of	the	innocence	of	
becoming,	the	affirmation	of	a	world	of	signs	without	fault,	without	truth,	and	without	
origin	which	is	offered	to	an	active	interpretation.	This	affirmation	then	determines	the	
noncenter	 otherwise	 than	 as	 loss	 of	 the	 center”	 (292).	 This,	 then,	 is	 the	 heart	 of	 the	
account	 of	 postmodern	 fiction	 that	 makes	 a	 virtue	 of	 deliberative	 paralysis	 by	
embodying	 a	 directionless	 realm	 of	 excessive	 profusions	 of	meaning	 that	 subordinate	
subjectivity	 to	 choiceless	 systemic	 drift,	 thus	 undermining	 the	 “realist”	 categories	 of	
sovereign	reason.		
There’s	a	missing	step	in	all	this,	which	is	any	demonstration	that	in	the	absence	
of	a	stably	grounded	endpoint	to	reason’s	definitional	regress	we	can’t	nevertheless	work	
with	provisional	definitions	or	make	provisional	choices.	 In	debate	with	Derrida,	 John	
Searle	made	precisely	this	point,	avoiding	the	more	obvious	examples	of	philosophical	
investigation	 of	 acting	 under	 conditions	 of	 uncertainty	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 same	
possibilities	 hold	 in	 terms	 of	 concept-structures.	 To	 his	 claim	 that	 philosophers	 and	
linguists	have	shown	that	“many,	perhaps	most,	concepts	do	not	have	sharp	boundaries”	
(103),	and	that	pragmatic	communication	nevertheless	goes	on,	Derrida	responds	with	
categorical	 refusal,	 “it	 is	 impossible	 or	 illegitimate	 to	 form	 a	 philosophical	 concept	
outside	 the	 logic	 of	 all	 or	 nothing”	 (qtd	 Searle	 103).	 	 In	 this	 respect,	 deconstruction	
operates	 on	 a	 conventionally	 rationalistic	 metaphysics,	 lacking	 only	 the	 rationalist’s	
faith	 in	 its	 practical	 viability.	 John	 Ellis	 has	 suggested	 that	 deconstruction’s	 claim	 to	
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dissolve	 the	 dubious	 binaries	 on	 which	 rationalist	 thinking	 proceeds	 “often	 seems	 to	
break	down,”	in	practice,	into	“a	strong	tilt	toward	the	polar	opposite	of	the	naïve	belief	
from	 which	 the	 argument	 begins”	 (139).	 Within	 the	 framework	 of	 “philosophical	
concepts,”	 Derrida’s	 own	 binary	 “all	 or	 nothing”	 presumes	 the	 rationalist	 all,	 and	
différance	 leads	us	 to	 require	 a	 “nothing.”	Rationalism’s	 operating	binary	 continues	 to	
dictate.	Unable	to	transcend	this	central	binary,	deconstruction,	even	in	its	affirmative	
guise,	 remains	 an	 antifoundationalism	 rather	 than	 a	 postfoundationalism.	 In	 the	
generalization	 of	 différance	 from	 conceptual	 to	 practical,	 the	 imperfectability	 of	
theoretical	 reason	 has	 to	 rule	 out	 practical	 reason.	 It’s	 this	 that	 I	 suggest	 the	
postmodern	project	novels	dispute.	So	what	antifoundational	heritage	can	they	lay	claim	
to	in	their	interest	in	constructive	contingent	agency?	
Derrida’s	 affirmative	 version	 of	 unfounded	 living	 sells	 its	 appeal	 in	 terms	 of	
getting	to	live	“without	fault.”	Tobin	Siebers’	historical	explanation	for	the	popularity	of	
sceptical	orthodoxies	 in	 literary-theoretical	 circles	notes	 that,	growing	out	of	cold	war	
worries	 about	 credulity	 in	 the	 face	 of	 power	 and	 charisma,	 critics	 adopted	 sceptical	
philosophies	 like	 deconstruction	 because	 “Believing	 in	 nothing	 is	 thought	 to	 be	more	
ethical	 than	 believing	 in	 something	 because	 belief,	 according	 to	 coldwar	 sceptics,	
usually	leads	directly	to	confrontation	on	the	battlefield”	(82).		Siebers’	language	echoes	
that	 of	 William	 James’	 disagreement	 with	 WK	 Clifford’s	 idea	 that	 “it	 is	 wrong,	
everywhere,	and	for	anyone,	to	believe	anything	upon	insufficient	evidence”	(WTB	227).	
James	 anticipatorily	 vindicates	 Siebers’	 argument	 in	 turn	 by	 his	 insistence	 that	
scepticism	is	a	matter	of	will	and	convenience:	“’Do	not	decide,	but	leave	the	question	
open,’	is	itself	a	passional	decision—just	like	deciding	yes	or	no—and	its	attended	with	
the	 same	 risk	of	 losing	 the	 truth”	 (WTB	229).	The	anti-deconstructive	 terms	of	 critics	
like	Graff,	Siebers,	Searle,	and	Ellis,	 stem	from	awareness	of	 logical	paralysis’	potential	
affective	rewards,	the	short	path	it	offers	to	revelling	in	exculpation	from	urgent	worldly	
commitments,	 or	 from	 the	 possibility	 of	 error	 or	 fault	 in	 action.	 In	 this	 worry,	 they	
constantly	 echo	 early	 US	 pragmatism,	 from	 James’	 implications	 of	 Clifford’s	 logic-
blinded	epistemic	cowardice—“Scepticism,	then,	is	not	avoidance	of	option;	it	is	option	
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of	 a	 certain	 particular	 kind	 of	 risk”	 (WTB	 241)—to	 Charles	 Peirce’s	 mockery	 of	 the	
aversion	 to	 correction:	 “Let	 all	 possible	 causes	 of	 a	 change	 of	mind	 be	 removed	 from	
men’s	apprehensions”	(FOB	117).	As	I’ll	show,	the	authors	of	postmodern	project	fictions	
share	 this	 distaste	 for	 using	 programmatic	 skepticism	 as	 a	 pre-emptive	 ward	 against	
discomfort.	
What,	then,	do	the	novels	have	in	common	with	US	pragmatism	that	they	don’t	
with	 poststructuralism,	 apart	 from	 an	 anticipatory	 hostility	 to	 poststructuralism’s	
blanket	 celebration	 of	 deliberative	 paralysis?	 Pragmatism	may	 be	 the	 oldest	 of	 these	
antifoundationalisms,	but	it	is	the	one	whose	negative	gestures	are	most	tightly	bound	
into	 the	 attempt	 to	 generate	 defensible	 new	warrants.	 The	 central	 difference	 in	 every	
sphere	 from	 agency	 to	 practical	 politics	 is	 that	 pragmatism	 takes	 impetus	 from	 the	
absence	 of	 certainty	 where	 for	 deconstruction	 it	 is	 necessarily	 paralyzing.	 For	 Peirce,	
doubt	“stimulates	us	to	action	until	it	is	destroyed”	(FOB	114):	like	Kierkegaard,	the	early	
pragmatists	keep	and	cultivate	doubt	precisely	as	the	ground	of	the	possibility	of	action.	
For	James,	the	feeling	of	contingency	and	the	possibility	of	regret	are	desirable	in	and	of	
themselves,	 and	 can	 only	 be	 accessed	 through	making	 live	 practical	 decisions.	Doubt	
that	 precedes	 the	 context	 of	 such	 action	 can	 only	 be	 part	 of	 a	 programmatic,	
commitment-averse	scepticism:	“a	mere	self-deception…	A	person	may,	it	is	true,	in	the	
course	of	his	studies,	find	reason	to	doubt	what	he	began	by	believing;	but	in	that	case	
he	doubts	because	he	has	a	positive	reason	for	 it,	and	not	on	account	of	the	Cartesian	
maxim.	Let	us	not	pretend	to	doubt	in	philosophy	what	we	do	not	doubt	in	our	hearts”	
(SOME	CON	71).	Federman	justifies	his	fiction	in	those	programmatic	terms:	“Doubt	is	
indeed	the	term	that	best	explains	and	defines	postmodern	fiction.		Founded	on	doubt	
and	perpetuating	 itself	with	doubt,	 the	 fiction	written	 in	the	 1960s	and	1970s	not	only	
doubted	itself,	but	it	also	doubted	the	historical	and	cultural	conditions	in	which	it	was	
created”	 (117).	 The	 distinction	 between	 the	 Federman-Sukenick	 and	 the	 project-novel	
versions	of	postmodern	fiction,	then,	is	a	distinction	of	openness	to	uncertainty,	and	of	
attitudes	to	whether	doubt	can	establish	a	path	toward	better	knowledge.	
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It	was	Peirce’s	fallibilism—his	dual	commitment	to	the	ineliminable	possibility	of	
error	and	the	viability	of	holding	truth-claims	for	the	purposes	of	action—that	Richard	
Rorty	 jettisoned	 in	 his	 “neo-pragmatist”	 reconciliation	 of	 pragmatism	 with	 Derrida.	
While	Peirce	might	have	agreed	that	“For	the	pragmatists,	 the	pattern	of	all	 inquiry—
scientific	as	well	as	moral—is	deliberation	concerning	the	relative	attractions	of	various	
concrete	alternatives”	(PRI	640),	Rorty	evades	Peirce’s	commitment	to	identifying	ways	
to	resolve	deliberation:	like	Derrida,	he	suggests	that	any	such	determination	would	be	a	
culpable	capitulation	to	“rule”,	“the	common	urge	to	escape	the	vocabulary	and	practice	
of	 one’s	 own	 time	 and	 find	 something	 ahistoricial	 and	necessary	 to	 cling	onto”	 (642).	
This,	however,	ignores	the	potential-failure	part	of	fallibilism,	and	that	potential’s	active	
affective	 attraction	 for	 Peirce	 and	 James.	 Postmodern	 project	 fiction’s	 recuperative	
inclinations	 also	 lack	 this	 escapist	 inclination,	 precisely	 because	 they	 don’t	 deny	 the	
postfoundational	givens	of	their	culture,	but	work	within	their	terms.	This	can	only	be	
reconciled	with	the	long-term,	sequential	actions	that	add	up	to	a	project	if	we	believe	
that	 each	 action	 gives	 us	 information	 with	 which	 we	 can	 judge	 whether	 we	 have	
approached	 or	 diverged	 from	 our	 ends.	 Another	 aspect	 of	 pragmatism’s	
construstiveness,	therefore,	is	its	intrinsically	long-term	and	directional	orientation.	
Against	versions	of	scepticism	that	claim	to	know	in	advance	that	the	outcome	of	
investigation	will	be	unjustifiable,	and	hence	exempt	themselves	from	the	possibility	of	
“fault”	or	error,	and	anticipating	the	later	Rortian	hostility	to	“method,”	James	suggests	
that	“No	particular	results,	then,	so	far,	but	only	an	attitude	of	orientation,	is	what	the	
pragmatic	method	means”	(WPM	295).	“Orientation”	has	two	valences	here:	the	first	in	
terms	merely	of	the	fallbilistic	 attitude	with	which	we	begin	our	actions	and	inquiries,	
but	 the	second,	stemming	 from	fallibilism’s	 intrinsically	 long-term	epistemology,	 from	
the	idea	that	each	action	or	experiment	will	give	us	information	with	which	to	direct	the	
next.	 This	 is	 one	 of	 the	 ideas	 animating	 Peirce’s	 definition	 of	 truth	 as	 the	 eventual	
destination	 to	 which	 all	 investigations	 will	 converge:	 the	 definition	 of	 truth	 depends	
upon,	rather	than	preceding,	a	psychology	in	which	“thought	is	what	it	is,	only	by	virtue	
of	 its	 addressing	 a	 future	 thought	 which	 is	 in	 its	 value	 as	 thought	 identical	 with	 it,	
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though	 more	 developed”	 (Some	 Con	 103).	 By	 the	 same	 token,	 “In	 every	 case,	 the	
subsequent	thought	denotes	what	was	thought	in	the	previous	thought”	(Some	Con	84).	
Thought,	 to	 the	 degree	 that	 it	 is	 ever	 singular	 and	 separable,	 thus	 contains	 a	
presumption	of	its	future	development	in	the	processes	of	decision	and	action.	As	James	
puts	 it,	 “when	as	empiricists	we	give	up	the	doctrine	of	objective	certitude,	we	do	not	
thereby	give	up	the	quest	or	hope	of	truth	itself.	We	still	pin	our	faith	on	its	existence	
and	 still	 believe	 that	 we	 gain	 an	 ever	 better	 position	 towards	 it	 by	 systematically	
continuing	to	roll	up	experiences	and	think”	(WTB	233-4).	This	orientating	presumption	
of	development	makes	contingent	estimation	an	antidote	to	rationalism’s	commitment	
to	 the	 pre-decision	 certainty	 of	 “particular	 results.”	 Each	 choice	made	 provides	 in	 its	
outcomes	 further	 information	 with	 which	 to	 re-orientate	 oneself	 in	 relation	 to	 goals.	
Accounts	 of	 foundationless	 action	 not	 oriented	 to	 this	 sense	 of	 development—like	
Derrida’s	 famous	 (though	 tendentious)	 paraphrase	 of	 Kierkegaard	 “the	 instant	 of	
decision	 is	 madness,”	 or	 Rorty’s	 identification	 of	 “Pragmatism	 and	 Anti-
Authoritarianism”	 more	 committed	 to	 removing	 “rule”	 than	 to	 progress	 toward	
“truth”—thus	 tend	 to	prioritize	undirected	 “free	play”	or	delegitimation.	Siebers	notes	
how	 this	 logic	 underpinned	 literary-theoretical	 claims	 to	 radicalism	 in	 the	 cold	 war	
period—for	him,	fashionable	scepticism	“makes	a	virtue	of	thinking	otherwise	without	
thinking	 about	 the	 directions	 in	 which	 it	 may	 lead”	 (28)—and	 it	 underpins	 the	
uniformity	of	the	anti-mimesis=anti-rational	conflation:	the	only	direction	that	matters	
for	 removing	 power	 from	 hegemonic	 reason	 and	 narratives	 is	 “away,”	 and	 all	
antimimetic	forms	thus,	for	practical	purposes,	tend	in	an	identical	direction.	
The	 novels	 I	 examine	 downplay	 these	 single	 destabilizing	 moments,	 not	 least	
because	 the	 Derridean	 focus	 on	 the	 “instant”	 and	 the	 Rortian	 sense	 that	
antifoundationalism	 makes	 permanent,	 anti-authoritative	 reallocations	 of	 power	 lack	
any	 explanation	 of	 how	 we	 get	 from	 one	 to	 the	 other.	 What	 Lisi	 Schoenbach	 has	
suggested	 of	 pragmatism’s	 significance	 to	many	modernist	 authors	 is	 true	 too	 of	 the	
sympathies	I	see	between	it	and	postmodern	fiction:		
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Without	the	recontextualizing	component	of	social	change,	the	energies	of	shock	
dispense,	 leaving	mindless	 habits	 of	 thought	 essentially	 intact.	 	 The	 gradualist	
politics	 of	 pragmatism,	 seen	 in	 this	 light,	 appear	 less	 like	 accomodationist	
capitulations	to	existing	power	structures	and	more	like	a	refusal	to	take	empty,	
radical	posturing	as	a	substitute	for	meaningful	political	change	(8/9).	
This	notion	of	direction’s	preferability	to	one-off	radical	shock,	of	the	value	of	a	targeted	
reorganisation	that	gets	rid	of	what	doesn’t	work	in	a	given	context	and	replaces	it	with	
what	 might,	 is	 crucial	 to	 the	 longterm	 project-orientiation	 of	 the	 novels	 I	 examine.	
They’re	not	just	attempting	to	blow	minds	and	uncover	myths,	but	to	actually	warrant	
coherent	restructurings	of	the	way	we	deliberate,	and	ground	our	deliberations,	in	daily	
life.	This	orienting	establishment	of	contingent	values,	and	its	intrinsic	commitment	to	
self-correction	 according	 to	 external	 standards,	 is	 a	 fundamental	 element	 of	 early	
pragmatism	 that	 has	 been	 almost	 entirely	 written	 out	 of	 the	 uses	 that	 postmodern	
literary	theory	has	made	of	it.	It’s	this	that	I	aim	to	show	that	the	novels	in	this	project	
most	 emphasize	 in	 their	 engagement	 with	 the	 philosophical	 lineage	 of	
antifoundationalism.	
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